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■ 1. Homage to Visnu, the sole cause of the origin, 
subsistence and annihilation of the world, the sole cause 
of perfect bliss, for whom everything is as instantly 
evident 1 as a myrobala\$ in the hand. 

2. Those of my contemporaries who are pro¬ 
foundly dishonest and will condemn a penetrating 
treatise, however great its merits, because they are 
envious, (may condemn it.) There are many others, 
who have an excellent judgment of what is essential 
and what is not—honest students who do not cavil; 
and they will praise my work. 

3. Even erudite scholars may err when their 
critical acumen is dominated by partisan views ; yet, 
let the sagacious without envy study the Bhagavata 
doctrine as I shall present it here. 

4 . There are certain people whose minds are 
confused by the noise of multitudes of sophisms and 
falsehoods which are borrowed from anyone that 
comes : and claiming superiority for their own studies 
and learning, and pretending to protect the Way of the 
Veda, 2 they refuse to accept the authority of Paflcaratra 
Tantra which, being composed by the Supreme Per¬ 
son Himself, leads to unparalleled beatitude. 

And they contend : 

It has been decided that Verbal Testimony 3 is 
, a means of knowledge in two ways: dependent 

testimony which depends on other authority, 

, , and independent testimony. 

These two kinds are thus distinguished: 

< "No verbal assertion can be a means of valid 

knowledge if it has been formulated by a person 



for a verbal assertion to be authoritative, it must 
by definition be independent. 

That is to say: verbal evidence which originates 
from a person carries authority only then when it is 
used to corroborate a fact which has already been truly 
established by other means of knowledge, 4 and which 
enables the speaker to take this fact for granted. Now, 
Perception and the other means of knowledge which 
involve Perception, cannot produce the, knowledge 
that the Paficaratra Tantra does indeed set forth that 
the desired heaven, release and other supernatural ends 
can be attained by means of such ritual acts as Con¬ 
secration and such devotional acts as worship of the 
Bhagavan etc., for this relation of means and ends is 
not of the order of Perception, For if we consider 
Consecration, worship etc. merely with the aid of 
Perception, we cannot say that they are means to realize 
the summum bonum. 

Not only, therefore, is Perception of an ordinary 
kind unavailing, but there is also no way to know that 
there have been recently certain persons of superhuman 
sensibility who would have had perceptual evidence 
that such acts really are means of attaining the desired 
ends; for the sense-organs of such persons, too, cannot 
surpass the boundaries of sensitiveness as we know it 

5. An objection may be raised here: 

However, perception of a superior kind is 
possible, depending on its percipient. Perception, 
therefore, may become perfect if the percipient is 

That is to say: a finite thing may be found to 
become infinite; for instance, extent becomes infinite 

XOAilA PRXlifcjYASi 


in space, which is infinitely extended. Similarly, we 
find that finite Perception is considerably widened in 
air-borne creatures, like crows, owls, vultures etc., 
so that Perception might conceivably become infinite 
in some being. This indeed is the uppermost limit of 
knowledge where it encompasses every knowable thing; 
for we know from experience' that knowledges exceed 
one another as their contents exceed one another. 

That is why the wise can say that there is 
Someone in Whom such finite qualities as 
supremacy, dispassionateness, power etc. subsist in 
ah infinite and unequalled condition. 
Consequently, this Person whose immediate 
perception encompasses the entire range of things that 
are present in the world is hereby explained to be the 
Bhagavan who has immediate perceptual knowledge 
that Consecration, worship and so forth are dharma. 
So what remains unproved ? (is improper). 

6. This objection is thus refuted: 

The supreme perceptual knowledge which 
you assume is just a fancy. Perceptual knowledge 
can never go beyond its own sphere and trespass 
on another. 

For instance: 

A superior kind of visual perception, as well 
as a superior perceptible object, must necessarily 
* occur in loci where inherent relations of one kind, 
as between colour and coloured, obtain in one 

< No knowledge that is received through one of 
the senses can encompass all that is knowable 
through all senses. So how can perceptual 



knowledge by itself make all things known, i.e. 
/» J a lso things known only through *ther means of 
.knowledge ? 

' 7. The objector resumes: 

However, the sensitivity which we attribute 
to Perception is directed toward the perceiving of 
what exists at present . 

Of course, if Perception did not have this function 
of perceiving what exists at present as its natural 
function, it would cease to be Perception at all. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that a superior 
kind of Perception, defined as encompassingallobjects, 
is a priori impossible because it is limited to being 
Perception 1 

8. The objection is refuted: 

If from finite Perception you conclude to infinite 
Perception, then I ask you to explain: can a finite 
quantity ever attain to such expansion that it cannot be 
further expanded? You insist, as it were, on full 
maturity in a little boy 8 J ‘even as a boy, after attaining 
the full growth, cannot grow physically further?* 
There are two possibilities: either the infinite 
exists in the finite, or the finite gradually becomes 

The former cannot stand, for there is no 
Perception to support it: we have never seen a 
bowl or a similar finite object which had the same 
expansion as space. 

And suppose a finite quantity could assume 
inconceivable infinitude: why, then any single jar or 
pitcher could fill up the entire space within the Egg of 

Jcaim pjOuInvaji 


Brahma, so that all other things would be pushed out 
and perish accordingly! 

• If you take space itself as the subject,'you 
merely prove the proved.’ In the alternative you 
cannot avoid the illogicality we have pointed out: 
as a matter of fact, never before has anybody'seen 
a finite pillar which was pervaded by an infinite 
pillar l 3 Consequently, there remains the defect of 
mutual exclusion. 

Let us also consider your illustration, namely that 
in space we have an example of a finite extent 
becoming infinite. Extent is by definition a limited 
extension of space, a relative quantity, something that 
can be entirely circumscribed. Extent in this 
definition does not subsist in space as such, so how can 
you adduce it as an example ? Besides} if one were to 
infer extent in space, one would simultaneously infer 
the possibility that space might be surpassed in extent 
by another quantity. And so the illustration again 
falls short of the thesis. 

Nor is there any evidence for the thesis that a 
superior perception reveals that Consecration, worship 
etc. are actually dliarma. 

■To sum up: For all these reasons it would appear 
to us that the supposition that some, otherwise un- 
perceived, supreme spiritual being exists with a superior 
sensibility is very weak; and this being so, we conclude 
that Perception offers no authority for the postulated 
relation of means to ends 5 ; and since the authority of 
Paficaratra is based upon the Perception of this sup- 
posed relation, its authority is entirely non-existent. 


Xgajja prXmXjjyam 

9,i Not only is thereto Perception, but there 
cannot possibly be an Inference to support the thesis in 
question, .for it is wholly suprasensible: and Inference, 
of course, can only take place after an invariable con- 
comitance has been observed by means of Perception. 
If no fires have ever been observed before, they cannot 
prove that smoke is invariably concomitant with them. 1 * 
10. Nor do we find scriptural evidence which sets 
forth that the performance of all the, rites which are 
established in the Sitvata 11 doctrine is mandatory; such 
evidence would have proved that the Pancaratra 
Tradition, being based upon this mandate, 11 carried 

Nor is it possible, in the absence of explicit 
revelation, to infer such evidence from Scripture!. For 
just as the relation of means to‘certain ends which are 
their fruits, e.g., heaven, as Paflcaratra maintains 
Consecration, worship etc. to be, does not allow of 
being inferred because no such relation can be verified 
by Perception, just so no scriptural authority to furnish 
the basis of such a relation can be inferred from 
Scripture. ' • . r 

1 w Nor is any verbal testimony capable of 
providing valid knowledge that Scripture is the 
basis of the Tradition concerned. Verbal 
testimony is of two kinds, originating from a 
person or not originating from a person.** 

Personal speech cannot be proof of it, far 
persons may lie in order to deceive their hearers. 

For even today, we find philosophers who pretend 
to be scriptural and yet expound an interpretation 
which is wholly unscriptural. 


So we have our doubts whether the claim made 
by the authors of the Paficaratra texts that their own 
compositions are founded in the Veda is really the 
result of an honest conviction that such is indeed the 
case, or nothing but the self-glorification of authors 
who write as their fancy takes them J • I 

This argumentation by* itself'suffices to 
disprove the contended authorjty of Paficaratra, 
for there is no eternal Scripture 14 to support the 

Nor can Analogy prove that Scripture is its 
basis, for this criterion cannot be properly applied; 
for how could the proof we need, which cannot be 
found by the other means of knowledge, be within 
the scope of the mere knowledge of similitude ? 
Nor can it be argued that, since the Tradition 
cannot be proved by other means, Implication 13 proves 
that Scripture is its basis. The argument is as follows, 
circumstantial Implication must prove the tradition, 
as it cannot be proved otherwise; the authors of the 
Paficaratra, clearly have this tradition that Consecration, 
worship, etc. are dharma and this tradition is 
comparable to the tradition of Manu and others that 
certain non-Vedic rites, as the astaka etc., are dharma; 
now there can be no tradition of a fact unless that fact 
has been cognized before; but here we have the 
tradition of a fact that cannot be proved by Perception, 
Inference, Verbal Testimony or Analogy; therefore the 
cognition of the fact can only have originated from 
Scripture., . ' 

However, this argument would only prove , its < 
point if there were any authority for the assumption 


Aoama frAmAnyam 

of the three estates do not accept the doctrines of 
Traditions of this kind. 

13. Objection: 

Nevertheless, the fact that Bhagavata Brahmins, 
who wear the hair-tuft, the sacred thread etc. 
prescribed in Scripture, perform daily the rites of 
Paficaratra should then justify the presumption that 
these rites likewise ultimately derive from the Veda. 
On what grounds, then, are we to assume that this 
same Paficaratra Tradition really has its origins in 
error, deceit and the like, the very negation of valid 
authority ?. 

14. Refutation : 

We reply; Well! So you really argue that the 
Bhagavatas, who are hated by the three estates, are 
exemplary and hence authoritative ?! 


But they are Brahmins, and Brahmins are 
considered to be the highest estate: why should they 
not be exemplary ? 


Brahmins ? Far from it! We do not regard 
Brahmins as a distinct species, different from the 
species man, with specific characteristics which mere 
sensory perception permits us to recognize as present 
in some specific bodies and absent in others. Hair-tuft, 
sacred thread etc. which are prescribed for Brahmins 
and the other two estates, do not make a man a 
Brahmin ! Nor do they demonstrate that a man is 
a Brahmin, for we sec them worn illegally by 
blackguards, outcastcs and the like. Therefore, the 
sole criterion by which 'we can tell whether a man 

Agama prAuanyam 


is indeed a Brahmin is acceptance of undisputed 
expressions by older persons, which give us irrefutable 
proof. Nor do ordinary people, use without hesitation 
the term Brahmin to describe Bhagavatas. There is 
also a distinct difference in the two appellations: here 
Brahmins, there Bhagavatas. 

■ 15. Objection : , 

i The people do not use the word * Brahmin* to 
refer to Bhagavatas. The reference is only difference 
as this much Brahmins and this much Bhagavatas. Be 
that as it may, still, the appellations Satvata, Bhagavata 
etc. ’ are also used to name Brahmins, by some sort of 
transference of properties, just as the word parivrajaka 
is used to designate a Brahmin 10 . 

Refutation : The argument is false. 

Persons of certain inferior castes are commonly 
i referred to as Satvatas; the name is used to denote 
these castes, and not anything else. The gram¬ 
marians have the rule that it is improper to use a 
certain word in its etymological sense if it can also 
be taken in a customary sense which is more 
. common, e.g., rathakara **. 

If there were no such rule, how could the word 
rathakara give up its etymological meaning of “chariot- 
maker” to become the name of a particular caste, even 
to the extent of cancelling all connotations which we 
have learnt 22 ? Similarly, Satvata refers to a person who 
has been bom from a urfitya vaitfya and belongs to the 
lowest castes, and is thus excluded from the sacraments 
of initiation* 3 , etc. Manu says: “The issue of a 
vaifya vratya extraction is called Sudhanva or Bharusa 
or 'Nijaflgha or Maitra or Salvata 2 V* It cannot 


Xqama prawAnyam 

that cognitions are invariably true. But when certain 
notions which are produced by the false cognitions of 
people whose judgement is clouded by hatred, 
prejudice and obstinacy, cause such “traditions” to be 
written in accordance with these false cognitions, could 
these traditions possibly be true ? 

11. Here an objection may be raised: 

However, the same arguments may be advanced 
against the authority of the traditions of Manu etc. 
The observation of the astaka rite does not produce any 
perceptual knowledge that this rite is indeed a means 
to realize the postulated end. Nor can it be inferred, 
because no relation 1 * is perceptually given. Nor is there 
any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found. 
Nor again can such evidence be inferred from Scripture 
where it is not found explicitly, because no relation is 
perceptually given. Nor can it be proved, through 
Analogy, as there is no apparent analogue. Nor 
through circumstantial Implication, because of the 
reasons given above against the argument that it is 
otherwise unprovable. Now, if it is legitimate in one 
case to presume scriptural authority in support of it 
because there happens to be a well-established tradition 
about it among Vedic experts,—well, in Paflcaratra, 
too, great sages are traditionally Jcnotvn as the founders 
of the sacred transmission, sagas like Narada, Sagdilya 
and others. The same objections and the same justifi¬ 
cations can be advanced about both the tradition'of 
Manu etc. and the tradition of Paflcaratra. Either 
both arc authoritative or neither is. There ore no 
grounds to show that the two traditions differ in some 
essential respect. Either we must reject the authority 

Xqaiia prXu5nya<( 

of Manu’s tradition as well, or we must indeed shdwin 
which respect the Paficaratra tradition is different from 

• 12. This objection is refuted: 

, The author of the Sutras, by making the Sutra; 
“Tradition is also valid, because it has the same 
agent as Scripture’ 7 ”, has clearly indicated that in 
his opinion no essentia! difference exists between 
Scriptural and Traditional validity. 

Accordingly, we find that those who are qualified 
for the three Vedas perform equally for purposes of 
higher benefits both the ritual acts which are 
enjoined by Scripture (e.g., agnihotra, purnadariamasa, 
jyofistoma ;8 ,etc.) and the ritual acts enjoined by Tradi¬ 
tion (e.g., astakd ., dcamana , samdhya worship I9 , etc.), 
because they have been instructed in both varieties of 
acts by their fathers or preceptors. The firmness with 
which so highly qualified exemplary persons have 
adopted these traditional rites as incumbent upon the 
three higher estates goes to show that the knowledge 
that rites of this kind, astakd etc., obviously found to 
exist, are mandatory ultimately derives from Scripture 
itself. On the other hand, we find that those who observe 
the scriptural rites of agnihotra etc. do not observe the 
Tantric customs in the same manner as they observe 
such traditional customs as dcamana investiture with 
the sacred thread etc. On the contrary, the Vedic 
experts condemn those who do. It follows that the 
validity which we attribute to different Traditions 
“because”, as the Sutra says, “they have the same 
agent as Scripture”, cannot well, apply to heterodox 
Traditions as the Paficaratra; for exemplary exponents 


be disputed 'that Bhagavata is another name for 
Satvata; Smrti has it that "the fifth, called Satvata, 
worships the temples and sanctuaries of Visnu by royal 
decreehe is als* called Bhagavata.” 25 . 

1 ‘ , *'The 'Smrti, thus describes’which profession the 
descendants of the said vralya vaiSya pursue—and with 
our own eyes we indeed see them'pursue this profes¬ 
sion. ‘ Thus USanas: ‘’They all live bythe plough and 
the sword, the Acaryas and the Satvatas live on' the 
Worship of the Deity.” 26 Similarly, 1 in the Brahma 
Furana—“He.worships the sanctuaries ofi'Visnu’by 
royal decree.”- Elsewhere the .same is stated . thus: 
“The profession of the Satvatas is to clean up the 
sanctuaries of the Deity and the eatables offered to the 
idol, as well as to guard it.’ ,JT And, to dispel the last 
doubt about the sort of people they are, Manu declares: 
“Whether disguised or not, they can be known by their 
deeds.” ’ 

16.* Their conduct, moreover, proves that they 
cannot be Brahmins. For a living they perform puja 
to the Deity, undergo their Consecration, eat them¬ 
selves the Food which is offered to the idols*, observe 
deviating sacraments—from the prenatal garbhadhdna 
rite to the funerary rituals—, omit to perform the 
iratila ritual and avoid contact with Brahmins. These 
and other habits show conclusively that they cannot be 

Smrtis declare that the reason of their disqualifica¬ 
tion for Vedic rites is this that they perform puja to 
the Deity in order to earn a living: “Those who from 
generation to generation have worshipped the Deity 
professionally arc disqualified for the study of the Veda, 

Aoajia prAuA-VYAjS 


for participation in the sacrifices and for officiating 
in sacrifices.” 23 Their own Parama Sanihita states the 
same prohibition: “Whether in disaster or emergency, 
in terror or in straits, one must never worship the God 
of gods for a living.”* 3 Sucli habits as wearing the 
garlands that are ofiered to the God and 'eating the 
food that is presented to the idol and other practices 
of that kind, which are condemned by all right-think¬ 
ing people, shows plainly that they are not Brahminl 
Furthermore, we \vonder how it can be presumed 
that the authority of these people proves that Scripture 
is the basis of their way of life: at the mere sight 
of them all respectable men perforin expiatory 
rites such as canirayana 1 Smrti declares that if one sets 
eyes on a devalaka , it is necessary to perform an 
expiation. A devalaka is someone who lives on temple 
treasure and worships the idol for a livelihood. Thus 
Devala: “One who lives on temple treasurers called a 
devalaka.** 31 Likewise: “A Brahmin who has worshipped 
the deity for three years in order to make a living is 
called a devalaka and he is held to be unworthy to 
partake in any ritual.” 31 Those who have been known 
to worship the God as a hereditary profession are 
automatically regarded as devalakas. The rite of 
expiation is set forth in the precept: “A Brahmin who' 
is taking his meal should not look at ordure, a pig, a 
eunuch, a sacrificial pole, a devalaka or a corpse; if he 
does he must observe the candrayano.” 31 Atri, too, very 
explicitly declares that they are not Brahmins : “The 
Avalukas, Devalakas, Kalpadevalakas, Ganabhoga- 
devalakas and fourthly those of the Bhagavata profes¬ 
sion are corruptBrahmins.” 54 Also the venerable Vyasa: 



“The Ahvayakas, JDevalakas, .Naksatragramayajakas 
and Mabapathikas are outcaste Brahmins.”* 3 

Therefore, the fact that Paficaratra recognizes the 
authority of the Bhagavatas who by birth and by deeds 
have deviated from the Way of the Veda is sufficient 
ground to deny authority to the Pancaratra Scriptures. 

17. Furthermore,' the class of texts with which 
we are here concerned are not valid means of knowing 
which acts are good and which are evil inasmuch as 
they are accepted by heretics, and thus are of the same 
kind as the Buddhist statements on stupa worship. 

Besides, their own texts relate that the instruction 
in all their dharmas presupposes the abandoning of the 
Way of the Veda; “having failed to find the supreme 
good in the four Vedas, Sandilya learnt this doct¬ 
rine....”* 5 . But how can we presume that a certain text 
can teach that a certain object, which is known from 
the four Vedas, is man’s supreme goal in lire if he 
rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as 
sourfces of knowledge about the means which lead to 
bliss? On the contrary, we 6nd that Manu and other 
authors of Traditions declare that their works which 
expound as their teaching the means of attaining ail 
kinds of desirable ends derive solely from Scripture: 
“The Veda in its entirety is the basis of the Law, as 
well as of the traditions and customs of those who are 
expert in Law”; “the Law is enjoined by Scripture and 
Tradition”; “it is entirely expressed in the Veda; for 
the Veda contains all knowledge.” 

Further, the assertion that those who have already 
been consecrated by the sacraments of Investiture etc. 
and are thereby qualified for all the Vedic rituals, 



agnihotra etc., must yet undergo another sacrament, 
called Consecration, 57 in order to be qualified for the 
worship of the Bhagavan, demonstrates that the system 
is non-Vedic; for if it were Vedic, they would be 
qualified for Tantric ritual by the regular sacraments. 

Again, another indication of its non-Vedic 
character is the fact that the system is not included 
among the fourteen sources of knowledge, which all 
orthodox people recognize as giving authoritative 
information on the’Law.* 3 If it were authoritative, then 
it would have been recognized as such by tradition; 
but as it is not so recognized, this proves that the 
Paficaratra tradition is non-Vedic. For this reason the 
venerable Badarayapa, when he has occasion to refute 
the heterodox doctrines of Kanada, Aksapada, the 
Buddha etc. as inimical to the Way of the Veda, also 
refutes the Paficaratra in his Sutra: “Because of the 
impossibility of origin.” 55 Therefore, as the Vedic 
experts regard the Paficaratra doctrine as non-Vedic 
since it is not included among the Vedic systems and 
because of other reasons which will be advanced in the 
sequel, it cannot be compared with the Tradition of 
Manu etc. 

In view of all this it is our opinion that such 
infrequent good rites—e.g., the worship of the Bhagavan 
—which are described by the Paficaratricas (who teach 
a good many others, mostly black arts of exciting 
hatred, haunting a person out of his occupation, 
envoutement etc.) arc merely added to deceive people 
about their jreal attentions and do not deserve our faith 
or consideration: they are like milk that is put in a 
dog’s bladder I , . 



. ‘ To sum up, it is not proper to assume' that 
Paficaratra is based on the Veda and therefore equally 
authoritative as the doctrinal works of Manu ’ and 
others. < t 

r Discursus • ' r i ■ ' 1 . 

18. At this point someone interjects : 10 If you 
please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute 
the cause of the delegated and indirect authority of the 
Tradition of Manu etc. But is there any reason why 
we'should have to depend exclusively on the Veda as 
the bask of the Paficaratra tradition too ? The same 
direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the 
authority of the Vedas themselves is also the foundation 
of the authority of the Paficaratra doctrine; the 
authority of the latter is not based upon the relation 
of supporting authority and supported authority which 
characterizes typical smarla injunctions, e.g., as taka and 
acamana which have their common basis in the Veda. 

In fact, the two traditions of the astaka rite and 
the acamana ,rite are not interdependent, but, they 
are equally and independently authoritative. Similarly, 
Paficaratra and Scripture are not interdependent. If 
Paficaratra collapses as soon as it is denied the support 
of the Veda, why then should the Veda not collapse 
when the support of Paficaratra is taken away from it ? 

19. The Vedas derive their' authority from 
direct knowledge which originates form a person and 
must therefore naturally derive from a person.--’Who 
can doubt it ? For we perceive that words, from tlicir 
very nature, depend for their composition on some 
entity that is different from themselves. How else 



could they exist at all? If it is objected that the 
significance of the Book called Veda just consists in 
this that it does in fact exist as Word though nobody 
has composed it, then we reply; why, if this were true, 
then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists 
in this that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire ! 
It is utterly out of the question, 41 

20. Objection. But since the applicability * 2 of 
the dharma cannot be shown by any of the means of 
.knowledge, how can a book on it be composed ? 

> Reply. Don’t argue like that: for the Bhagavan 
who, of course, has an immediate intuition of dharma 
and adharma through the knowledge which is natural 
to Him has had this Book called Veda composed out of 
compassion for the world. 

21. Objection. But does this intuition or per¬ 
ception also encompass dharma and adharma ? 

Reply. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavan 
be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.? 
For the maker of such effects must be one who is 
capable of perceiving their material and instrumental 
causes. Now, dharma and adharma are the instrumental 
causes of the world 43 ; this is also the consensus of the 
Mimarhsakas. Consequently we must postulate a cer¬ 
tain person who has this perceptual knowledge; and 
that person must also be the one who created the Veda 
at the beginning. 

22. If one contends that such entities as 
mountains, earth and the like are not effects, the 
‘answer is as follows: 

The entities in question, earth etc., arc effects, 
because they have a complex construction, like a 
1 king’s palace. 44 




Similarly, from the fact that they are made 
up of parts we conclude that they are subject to 

Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed 
by someone who knows the means by which they 
can be destroyed, just as we can destroy clay vessels 
etc. when we know by what means t* destroy 

In the case of entities that are shattered, for 
instance, by a falling tree, that is without perceptible 
intelligent agency, the cause of their destruction 
remains dubious: but because of this very dubiety there 
can a/so be not positive certainty that the cause of 
their destruction is entirely occasional. 

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to 
infer in this world that an entity which has mass and 
can move is subject to origination and to destruction. 

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed 
effects, on the grounds adduced above, it follows that 
the Bhagavan has knowledge of dkarma and adkarma 
which are the instrumental causes of origination and 
annihilation. 45 

Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, 
mountains and the like, have been created by a maker 
who possesses the described knowledge. 

Everything that has origin and end is, in our 
experience, created by such a maker, just because it 13 
subject to origination and annihilation, like a house. 

23. Let it not be argued that there is no inter¬ 
mediate production of effects like body, world etc. 
between acts that bring about the desires of the person 
who undertakes them, 46 for these acts are unable to 

Aqama P rAmAN YA-M 

19 ’ 

produce anything unless they are used as an instrument 
by a spiritual being, since they are non-spiritual them¬ 
selves, like an adze,: without the operation of a 
spiritual being—the carpenter—an adze is incapable of 
effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole. 

And we are not able to create through the instru¬ 
mentality of aptlrva factors : 4T for before the actual 
fruition of the ritual act wc cannot know their instru¬ 
mentality, and it has been said that only a person who 
has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental 
causes can be a maker with respect to these causes/* And 
there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, 
to be capable of having the required actual knowledge 
of the apurva that is to arise from the act. 

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute 
omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the 
entire Universe with dkarma and adharma of all em¬ 
bodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc., 
and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted 
knowledge etc. subsist. As they say: “Theunobstructed 
knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a 
universal lord and dharroa are all four established 
together.”* 9 

Mantras, arthavadas, 60 epic and purana corroborate 
this point; e.g. “The one god, Prajapati, creating 
heaven and earth, created the Vedas,” 51 etc. At the 
moment of inception the great Grace of this Person 
who is the hhagavan is evoked by a glance at the 
aggregate of individual souls who are almost in a state 
of non-spiritual stupor, their instruments for the 
experiencing of karmic results—body, senses and other 
organs—being completely dissolved. His Grace evoked. 



he originates the entire universe and simultaneously 
He creates the triple Veda which states pcllucidly the 
means by which the souls in transmigration can realize 
the objects of their desires. Then again, perceiving 
that they arc in a pitiable condition, being immersed in 
the ocean of existence which is perturbed by wave upon 
wave of all manner of iniquities, His heart burns with 
supreme compassion and He promulgates, through 
Sanatkumara, Narada etc., the Paficaratra Samhitas 
which constitute the sources of knowledge about the 
manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to 
perfect bliss. Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore 
based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord and 
are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas, can they 
belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu 

Refutation . 61 

24. If this is true, then on what authority is such 
a creator of the Vedas known to exist? He is not 
directly perceived. 

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is 
word that it therefore must have an author, for that 
would entail the total reversion of your special 

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for 
its composition on the agency of some being is also 
perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied 

Now for all embodied beings the body is the 
instrument for good and for evil; so the assumption 
that the Veda is utterance would occasion the inference 
that it has been created by an embodied being whose 

Acjama prXmJnyajY 


"happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and 
-evil karman, and who therefore cannot be God. 

Moreover, in that case it would be impossible to 
establish the authority of the Vedas themselves; for if 
dharma —the Law—is not independent of other means 
of knowledge, there is no exclusive authority of the 
Vedas. 15 

25. Objection. But why should dharma be in¬ 
dependent of other means of knowledge? For we have 
asserted that He has actual knowledge of dharma and 
adharma : how else could He produce the world of 
which dharma and adharma are the instrumental causes? 

Reply. That has indeed been asserted, but the 
assertion is fallacious: for no creator of the entire uni¬ 
verse can be found of whom this can be assumed. 

To your argument that the world must be effected 
because it has a complex construction can be objected 
that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities: 

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g, 
pots and the like ; those which are not found to be 
made at all; 14 and those whose creation remained 
doubtful, like the earth etc. 

In the two first-mentioned cases there is no room 
for God’s activity. As to the third, the earth etc. are 
not involved in a total origination or disintegrations, 
“but merely, as now, subject ta varying degrees of 
increase and decrease which are adventitious. To say 
that the Mlmamsakas accept origination and annihila¬ 
tion in this sense is to prove the proved.* 

In our opinion, too, these intelligent agents bring 
about various results by means of sacrifices and other 
acts, in order to enjoy these results themselves; and 



the assumption that they are indeed, as’is proved for 
both of .us, instrumental therein is quite correct, for we 
can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, 
donations and the like. However, the special power 
described with terms like apurva can never be open to 
perception. How then can we have use for a supervis¬ 
ing God? 35 

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for 
instance a potter, when he wishes to produce a certain 
product—pots—must first have direct knowledge of the 
power of their material cause—clay—and instrumental 
cause—stick—to produce these products before he can 
actually undertake their production. .Else people who 
arc unaware of the power of the requisite causes would 
never be able t* employ these causes in order to pro¬ 
duce the results they want. In the case under discussion 
the persons concerned do indeed know which causes, 
are required to bring about the results they want, for 
they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc., through 
the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scrip¬ 
ture. Thus, aided by these causes, they render mani¬ 
fest such products as earth etc. 

Also, there is no invariable rule that only an agent 
to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully 
known is capable of undertaking an action and nobody 
else. A man can still be an agent in the action of 
knowing without perceiving in Ills own mind the 
material and instrumental causes that go int» the 
making of this action of knowing. Why, then, contend 
that the causes must be known first ? 

27. The contention that the entire Universe is 
subject to annihilation because i t has parts is incorrect. 



Such a conclusion is cancelled by stronger perceptual 
evidence against it. For the knowledge that does arise 
in the world ofhere and now is plainly this: ‘Here is 
the meru; here is the sun ; here is the earth.* 

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that these 
entities are related to different times; and certainly 
both in former and later ages there arise similar per¬ 
sons who have the same notion of these entities’ present 
existence. To put it in syllogistic form: 

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and 
mountain, because the past is time, like the present. 

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard 
to the future. This reasoning does not entail the 
fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal, for in 
their case origination and annihilation are directly 

It does not follow that, when a certain fact cannot 
be proved on the strength of a certain ground, since 
this ground involves a contradiction, this same ground 
cannot prove the same fact when it does not involve a 
contradiction. 67 

The other inference that has been given to prove 
that the world is subject to origination and annihila¬ 
tion, namely on the ground of motion when there is 
mass, is likewise incorrect; for this ground, too, is 
cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition. Con¬ 
sequently, inference cannot provide positive proof that 
the world is subject to origination and annihilation. 

28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on 
the ground that the world is a product; but this ground 
precludes a specially qualified producer. For a product 
generally implies on the part of its producer a number 


Joasia PrJhA.NVA& 

of properties which arc natural to him and therefore 
indispensable for the precise knowledge of the con¬ 
comitance between him and his product. Properties 
like being in possession of a body, having something 
left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and 
omniscience', etc. How, then, can the fact that the 
world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the 
producer proposed for it possesses the postulated pro¬ 
perties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient 
etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what 
would naturally follow? The production of. a product 
.requires the activation of the body, which requires on 
the producer’s part an effort whose inherent cause is 
his relation with a body and is impossible of any but 
just such a producer. It follows that under no condi¬ 
tion bodiless person can be an agent. 

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argu¬ 
ment, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses 
a body, then the question arises. Is that body itself 
subject to origination or not? If it be subject to 
origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, 
then your contention that whatever has parts must 
come to an end is not universally true. The solution 
of others, namely that God’s special properties can be 
demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion,® 3 does not hold 
good either. For that rule holds only of a case where 
a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does 
not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict 
is plain enough. 

29. Objection. But if even a well-considered 
invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the 
cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all 

Xomia prJmA?tvaj;i 


logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduc¬ 
tion can indeed convey true knowledge,' that it must 
also convey that there is a producer capable of creating 
the entire universe. 

Reply. We do not say that your deduction fails 
to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that 
it also demonstrates without discrimination as many 
properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasp¬ 
ing the concomitance, are known to obtain in any 

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case 
where the term which we seek to establish through 
deduction can also be known through another means 
ofknowledge, then this other means of knowledge may 
exclude fiom our term certain contrary properties 
which would have applied on the strength of our 
inferential mark alone. In the present instance, how¬ 
ever, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency 
falls completely outside the scope of other means of 
knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that 
participate in an invariable concomitance elicited 
through positive and negative consideration are in¬ 
discriminately established by the deduction. 

A similarly occasional relationship between pro¬ 
ducer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that 
has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be 
positive that this grass has sprung from a person’s 
action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a 
person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been 
instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must 
remain entirely conjectural. j .. n; 



of properties which arc natural to‘ him and therefore 
indispensable for the precise knowledge of the con¬ 
comitance between him and his product. Properties 
like being in possession of a body, having something 
left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and 
omniscience', etc. How, then, can the fact that the 
world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the 
producer proposed for it possesses the postulated pro¬ 
perties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient 
etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what 
would naturally follow? The production of a product 
requires the activation of the body, which requires on 
the producer’s part an effort whose inherent cause is 
his relation with a body and is impossible of any but 
just such a producer. It follows that under no condi¬ 
tion bodiless person can be an agent- 

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argu¬ 
ment, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses 
a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself 
subject to origination or not? If it be subject to 
origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, 
then your contention that whatever has parts must 
come to an end is not universally true. The solution 
of others, namely that God’s special properties can be 
demonstrated by an ad-hoc conclusion , 89 does not hold 
good either. For that rule holds only of a case where 
a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does 
not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict 
is plain enough. 

29. Objection-. But if even ’a ’well-considered 
invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the 
cause of the earth etc. is an intelligentbeing, then all 

Xoama prXhXnyaKi 


logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduc¬ 
tion can indeed convey true knowledge, that it must 
also convey that there is a producer capable of creating 
the entire universe. 

Reply. We do not say that your deduction fails 
to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that 
it also demonstrates without discrimination as^many 
properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasp¬ 
ing the concomitance, are known to obtain in any 

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case 
where the term which we seek to establish through 
deduction can also be known through another means 
of knowledge, then this other means ofknowledge may 
exclude from our term certain contrary properties 
which would have applied on the strength of our 
inferential mark alone. In the present instance, how¬ 
ever, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency 
falls completely outside the scope of other means of 
knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that 
participate in an invariable concomitance elicited 
through positive and negative consideration are in¬ 
discriminately established by the deduction. 

A similarly occasional relationship between pro¬ 
ducer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that 
has grown just outside a house*garden. We cannot be 
positive that this grass has sprung from a person’s 
action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a 
person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been 
instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must 
remain entirely conjectural. * j /• ; 


Aoama frAmAnyam 

30. Another question to be considered is from 

what point in space, at what point in time, and to 
what purpose a person who is satisfied in all eternity 
would produce the universe. Every agent, e.g.,a potter, 
produces a product by means of certain instruments, 
while occupying a certain space at a certain time and 
aiming at a certain result which he wants. If the 
production of the world is purely sport and without 
ulterior motivation, since God does not want anything, 
beware, for this states clearly that the Lord is by nature 
Independent from anything beside Himself. Yet willy- 
nilly, without regard for anything He might wish. He 
shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and 
destroying the world. Is He in creating the creatures 
prompted by His compassion ? But why, then, does He 
not create them happy? If you reply, because God 
takes karman into account, then you deny his complete 
independence. Besides, if their karman provides 
sufficient causes for these creatures’ variety, why 
assume God at all ? r < ■ 

Therefore, there cannot be such a person who is 
capable of creating the universe, of perceiving 
immediately dharma and adharma , and of composing 
the Vedas. 

31. Moreover, if the .Vedas were created by 
someone, this creator would be remembered;, c He is 
the one who has composed them. ’ It is not proper to 
assume that he has been forgotten, just as the digger of 
an exhausted well is forgotten. The latter is justifiable 
because the well no longer serves a purpose. But in 
the case of the Vedas, who, without remembering that 

Ioasia prJmXnyam 

27 - 

the author was reliable, would give credence to all the 
Vedic rites which are to be performed at the expense 
of great trouble involving the lossof various properties? 
Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas that 
they have been composed by a person, because this 
person, however worthy of remembrance, is not re¬ 
membered, they can no more prove that God was their 
author than the Mahabharata and similar books can. 
Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person. 
Inconsequence, the contention that the validity of 
Paficaratra is based upon the same immediate cogni¬ 
tion which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself 
is the contention of those whose discrimination has 
been warped by their bias in favour of their own 

32. Objection. But in what does this ‘preter- 
personal* character of the Veda consist ? If it consists 
in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words, 
the same holds true of the Paficaratra Tantra. 85 Or if 
it is the eternity of the words that constitute it, again 
the same is true. It could not be the eternity of the 
word-sequence, for sequence cannot be natural to 
eternal entities. 60 If it is said that it is the sequence of 
the sounds in so far as these sounds are pronounced in 
one particular sequence, then we reply that since a 
seiquence of pronunciation is non-eternal, the sequence 
of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal. So where 
does the difference lie between Paficaratra and Vedic 

Reply. The difference lies herein that in the 
case of the Paficaratra the sequence is created by an 


XOAMA PR fatty YAKl 

independent person, whereas in the case of the Veda, a 
dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact 
sequence which had been laid down before him by 
students who preceded him. A category of a different 
degree 61 which is established on the strength of recog¬ 
nition should not be denied. And with this we con¬ 
clude our lengthy disquisition. 

33. The preceding has proved that the proposi¬ 
tion that the Paficaratra is authoritative because it is 
based upon an immediate cognition of a person cate¬ 
gorically different from other persons, is not viable at 
all. Since there is no means of knowledge by which the 
existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of 
good and evil can be proved, it follows that this Tantra 
must have been promulgated by some human being 
with the purpose of deceiving the world. 

34. Objection . 61 ( This would be true if proof of 
the existence of the Lord could only be sought on the 
strength of logical argumentation. As it is, this is a 
fallacy, for the great Lord is known on the authority of 
the upanisads. When we hear the multitudinous 
statements of the eternal Scriptures which set forth the 
existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme 
Personality who is capable of creating the entire uni¬ 
verse, how then can we refuse to accept the authority 
or a tradition which derives from His immediate 
cognition ? 

35. To continue this topic, 68 these scriptural 
statements do not exceed the bounds of their authority 
just because they are concerned with facts; for similar 



statements made by persons concerning facts that are 
extremely remote from a connection with other means 
of knowledge cannot be denied the authority which is 
afforded them naturally. 

Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority 
because of the consideration that since either a proving 
or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up there 
remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or 
reversed 64 ; for the same may equally well happen to a 
statement concerning, not a fact, but a karya. A karya, 
too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for 
it must be' admitted that ordinary karyas , like 'fetch 
firewood’ are also known through other means of 
knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the odana .® 

Or if it be claimed that, inasmuch as a karya con¬ 
cerning a categorically different thing like the agnihotra 
etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority, there¬ 
fore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing 
must needs be its authority,—well, then we may say 
that there is not a ghost of another authority for the 
Bhagavan whose form consists in unsurpassed 
knowledge, supremacy and beatitude; so that it should 
follow that everything is entirely the same in both 
cases, depending on one’s particular partisan views. 

Moreover, the theory is that since another means 
of knowledge can apply to a fact, a verbal statement 
concerning this fact cannot validly prove it: but why 
should not this other means of knowledge itself be the 
repetitious one since verbal testimony concerning its 
fact may conceivably turn up? 66 or, why should other 
means of knowledge which themselves are liable to 



various deficiencies entail the negation of a notion that 
arises from eternal Scripture untouched by all defects 
inherent in persons, merely because it is deduced that 
its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge ? 
This is absurd. 

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily 
follow from the induction, c.g. absence of omni¬ 
science 6 ’, possession ofa body etc., find no room in the 
Bhagavan whose supernal manifestation of miraculous 
knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from 
hundreds of bruits, just as cold can find no place in 

And, in consequence, 

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the 
Tantra is false, while it is composed by the Omniscient 
One Himself who is known through the Upanisads? 
Alas for the fool’s grand exhibition of labour in 
Mimanisa 1 How can a mind schooled in Mlmamsa be 
so mistaken? 

36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers 
command respect, 63 maintain that all Vedic testimony 
carries authority only concerning such karyas as cannot 
presuppose any other authority. Since words arc 
considered to have their true sense only when they 
concern such a karya, it is impossible that any state¬ 
ment can be denotative if it concerns something else 
than a karya. Therefore, when a man has observed 
that in an exchange between two adult persons a certain 
inherently related action of one of them takes place 
immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the 
other, he concludes with certainty that the denoting 



power of the sentence as inferred by means of circum¬ 
stantial-implication terminates completely in the karya 
that has been conveyed by that sentence. 0 The very 
awareness of karya is known to relate to one’s own 
karya] 10 so the onlooker, observing the same pro¬ 
cess in the present case, realizes that the one person’s 
action has been caused by the other person’s variously 
differentiated behaviour: “Surely this person has been 
made aware by the other of this karya that he proceed 
to his action immediately upon become aware of what 
he has to do.” This leads the observer to the conclu¬ 
sion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly 
denotative in so far as it serves to convey a karya whose 
specific motivation conforms to the entire statement, 
then whatever bits of meaning come to mind as a result 
of the addition or omission of words are denoted by 
these words only in strict accordance to this karya, 71 
which thus constitutes the primarily known principal 
element of the statement. In such a statement the 
imperative and optative verbal terminations, 71 which 
unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of karya, 
convey by themselves the body of the karya, whereas 
the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a con¬ 
textual relation with the karya by describing consequent 
matters which required by the karya> e.g. a person’s 
qualification to accomplish it etc. 75 

37, Take for example the statement that a son 
has been born to the person spoken to, a purely sub¬ 
stantive statement; the aggregate of words which 
convey nothing more than this bare fact that a son has 
been bom, is not definitely proved to possess the power 



of denoting the postulated birth of the son by means of 
such resultant effects as cheerful looks or joyfully 
bristling hairs on the part of the father. 74 For, it is 
impossible to establish’definitely that the occurrence of 
a cause for various joys in future, past and present is 
really due to the denotative power of the statement. 
Therefore, also in the case when we have a verb in the 
present indicative collocated with words that have their 
proper signification (in that they refer to things that 
presuppose no other means of knowledge), it must be 
assumed that in it we have a substitute with a positive 
(i.e. injunctive) denotation of words without actually 
having explicit reference to a karya? s 

38. A person knows that a certain word has a 
certain denotation, when it is known what is the deno¬ 
tation, of the other words with which it is collocated . 76 
It is proved that words have the power of denoting 
things only in so far as they are contextually connected 
with a kdrya ; consequently, their validity concerning 
an established fact is based on this that they give rise 
to the notion of karya . 

It is contended that this denotation of karya i$ only 
occasional in words, 77 but this contention is incorrect; 
the ground for words to be denotative is that they deal 
with a karya , so that the contention suffers of the vice 
of being unproved. For a notion that arises from a 
verbal statement can never terminate in any object 
whatsoever that is not a karya. 

The cognitions of contextual relations which arise 
immediately upon hearing a profane statement are said 
to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from 

Jo AHA PRJmXnyaKi 


Inference. 78 Thus it is right that these cognitions do 
not terminate in karyas. 

39. I f i t were not accepted that verbal statements 
always bear on kay os, on what grounds then could an 
indicative statement like agnihatram juholi “he offers the 
agnihotra” be accepted as an injunction? Or if it be 
claimed that in this case, even though the statement as 
it stands has no complete validity, it is accepted as an 
injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a pur¬ 
pose, we reply that this claim is incorrect, since the 
operation of means of knowledge is not dependent on 
purpose, but rather is the acceptance of purpose depen¬ 
dent on the operation of the means of knowledge. It 
is not proper to assume that since one does not like to 
find rocks when one is looking for gold therefore one 
finds gold ! As long as we do not assume that a state¬ 
ment is denotative only when it bears on a karya , we 
cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative 
contains an injunction. 

40. In the same manner the meaning of the 
upanisads must also be interpreted as being subordi¬ 
nate to such injunctions as “One must know the soul, 
meditate on it, etc.” 79 which are expressed in differnt 
passages; this meaning, then, is that one must know 
the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunc¬ 
tion. That the soul is the object of an injunction does 
not by itself however prove that the soul exists as an 
established fact; for there can also be an injunction 
that a certain thing be such while actually it is not so; 
for example the injunction, “Know your father in 
someone who is not your father,” or “Know that the 


Xoama prAmXnyam 

syllable'OM, which is not the udgifha, is the udgitha.” 80 
All statements that set forth the reality and the 
etcrnality of the soul only serve to convey that there is 
a spiritual agent, who is required in order to experience 
the otherworldly fruits that arc mentioned in ritual 
injunctions where the time of fruition is not speci¬ 
fied. 01 

Theref ore, no verbal statement whatever is a means 
of knowing a thing as such. Thus, by denying thatthe 
arthavadas, 82 too, can serve to convey knowledge of 
facts like Rudra’s weeping, it is shown that they merely 
serve to give praise in contextual connection with an 
injunction, which may be comparatively remote. 85 

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated 
divine person, whose personality is the product of the 
baseless beliefs of people that have failed to consider 
the true denotation of preceding or succeeding state¬ 
ments, is eliminated, with which we conclude out 
extensive discussion. 

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that 
postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture. 
Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed 
convey knowledge of facts; even so, what possible basis 
is there for the assumption that there exists a person 
who knows dharma and adharma , when we take into 
account the cognition that arises from injunction? 
Omniscience 84 is possible only if the omniscient person 
knows the objects exactly as they arc known by means 
of the different means of knowledge;- for there is no 
statement which declares omniscience by cancelling the 
normal means of knowledge. Evenif there were such 
a statement, it would have to be explained as an 



arthavada since its word-meanings would not allow of 
mutual relation. A cognition about a sentence-mean¬ 
ing arises from the individual words and it presupposes 
in these words such properties as appropriateness 
etc. 85 , which are learnt through other means of know¬ 
ledge; now we wonder how.such a cognition could 
arise at all, if there were a conflict with these other 
means of knowledge that are required primarily for the 
cognition to arise! If a statement : concerning an 
object that is contradicted by perception etc., were 
authoritative, who could then reject the identity of sun 
and sacrificial pole? 86 And if there is a person who 
possesses this peculiar excellency, what happens to the 
authority of the texts which is sought to be proved? 87 

43. Objection. However, those who follow the, 
Paiicaratra clan have the tradition that this Paficaratra 
has been composed by this person. 

Refutation. But why do the Pa^upatas then not 
agree with their view? They, too, claim that the 
sovereign of the universe is the promulgator of their 
own system, and others have the same claims. Now 
they cannot all of them be omniscient, because then it 
would be impossible for them to set forth mutually 
contradictory teachings. The same ground which 
allows one among several discussants to prove an 
omniscient promulgator must hold equally for all of 
them.* But which one among the many omniscient 
beings who propound 1 mutually conflicting teachings 
while claiming each for himself the prerogative of 
omniscience, which one do we conclude is the one and 
only omniscient God? As the text says, “If there arc 
several omniscient beings who propound incompatible 


Xoama prAmAnyam 

, doctrines and if for each of them the arguments are 
equally) valid, then whom can we elicit as the true and 
only one ?” BB When each omniscient being is assumed 
on the basis of one’s own Tantra doctrine since the 
various tantrio doctrines are mutually in conflict, the 
result will be that none of them is authoritative. ? I 

44. Objection. H»w can the teaching of Vasu- 
deva himself, who is well-known in Revelation and 
Tradition, be brought to the same level as other 
Tantras? For the manifestation of Hisjpower has been 
revealed in the Purusa Hymn, “The earth sprang from 
his feet,'die quarters of the sky from" his ears ;” 59 and 
again/ “Tile creator created sun and moon as before;” 50 
likewise,' /‘He is Brahma, he is Siva;” 91 ^ “Visnu’s 
highest step ;” 95 “No one is his lord in' this world, no j 
one his commander; he has no sign.” 93 In this way, 
the statements of Revelation describe his manifestation 
characterized by His origination, maintenance and 
annihilation of the world. Similarly, the Tradition: 
“From Visnu arose the world, in him does it subsist; 
he is the one who causes it to exist and to perish/’ said 
Para§ara 9+ ; Manu,too, declared that He is the lord: 
^Narayana is above the uhmanifest, and the World-egg 
is produced by the unmanifest.” 93 ' 

, v This Supreme Person who is continually! praised 
forHis knowledge and supremacy in the statements of: 
Revelation and of the sages has created Paflcaratra. If 
this Tantra is then on a level with Tantras that are 
apostate from the path of Revelation, then one might 
as well reason that a soma-drinker is on a level with a 
wine-drinker, just because he .is a drinker 1 Is this 



Tantmnot superior? Wherefore, then, are the qualities 
of immaculate knowledge, supremacy etc. of the 
Bhagavan not currently attributed also to the Destroyer 
of the Three Cities in the texts of Revelation ? There¬ 
fore, it is absurd to hold the equality of the Tantras 
promulgated by both. Or, since He is the God who 
is the cause of the origination, protection and destruc¬ 
tion of the universe and for whom the entire Vedanta 
furnishes evidence to the exclusion of anyone else, how 
could He promulgate a ; doctrine that is outside the 
pales of the Veda? 

45. Objection. Nevertheless, 56 a fair number 
of ^rutis' are found which ascribe omniscience and 
omnipotence to lord PaSupati as well: “He who is all- 
knowing, omniscient ;” 97 “The supreme great sovereign 
of sovereigns.” 93 

Reply. By secondary denotation these two words 
‘‘omniscient’* and “sovereign” apply not only to the 
one who actually'is omniscient and sovereign* but also 
to others, not excepting God Siva, who are as it were 
all-knowing and supreme. Besides, if in the above 
quotation ja/i sawajrla/i iarvavit the word sanajm were 
indeed used to describe the omniscient one, there would 
be tautology of sarvawit. 

Consequently, the word sarvajrla refers only to 
Mahadcva; and so the Skanda-Purana, Linga-Puraija 
and other Puranas exhaust themselves in describing this 
all knowing and sovereign character of Siva. There¬ 
fore, since the PaSupata Tantra has been promulgated 
by this Pagupati, it acquires authority in this way; but 


Aoaua pfAmXnyam 

the reversion of the authority of all Tantras in con¬ 
sequence of their mutual contradictions applies to this 
PaSupata Tantra too. 

- 46. Further, granted that the Lord Vasudeva is 
the Person known in the upanisads, how then can the 
theory be held of him that he has -promulgated the 
Paficaratra Tantra which conflicts with Revelation—of 
him who said, “Revelation and Tradition are my 
commands Thus we conclude that there has been a 
deceiver who assumed ’ the name of Vasudeva'and 
under that name composed the ' Tantra under 

Or else/ suppose that Vasudeva Himself, ruler of 
the entire universe^ was the promulgator of this Tantra; 
they'still say that Hari, whose personal manifestations 
are deceptive because of his power of ‘illusion, has 
promulgated these unholy texts deceivingly under the 
guise of holy texts in order to destroy the whole mass 
of enemies of the gods. ' Now, has he indeed composed 
this Tantra, leading the faithful into the 1 mysterious 
abyss of his grand power of illusion, or not ? This is 
the question that now arises. How are we to .resolve 
it ? Or are we rather to understand that he composed 
this Tantra while he himself was in error, since it is not 
accepted by the followers of the Veda, just as the 
doctrine of the Jainas is not accepted? That the 
followers of the Veda do not accept it has been set 
forth at length above. 100 Consequently, then, 
Paficaratra Tantra is not authoritative because' it 
derives from the cognition of an independent Person. 

47. Nor is it proper to argue the validity of the 
Paficaratra Tradition “like theMatiu Traditionetc.” 101 PrAmAnYAM 


If the God has composed the Tantra after having, like 
manu etc., learnt the meaning of the Veda from a 
teacher who was satisfied with his pupil’s obedience, 
then the assumption that He was independent is pur¬ 
poseless and false. It is not borne out by human 
experience that the Veda was immediately manifest to 
him, even though he never learnt it. The defects 
which the Author of the Varttika enumerates, those of 
personal superiority and inferiority etc., 102 are all to be 
presumed in the case of Pailcaratra. 

48. Moreover, the Saivite, PaSupata, Buddhist, 
Jainist, Kapalika and Pailcaratra teachings are tradi¬ 
tionally known as heretical. On the basis of the 
distinction between Vedic and Tantric we arrive at the 
conclusion that Pailcaratra is outside the Veda. 
“Tantra is of four kinds: Saiva, PaSupata, Saumya 
and Laguda; thus are described the divisions of 
Tantra; one should not confuse them.” Likewise: 
“There are three distinct doctrines, the Bhakta, the 
Bhagavata and the Satvata;” this description of the 
divisions of Tantra is also found in Paficaratra. 

49. Furthermore, that a doctrine destitute of all 
logic and embracing the view that the soul knows 
birth, which is rejected by Revelation and Tradition, 
should be Truth is a highly ludicrous contention. Thus 
we find the iruti, “Verily, this soul is unperishing, 
essentially indestructible; it is not conjoined with 
size ;” ,os and, “This dies without the soul; the soul 
does not die.” 10 * 

Objection. This is all very well, but all that this 
statement says is that the soul is not destroyed, not 
that it is not bom. 



Refutation. No, hy stating that it cannot be 
destroyed, it also decides that it cannot be born; it is 
impossible that an entity that has been born does not 
perish. - 

Objection. Nonetheless, from the emphasis which 
in the statement “only sat was here is laid on the 
uniqueness of sat, it follows that there were no souls 
before the time of creation. Had the individual soul 
existed before why then this emphasis of *‘only sat” on 
sat’s absolute solitariness ? 

Refutation. The reply to this is that here the 
emphasis on sat’s uniqueness is with regard to the 
elements of wind, water and ether that were about to 
be created by sat. Were the s»ul excluded by this 
statement of sat’s solitariness, then the soul's origin 
would have been described in the sequel, just as the 
creation of ether is described. This is not done; there¬ 
fore the soul does not know birth, since in the sequel 
“That sat created fire, etc.”* 06 we do not hear of the 
creation of the individual soul. 

Objection. However, in the text yalo va imam 
ihutani etc. 107 we hear that the souls too know origin, 
continuance and rcabsorption. Here the word bhuta 
denotes th ejtva, the individual soul; for thus we find 
the word used in the passage bhrdmayan sarvabhutani. 10 * 
The verb jiwanti “they live” in the text can only apply 
to the souls, the expression Jena jay ante "by whom they 
are born” evidently refers to these same souls. 

Refutation. This is not right. .The word bhiila 
commonly denotes only the elements ether, wind, fire, 
water and earth. If the word is used for something 

Xomia pfcJuLyYA^r 


else, it is used metaphorically. Of these elements, 
ether etc. which are primarily understood by the word 
bhula, it is stated that they are variously modified 109 
and that they live. The verb “they live” describes a 
condition of being analogous to living. And if the 
word bhula be used in the sense of individual soul, 
then too the statement declares that the soul is born 
only in the sense that its entrance into a body is a 
birth. Therefore, when the word bhftia refers to the 
individual soul, it can rightly be said that the souls are 
born, just as it is said that the cow, once born walks 
about. There are Srutis to this eff ect, like “ For the 
soul, unborn, alone—” no and we also have other £rutis 
which declare that the soul is unborn. Similarly, the 
word of the Lord : “Know that both matter and spirit 
are without beginning ;” m “this ancient spirit is un¬ 
born, eternal, everlasting;” 111 “it is never born nor 
does it die” 115 etc. Finally there is the syllogism; the 
individual soul in question never knows birth; for, 
while being substantial, it is bodiless, as it consists of 
spirit, like the Supreme Soul. 

50. There are some who notice the logical defects 
inherent in the view that Scripture of a personal 
origin, which we have explained above, and having no 
other course open posit that Tantra too must be 
eternal. Against this position, we state that it is 
sublated by the fact that its author, who is patent 
euough and tacitly remembered, is not forgotten at 
all; and hence this position does not deserve our 
notice. ' 

51, Besides, why has the argument about the 
PaSupatas etc. been swept aside with a stick? If one 


Xgama. trXmanyatCi 

repliesj let the argument stand, we shall have the 
defect of mutual exclusion. • And Vasudeva’s author¬ 
ship of the Tantra, which is commonly known to 
everybody, can no more be rejected than the prefer- 
personal origin of the Veda. Or else,' if someone says 
that any of the three means of knowledge is in the case 
of Piiiupata Tantra cancelled by non-appearance, ,H 
reversion and dubiety, the answer is, your own postu¬ 
lation applies equally well to the Laguda doctrine” 4 , 
and once you know this, it is refuted. Vour worship 
better keep quiet. ' 

52. To sum up. For the reasons set forth above 
we maintain that the exposure of this Tantra’s incom¬ 
patibility with Revelation, Tradition, Epic and Parana 
as well as with the conclusions of our logical demonstra¬ 
tion, and the inacceptability of this Tantra to all 
exemplary persons go to show that the Pancaratra texts 
must have been composed by someone who pretended 
to teach a path that would lead to heaven and salva¬ 
tion, but actually wished to deceive the world. Con- 
cerning.its apocryphal character,’ which we have now 
exposed; we have the declaration: “The traditional 
teachings that are outside the Veda and all other false 
doctrines remain fruitless in the afterworld, for they 
are considered to derive from tamos .** Those who 
Follow the Veda are forbidden tm speak with those who 
follow such evil paths: “The following are not to be 
honoured even with a word: heretics, criminals, 
impostors, crooks, thieves and hypocrites are not to be 
honoured even with a word,” 1 

i 53. > In the manner 1 ,s presented above the prima- 
facie case can be made *that the Paficaratra in its 

Jcama I>RAmA.SYA\‘1 


entirety has no validity whatever as a means of 
knowledge. Against this prima-facie case we now sub¬ 
mit that the Tanlra in question must be accepted as 
valid, because it produces Faultless knowledge, like the 
scriptural statements on the Vedic sacrifices jyotisfoma 

54. Now, such defects as arc elicited by the 
science of logic cannot be detected in this inference. 
Let us consider the Object of the Proposition. The 
Object of the Proposition is, by definition, the'content 
of a certain thesis is proposed; it is a term which itself 
is established, and of which it is now. to be proved that 
it is particularized by another term, which is also 
established. 117 In the present case the term which 
particularizes the object is not unknown, for this term, 
sc. “validity,” is for both parties established with 
regard to the valid means of knowledge, Perception, 
Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. Nor is the subject 
itself unknown, for the Paftcaratra system is known 
universally. Nor is the Object to be proved already 
proved, for this Object, “The Pancaratra is valid,” is 
not proved for the opponent. Nor is this Object in* 
compatible with Perception, since its opposite, sc. non¬ 
validity, is beyond perceptual verifiability. Nor is this 
Object incompatible with Inference, because no 
inference proving non-validity is found. 

' 55. Objection. But such an inference is actually 
found : Paftcaratra Sastra is non-authoritative, because 
it is non.Vedic, like Buddhism. 

Refutation. We reply, What is this non- 
authoritativeness which this reasoning seeks to prove? 


Xgama pramanyam 

If it is defined by the fact that the Tantra does not 
produce knowledge, then this definition militates 
against Perception; for the knowledge which arises in 
a student, who is able to comprehend the relation bet¬ 
ween, word and meaning, concerning the meaning of 
the sentences of Pancaratra Sastra he hears is per¬ 
ceptually evident. Nor is the predicate, sc. “non- 
authoritativeness,” defined by dubiety, since then we 
have the same comflict with Perception; for the state¬ 
ment, “One must worship the four-armed Supreme 
Person in the centre of the lotus,” does not occasion a 
doubtful cognition: “Must one worship Him thus or 
not?” Nor, in the third place, is the predicate.defined 
by reversion, since there is no non-apprehension of 
what should be there, 118 and since, the presumption of 
future reversion militates against Perception and would 
put an end to all operations. This point shall be dis¬ 
cussed in detail later »n. 

56. •bjection. Still, the proposed validity of 
PaffcarStra militates against Scripture. Since in 
Pancaratra Agama we have its meaning conveyed 
exactly as it is, this conflict between Scripture and 
Paficaratra is not vicious only if Paficaratra is not 

Refutation. Why, if that were so, that would 
mean that if its authority is disproved by Scripture 
it is proved by Inference, and if it is proved by 
inference it is disproved by Scripture ; m which is a 
vicious circle. 

57. Besides, what does this mean, “being non- 
Vedic, or outside the Veda?” If it means that 



Paficaratra is different from the Veda, we have an 
occasional application to Perception etc., which are 
also different from the Veda. If, in order to avoid this 
defect, the ground is thus specified, ‘because, while 
being language, it is different from the Veda,* we have 
a hetvantaram deadlock, which, as they say, occurs when 
into a syllogism with an unqualified ground and addi¬ 
tional qualification is accepted. 120 Also, we then have 
an occasional application to the statements of Manu, 
which also are language and different from the Veda. 
If then, my slow-witted opponent, in order to remove 
this defect from your ground you claim that being 
outside the Veda means “not deriving from the Veda,” 
then what do you, logician, think of it ? 

Well, by this definition of the ground we get the 
meaning, “something, namely in case there is question 
oflanguage-statements, is non-Vedic, because it does 
not derive from the Veda.” But then there is an 
occasional application to the Veda itself, which does 
not derive from the Veda! When the ground is re¬ 
defined as “because it does not derive from the Veda, 
in case of a language-statement but not a Vedic state¬ 
ment," then again there would inevitably be an occa¬ 
sional application to statements of reliable persons 
which do not derive from the Veda and yet are valid, 
like “ Thereare trees on the river-bank." If the reason 
is further corrected into: “because it does not derive 
from the Veda, namely, in case of a language-statement 
—but not a Vedic statement—and this statement con¬ 
cerns an action to be taken,” then still we have a vicious 
applicability to such precepts as “One must eat little 
when one has indigestion.” Again, if the ground is 



then reformulated as .“because it does not derive from 
the Veda, in case of a statement specified by all the 
above specifications and also concerned with dharma 
and adhartna ” then this ground is partly impertinent, 
because Paficaratra Sastra does not deal with dharma 
and adhartna exclusively, since the great majority of its 
statements concern brahman. If then, the specifica¬ 
tion is added “....when it deals with objects that arc 
outside the scope of other pramanas,” then again the 
ground does not fully apply, for hundreds of Srutis 
demonstrate that the Perception of God encompasses 
all things related to dharma and adkarma. We shall 
discuss this point presently ; 121 this suffices for the time 
being to expose the baseless fancies of those who have 
not madea study of AksapadaV 2 * system. Other con¬ 
ceivable inferences will be presented; and refuted, 
later on. 

We conclude therefore, that the proposition 
“Paxlcaratra is authoritative,” is not in conflict with 
Inference. : / > 

58. Nor is it in conflict with Scripture, for 
hundreds of scriptural statements, like idam mahopa- 
nisadam, will be adduced which set forth that 
Paficaratra is authoritative. There are no grounds to 
suspect in our proposition anyone of the three kinds of 
contradiction of language-statements; namely, con¬ 
tradiction within the terms of the statement; contradic¬ 
tion with one’s own thesis; or contradiction with 
universally accepted facts. 

• First, there is no contradiction within the state¬ 
ment, , This type of contradiction is of three kinds: of 

Acmma prAmJ^ai'i 


mere utterance; or utterance of property ; and of 
utterance of substance. Firstly, the proposition is not 
contradicted by its mere utterance, for the statement of 
the thesis “Paftcaratra Sastra is authoritative” docs not 
cancel its own content, as does, for instance, the 
statement: “During my entire life I have kept 
silence.” Secondly, there is no contradiction through 
utterance of property, as for example the statement: 
“All statements arc untruefor the authoritativeness 
predicated of Paficaratra docs not cancel the proposi¬ 
tion. Thirdly, there is no contradiction through 
utterance of substance, since in the given substance a 
connection with the given property is not contradictory: 
Paflcar3tra is not contradicted by its property authorita¬ 
tiveness, as motherhood is contradicted by the property 
sterility. For upon the assertion of the authoritative¬ 
ness of the substance in question, it is not contradicted 
by any particular substance named in Revelation, 
since the imputation of questionableness is secondary, 
as in the case of the assertion that certain acts of 
violence which are enjoined are against the dharma. ,2s 
There is, therefore, no contradiction by language- 
statement ; so that we conclude that the proposition is 

59. Nor is the ground affected by logical defects, 
like occasional application etc. The ground is not 
occasionally applicable to other terms. This fallacy of 
occasional ness is of two kinds, general occasionalness 
and special occasionalness. An instance of y the first 
kind provides the ground in the argument: “The earth 
is eternal, because it is knowable.” 114 Of the second 
kind: “The earth is eternal, because it, possesses 



smell/*'” Our ground, namely, ‘Paficaratra is authori¬ 
tative, because it produces faultless knowledge^ does not 
apply equally whether it is authoritative or not, which 
would render the ground general Iy-occasional. t5S For 
this ground, namely its being a cause of faultless know¬ 
ledge, has not been found before in the alternative pro¬ 
positions that Paficaratra is deceptive and hence non- 
authoritative. Neither does the ground have a specially- 
occasional application, because the illustration ‘'like 
statements on Vedic sacrifices such as jyotistotna etc.” 
shows its connection with other instances on the same 
side of the argument. 

Nor is the ground precluded, since there is no con¬ 
comitance of its opposite; being a cause of faultless 
knowledge is not invariably accompanied by non- 
authoritativeness. Nor is the ground cancelled by 
lapse of time, since there is no conflict with Percep¬ 
tion and in this it is analogous with Scripture. 

Nor is the ground itself unproved or unestablished. 

If a ground is unestablished, this is because either its 
locus or its essence is unestablished. The first does not 
apply, for its locus is Paficaratra Sastra, which is proved 
to exist. Nor does the second apply: for there are 
three ways in whieh a ground may be unestablished as 
to its essence: through ignorance, through dubiety, or 
through reversion. Ignorance does not apply, as 
follows from the fact that the words describing the 
ground are pronounced. 1 ” Nor does dubiety apply, 
for that the ground is correct is undoubted and self- 
evident to the defender of the proposition, while for 
the opponent the same is easily proved by the fact that 

Aoama frAmAnyaXi 


no defects are apprehended in it. That the ground 
would be unestablished through reversal is utterly out 
of the question. 

60. Objection. But how can we discard the 
supposition that the Paficaratra texts are faulty? 1 * 8 
This supposition arises instantly since the texts are of 
personal origin. 

Refutation. How do you avoid the same supposi¬ 
tion in the case of the Vedas? There too it arises 
instantly, since the Vedas are language-statements. 
When you reply, it is avoided because the Vedas have 
no personal author, then you may realize that in our 
case, too, it is avoided, since the Tantras have been 
composed by the Supreme Person, who is omniscient 
and eternally satisfied, and you may keep quiet! 

What I mean to say is this. Our position is that 
in language as such there are no defects that invalidate 
its authority 129 ; as language, language is authoritative. 
Its authority is in certain cases invalidated by defects 
in the character of the speaker, for instance in a 
language statement, “ There is a herd of elephants on 
my finger-tip.” The statements in the upanisad 
portion of the Veda remove whatever suspicion we may 
have about any defects in the character of the speaker 
in the text collection here under discussion. For the 
Vedanta texts set forth that the omniscient Lord of 
the world is supremely compassionate; then how can 
wc suppose Him to be deceitful etc.? 

61. Objection. However, I have said that 
language statements have no authority when they 
concern established facts, on the ground that when 
terms are applied to such facts they do not have proper 
denotative power. 


Aoama prAmAnyam 

Refutation. This view is not correct. Profane 
language, eliciting a fact by direct application, > even 
though this fact is established, really operates its 
denoting power as fully as it does by applications which 
concern karyas. Consider the illustration that has been 
given above 130 . When certain manifestations (of joy) in 
a man’s face, which follow on his hearing the 
statement “A son has been born to you, n make it 
appear that the man spoken-to is happy, one instantly 
understands that his happiness is the result of his 
receiving from this statement a knowledge of an 
agreeable meaning, and one then infers that, for a 
medium-aged person too, this happiness derives from 
the statement. Thus one concludes that, since this 
happiness came to exist upon the existence of the 
statement, the statement itself has the power to convey 
an agreeable meaning. If there arises a doubt as to 
which particular ground of happiness among the many 
different grounds that may occur according to past, 
present and future, then consider this. A young boy, 
who wants to understand the meaning of speech, 
immediately upon hearing the same statement receives 
knowledge that a birth ceremony is being held. He 
thinks to himself, “There must be a reason for this.” 
Then he considers, “ Is the agreeable meaning which 
has been understood from the statement the cause of 
this knowledge that a birth ceremony is to be held ?” 
and he realizes that this meaning was precisely this 
that a son had been born. 1 * 1 

And on that issue: Definite knowledge of the 
donation of words in a sentence is had through the 
words that are included or excluded. This being so, 



words denote their meanings, whether these are 
established things or not. 

62. Objection. However, the relation of cause 
and effect is not just known from the fact that one 
comes into existence upon the existence of the other, 
for that would mean over-extension. Nor does the 
realization that a birth ceremony is to be held follow 
invariably upon the knowledge of an agreeable mean¬ 
ing ; for we fi nd also that the same realization follows 
upon a feeling of distress, namely when the informed 
father is vexed by the trouble of maintaining his 
family. 112 

Refutation. Don’t we find that the realization 
of a k&rya is caused by a verbal statement, so that we 
can agree that, for example, the realization that a cow 
is to be fetched following a statement tf Fctch the cow” 
is indeed caused by that statement ? When you say 
that, since this realization cannot occur without a 
cause therefore the proximate statement must in that 
case be the cause of the realization, then I maintain 
that the same holds also in the case of “A son is born.’’ 

It has been decided by our opponent that the 
verbal denotation of a meaning which causes an action 
to be taken is a result of the inclusion in the statement 
of a liiiadi suffix. 133 He who maintains that all words 
only beaT meaningfully on karya, maintains in effect 
that padarthas 134 exist only in karya statements and that 
e.g. in the case of cows, horses and the like, which are 
related to bodies, their being a padartha is ascertained 
by the inclusion or exclusion of the words denoting 
them in a statement concerning karya. If he says, 
indeed, whenever their being a padartha is significantly 



construed, it is construed just as connected with karya, 
we reply, Stop being obstinate; for verbal exchange is 
also possible through denotation of. words that are 
connected with other things than karyas. 

63. It is necessary to accept the position that 
words are 'denotative of connected meanings, for 
Otherwise it would be impossible to explain that they 
are denotative of meanings connected with karyas. 
The definition' *the thing meant by a word is always 
connected with a karya’ fails to cover the defined topic 
completely; for it does not apply in the case of 
injunctive suffixes, since these suffixes denote their own 
meanings as connected, not with karya, but with 
consequences of already established facts, such as 
proper qualification on the part of the person enjoined 
etc. 135 Or if it is said that in their case there is 
denotation of connected meanings and in tie other case 
denotation of meanings connected with karya, we reply 
that this is a neither old nor young, argument j I3s it is 
more appropriate simply to accept the view that there 
is denotation of connected meanings in general. 

64. Therefore, the adherents of all schools should 
accept that words have proper denotation for the 
meanings they denote because these meanings arc 
connected with other meanings that are required to 
complete the sense of the statement, are closely 
collocated and are appropriate. Even if the denoting 
power of language were to be understood only through 
its proper signification in karya statements alone, 1 ” 
even so it is correct when we decide the denotation of 
language to take the standpoint that karya is just one of 
the inessential factors of denotation, like (he identity 



of the speaker, the extent of space in which a statement 
can be heard etc. The logicians hold the view that 
the meaning of a language statement cannot be known 
except by language statement. 158 Consequently, there 
exists no inherent relationship with karya as cause of 
denotation in uses of words that have their proper 
signification, just as is the case with floating precious 
stones on water. Just as this floating, however helpful 
it may be to determine the identity of certain diamonds, 
e.g. the brahmin diamond, serves no purpose when a 
stone is being 'transacted which has already been 
properly identified, similarly the karya,however helpful 
to understand the proper signification of a word, serves 
no purpose once its proper signification has been 

65. Moreover, if words denote their meanings 
only as connected with karya, then how can we know 
from them that, for example, there is a relation 
between a fruit and a river-bank, is in a statement : 
‘‘There is a fruit on the river-bank ? '* If you say 
that a statement of such a substantive relation does not 
denote the relation it states through its primary sense, 
but through secondary sense, then, we may ask, where 
do statements then have their primary sense ? If you 
answer : in a karja which is not previously known 
through other means of knowledge, we reply: no, for 
then no use of words would be possible, since their 
meaning would not yet have been identified. Naturally 
there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a word 
when that word denotes a meaning not previously 
known through other means of knowledge, and no 
cognition can arise from words with unknown meanings^ 
fbr that would entail over-extension. 


66. Objection. My position is this. In ordinary 
language a statement is understood to have its 
proper signification when it bears on a karya that is 
to be accomplished with a certain action. In Vedic 
language a statement enjoys a special power of denota¬ 
tion which transcends the transitory root-sense of the 
word “ sacrificing ”, and it has this power of denotation 
because it is the means of realizing a certain fruit 
and acquires this power on account of the collocation 
of words describing this fruit; whereas in ordinary 
language, since there verbal exchange is possible also 
to the unsophisticated, this determination of the nature 
of word and meaning is not attended to. 

Refutation. This position is just wishful think¬ 
ing; for a language statement, even if understood in 
your way as bearing meaningfully only on a karya to 
be accomplished with an action,’* 9 does not by that 
token set forth a permanent karya, 1 * 0 since that would 
mean over-extension. If we cannot know the true 
connection of words even when the usage of our elders, 
through which the denotations of these words is under¬ 
stood, takes place in accordance with these words, then 
we can never know their connection ! If a language 
statement has lost its postulated true denoting power 
because it is impossible, it does not thereby acquire 
another denoting power. In such cases we surely 
must assume laksana. 1 * 1 For when certain words are 
collocated that have incompatible meanings, these words 
do not therefore denote something else altogether, for 
then all word meanings would become unreliable. 

67. Besides, we do not admit that tlie fact that a 
word has the power to communicate a karya that is not 



previously known through other means of knowledge 
proves that there actually exists a relationship between 
itself and the fruit of the action it enjoins. The only 
relation proved of it is that with injunction, not with 
instrumentality. That in a statement there subsists a 
relation with a karya which transcends the root-sense of 
the verb cannot be proved except by the relation of 
karya with the fruit of the act, and the latter relation 
cannot be proved without the former. And therefore 
there is a vicious interdependence that cannot be 
refuted. If there is no factor which activates the 
person who, according to the injunction, is specified by 
the heaven that is to be achieved, the injunction itself 
cannot be the means of achieving the desired heaven. 
The root-sense of the words being transitory, the 
statement itself cannot function as this means. 14 * 
Therefore the assertion that a language statement 
communicates as its proper meaning a karya which 
exceeds this transitory root-sense, cannot be correct. A 
person is not specified hy heaven as the object to be 
achieved, 14 * but it is the person who desires heaven who 
is enjoined upon to accomplish the act. Heaven can¬ 
not be the specification of the person’s qualification, 
because heaven is yet to be achieved. Only something 
that has already been achieved, that actually exists, can 
specify the person upon whom an act is enjoined, for 
instance, the real fact of his being alive etc. Conse¬ 
quently only his desire can specify his qualification for 
the act. 

68. Furthermore, precisely how is heaven, which 
in your opinion functions as the specification of the 
person enjoined, an object to be realized, a sadhya? 


Xqama pRamanvam 

If its being a sddhya means that it is fit for a relation 
with a sadhana, it is impossible for heaven to be siddha , 
as t long as its relatability obtains, since it cannot 
become siddha in the meantime. 1 * 4 The only authority 
that exists for heaven becoming siddha in the end is the 
injunction itself, while the only authority for the 
injunction is just this that heaven does become siddha. 
This is plainly a vicious circle. If heaven is the sadhya, 
the injunction is not the sddhya. It is not possible to 
combine two sadhyas in one sentence. 

69. Objection. Indeed, the unity of a sentence 
is broken up ,4s when it contains two sadhyas that are 
independent, but not when the two are interdependent. 
And here the two sadhyas are interdependent since the 
realization of heaven is contained In the realization of 
the injunction. That is what the Author says: ‘‘When 
the niyoga is realized, everything else in accordance 
with it is also realized;’* and: “Why should tile 
realization of the fruit not be held to be subservient to 
the realization of the injunction ?” 146 Therefore there is 
no conflict here. 

Refutation. No ; unless heaven is realized, how 
can the injunction be realized? Without the realiza- 
tion of heaven neither the qualification, nor the 
object, nor anything else required by tlie injunction is 

70. Objection. In the case of the qualifications 
for periodical rites the injunction does not require the 

1 realization of any fruit.’ 47 Nor does an injunction to 
one act fail to apply to a person who reaUy desire s 
another fruit. The pre-eminence 148 is really the 
injunction’s; a person is enjoined upon by the injunc- 

Xoaua PRAmXNYaK! 


tion to any act in the same way as he is enjoined upon 
to perform the periodical acts. For the injunction 
draws unto itself the desirous person who himself 
thinks that the heaven which he desires is the principal 
object, in the same way as the injunction to perform 
the periodical acts activates a person, even though he 
does not desire anything, to these acts which bear no 
fruit at all. 

Besides, a person who is desirous of heaven also 
opens and shuts his eyes; for you these actions do not 
subserve his realization of heaven. Why not consider 
the sacrificing an action of the same kind ? There are 
some who do not accept that it is a means of realizing 

71. Refutation. If that is the view, we ask: 
Are the sacrifice etc., ivhich are to be grasped by the 
cognition that they are such means, eliminated from 
the injunction? On this point: When the injunction 
does not mean to convey a relation between the object 
to be realized and the means of realizing it, then all 
acts are fruitless. 

Therefore, it is sound to maintain that from the 
injunctive suffixes there results first the cognition that 
they are indeed the means to realize the desired object, 
and that subsequently the desire for this object prompts 
a person to undertake the act of realization. But it is 
improper to maintain that the primary denotation 
occurs in the expressing of a meaning that was 
previously unknown, and that the denotation in the 
expressing of any other meaning is secondary. We 
conclude that ordinary, non-Vedic statements give rise 
to cognitions concerning meanings that are just so 
established by these statements. 




72. Objection. But these cognitions do not arise 
from the denoting power of language, but result from 
Inference. For these statements, though their denota¬ 
tions in conveying certain meanings are consciously 
known once their proper meanings have been learnt, 
do not furnish complete certainty about their meanings 
merely upon being' heard by a listener, when they are 
accompanied by doubt which is created by the listener’s 
observation that in one case or other statements have 
deviated from their proper meanings. And, unless 
there be complete certainty, the meaning will remain 
unknown ; for no knowledge can arise in one’s mind 
from uncertainty. 

If the meaning of a statement is not known, 
the listener wants to discover it: “ The speaker uses 
words whose meanings apparently admit of being 
connected; and reliable persons do not use words 
whose connections are unknown;” and the listener 
realizes that therefore the speaker has knowledge of 
such a connection. If the knowledge of connection is 
thus inferred , the meaning discovered by the listener 
does not require the authority of verbal testimony. 
Consequently, since ordinary language statements arc 
dependent on the speaker’s cognition; they terminate 
in that cognition through Inference alone. 

73. Refutation. This view is not correct; for 
a word conveys its right meaning as its natural func¬ 
tion, and the observation that in one case the statement 
happened to be untrue under the influence of defects 
in the speaker’s character should not give rise to a 
general suspicion which would cause aJ! statement to 
give up its natural capacity of conveying its meaning. 



The suspicion that a fire may not burn in other eases 
because in one ease, when obstructed by mantras, it 
fails to bum, does not make fire fail to bum! And the 
fact that the sense of vision may give rise to a cogni¬ 
tion which docs not correspond to reality—e.g. that 
nacre is silver—as the result of some optical error does 
not signify that the visual sense cannot produce true 
cognition of the visible presence of n. pitcher etc. 

Therefore, a statement does indeed instantly 
convey a certain meaning to the listener if he knows 
the relation between the words and their meanings. It 
docs not require knowledge of the basis. Before there 
is complete knowledge on the part of the listener about 
the basic knowledge of the speaker, and, further, when 
the meaning has been expressed, the question rises: 
“How does he know this?” and Inference proceeds to 
resolve that question. You want to infer: a Did the 
speaker know something V* or wish to infer his knowledge 
of the connection of the different meanings. But the 
mere knowledge that the speaker knew something is not 
enough for utterance and action concerning a state¬ 
ment—meaning to proceed. Inference of a cognition 

concerning the connection, of different meanings is im¬ 
possible without a prior cognition of such a connection. 
This being so, the meaning of the statement must be 
known first. For cognitions whose particular objects 
are not connected, are not connected themselves. Nor is 
a particular meaning established by cognitions that are 
inferred to be such. If you say that any word combina¬ 
tion which is able to convey a certain connection 
produces knowledge of just this connection, I maintain 
that the connection of the particular meanings must be 



known previously; unless a connection has already 
reached the level of cognition it cannot give rise to being 
expressed in a statement. 

74. To conclude, the cognition of an established 
fact in statements like “there is a fruit on the river- 
bank ” is strictly of verbal origin and does not arise 
from Inference. 1 Therefore the position that statements 
produce valid knowledge only if they deal with a 
previously unknotvn is taken *nly by people whose 
judgments are’stultified by their continuous preoccupa¬ 
tion with their own theories. In the manner set forth 
above it is true that statements may bear meaningfully 
and informatively on other meanings as well. 

Consequently, all the statements of the Upanisads 
which set forth the existence of a categorically different 
Person (e.g. “He is the overlord of the Universe, 
sovereign of all. He commands all the world ”. 149 
“ All this is manifest to Him 150 etc.”) are authoritative 
etc.”) are authoritative as to what they state, since they 
produce indubitable and unreversed knowledge of their 

75. Nor do statements concerning established 
facts lose their authority simply because of the con¬ 
sideration that repetition or reversion might be antici¬ 
pated on the strength of our assumption that either a 
corroborating or an invalidating cognition about the 
same facts could conceivably occur; for the same thing 
would also apply to statements concerning karya. Be¬ 
sides, a karja can also be known through other means 
of knowledge, e.g. the karja that firewood is to be 
fetched ; for it has been admitted that that karya can 
also be known through another means of knowledge as 



in the case of the cooking of the odana . 15) Or if a 
statement which sets forth a karya about a categori¬ 
cally different act like the agnihotra is held to be 
authoritative because no other authority for it can be 
conceived to exist,—why, since there is not a ghost of 
other authority for the existence of the Bhagavan whose 
personality consists in unsurpassed knowledge, sove¬ 
reignty and beatitude, it is all the same, depending on 
what partisan view one takes ! 

Moreover, if a cognition concerning a content that 
is also known through another means of knowledge 
does not recognize its own content as authoritative, 
since it has already been taken care of by another 
authority, this non-authoritativenes of its content is 
beyond experience for it is a mere matter of assump¬ 
tion. Therefore it must be-maintained that all indubi¬ 
table and unreversed knowledge is authoritative, 
regardless of whether its content is established, or yet 
to be performed, or anything else. Hence we reject 
our opponent’s position. 

76. The objection 151 that omniscience is acquired 
by means of the regular senses is incorrect, ISS because 
^ruti contradicts it: “ He sees without eyes, hears with 
ears; he who does not see with the eye, who sees the 
eyes, has neither effect nor instrument;” IM “know¬ 
ledge, strength and action are natural to Him,” 155 etc. 
These grutis do not speak metaphorically, for there is 
no authority for this assumption. Metaphorical usage 
is assumed when the primary meanings of the grutis 
make no sense. Since the primary meaning here makes 
sense, the assumption of metaphorical use Is baseless. 



77. Objection. But in this case we have in fact 
reason to cancel the primay meaning, because the 
primary sense militates against other means of know¬ 

Refutation. What other means of knowledge ? 
Not, to start, Perception, for we see no Perception 
occur which shows that the said Person is non-existent. 
If you retort that non-existence is decided by the non- • 
apprehension of what should be there, we reply that this 
does not hold in our case since the object, that is the 
said Person, is actually apprehended through Scripture 
itself, which is the highest-ranking among the assembly 
of the means of knowledge. Nor does it militate against 
Inference; for how could an Inference which disproves 
that Person arise at all, slow-moving as it is, when its 
object is instantly refuted by the rapidly arising 
scriptural cognition ? Moreover, if this were so, the 
relation of sacrificing etc. to heaven, apiiroa 156 etc., 
would logically be contradicted by the fact that 
sacrificing etc. are actions, when Scripture did not 
cancel such reasoning. True, the identity of sacrificial 
pole and sun, which is asserted by Scripture, is 
cancelled by another means of knowledge, namely 
Perception alone, because the difference between a 
piece of wood and the disc of the sun is indeed obvious. 
Besides, in this case it is legitimate to assume 
metaphorical usage, for the statement of this identity 
is an artkavada , since it forms one single statement with 
the proximate injunction about the unction of the 
sacrificial pole. 157 There is no other injunction to 
which it could be accessory as an artkavada . 
Alternatively, inasmuch as the human importance of a 

Aoama prXmXijyax'i 


statement would be lost if there were no injunction to 
connect it with, an injunction may be supplemented 
and then the arthavada is regarded as accessory to that 
supplemented injunction. 

7B. The objection 15 * that as long as statements fail 
to prompt the operator of the means of knowledge to 
being active or to prevent him from being active, they 
do not communicate self-sufficient information, docs 
not hold good. For, we find that statements have 
human importance also outside any connection with an 
injunction; in such a case it will be as in the statement 
“A son has been born to you,” and the like. Nor need 
an injunction be supplemented in these cases. For 
without an injunction, too, joy arises from the informa¬ 
tion that a son has been born. Likewise, a statement 
which is sclf-sufiicient in merely expressing particular 
actions which questioners want to know in exchanges 
of question and answer—e.g. “Which action?” 
“ Cooking ! ”—do not require the supplementation of 
an injunction. In the upanisadic texts the knowledge 
of brahman is declared to be rewarded by great bliss : 

“ the brahman-knower becomes brahman ”; ,w “ the 
brahman knower attains the supreme **; *«• “ the saman 
cantor attains with brahman all that he desires: 
the human importance of statements without injunc¬ 
tions is quite clear from these and other scriptural 

' To sum up, when it is established that the 
Bhagavan is the treasury solely of beautiful qualities of 
direct universal cognition, compassionateness etc., 
qualities which arc true and natural to Him, and 
which we know from hundreds of quoted 4rutis, then it 



is also established that the Tantra which is based on 
His universal cognition is authoritative indeed. 

79. Objection. Granted that, as you have des¬ 
cribed it, there exists some Person who is endowed 
with natural omniscience, as it is known from the 
upanisads, yet, unless it is absolutely certain that this 
Person is indeed Hari, Paficaratra will not be authori¬ 

Refutation. This is a worthless remark; no 
experts in the Veda dispute that the Supreme Soul, 
cause of the entire universe, is Vasudeva. For He is 
revealed in the upanisads as the Supreme Soul: 

“ Truth, knowledge, infinite ; that is the supreme step 
of Visnu. Vasudeva is the ultimate matter, the ulti¬ 
mate spirit ” 162 “ He was alone beyond who became 
this world ” ; “ higher than whom there is nothing at 
all in accordance with the subject expressed in these 
statements there are passages like: “From whom these 
beings...” “Sal alone, my son..” Therefore Visnu’s 
perfect knowledge is established by the 1 upanisads. 
And it is not declared in gruti that the origination, 
subsistence and destruction of the world are caused by 
anyone but Him. Hence there is a consensus that He 
is the supreme omniscient soul. > 

That He is the Supreme Soul we learn also from 
the statements of Dvaipayana, Paraiara, Narada and 
other great seers. Thus i“ Know th»u, O tormentor 
of thy foes, that the entire world rests on Visnu. The 
Great Visnu creates the totality of creatures, moving 
and unmoving. In him they go to their reabsoiption, 
from Him they originate / f “ The glorious Sage 
Narayana, without beginning or end, is the sovereign 

Xoama fkXmXnyam 


Lord. He creates the creatures, those that stand still 
and those that move. That He is the Supreme 
Brahman is also learnt elsewhere. KeSava, O best of 
the Bharatas, the Blessed One, is the sovereign, the 
supreme soul, the entire universe: thus it stands 
revealed in many places of the Scripture.” 163 “ For 
those who seek to know the supreme principle by means 
of many-sided reasonings Hari alone is the Principle, 
the great Yogin, Narayana the Lord. ,,lw 

Likewise in the Danadharma, 

“Padmanjibha is the Supreme Soul, the highest 
One, the pure One, the Refuge. This is the secret 
doctrine of the Veda; dost thou not know, sacker of 
cities ? By His grace do we all cause the worlds to exist. 
And the trusted ones, and the first among the 
immortals, and the gods are held to be His repre¬ 
sentatives. If Visnu is indifferent, no good will come 
to us.” 

Thus Rudra’s word. 165 Similarly, in the Maha- 
bh&rata and Matsya Purana, 

“He who amongst them is the Supreme Soul, He 
indeed is the eternal, unqualified, perfect One; He is 
to be known as Narayana, fer He is the world-soul, the 

Likewise in the Varaha Purana, 

"Who, excepting the Lord Narayana, is superior 
to the God whose conduct has become the life-order 0 n 
the earth ?” 

“There has been no God greater than Narayana, 
nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of the 
Vedas and the Puranas, O excellent ones.” 


Xoama prXmXkyam 

Likewise in the Liriga Furana, 

■ “Janardana is the sole Spirit, the highest One,*the 
Supreme Soul, from whom Brahma was born ; from 
Him Rudra and from Him all the world.*’ < 

Likewise Fara£ara*s word/ 

“The world has originated from Vistiu and'on 
Him it rests. He is the maker of its subsistence and 
its destruction.” 166 

Likewise in the ManavadharmaSastra, 167 

“Narayana is higher than the unmanifest; the 
World-Egg originates from the unmanifest. Within 
the Egg are all these worlds as well as the earth with 
her seven continents." 

Therefore, the study of these and similar 3rutis, 
smrtis, epical texts and puranas proves that Vasudeva 
is the universal cause, the Supreme Soul. 

80. Nor do the Srutis declare that Rudra is the 
Supreme Soul, or that any other deity is. On the 
contrary, the followers of the Ekayana £akha ,<58 say that 
he has an origin, and the same is found in the Veda 
itself: “Darkness was here....from which Rudra is 
b*rn; that is the greatest in all the worlds, that indeed 
is the oldest in the worlds.” “Similarly, Rudra’s posi¬ 
tion is clearly known to bea result of his karman 
obtained his greatness by propitiating Visnu.” “From 
the forehead sprang a drop; from that Rudra was 
born.” 169 

These and other Gratis declare that Rudra was 
born. This being so, the statements that in appearance 
convey the greatness of Rudra and others really serve 
as laudatory statements, like' the 3ruti: “the ear is 



brahmaa.” ,, ° Consequently, the passages in the 
Puranas which declare Rudra etc. to be the Supreme 
Soul have not their primary meaning, because they arc 
in conflict with Perception and Scripture. 

81. Concerning the objection that the assertions 
of the doctrines of the Tantras are to be rejected since 
their greatness is set forth only in non-Vcdic Tantric 
texts, we say that Visnu is stated to be the Supreme One 
in the texts of the Way of the Vedic doctrine. For 
example in the Visnu Purana, 

“The Supreme Soul, the Basis of all creatures, the 
Supreme Lord is called by the name of Visnu in Vedas 
and Upanisads.” 171 

In the Varaha Purana, 

“ The Supreme Brahman is Visnu; the triple 
division in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine is here 
set forth ; the ignorant do not know this. 172 There has 
been no god greater than Narayana, nor shall there 
be; m this is the secret doctrine of Vedas and Puranas, 
O excellent ones.” 

Likewise in the Matsya Purana, 

“In those aeons where saitva prevails, the great¬ 
ness of Vi§nu is declared. In aeons predominated by 
tamas the greatness of Fire and Siva is expounded.” 174 

Likewise in the Liriga Purana, 

“ For there is no other recourse ordained but 
Visnu; this' the Vedas constantly declare; n o doubt 
about it.” 

‘ Likewise in the Vayu Purana, 


aoama prXmXnyapJi 

<{ The Spirit that belongs to the Way of the Veda 
is explaind to be the thousand-armed supreme lord of 

Likewise in the Bhavisyat Purana, 

“ Visnu is traditionally known to be the Sepreme 
in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine. Visnu is the 
greatest among persons, the most exalted Supreme 

All this has already been explained in great detail 
in the Purusanirnaya 176 and is therefore not further 
enlarged upon here. Therefore, how can our tongue 
endeavour to say that the Tantra which is revealed by 
Visnnu who is known from the Upanisads is false ? 
For He is such that He has an immediate insight into 
the dharma of Consecration, Propitiation etc., by virtue 
of the omniscience that is natural to Him. 1 ” 

82. Considering that the sensual pleasure to be 
had from attainment of heaven, the birth of a son etc. 
is inseparable from various forms of misery and does 
not. continue for long, the supreme sages Sandilya, , 
Karada and others have rejected this pleasure, which 
in their view was really misery, and in order to attain 
the release left their dwellings to become mendicants ; 
and they have decided definitively that He has created 
the PafScaratra Sastra which sets forth the knowledge 
and manner o f propitiation of Himself which constitute 
the sole means of attaining the unparalleled beatitude 
they sought. 

83. This argument cannot be extended to other 
Tantras, for in the various authors of those Tantras 
error etc. is possible. It is impossible that Perception 

Agava prAvAnyaj'i 


or another means of knowledge forms the basis for the 
other Tantras, and they themselves do also not claim 
that Scripture is the basis. Besides, because they 
communicate a meaning that is incompatible with the 
conclusions of the upanisads the view that these 
Tantras are based on Perception or Scripture is 

For there are four kinds of followers of the way of 
life set forth in those Tantras, the Kapalikas, Kala- 
mukhas, PaSupatas and Saivas. The Kapalika doctrine 
is described as follows : the reward of release is attained 
by knowing what the six mudrikas m are and by wearing 
them, not by knowing Brahman. As they say, “He 
who knows the identities of the six mudrikas and is 
expert in the supreme Mudra, and meditates upon the 
self in the vulva posture, attains nirvana.” The six 
mudrikas of the Kapalikas are stated to be the earring, 
necklace, pendent, head ornament, ashes and the sacri¬ 
ficial theread : there are two more subsidiary mudras 
described, namely skull and skull-staff'. One whose 
body is marked by these mudrus will not be reborn in 
the world.” Now, the £rutis do not bear out their view 
that the knowledge of such paraphernalia, the wearing 
of them and the concentration on the body in the 
immoral vulva posture are means to attain release, for 
the grutis expound that release is attainable only by one 
who has renounced all sensual desires of this world and 
the other world and who concentrates on the soul 
Vasudevaas the cause of the entire Universe: “knowing 
Him one goes beyond death; there is no other path to 
tread ctc.” m 

The same is. true of the Kalamukhas who teach 
that certain practices, which are condemned by all the 

70 Aoama prXmXnya^j 

iastras, like eating from a skull, bathing in and tasting 
of ashes of cremated corpses, carrying a Jaguda staff, 
putting up wine-cups and worshipping the dpity in 
them, will secure all material and immaterial desires : 
these teachings are outside the Veda. 

84. Also some of the teachings of the PaJupatas 
and the Saivas in which compatible and incompatible 
element arc indiscriminately mixed are likewise out¬ 
side the Veda. The PaSupata system is ( as follows: 
there are individual souls which are called pa^us, 
cattle, and their overlord is Siva, the Lord of Cattle. 
To assist the souls Siva has composed the 
PaUcadhyayi. 190 There the five Categories are ex¬ 
plained, namely. Cause, Effect, Injunction, Yoga and 
the Cessation of Misery. The Cause is of two kinds, 
material and instrumental. Rudra is the instrumental 
cause and a sixteenth part of him is the material cause. 
The Effect comprises the elements from Mahat m to 
earth. The Injunction is stated to comprehend 
principally a number of rites, secret practices, bathing 
and lying in ashes etc. m The Yoga is said to be con¬ 
centration and the muttering of formula, OM etc. m 
The Cessation of Misery is held to be release; thus the 
five Categories are enumerated.—The term “cessation 
of misery” means total and final cessation of misery. 

The system holds that this cessation or release is defined 
by the annihilation of all the qualities of the differential 

This conception of God is held by the Saivas as 
well as the others. Add this view of God is entirely 
incompatible with Scripture, for it is t revealed in Sruti 
that the Supreme Brahman is both the material and the 



instrumental cause of the Universe. Also, it is 
repeatedly revealed in the scriptures that release con¬ 
sists in perfect bliss. As the authoritativeness of these 
Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradic¬ 
tions, it is not really necessary for them to be rejected 
with the stick of the Veda. 

85. Moreover, the Saivas etc. accept stages of 
life etc. that are outside the vanxdixama system that is 
proved by the Veda and are'consequently outside the 
Veda. As they say,” merely by entering Consecration 
one becomes instantly a Brahmin. A man becomes an 
ascetic by accepting the Kapalika vow.” 

86. Let it not be said, How could Rudra, who is 
very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of 
texts which are not authoritative ? Nor is it right to 
hold that these texts are based upon the recollection of 
an author of the same name as Siva, because the 
ground is overextensive. For the theory that the author 
was in error and could be in error, because he was not 
Siva but some other person with the same name, can 
only follow if the Veda sublates the system; this latter 
ground is sufficient to prove the lack of authority of 
these texts and entails no Overextension to other texts. 
And error is not entirely impossible in the case of such 
persons as Rudra etc. Or else one may reason that 
since Rudra may have composed such a system for the 
purpose of deceiving the w»rld because he is known as 
a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even 
necessary to assume error on his part. For thus it 
reads in the Varaha Purana, 

“For Thou, strong-armed Rudra, must cause 
deluding doctrines to be expounded, the deceptions of 


Aoama p rA m Any am 

jugglers and the like as well as conflicting practices. 
Having shown that the Fruit can be won with little 
effort, you must delude all these people quickly.” 7 ** 
Similarly, the venerable Rudra himself shows 
in the same Purapa that the Saiva and the like scrip¬ 
tures which are there being discussed are apostate from 
the Veda, that only apostates from the Veda are quali¬ 
fied for these doctrines and that their only purpose is 
just to deceive them. “I have propounded this 3astra 
as though it were correct doctrine in order to deceive 
those who have deserted the Way of the Veda.' 85 From 
that time onward, O excellent Ones, the people who 
believe in the scriptures promulgated by myself do not 
respect the Vedas. 186 Thus the PaSupata and like 
doctrines are active in the Kali Age." 187 

Likewise he shows that the worship concerning 
himself as it is propounded in the Pa£upata Tantras 
and other such Tantras is different and does not form 
part of the worship of the Bhagavan: “The said act of 
worship concerning me which is being observed is 
really outside the Veda. This ritual called PaSupata is 
the lowliest and deceives men. 188 Only the lowest people 
worship me with exclusion of Vis9U. ,,,S9 The large 
numbers of statements like the preceding ones will not 
be written out here, because they are t*o numerous. It 
is clear enough that those who follow these scriptures 
are outside the Veda, as is stated in the same Puraija: 
“He cursed those who kept the observances of hairtuft, 
ashes and skull. Be you outside the Veda and disquali¬ 
fied for Vedic rites. In the Kali Age all those who 
assume that appearance, wearing hairtuft and carrying 
a laguda stick, exhibitng arbitrary observances and 



carrying false lingas about, all these hair-tuft wearing 
devotees of Rudra are consumed by the fire of 
Brahma’s curse.” 190 These practices are well-known 
in the Saiva scriptures: “Rosary, and bracelet in the 
hand, a hair-tuft on the head, a skull, bathing in ashes 

Similarly, he declares in the Aditya Parana that 
along with relinquishing the Bhagavan they relinquish 
the Veda: “Others, those that wear ashes and hair-tufts 
as described have formerly been made to relinquish 
the Veda as well as God Narayana on account of 
Gautama’s curse.” 191 

Moreover, those fools who pass censure on 
Vasudeva arc to be regarded as heretics, for thus it is 
declared in the Linga Purana, “Those who consider 
the Supreme Person to be equal (to Siva) are to be 
regarded as heretics who are expelled from the Wayof 
the Veda.” 192 

To conclude, it is these followers of other Tantras 
of whom 1 " it is said, in the smrtis: “Heretics, crimi¬ 
nals etc.”, that they should not be honoured even with 
a word ; and the declaration “Which are outside the 
Veda. .refers to them. Consequently, since it cannot 
properly be said of the other Tantras that they are 
based either on Veda or on Perception, another cause 
must be assumed for them. 

87. Odjection. If it is true that for these 
Tantras another basis must be assumed, let the defect 
be granted. But is in your own view knowledge not 
self-proved ? 



Refutation. Certainly; but this self-validity of 
knowledge is here negated by these two defects of 
sublation, namely, sublation through Perception and 
through Scripture, for both these defects arc plain in 
tlieir' case. The equality of Paficaratra Tantra and 
those other Tantras which has been postulated on the 
ground that both happen to be Tantra, while in fact 
one of the two is incompatible with Scripture and 
plainly shows a different provenance, would mean that 
Brahmin Murder and Horse Sacrifice are on the same 
level because both are actions: For in the case of 
Paficaratra Sastra we have positive certainty that it is 
based on Scripture and Perception. 

88. Objection. I made the objection 194 that if 
its being based on Scripture follows from its being 
established by the Veda, then it cannot be assumed 
that the author was independent. 

Refutation. No. Surely, we can assume no 
independence in man, but for God it is revealed in 
Scripture, e.g., “To Him'all the world is manifest,. 
“From fear for Him.. 

89. Objection. But if the Paficaratra traditions 
are really derived Rom the Veda, then* how is it that 
no recollection of the Vedic words which furnishes 
this basis has persisted among the Paficaratrikas, 
whereas the meaning of these words apparently does 
persist? It is not right to contend that only the recol¬ 
lection of the meaning is important because that has 
purpose while the recollection of the actual Vedic 
statements is to be disregarded because it is purpose¬ 
less ; for it is not proper to forget that from which the 
meaning’s authority derives. 

Xgama pram&nyam 


Or if, in order to justify this oblivion* the stand* 
point is taken that the doctrine is based on a Vedic 
sakha which has been lost or which is always deducible, 
then whatever doctrine a person adopts he can always 
make authoritative simply by attributing it to a lost 
3akha; however, it is hard to prove what a lost or 
deducible sakha actually contain. 

Or if these traditions are based on an extant 
Sakha, then others would know it as well as the author, 
and hence his taking the trouble of promulgating these 
texts would be purposeless. 

Refutation. The reply to this is as follows: The 
Bhagavan, who has an immediate presentation of the 
entire collection of the Veda by virtue of the perfect 
knowledge that is natural to Him, observed that his 
devotees were not firm enough in their minds to retain 
and transmit the lessons of all the various Sakhas which 
consist of widely scattered injunctions, arthacadas and 
mantras of many different kinds, and having observed 
this he was moved by his compassion to condense the 
meaning of the Veda in an easily comprehensible way 
and to teach it so. On this showing nothing is un¬ 
established. As they say “The blessed Hari took the 
essence of the Upanisads and condensed it, the Sage, 
out of compassion with his devotees for their con¬ 

The other objections made, 194 which are equally 
applicable to all Traditions of Manu and the others, 
are easily answered by all those who have made a 
diligent study of the commentaries on the Tantras and 
are not further enlarged upon here. 


90* Ohjection. The thesis tliat the Paficaratra 
Tantras are based on the Veda is disproved by the fact 
that we find in these very Tantras a condemnation of 
the Veda. For it is said that Sancfi/ya, failing- to find 
a meaning of human importance in the four Vedas, 
learnt this lustra. 

Refutation. This is the objection of someone 
who does not know the distinct meaning of the state¬ 
ment. For this censure docs not mean to censure 
something deserving or censure, but rather to praise 
something else than that which is censured. For 
instance, in the Aitareya Brahmana the censure passed 
on the pre-dawn oblation “Morning upon morning 
they speak untruth,” 190 is understood to praise the 
post-dawn oblation. It is as in the Manavadharma- 
Mstra: “The Ijlgvcda is of gods and deities, the 
Yajurvcdaof man, and the Samavcda of the deceased; 
therefore its sound is impure;” m here the censure of 
the Samavcda serves to praise the other Vedas. Or as 
in the Maliabharata: “Formerly the assembled seers 
placed the four Vedas and the Maliabharata in the 
balance, one at one side, the other at the other side. 
And since in bulk and in weight the latter- pre¬ 
ponderated, it is called the Great Bliarata for its bulk 
and weight." 1 * 8 This is said, notto belittle the Vedas, 
but to be$t*w praise on the MalwbhSrata. In this 
same way the above statement must be taken as praise 
of the Paficaratra. Just as the censure of the pre-dawn 
oblation etc. docs not really intend censure, since 
elsewhere in the same texts they are praised, so will it 
be in our case too. In Paficaratra, too, we frequently 
find praise of the Veda; for example: “Nothing that 

Xgama pramJnyam 


is made up of words is superior to the Veda, thou who 
art seated on the Lotus. That is said by the Upanisads 
which set forth the knowledge of truth** etc. 

91. Besides in the quotation catursu vedesu m the 
meaning is not that there is no purpose of human 
importance in the Vedas but simply “failing to find 
the purpose of human importance which is in the 

Objection. However, the principal connection in 
this sentence is between “failing to find** and “a pur¬ 
pose of human importance;” not between “purpose of 
human importance” and “in the Vedas.’* 

Refutation. Don’t argue like that, for there is 
no negation in the sentence. For it is not so that this 
purpose of human importance is absent from the 
Vedas; hence the sentence “failing to find that pur¬ 
pose of human importance which is in the Vedas, and 
desirous of finding it, he learnt the Paficaratra Sastra,” 
conveys that both Revelation and Paficaratra have the 
same meaning. 

92. The further objection 100 that Paficaratra is 
non-Vedic because of the injunction that those who 
are qualified for Vedic sacraments etc. must undergo 
such sacraments described as Consecration because 
they are propitiations of the Lord, does not hold good. 
For such statements as agnavaisnavam. . . J01 which enjoin 
the sacrament of consecration upon those qualified for 
Initiation etc. as accessory to the ritual of the 
jyotistoma etc. do not therefore become non-Vedic. 

Or if the ground for its non-Vedic character is the 
injunction of sacraments other than the Vedic ones 


Agama puAviX-Vyam 

the ground is inappropriate, because of the circular 
argument it involves: only if the non-Vcdic character 
of Paficaratra Sastra is proved, it is proved that these 
sacraments arc really different; and if the latter is 
proved, it is proved that Paficaratra Sastra is non- 

Moreovcr, the ground is either that the Paficaratra 
sacraments are different from all Vedic sacraments, or 
that they are different from some Vedic sacraments. 
Not the latter alternative, for this would mean that the 
sacrament of Initiation etc. is non-Vedic because it is 
different from the sacrament of Tonsure ; nor the first 
alternative, because it does not escape the said defect? 
for the sacrament of Initiation is not different from all 
Vedic sacraments; and we have said that the 
difference (of Paficaratra sacraments) from Vedic 
sacraments is disproved on the ground that Fancaratra 
Sastra is Vedic. 

93. The objection 101 that Paficaratra is outside 
the Veda, because like the Paiupata Tantra it is not 
included among the fourteen sciences which are held 
to be authoritative of dharma, would also have an 
occasional application to the texts of the Eharata and 
Ramayana composed by Dvaipayana and Valmlki. 

94. The objection that Paficaratra is non-Vedic 
because it is rejected by the blessed Badarayana is 
incorrect. For how could the blessed Dvaipayana 205 
be thought to reject the Bhagavata doctrine, while he 
himself is a supreme Bhagavata, model for all the 
world ? It was he who said, '‘This has been extracted 
from the Bharata in its full length of one hundred 



thousand Slokas after it had been churned with the 
stick of thought, as butter is extracted from curds, and 
curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the 
Aranyaka from the Vedas, and the amrta from the 
herbs; this Mahopanisada which is consistent with the 
four Vedas and the demonstrations of Samkhyaand 
Yoga is called the Paiicaratra. This is bliss, this is 
brahman, this is the summum bonum. Being consistent 
with Rk, Yajuh and Saman and the Atharvangirasas, 
this discipline will of a certainty be authoritative ” 254 

And in the Bhlsmaparvan too; “Brahmins, 
Ksatriyas, Vaiiyas and Sudras as described are all to 
worship, serve and honour Madhava according to the 
Satvata ritual that has been promulgated by 
Samkarsana, at the end of the Dvapara age and the 
beginning of the Kali age.” 205 

Also in the Santiparavan: “Certainly, the 
Vaisnava must undergo Consecration with all effort: 
For Hari will be particularly graceful to one who has 
been consecrated and to no one else. One should 
consecrate a Brahmin in spring, a Ksatriya in summer, 
a Vai&ya in the autumn, a Sudra in winter, a woman 
in the rainy season according to the Pancaratra 
doctrine.’ 1206 And likewise: “It has been made 
commensurate with the four Vedas on the great 
Mountain Meru.”*° T 

Now, how could Dvaipayana reject the Pancaratra, 
which is his own supreme doctrine, comprising the 
sense of the Upanisads, as follows from these and 
a hundred direct and circumlocutory declarations made 
with full respect ? 


Aoama prJuInyam 

95, Objection. But then how to explain the 
su tra ulfiatiyasambkavat ? 103 

Reply. What is the intention of the sutra ? 

Objection. The following: Since it is expounded 
in the Bhagavata Sastra that the individual s*ul has an 
origin, and since this is impossible as it militates 
against Scripture and Logic, therefore this Sastra is 

Reply. If that is the meaning of the sutra, then 
how can the sutra he intended to reject the Pancaratra 
Sastra ? For the Paficaratra Sastras do not accept that 
the individual soul has an origin, which assumption 
would have j’usdfied the sutra’s rejection. 

Objection. But is it not their assertion that 
Vasudeva is at once the supreme material cause and 
the supreme spirit; that from him the individual soul 
Samkarsaria is born, from Samkarsana the mind called 
Pradyumna, and from the latter the ego called 
Aniruddk a ? 

Reply. No. The personal manifestation of Godis 
described as being constituted by vjiikos™* and the 
word ‘‘individual soul” is assigned to one of these 
vjytlbas for practical purposes, in order to prove clearly 
the differences that exist within the Adorable One, 
which differences are in accordance with those of the 
varnas. It is as they say: “The four vyiihas are to be 
Worshipped successively by the four varnas succes¬ 
sively.” Besides, the words 'individual soul/ 'mind* 
an< ‘ego* do not denote these lanmatras 210 themselves, 
but refer to a person who is the superintending deity of 
these orders and whose personality is entirely different 

Jqaua prXilLvyam 

81 . 

from the order he superintends. Birth is described 
as the acquisition of various bodies, as is said in the 
statement loyena jiodn in the Yajurmurdhan. 111 

Besides, the Author of the Sutras has already- 
discarded the Sruti, smrti and profane views concerning 
the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul 
in the sutra car dearavpapdlrayas tu sydt loduyapadeSa 
bhdklas ladbhdcahhdvltrdt. 7n And since, moreover, the 
origination of the individual soul out of Brahman has 
been rejected in the sutras natma iruleh nltyatvdc ca 
tabkjaJi™ it does not occasion a renewed exposition: 
an issue which does not need being made a topic 
would then be made a topic. 

9G. This also explains the sutra na ca kartuh 
karanam ; 214 for it is not said here that the instrument, 
sc. themind, originates from the agent, sc. Samkarsana. 
For we have already stated that these names solely 
refer to the persons who superintendent these orders 
but are themselves diff erent from them. 

Objection. Then why this sutra at all? For we 
do not find that instruments, like a hatchet, originate 
from an agent, like Devadatta, so that an instrument 
out of an agent makes no sense. 

Refutation. Well, then you reject the general 
view that all instruments, vital airs, mind etc. have 
their origin in Brahman which itself is without the 
entire collection of all instruments and rests solely on 
its own power ; this view is stated in the text: “From 
it springs the vital air, the mind and all the senses.” 31 * 
Or if you do agree on this because it is clearly 
proved in Revelation, 1 ask you why you don’t agree- 



on it because it is clearly proved in Paficaratra. It is 
not a very proper procedure to deny things that are 
proved by smrti; since both 3ruti and smrti spring 
from perfect knowledge, they are equally valid. 

97. Odjection. The sutra vijnanadibhavt va 
tadapTalistdhah 7 ' 6 is explained as follows: The Author 
raises the question which one of two alternatives may 
be true: Are these four equally and independently 
sovereign, or has one a quatemity of personalities 
which he has assumed at his own desire ? and then he 
points out the defect: if they arc equally sovereign, 
none of them can be effects because they are equal; 
when they are different forms of one, whal is the pur¬ 
pose of this division ? 

Refutation. That is not correct, because an 
alternative is impossible. For no one who holds that 
there is a God theorizes that the world has several 
Gods, least of all the Paficaratrikas who hold that 
"Vasudeva is the ultimate material cause”. But this 
one Bhagavan, who has divided Himself into four for 
reasons of sport, protects the entire world. And this 
position is not unjustified, because it is justified in the 
same manner as the appearance of second-born and 
first-born brothers like Bala and Bharata, For just as 
the Bhagavan, who has created the variety of pheno¬ 
mena of ether, ‘Wind, Siva, Brahma etc. for His sport, 
and whose sole motivation is the sport of his 
unfathomable power, has voluntarily assumed the 
personalities of Rama, Laksmana, Bharata, Satrughna 
etc., without there being the possibility of logical 
conflict in the same manner the divisions of 

Xoama prXmX^yaiTi 83 

Sanikarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, too, are 

98. Furthermore, vipratisedhai 717 may mean either 
“because of conflict with Revelation”, on the basis of 
the citation “failing to find in the four Vedas*...;” or 
“because of mutual conflict between theTantias them¬ 
selves”. The former alternative, incompatibility with 
Revelation has already been refuted as being without 
valid basis. Mutual conflict between the Paficaratra 
Tantras themselves, whose terminological precision has 
been perfected by the rules of logic governing principal 
matter, generality, peculiarity, quality and the like, 
does not exist. On the other hand, statements that 
lack the corroboration of logic Can have no cogency ; 
as the maxim says : “A statement must have precision 
perfected by logic before it can communicate its 

Consequently, the Author of the Sutras gives the 
lie to those exegetes who, hy superimposing on the 
Paficaratra Tantras (whose validity he strongly affirms 
as no less than that of the Vedas, in such assertions as 
“idam mahopanisadam,” etc.) the non-existent 
doctrine of the soul’s origination, explain that the 
sutra means to reject the Paficaratra Tantras. Enough 
of the book! 

99. The meaning of the sutras is this. First the 
Author has set forth that the doctrines of Kapila 
KaSyapa, Bnddha, Jina and PaSupati,* 18 who oppose 
the Author’s own accepted doctrine, are unnatural* 19 
because they conflict with Revelation and logic. Now, 
in order to remove the suspicion that the Paficaratra 

Soama ppXuanyam 


Tantras (which are his own accepted doctine) are 
equally unnatural with the other doctrines because 
their usual enumeration on an equal plane with the 
others has made them closely associated with them in 
people’s thinking, he elicits their validity. 

In the first two sutras the prima-facie case is laid 
down: the Paficaratra likewise has no validity, 
utpattj)asa)nbhaval > i.e., on account of the impossibility 
of Sarrikarsana’s origination which is taught there. 
Why should it be impossible? Because it cannot be 
established in either of two possible cases; either the 
four Vyukas are equally sovereign, or else one God 
exists in four persons; and in either case there is im¬ 
possibility of origination. If they are equally sovereign/ 
they cannot be created because they are equal; if only 
one being is admitted no origination is possible either, 
since a distribution within one being of creating and 
created parts is inconceivable. 

100. Similarly na ca kartuh karatiam: Paficaratra 
has no validity for the further reason that it is impos¬ 
sible that the instrument, sc. the mind called 
Pradyumna, originates from the agent, sc. the indi¬ 
vidual soul called Sarpkarsana, for the hatchet docs not 
originate from Dcvadatta. Or there is this alternative 
explanation of na ca kartuh karatiam : and for the further 
reason that the instrument does not originate from the 
agent Samkarsana, since according to the text: "From 
it spring the vital air, the mind and all the senses," it 
is revealed that all instruments really originate from 

Xc; pbAmanyam 


101. Then follows; vijitdruldibhdre cd tad a - 
pratisedhah. By the particle vd this prima-facic case is 
now reversed. What has been said, viz. T that there is 
no validity since in neither case origination of 
Sainkarsana etc. is possible, is untrue; it is not contra¬ 
dictory that Sarnkarsaija etc. have originated. Indeed, 
it would be contradictory if they were not vijiianddi. 

Vijiianddi is a dvandva compound: “knowledge 
and beginning,” that means : Brahman ; thus vijfia- 
nadibhave means brahmabhdve. Inasmuch as they arc 
Brahman ( brahmabhdve ), the origination is not contra¬ 
dictory. That is to say : by virtue of the fact that the 
unique Supreme Soul Vasudeva, whose omnipotence is 
unbounded, enters into them through His maya, a 
cause-effect relation is justified. The objection that 
the mind cannot originate from Samkarsaria, on the 
authority of the £ruti that the mind originates from 
Brahman, is invalidated by the fact that he, sc. 
Sainkarsana is vijiianddi, i.e., Brahman. 

102. Furthermore, what is being said in the 
argument na ca karluh kanuaml Is it that the instru¬ 
ment of a certain action does not originate from the 
agent of that same action; or that no instrument of 
any action whatever originates from any agent whatso¬ 
ever? If the first view is taken, we have a conflict with 
Inference, because the argument contains the fallacy of 
proving the proved. The mind, originating from the 
agent Sainkarsana cannot be the instrument of 
Samkarsana’s action of originating it, since it itself is 
the object of the action ; nor can it be the instrument 
of the action of being originated, since it itself is the 


Xoama. frauanyaKi 

agent of that action. If the alternative view is taken, 
we have a conflict with Perception, because we see that 
for instance a pitcher, though it be the instrument of 
an action of fetching water, yet originates from the 
agent of such an action, the potter. This the Author 
says in the sutra xnpratisedhat'. ‘because there is conflict. 1 

103. As to the other explanation that has been 
given of these two sutras, 220 since it is vijiicincidi , i.e. 
“a ground for validity”, 221 the denial of the validity 
of Pancaratra is not justified, because it entails over- 
extension. The invalidity, which is defined by the 
non-origination of knowledge through repetition or 
dubiety in the Tantras, is rejected, because knowledge 
is actually had from them. In order to remove the 
suspicion of untruth occasioned by the speaker’s 
character, the word adi is used to convey the intended 
meaning that the Tantras are in fact spoken by a trust¬ 
worthy person. 

Consequently the meaning is this : He always has 
direct knowledge of the entire world by virtue of the 
omniscience which is part of His nature; He bestows 
man’s wishes upon him, when He is satisfied—and he 
is satisfied by meditation alone; Him the experts in the 
Veda describe as eternally satisfied in all His desires: 
how then can there be defects in Him like error, deceit 
etc. ? 

104. T he ‘impossibility of origination, ’ which has 
been stated in the first two sutras, is thereupon denied 
for Sarpkarsana and the other forms of God in the 
sutra vipratistdkdt. This means either; “Because there 
is conflict with the Bhagavan’s perception which is 

Koaua rR.^ illy yam 


inferred through Paficaratra;” or “Because there is 
conflict with Sruti which is inferred from the same 

105. Or there is another interpretation : since the 
sutras intend to illustrate the rules of exegesis, the 
author first assumes that there is a conflict between 
§ruti and Paficaratra, though in fact there is no such 
conflict, and then reasons this out as follows: 
suppose that Paficaratra is in conflict with the veda, is 
this gastra then, like the statements of Manu etc., valid 
or invalid? This question is thereupon answered : “It is 
invalid, because of the impossibility of the origination 
of valid knowledge concerning a conflicting sense; and 
this impossibility itself is proved on the ground that 
there is independence of something that is dependent.” 

Thus the sutra utpatlyasajnbhavat means: “because 
it is impossible that a valid knowledge originates, 
since, as long as the dependent Paficaratra Tradition 
docs not start proving the validity of its own sense by 
establishing the validity of its basis, the cognition 
which originates from the independent preterpersonal 
scripture determines the Tradition’s sense as being 
different, and consequently conflicting with itself For 
Paficaratra conveys that scripture is its basis only as 
long as the sword of direct scripture does not cut its 

106. Objection. But why should the Vedas 
themselves be independent, since their validity, too, 
depends on the direct cognition of the Bhagavfin, 
because this cognition is their cause? Just as the 
Paficaratra Traditions are dependent on His cognition, 
so are the Vedas too dependent on His cognition.” 1 


Rr.ruTATiON. To refute this view, the statement 
is made: na ca karltih karanam: “The Vedas arc not 
the product of a maker, i.c. the Bhagavan. Karaite 
here in the sense of “things that are made or pro¬ 
duced,” by the rule “sufiix-fltifl in the sense of the 
object of the action.” 2 ** This then means that the 
Vedas are preterhuman. 

107. Vijndnadibhdve vd tadapratisedhah. If, on the 
other hand, it is not true that the Paftcaratra Sastra is 
invalid, then what? tadapralisedhaf:, i e. non-rejection 
of the origination of valid knowledge (namely, even 
when partly conflicting, the conflicting statement may 
be valid optionally), because it is based upon the direct 
cognition of the Bhagavan in whom error and deceit 
are impossible as He is a source of vijfidna (vijnanadi- 
bhave): Vijuana means “knowledge par excellence in 
which no mistake is possible. For since all other 
authors of DharmaSastras are not omniscient, as they 
are involved in samsara, and since therefore they are 
also not entirely selfsufficient, various lapses are con 
ceivable in their knowledge. Whereas in the case of 
the Bhagavan, whose supremacy is natural and un¬ 
limited, His knowledge is the immediate insight in all 
dharma and adharma, which is natural to Him and true, 
as is known from hundreds of Srutis; it is this 
knowledge which in the putra is described as vijffana. 
When such knowledge is the ‘beginning,’ i.e. the basis, 
there is non-rejection, sc. the gastra is valid. 

108. Objkction. But how can it be assumed 
that the Tantra, which conflicts with scripture, has 
validity? For if it is valid, it becomes optional beside 


scripture; and optionality is deficient in the case of the 
Tantrasby eight defects. Option is assumed when 
there is no invariable rule that something should be 
such and not otherwise, because there is no reason to 
reject, in one case or another, an alternative statement J 
for instance: “He must sacrifice with rice,” beside 
“he must sacrifice with barley.” In the latter case it 
is impossible to eliminate one or the other because 
neither of these statements is characterized by in¬ 
dependence. In the former case, however, there can 
be no such option between scripture and Paficaratra, 
because the two are not equal; for the Vedic statement 
is independent, because it is preterhuman, whereas the 
Paficaratra statement is dependent. So how can they 
be alternatives and optional ? 

109. Refutation. Listen: because Paficaratra 
too is independent. 

Objection. How can a statement deriving from 
a person be independent? 

Refutation. Let us ask the logician to explain 
this: must dependence on something else be assumed 
for a statement to be informative, to give positive 
certainty, or to state the truth about its content, or 
to serve a purpose of human importance? 

All four are impossible. When the statement is 
heard, “One must worship the Bhagavan with the 
attendance due an emperor, 1 ' 22,1 nuthing else is re¬ 
quired for this statement to be informative, because 
the meaning of the words has already become known 
from other contexts. Nor does this small measure of 
dependence prove the weakness of the statement’s 

90 Aoama rnXu\$YAti 

validity, for the same weakness would follow for 
Sruthi too.” 1 

Nor is anything else required for the statement 
to give positive certainty; far the statement "One 
must worship—.” docs not occasion doubt whether 
one must or must not worship, since that would entail 
a negation or the direct declaration of the real sense. 

Nor is anything required for the statement to be 
true to the facts, for the knowledge produced by the 
statement does not require anything outside its own 
cause” 6 to be true to the facts, because secondary 
validity is inappropriate and not admitted.” 7 

Nor is it necessary for the statement to be 
dependent on something else in order to serve a purpose 
of human importance, for the proof of this purpose 
follows from a consideration of the entire body of 
doctrine. In this case, those who have undergone the 
afore-mentioned sacraments have knowledge of the 
content of the statement when they have Jieard the 
doctrine, and hence they perform the “five-times- 
a-day”” B rites, which form this content, and hence 
they attain to supreme perfection; this is learnt solely 
from the Sastra itself. 

110. Or if the objection is raised that, granted 
the self-validity of Pancaratra, this validity is not 
complete as long as it has not been made certain that 
there are no defects, after it has been made certain 
that the speaker is reliable,—I reply that this view 
is not correct; knowledge that there are no defects 
does not completely establish validity, since the validity 
arises from the cause itself of defectless knowledge and 
not from the defectlessness of this knowledge. 



111. Nor is positive certainty about such of the 
speaker’s qualities as his reliability required for his 
statement to be defectless, because the statement’s 
defectlessness is proved solely by its being defectless. 
As the Author of the Varttika declares, “Then the 
qualities (of the speaker) do not exert any influence 
(on the validity of his statement) because (its defectless¬ 
ness) is already known.” 229 The same Author also 
shows that, even when there is certainty about its 
defectlessness, the existence of qualities (like reliability 
in the speaker) is helpful: “When defectlessness is 
known, they are helpful by merely existing.”* 30 

Nor does the validity, when it has been established 
require something else in order that consequent actions 
of acceptance, rejection etc. proceed, because action 
proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire. As 
they say, “Action proceeds on the basis of recollection 
and desire.” 

Moreover, in the case of the self-valid Vedas, too, 
we find this same dependence in that their validity 
would not be completely established as long as there 
were no certainty of their defectlessness after the 
certainty about the non-existence of their author. 

112. Objection. But when the non-existence of 
their author is proved without effort by the non-appre¬ 
hension of what ought to be there, the question of the 
non-validity does not arise for the Veda, for defects 
are impossible without something or someone in which 
they could reside. As they say: “In that case (the 
Veda) the absence of non-validity follows quite 
naturally from the absence or an author; therefore 
its validity cannot be questioned.” 731 


Xqama frAuA^yam 

Refutation. Why, in the case of Faficaratra 
too no question can arise about its validity, since the 
absence of defects is easily proved by the fact that the 
omniscient and omnipotent God is its speaker; so the 
argument is the same. 

In other words, in both cases of self-validity 
there is positive certainty that there are no defects; 
in the case of the Veda because there is positive 
certainty that n» person is involved who could possess 
these defects ; in the case of Paftcaratra because there 
is positive certainty that its speaker possesses virtues 
which preclude defects. It is here as in the following 
two cases of absence of heat: there is no heat in ether 
because it is certain that there is no locus for heat in 
ether; nor is there heat in cold water because there is 
coldness which precludes heat. 

113. Moreover, neither dependence nor inde¬ 
pendence is by itself a cause of invalidation. 25 * The 
independent cognition that some substance is silver 
while in reality it is nacre is invalidated by the cogni¬ 
tion : “This is not silver:’* this cognition itself is consi¬ 
dered as dependent. 233 The cognition “Thisis that 
flame,” is found to be invalidated by the inferential 
cognition that arises from the disappearance of oil 234 ; 
the latter cognition itself is dependent because it arises 
from a sense-perception. The simple truth therefore is 
that which is susceptible to invalidation is invalidated 
by that which is not so susceptible; in our present case 
there is no such susceptibility either of Scripture or of 

114. Or if you think that it is impossible to give 
positive certainty that the Tantra is promulgated by 



Vasudeva, as it is in conflict with Scripture, I ask you: 
Why then does the knowledge arise that Scripture is 
preterpersonal, while it is invalidated because it 
conflicts with Paficaratra? They accept it that the Veda 
is preterpersonal just because it is Veda; but then 
one can equally claim that Paiicaratra is promulgated 
by Vasudeva just because it is Pancaratra, If the 
preterpersonal origin of the Veda is proved by the 
fact that there is no recollection of an author, then 
why not agree that Paftcaratra is promulgated by 
Vasudeva just because there is recollection of his 
authorship ? For there exists a strong transmission of 
the recollection, extending to women and children, 
that Ke^ava is the author of the Paficaratra. So great 
a faith do people have in His authorship that they 
erect monuments according to the precepts of Paftca¬ 
ratra, donating elephants, horses and great wealth 
in various fees. 

In the Skanda Purina it is said that “Kapila is the 
promulgator of Samkhya, Kdhva of Pancaratra.*’ 
Likewise In the Mahabharata: “ Narayana Himself is 

the promulgator of the entire Pancaratra. This great 
Upanisada, consistent with the four Vedas, as well as 
with the doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga, called 
Pancaratra, which was revealed by Narayana’s tongue, 
has been taught to the sages by Narada as he had seen 
it and heard it in the abode or Brahma.” From these 
and thousands of other statements in the Puranas, 
which are supported by the rules of interpretation, the 
conclusion follows naturally that Pancaratra was indeed 
composed by Vasudeva Himself. On the other hand, 
some experts dispute that the Veda is eternal.” 5 



Therefore, the real ground for the thesis that 
the validity of the doctrine of the Bhagavan and 
that of the Veda is above question is this that both are 
causes of dcFectlcss knowledge. Consequently, because 
both are equally exemplary, they are optionally valid. 
It is with this view in mind that the wise Author of the 
Sutras has explained : vijn and dib have va tadapralisedhah. 

115, Objection. However, granted that error 
is made inconceivable by the Jhagavan’s omniscience, 
yet, since He is also omnipotent, He can also have 
composed the Paflcaratra in order to deceive. Now, 
when people, considering this possibility, are confused 
in their minds as to which view they should take, that 
this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them, or 
that it has been stated according to the truth with 
complete attentiveness of mind, what way is there to 
resolve their dilemma? We should prefer to decide 
that since it militates against Scripture it results 
in disaster. 

Refutation. To this objection the Author replies 
vipratisedhat , i.e., on account of the contradiction of all 
Sruti, epic, purana and worldly experience. If, without 
any reason, merely because the Bhagavan is omnipotent, 
the question is raised if He might have intended to ruin 
His devotees, why, then one could also raise the 
question whether He would not hurl even the virtuous 
into hell by a whim of His omnipotence and con¬ 
sequently the whole world would fall into inactivity ! 
Besides, we could also raise the question whether 
He did not wish to deceive people, because He is 
omnipotent, and thus created in the beginning the 
Vedas themselves with false meanings, which are also 

Xoaua prAuAnyam 


suprasensible, took away from Brahma* 16 etc. also the 
power of recollecting that He was the creator of the 
Vedas, and from then onward set in motion the 
transmission of Vedic instruction until the present day: 
how can we be sure about it ? 

Or the position can be taken that since there is no 
evidence that, while He is indeed omnipotent, He 
acted up to the full measure of His omnipotence, since 
there is no purpose for Him to deceive people because 
He is satisfied in all His desires, and since He is not 
in the least affected by defects of partiality and cruelty 
etc. because He abides with natural affection for all 
living beings; and since, if He had composed the 
Paricaratra in order to deceive, it would be impossible 
to demonstrate that the wise men who, up to now, 
learn its instructions and perform the contents of these 
instructions have forgotten the defects of its author, 
it must follow that such a suspicion does not arise; and 
if this view is taken, all this will equally apply to the 
Vedas as well. 

Therefore, what possible purpose could He who is 
satisfied in all His desires, who is omniscient and 
a treasury of compassion have in deceiving the poor 
people who have failed to understand the meaning 
(of the Veda) ? Or how could the supreme sages 
everywhere praise the Tantra as being equal to the 
Upanisads, if it had been composed in order to deceive ? 
For thus the saints declare in Varaha Purana, the 
Ramayana and the Bharata etc. that this Tantra is 
an equally esoteric doctrine as the Vedas; and wc 
declare the same. “Through Veda, Pancaratra, 
through devotion and sacrifice, O Brahmin, I can be 


Xoama rR^MXyYAM 

attained, and not in any other way, even in hundreds 
of lacs of years. If one among thousands will grasp 
the Paficaratra and, at the expiry *f his karman, will 
die my devotee, the Vedas and the Paficaratra will 
dwell in his heart forever. 217 This supreme Paficaratra 
doctrineof mine, which is not difficult to grasp, that 
you shall reach to all the world by my grace, 
doubtless. 238 The Yogins mediate upon the Eternal One 
with Furanas, Vedas and Paficaratras, and worship 
Him with the proper rites. Thus Sarnkhya and Yoga 
on the one hand, and Veda and Aranyaka on the 
other hand are one and the same; all togetherthey are 
the members that constitute Paficaratra, O excellent 
one. He who sees through Veda and Paficaratra sees 
truly; this great Upanisada, consistent with the four 
Vedas....” Since the number of these and similar 
statements is infinite, we stop here. If you still raise 
the question if there cannot be ruin in such a Tantra, 
then there can be no faith in anything. It is with this 
view in mind that the Author sets forth: vipralisedhat. 

Therefore, even if there were a conflict between 
the Bhagavan’s doctrine and the Veda, there Still 
would be option between them; but we have already 
expounded that there is no conflict between them 
at all. 

116. Objection. However, how can the venerable 
Author of the Bhasya 239 state that those parts which are 
in conflict are invalid: “If there be conflict, it is 
carefully eliminated.” 

Refutation. This statement means that those of 
frail minds, who are not strong enough to plunge into 
the deep ocean of rules of interpretation, must not be 

Agawa prAuAxvam 


disrespectful to the Veda. This is comparable to the 
venerable Jaimini’s exposition that the fruits of acts 
serve to increase people’s faith in the acts. 

117. The contention has been voiced that Pafica- 
ratra is invalid because “it is accepted by those who 
are outside the Veda.” 3<4 But why could one not 
equally well contend that the Vedas are invalid 
because they are accepted by those who are outside 
Paficaratra ? 

Furthermore, what exactly does this mean, being 
“outside the Veda,” and what means “accepted by 
those who are outside the Veda?” Does “being outside 
the Veda” mean “being different from the Veda” or 
“doing what is forbidden by the Veda” or “being 
hostile to the Vedas ? ” 

Likewise we must inquire whether “accepted” 
means “learnt” or “known” or “observed.” In all 
cases the ground proves to be defective. 

First of all, if “outside the Veda” means “different 
from the Veda,” and “ accepted ” means “ learnt, ” 
then the ground proves to be occasional, since 
it equally applies to the Vedas themselves: the 
Vedic statements, which are valid, are “learnt” by 
members of the three estates, which themselves are 
“different from the Veda.” If you take “accepted” 
to mean “known,” you do not get rid of the same 
defect. If the term “outside the Veda” means 
“different from the Veda,” and “accepted” means 
“observed,” theu there would likewise be nnotcusWaSi 
application of the ground to the Vedas themselves. If 
‘'outside the Veda” is taken to mean “performing for¬ 
bidden acts,” the ground has an occasional application 
to those statements of the Veda which enjoin expiatory 



Aqama prXmAnyaKi 

ceremonies. For since statements enjoining expiations, 
e.g. “One must sacrifice with the kiismartda verses/’ 5 * 1 
whose content is to be ‘learnt”, “known” and 
“observed,” by those who perform forbidden acts, are 
authoritative, it would follow that the ground “because 
they are accepted by people outside the Veda” is 
occasional.* 12 

Nor are the Pa/icaratra Tantras invalid because 
they are “accepted” by people hostile to the Veda, for 
the ground is unproved. Besides, acceptance by 
people hostile to the Veda does not by itself refute the 
validity of what is accepted. If it did, the Path of the 
Heretics would be unbarred; for they endeavour to 
uproot the validity of the Veda. Thus the naked 
Jainas could effortlessly render the Vedas untruthful 
simply by “accepting” the Vedas in some manner 
by way of deception. 

118 . Objection. A consideration of such state- 
ments as “He should never use the Veda, except at 
a funerary offering,”*< 3 shows that the defect affects 
only the unqualified students, not the defectless Vedic 
statements themselves. 

Reply. Then the defect affects only the unquali¬ 
fied students in the case of the Tantras under discussion 
as well, and not the defectless Tantras themselves; 
so everything is the same, depending on what partisan 
view one takes. 

Or if it be held that “outside the Veda” means 
“unqualified to perform Vedic acts,” and that Panca- 
ratra is invalid, like the caityavandana statements, M< 
because it is accepted by those who, being unqualified, 
are outside the Veda, the following distinction must be 



considered: is the ground here that theTantras are 
accepted by people unqualified for all Vedic rites, or 
by people who are unqualified for some Vedic rites ? 
This point should be clarified. 

Now, the first alternative cannot be adopted, 
because the ground is not proved. For there is no 
human being who is not qualified for any irauta rite 
whatsoever, e.g. non-violence etc., because his human¬ 
ity as such provides his qualification. Otherwise 
candalas etc, would do no wrong if they committed 
such crimes a brahmin-murder, theft of brahmin- 
wealth, miscegenation with caste-women, study of 
the Veda etc., simply because they were not qualified 
to observe these prohibitions. If a man does something 
he should not do, he commits an offence. It follows 
that everybody is qualified to these Vedic rites , 2 * 5 
which shows that the ground is not proved and that the 
illustration falls short of the means of proof. 

Nor can the second alternative be adopted that 
the Tantras are invalid because they are accepted 
by people who are unqualified for certain Vedic rites, 
because that would entail the conclusion that all Vedic 
statements are invalid. For every man has some Vedic 
rites for which he is not qualified: the brahmin is not 
qualified for the Royal Consecration, the ksatriya 
not for the ritual drinking of soma. Consequently, this 
ground has an occasional application to the Vedic state¬ 
ments, which are accepted by qualified persons belong¬ 
ing to the three estates, and is therefore inconclusive. 
As to the illustration, the view that heaven is attained 
by worshipping a caitya is not invalidated by its being 
accepted by heretics, but by the deficiency of its cause. 


Aqama. pbAmanvm'i 

119. We have already said that Paftcaratra 
has been accepted by the Vedic, and among all 
orthodox pre-eminent, sages Bhrgu, Bharadvaja, 
Dvaipayana etc. And in the present day we can also 
observe how exemplary persons of great learning, 
believing that these rites are most effective in attaining 
bliss, perform the rites of temple-building, erection of 
idols, prostration, circumambulation and particular 
festival ceremonies, just as they perform the Qgnihotra 
and other rituals enjoined directly by Scripture. And 
it is improper to maintain that their conduct has no 
foundation, for that would entail that such smarta 
rites as crepuscular worship, astaka etc., are similarly 
without foundation. It has been said that the conduct 
of exemplary people is authoritative, 246 and also that 
even when they do not know the cause of their custom, 
they do know what is proper custom. 

120. If the ground for the invalidity of Pafica- 
ratra is that it is accepted by Bh5gavatas, 247 well, then 
th e scriptural statements of the Ekayana iakha and the 
Vajasaneyaka Vakhas and the means of knowledge 
Perception, Inference etc., would also be invalid since 
the Bhagavatas accept those too ! This same ground, 
moreover, namely that Paficaratra is invalid because 
it is accepted by the Bhagavatas, suffers from two 
defects; it is both specialty-occasional and unproved. 248 
Why is Paitcaratra rendered invalid by their accept¬ 
ance? If it is bccan se they do not belong to the three 
estates, then the Atharvanic statements whose content 
is accepted and observed by rathakdros, nisadas and 
other groups which do not belong to the three estates 
(Statements like “Therathakara must add fuel,” ‘‘With 

Xgama prXmLnyam 


that he must sacrifice for the chief of the Nisadas,” 749 
etc.) would also be invalid. 

Or, be it granted that the acceptance of certain 
rites byoutcastes renders them invalid; yet, in view of 
the fact that the eminent brahminhood of these 
Bhagavatas who follow the doctrine of the Bhagavan 
is evident by all criteria of knowledge, their acceptance 
of Paficaratra rather confirms its validity. He says: 
By the same means of knowledge by which the 
brahminhood of one set of people is evident the 
brahminhood of another set of people is evident. 

121. Objection. But when one sees the small 
sons of the twice-born who wear the customary hairtuft, 
sacred thread, palafa wood stick and jnuti/agrass girdle, 
one knows, the moment the eyes fall on them, that they 
are brahmins. 

Refutation. And in our case, when one sees 
learned people who day after day study the Vaja- 
saneyaka and Ekayana sakhas, wear prominently their 
sacred threads, upper garments and hairtufts, impart 
teaching, sacrifice, receive priestly stipends—does one 
not instantly know that they are brahmins? If it be 
held that outcastes, low-caste people etc., may also 
illegitimately sacrifice, teach, carry pddia sticks etc. 
and that they behave as though they were legitimate 
brahmins, and that therefore neither costume nor 
conduct provides positive certainty that a man is a 
brahmin, then the same applies to other priests than 

Or be it granted that there are cases where people 
illegitimately display the marks of brahminhood ; still, 


Xoaua mi^mXnyam 

though there may be doubt about the legitimacy of 
these marks in others because of their resemblance to 
pretenders (just as when there is a doubt that one may 
be mistaken about real silver too because one has 
mistaken nacre for silver), then there can be certainty 
of their being genuine brahmins in all cases when no 
misapprehension occurs, because otherwise doubt 
would conflict with Perception and lead to infinite 

122. Or if it be held that the others are genuine 
brahmins because they recollect those gotras which are 
peculiar to brahmins, the same applies to the 
Bhagavatas; for the Bhagavatas have the tradition: 
“We are descendants of Bharadvaja, of KaSyapa, of 
Gotama, of Upagava.” 

Nor is this recollection or tradition of gotras un¬ 
founded or merely contemporary, for the same can be 
argued for all tradition of gotras. If there were doubt 
about descent since error could conceivably occur, this 
would confuse the whole world about the authenticity 
of their brahminhood. After all, anyone' may fear 
that he really is a candala if he suspects his mother of 
having had a lover; and how, my excellent opponent, 
can you be quite sure yourself that your birth entitled 
you to Vcda-study? Therefore if the brahminhood of 
Bhagavatas, which is completely established by the 
recollection of the various gotras which has been passed 
on in uninterrupted transmission, stands unchallenged, 
then there is no differeMce whatever in this between 
the brahminhood of Bhagavatas and of others. 

123. Further, i f some who believe in the Supreme 
Person are monotheists and others who believe in 

7.0AUA pr.Aji.Anyam 


petty godlings are polytheists, is then the same 
authority stated for the brahminhood of the ones as 
well as of the others, or how else is their brahminhood 
known if not by that same authority? If this is the 
question, then listen: there remains a criterion to 
determine brahminhood in either case, either Percep¬ 
tion, or Inference, or Circumstantial-Implication. 

124. Objection. But how can Perception con¬ 
vey that they are brahmins ? For when we are close to 
two individuals whom we have not seen before, one a 
brahmin, the other a ksatriya, of the same age and the 
same appearance, we do not immediately observe the 
distinction that one is a brahmin and the other a 
ksatriya in the same way as we instantly observe the 
differentness of a goat, an elephant, a buffalo etc. Nor 
is it proper to maintain that the visual sense conveys 
the brahminhood of a nearby individual in dependence 
on our recollection of his father’s brahminhood etc.; 
for that recollection itself is impossible without a previ¬ 
ous immediate cognition, just as the recollection of the 
son of a sterile mother is impossible. Nor can we 
know from Inference that a man is a brahmin, for we 
do not find a concomitant mark. And such qualities 
as tranquillity, self-restraint, austerity, purity etc., 
cannot be taken as marks of brahminhood, because 
they are available only in the case of a good brahmin 
and because they are not exclusively confined to 
brahmins. Korean Circumstantial-Implication Furnish 
proof of brahminhood, because it is not lacking in 
season and the fact that the sentence-meaning o f the 
statement, “In spring the brahmin must add fuel to 
the fire,”” 0 is otherwise unestablished does not there- 


.Xoajja pn & itAi$YAtii 

fore by Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof that 
a man is a brahmin; for knowledge of that sentence- 
meaning presupposes knowledge of the word-meaning 
of brahminhood etc. 

125. Refutation. All this does not make for 
a defect in my argument. There is no invariable rule 
that Perception becomes manifest only at the first 
contact between sense and object and not otherwise 
Perception is that which illumines the unmanifest while 
there is continuity of the operation of the senses. Thus 
there can be Perception of brahminhood ; for when we 
keep our eyes open we note, immediately upon observ¬ 
ing the particular differentiae of the genus brahmin- 
hood, that the brahminhood is quite clearly noticeable 
in those who belong to the families of the different 
gotras —Vasistha, Kaiyaplya Sathamarsana etc.—, 
who are pure in their conduct, and who display the 
sacred thread, upper cloth, hairtuft and muiija grass 
girdle. Nor does it run counter to ordinary experience 
that the eyes can convey brahminhood in dependence 
on the observation of the peculiarities of genus. In 
every case the sense becomes the cause of the rise of 
determination of sense-object when favoured by the 
accompanying circumstances of place, time, configura¬ 
tion etc. 2M It is the natural function of the sense-organ 
as such to relate itself to these accompanying circum¬ 
stances. As the author says: “No organ of knowledge, 
whether in Veda or in ordinary process, becomes effica¬ 
cious in determining the object that is to be realized 
through the accompanying circumstances unless it 
is favoured by these circumstance's.” 2 ” Consequently 
the visual sense, when favoured by the recollection 



ofgenus, gives knowledge of brahminhood without the 
object giving up its perceptuality. So it ts evident that 
the visual sense can be the instrument of knowledge of 
genus in dependence on a variety of accompanying 
factors* Gold becomes manifest through its colour 
fromcopper etc., gheeis differentiated from oil, through 
its smell and taste; ftre, which is hidden by ashes, is 
perceived through touching the ashes. Sound may 
provide us with proof that there is a horse in the 
distance; a pitcher etc. are known through their 
configuration; brahminhood through descent, and 
also through conduct in certain particulars, which is 
completely protected by the king. 

It' has been contended that when we see two 
individuals of the same age and appearance, the differ¬ 
ence between the two does not immediately appear to 
the eye; but the perceptuality of their difTcrcntness is 
not refuted by just this. In this case the non-percep¬ 
tion of their differentness is caused by the defect of 
similarity. TUe difference between nacre and silver, 
which are similar in appearance and configuration, 
may not be immediately visible, yet that does not mean 
that their difference is not visible at another time; and 
the same holds for the difference between brah m m, 
ksatriya and vai§ya. 

Or else, brahminhood is that which arises from 
the differentiae of genus, and such a product can 
empirically be known just like any other product by 
a process of positive and negative consideration, e .g. 
“what are the specific characteristics to which the 
elders .apply the term brahminhood, or to which 
characteristics is the term applied ?” It has been said 



often that it applies to those who possess recollection of 
gotra, Vcdic ancestry etc.; let us not start discussing 
this question again, or we must repeat our old argu¬ 
ment : it is established that the Bhagavatas are 
brahmins, because they possess gotra etc. 

126. The objection 255 was made that the 
Bhagavatas are born from a vai^ya vratyaj on the 
authority of the two statements: “The fifth one, the 
Satvata, must worship the sanctuaries of Visnu by royal 
decree;’* and "he is also called a Bhagavata; he is bom 
from a vaiSya vratya.” To this we reply: precisely 
what do we learn from these two statements ? Is there 
a simple connection of names, or must an invariable 
rule be stated ? 254 

It is impossible to make it a rule that the words 
Bhagavata and Satvata denote a vai£ya vratya, for that 
is not known from the text, and it involves overexten¬ 
sion. In the statement, "the fifth one, Satvata,” we 
do not find a denial that the words Bhagavata and 
Satvata denote other meanings, for that would mean 
ignoring the explicit and inventing the unstated. In 
our statement the fifth one, who is born from an 
vaiSya vratya, is understood to bear the name of 
Satvata: “The fifth one, Satvata-.”, since the word 
‘fifth* is the operative term as it is mentioned first. And 
if the fifth is the Satvata, the Satvata is not necessarily 
also be the fifth, namely the vaiSya vratya. For when 
the stated subject (e.g. a mountain) js possessed of fire, 
the predicated fire does not necessarily possess smoke. 235 
Consequently the consideration if a smrti statement of 
this ki»d cannot give certainty that the words Satvata, 
Bhagavata etc mean vratya. 

Aga>ca prAiiA-nyaj'i 


127. I f it be argued that since these two words 
also may denote another caste (namely of the VaiSya 
vratyas), then the mere fact that certain brahmins arc 
denoted by these \sords proves that these brahmins 
belong to that caste, even though they follow the 
doctrine of the Bbagavan, it would also follow that, 
since we find the collocated word dcdrya K5 also used to 
denote the issue of a lowly vai£ya, therefore an eminent 
brahmin who is an acarya imparting teaching of the 
Veda with its ancillae and its esoteric teachings is 
thereby denoted as being a vaiSya vratya! If, on the 
other hand, even though a true brahmin is denoted by 
the word alary a which denotes a vratya, there still can 
be no suspicion that he actually is a vratya, because 
there is positive certainty of his brahminhood which is 
clearly proved by other means of knowledge, and 
because it is possible that the word acarya is used 
figuratively (acarya as one who “accumulates”— 
dcinoti the pupil’s knowledge) for a Brahmin teacher, 
then in our case, too, the same argument can be made, 
namely thus: even though they are denoted by the 
terms Satvata and Bhagavata, which denote another 
caste, yet there can rise no suspicion that they actually 
are vratyas, because the brahminhood of these 
followers of the Bhagavan’s doctrine is firmly known 
from the recollection of completely obvious clans, 
Vedic ancestry etc., and because it is possible that the 
terms Satvata and Bhagavata have a figurative denota¬ 
tion of satlva-val ni and bhaga-vat. 

In other words, the fact that the same word de¬ 
notes both classes of people does not mean that there¬ 
fore both belong to one and the same caste, lest the 

Jcmma. i rXmA.nyam 


true brahmin be not made into a low-caste man 
because he is also denoted by the word dcarja. We 
find that the word hari 758 also means ‘frog.* Docs it 
follow that a lion is a frog because both arc denoted 
by the same word? Then word itself would be horned, 
since Vord’ is denoted by gauli 

Consequently, just as the words sudhanvan , acarja 
etc., which denote more than one meaning, arc also 
used for someone bom from a vaiSya vrajya, so also the 
words Uhagavata ami Satvata. 

128. The contention™ that when the conven¬ 
tional meaning and the etymological meaning of a 
word collide, it is right to assume the conventional 
meaning of the term, in this case of the terms 
Bhagavata and Satvata, is not correct; for when a 
denotation is appropriate which is the composite of the 
denotations of the component elements of the words, 
then it is not right to assume a non-composite denota¬ 
tion. For he who theorizes that the words Satvata and 
bhagavata have their conventional meaning in denoting 
someone born from a vailya vrStya, must also theorize 
that the words satlvavat and bhagavata which are the 
strm and the taddhita suJIix built on the stem, ,6, have a 
different meaning in a sentence like, “having observed 
the satvata rules, a man becomes a Bh5gavaia because 
of the merits he has won in a previous existence.“ ,6J 
This goes to prove the assumption that in this case the 
word may have a double meaning by etymology alone, 
because it is possible for it to be used in the sense of 
“issue of a vaiiya vratya.” And it is possible that 
those vr5tyas too, despite the fact that they fail to 

Xoaua prAhXhyam 


worship the Bhagavan directly, yet may be denoted by 
the words satvata and bhagavaia, because of their work 
discipline of cleaning up Vasudeva’s temple, clearing 
away the ball offerings, guarding the idol etc., for it is 
taught that the can suffix may occur in the sense of a 
simple relation, “this is of that.” 261 And it is declared 
that the issue of a vaiSya vratya has the work discipline 
of cleaning the Bhagavan’s temple etc., “and (the task) 
of the satvatas is the cleaning of the deity’s temple, 
the eating of the offerings, the guarding of the idol;” 
and “he must worship Visnu’s sanctuaries.” 264 

129. Herewith is also rejected the contention that 
the Bhagavatas are vratyas because they would have 
the same profession. For it is one thing to clean the 
temple, clear away the ball offerings, guard the idol, and 
quite another thing to perform the variety of actions 
that are daily observed by the Bhagavatas: the cleaning 
of the way to the idol, the preparation for worship, 
offering, daily study, and meditation. It is as it is in 
the case of the jyotistoma etc. In the jyotistoma, too, 
a carpenter has a task in making the various receptacles, 
soma-cups, soma-decanters, ladles etc., while the 
officiating priests have their tasks in reciting various 
different mantra recitations, representing the deity, pres¬ 
sing of the soma etc. And this occupational similarity, 
limited as it is, does not raise the question whether the 
priests have the same caste as the carpenters! So here, 
too, there is a difference between, those who perform the 
Pancakalika 265 ritual, which is established by the 
Bhagavan’s doctrine, and the low-caste people who do 
the cleaning-up of the temple and are also called 



130. Further, the contention 866 that, if the words 
bhagavata and satvata have their etymological meaning, 
this entails that the word rathakdra in the injunction 
‘‘the tathakdra must build a fire" 867 denotes someone 
belonging to the three varnas on account of its 
etymology of chariot-making, 268 is not correct. For in 
the case of rathakdra it is correct that the term refers to 
someone belonging to the three vanias, because other¬ 
wise the springtime etc., which are given in the state¬ 
ment on the origin of this fire-building, would be 
invalidated, and because usages of a word in the sense 
of different castes, which is given in the mantra 
“saudhanvand rbhavah suracaksasah >,m would be invalid¬ 
ated. 270 Despite the fact that rathakdra is also a name 
for another caste—as learnt from the smfti “the 
rathakdra is born out of a karint by a mahisya” 271 (so 
that the rathakdra is born from an anuloma marriage 
of a ksatriya man and a vai§ya woman), nevertheless, 
since, on Sankha’s evidence 2 ” that the rathakdra is not 
forbidden to perform rites of sacrificing, fire-building 
and initiation, there is no conflict of qualification for 
rites that can only be realized through knowledge of 
the Veda, 375 and since the word rathakdra (in its 
etymological meaning) is inappropriate for members of 
the three varnas because they are forbidden to follow 
an artisan’s profession, therefore we can only conclude 
that in both cases different castes are denored by the 
term, and so there is no conflict. 

Moreover, when knowledge of the thing meant by 
a word is obtained from the denotation of the separate 
members that compose the word, then the Author of 
the Sutras rules out the validity of a denotation in 



which the meanings of the component members are 
lost, namely in proksanisv arthasamyogat . 274 

Therefore, those eminent brahmins are called 
satvatas and bhagavatas who because of their pure 
character (sattva) devote themselves to the Bhagavan 
who is the Supreme Person. Later on we shall show 
that other smrtis set forth the eminent brahminhood of 
the Bhagavatas. 

131. The further objection, 275 namely why these 
people should invariably be denoted by the exclusive 
names of Satvata and Bhagavata, if their brahminhood 
were the same as that of others, can be answered thus; 
there is no defect in that, for it is as it is in the case of 
the names parivTdjaka and nigada . Certain brahmins 
are called bhagavatas, just as certain brahmins are 
called parivrajakas, and certain yajuli formulae nigadas, 
though both are equally brahmins and equally yajuh 
formulae; namely in the statements: “The brahmins 
should remain, the parmajakas must be fetched ;”” 6 
“the yajuli formulae take place, not the nigadas ; the 
nigadas take place, not the yajuh formulae;” 2 ” and 
this is so because of the interpretation : “the nigadas 
are the fourth mantra collection, or the yajuh formulae, 
because they are identical.” 

132. The contention” 8 that the Bhagavatas arc 
bad brahmins because they perform puja to the God 
partake of the offering substance etc. fora livelihood, 
is countered in the following manner: Surely not all 
Bhagavatas worship Hari for their profession, for many 
Satvatas are found who perform puja for themselves. 
If there are certain people who, while being Satvatas, 



follow a reprehensible profession and perform sacrifices 
for respectable Bhagavatas professionally, this fact 
alone does not mean that one may say that they are not 
brahmins. A vedic priest who officiates as an adhvaryu 
at a jyotistoma does not thereby lose caste. If the priest 
were not to receive fees, the puja itself would remain 
fruitless; they take fees in order to realize completely 
the excellence of the puja. At the conclusion of the 
worship one must give gold to the priest according to 
capacity; otherwise the fruit will go to the puja priest 
himself, as is shown by the smrti: “A sacrifice for 
which a small fee is given kills (the sacrificer).” 279 It 
is however prohibited that a covetous Vedic priest 
officiate as a priest after he himself has put up his 
demands for a fee, c.g, in the statement: (“There is an 
error called garbage”*). When the sacrificer appoints 
as a officiant priest who covets the office, thinking 
either “He should give me (a fee)” or “He should 
choose me.” “This is as far from the sacrificer as 
garbage; this does not benefit the sacrificer.” 280 The 
donation of the sacerdotal fee which is purified by 
faith is felicitous for both, as according to the smrti, 
“He who receives the offering and he who denotes it 
both go to heaven.” 281 

133. The statement 582 that professional worship 
of the deity and living off the god’s treasure makes a 
man a dcvalaka must be taken to refer to the profes 
sional worship of, and the living off' the treasure of, 
other deities than Vasudeva. Thus the blessed VySsa: 

“A devalaka is he who lives on Rudra etc.” 282 And 
there is also Sandilya’s word: “All those who perform 
sacrifices professionally and are also not consecrated 



arc the only ones who arc traditionally known as 
karmadfcalakas in this world, O sage. One should not 
touch them or consort with them for a year.” Like¬ 
wise: “Certain people who arc karmadevalakas and 
kalpadevalakas arc unqualified for ritual before the 
deity for a period of three years. Those brahmins 
who, without being consecrated, perform rites set forth 
in the Kalpa, either professionally or for the fame of 
it, arc kalpadevalakas. One must have puju offered by 
another professional priest who has been properly 
consecrated; one is unable to worship the god oneself. 
This is the principal offering ; in another manner it is 
secondary.” *In another manner,’ that is to say, when 
it is dene by a non-consecrated priest. This the author 
elucidates: “The rite performed professionally by 
'some priest who has not been properly consecrated is 
called of the lowest degree.” By considering these and 
a hundred similar smrti statements we can be sure that 
living off the deity’s treasure and professional puja 
offering of brahmins who go without the sacrament of 
consecration as established by Pancaratra renders them 
sub-Brahmins and devalakas. 

134. As to the statement 284 that the Bhagavatas 
cannot pass for exemplary persons because they make 
use of flower and food offerings, which practice is 
abhorred by exemplary persons, to this we say: what 
does the srotriya 735 mean by left-over flowers and left¬ 
over food? When he takes it only as the flowers and 
the Cakes, MC he is contradicted by all the world, for 
nobody approves of wasting flowers and cakes. Also, 
a particularized prohibition 137 is not in order, because 
it is not established. No notion of a particularized 



thing occurs when the particularization is not deter¬ 
mined; and here it is impossible to determine the 
particulariza tion. 

Objection. Why should it be impossible, since 
the particularization is thaVit is forbidden to use food 
what has been off ered up to the deity ? 

Reply. Are you now accepting the validity of 
Pancaratra? For only when one admits that there is a 
deity present in the idols that are erected with the 
sacred formulae enjoined by Paficaratra Tantra can one 
postulatethat the particularization oftheprohibitionlies 
in the offering-up to the deity. For unless the validity 
of the Tantra is admitted, how can an idol which 
is set forth in the Tantra be a deity, and, a fortiori 
how can the substance that is offered up for this deity’s 
sake be nirmalya and nivedyn . 163 For a deity does not 
exist by just being a deity; only that deity which is 
known to be correlated with an oblation on the autho¬ 
rity of scriptural testimony is the deity to that oblation ; 
that is your own doctrine. 

Or if it be held that something is nirmalya and 
nivedya because it is admitted by the Paficaratrikas that 
it is off ered up to the deity, well, in that case you must 
also admit its purity because the Paficaratrikas accept 
also that the utilization of nirmalya and nivedya is per¬ 
fectly pure. 

Or if you do not accept this peculiar excellence, 
since in your opinion the Paficaratrikas have accepted 
as pure something that is really impure,—well, in that 
case you must accept it that the substance which is 
offered up is not really nirmalya and nivedya, since then 



you opine that the Paficaratrikas have adopted some¬ 
one who is not really a deity by mistaking him for 
a deity! 

In other words, inasmuch as the offering up of 
mere flowers, cakes etc. 289 is not approved, and because 
it is impossible to particularize the prohibition of 
utilizing these substances according to the terms of 
one's own doctrine, therefore the particularization 
must be determined in the terms of the others’, i.e. the 
Pancaratrikas’, doctrine; and thus the offering up 
becomes greatly purifying. And inasmuch as therefore 
the utilization of nirmdlya and nxvedya becomes most 
purifying, it must needs be accepted by those who 
admit the validity of the PancaratraTantra as well by 
others who do not. 

135. Objection. But how is it possible then 
that even one who admits the validity of Pancaratra 
should reject nevertheless the nirmdlya and nivedya? 
For in the Tantras the tasting etc. of the nirmdlya is 
prohibited. For instance, it is said in the Sanat- 
kumariya Samhita: “The offering that is proffered (to 
the deity), flower or fruit, is called nirmdlya; that must 
be avoided meticulously.” Similarly in another 
passage : “When one has eaten nirmdlya, or the food- 
rests of someone who is not one’s guru, one must 
observe a milk-vow for a month, continuously recite 
the eight-syllable formula, and drink the pancagavya, 
in order to he purified.” 290 Likewise in the Indraratra: 
“One should not live off'the Supreme God, nor eat the 
nirmdlya offerings.” Also: “And the nirmdlya offerings 
are never fit for consumption.” Similarly in another 
Samhita: “One should not eat the nirmdlya offerings. 



nor smell them, nor step over them.”—How then can 
one accept the purity of the utilization of the nirmalya 
when we thus know from several Samhitas that it is 

Refutation. To this he says: Tbe utilization of 
a proffered substance which has been offered up to the 
deity is not condemned if it is done within a period of 
ten nadikas P* Thus in the same Jndraratra: “The 
wise one must let the offering-cake stand for ten 
nadikas. This period of time has been prescribed both 
for night and for day. They condemn the nirmalya 
that has stood for more than this period of time; 
thereupon he must throw it in water, or in fire, or bury 
it in the ground.” 

Objection. But what is said here is not to praise 
the tasting etc. of the nirmalya, but to prescribe that 
the substance of the cake puja is thrown away after a 
period of ten nadikas. In the statement: “He must 
let the offering cake stand for over ten nadikas” the 
injunction is laid down that when the proflered flowers, 
cake etc. in general have been taken off* as nirmalya, 
because they have now fulfilled their ritual function, 
they must be kept by way of accessory puja rite for a 
period of ten nadikas. And consequently even a study 
of the conclusions of your own Tantras shows that the 
touching etc. of the turmeric powder, the food offerings 
and the water used to clean the idol's feet is not 
established by Tantric doctrine. Now, where are you J 

Refutation. Where are you, loquacious debat¬ 
ers, witless fools who have been swallowed by your 
own tongue which plays around with a grain of 

Aoama prAmAnyaa! 


knowledge! Your objection looks black and white at 
once, like the moon with its spots. This prohibition 
applies only to fools like you, since all this is indeed to 
be observed by Vaisnavas who are qualified to do so, 
and thus it is capable of wiping ofi* a multitude of sins 
in the same way as the drinking of soma at a Vcdic 
sacrifice; for it is not to be touched by others, just as 
the purodaSa cake” 1 is not to be touched by dogs ) 
Thus in the I^vara Satnhita, “It is difficult to find in 
this world a true votary of the lord, my son, and, 
among those who are, it is even more difficult to find 
a disposition which is truly pure enough for the foot- 
water, or to use the garlands etc. which have been 
mentioned in the doctrine. Therefore, O six-faced 
One, all this which is purified by the formulae and the 
glance of the Bhagavan is forbidden to those who lack 
this disposition and are not votaries.” And in another 
passage: “The saffron, sandal, camphor and oils that 
have been taken off Visnu’s body arc supremely puri¬ 
fying.” Likewise in the Padmodbhava: “He who 
wears the powder that is taken of Visnu’s body on his 
head obtains the fruit of a Horse Sacrifice and glories 
in Visnu’s heaven.” Similarly in the Iivara Samhita, 
“No blame should be put by statements arising from 
ignorance on all that is used, the perfume, flowers etc., 
(the water] of the idol’s bath etc., and the curds, milk 
etc. Those who condemn this divine purifying agent be¬ 
cause they consider it nirmalya , those witless detractors 
of its power will go to hell.” 

The above statements which to the consecrated 
prohibit the use of nirmalya at the time mentioned in 
the time instruction 183 must be understood to mean a 



time subsequent to that when the (offerings to) the 
chief of the Bhagavan’s retinue 294 is being used. Since 
the garlands, sandal etc. which arc offered up to the 
Bhagavan, later on, after the ViSvaksena offering, 
become unfit to eat, therefore the Satvatas use the 
mvtdya etc. before that time. Consequently the use of 
the nirmalya is a cause of excellence for the Satvatas. 

136. Moreover, it is our postulation that the 
exemplary people hold the nirmalya of other gods in 
contempt; this is postulated like the drinking of soma 
(which is good) because it is Vedic (in contrast to the 
drinking ofliquor which is evil). So I have said that 
those who do not accept the validity of the Bhagavan’s 
doctrine are unable to determine what is nirmalya. 
When it is properly determined (namely according to 
theBhagavans doctrine) the Bhagavan’s nirmalya proves 
to be extremely purifying, as is demonstrated by the 
statements of all Vedic teachers. In a matter for 
which the only means of knowledge is verbal testi¬ 
mony, it must be so as verbal testimony says that it is. 
Unless one is deaf, one cannot say that there is no 
verbal testimony concerning it. 

For instance it is said in the Brahma Parana; 
“The nicedya of Visnu is declared by the sages to be 
pure and fit for consumption; one who cats other 
nirmalya and niredya must perform the cdndrdyana in 
expiation. The mdlya which is taken from the body of 
Visnu takes away evil and is holy. He who wears iton 
his head goes to supreme bliss.” It follows that the 
smfti statement that a man who cats nirmalya and 
nivedya must perform the conduit ana 1 ** should he taken 



to bear upon the nirmnlya of Rudra,Kali etc. Thusin 
the Mahabharata: “Meditating in one’s heart upon 
Hari, one must offer food to Him with full attention, 
thereupon pick up this food again with the middle- 
finger and the thumb, and then sacrifice it bit by bit, 
saying: “Pranaya svaha, Apanayasvaha, Vyanaya svaha, 
Udanaya svaha, Samanaya svaha.” Likewise in another 
passage, “what has been offered to the god must be 
given to a brahmacarin.” 796 Thus in the Mahabharata: 
“The saintly knowers of the Paflcaratra ate in his house 
that which had been left over by the Bhagavan, as a 
means to attain to bliss, as supreme nourishment.” 197 
And likewise the blessed Saunaka : "He himself eats the 
nivedya ” He who condemns Visnu’s nivedya, whose 
purity is proved by hundreds of similar smrtis and 
which dispels the fear of rebirth, really ignores the 
statements of the smrti because of his heterodoxy and 
ought to have his tongue cut off 

137. Objection. But how can the nivedya be a 
means for the pranagnihotra ? The exemplary people do 
not approve of a means for homa etc. for which no 
building bricks are used. Nor can a substitution of 
another substance do duty as a homa, because he lives 
off food that has been obtained according to taste. Nor 
can a substitution of another consumption be made to 
replace the nivedya , for scripture enjoins upon the 
twiceborn a meal in the evening and a meal in the 
morning, as follows from the prohibition: “One 
should not take food in between.” 

Refutation. That is no defect, since the multitude 
of deities, like prana etc. are revealed to be parts 
of Visnu, in the same way as ViSvaksena, the chief 



of Visnu’s retinue. For just as the flowers, cake etc., 
though proffered to the Bhagavanbut actually given to 
Visvaksena shows that He is familiar under various 
guises, or just as at a sacrifice the soma juice that is left 
over by the hotar is pure to the adhvaryu , so it is also 
with the nirmalya.** 3 

Moreover, only scripture can be our criterion for 
what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten. When 
it says that something is fit to be eaten, what injunc- 
tion are we to invent ourselves? Just as the same rule 
governs both the periodical and the desiderative agni- 
hotra , so the same rule governing the eating of the 
nivedya applies also to the prdndgnihotra. 

138. As to the remark 233 that from the observance 
of different sacraments , from conception ceremmny to 
crematiun, it follows that the Bhagavatas are not 
brahmins, here again ignorance is to blame. It is not 
your Honour’s fault that the Bhagavatas, who have the 
VdjasaneyaSakhd in the transmission of their family 
line, observe the sacraments of conception ceremony 
etc. according to the manner laid down by the grhya- 
siitras of K atyayana etc. Those who perform the forty 
sacraments which are enjoined by the Ekayana scrip¬ 
ture while giving up the dharmaS of the Veda, from 
the recitation of the gayatri onward, 300 they properly 
follow the rules laid down by the grhyasutras of their 
own 3akha and do not abdicate their brahminhood 
because they fail to follow the rites of a different 
t&kha; since otherwise it would follow that other 
brahmins too would forfeit their brahminhood because 
they fail to perform the rites enjoined hy 0tlicr 



people’s £akha. For everywhere among brahmins we 
find customs that differ according to birth, cSraip, 
gotra, qualification etc. Even though one ritual is 
understood for all Vakhas, still all the various dharmas 
relating to mutually different qualified performers do 
not all together accumulate in anyone place. And the 
Aspirants who arc distinct from those brahmins who 
are qualified for rites of the atndragneja etc.,* 01 which 
are means leading to the enjoyment of rewards 
like heaven etc., as enjoined by the three Vedas, and 
who themselves are qualified for the rites of the 
Ekayana, rites which alone are the means of attaining 
to the Bhagavan, viz. knowledge, cleansing the way to 
the Lord, preparation of worship and oblation, as 
enjoined by the Ekayana scripture, are brahmins too. 
It follows that the non-observance of certain rites en¬ 
joined by different Sakhas does not mean that either 
one forfeits his brahminhood—that the Ekayana ^akha 
is preterpersonal scripture has been enlarged upon in 
the Treatise on the Validity of Kaimira Agama , so * and is 
therefore here not further discussed. But since it is 
quite obvious that the Bhagavatas, which we are dis¬ 
cussing here, are connected with the dharmas of the 
three Vedas, like the savitri recitation, there is no 
possible support for the suspicion that they are really 
vratyas because they would have abandoned these 
Vedic dharmas. 

139. May Nathamuni 501 be victorious, he to 
whom the Three Principles are immediately evident by 
virtue of his own miraculous power, he by whose pupils 
the arrogance of the rivals of the Satvata Doctrine is 
terminated after their own view was rent to pieces by 

12 2 

Xoama prAmAnyaM 

variously apposite arguments, he whose spirit is for 
ever the abode of the feet of Mukunda. 

May, for the length of this Aeon, play on the 
pious, enchanting and irreproachable sayings of the 
extensive collection of prose and verse compositions 
which eclipse the cleverness of the befuddled, conceited 
and witless assembly of the evil crowd of the rivals 
of the Satvata doctrine, whose spirit has been increased 
by the glorious Nathamunlndra , 304 and by which all 
the unholy powers are cleansed. 

Printed *t Prablia Priming Home, B»ng«Iore*4. Ind»* 


1. To Yamuna, God's omniscience consists in this unlimited 
percipience, so that, as he will argue below (§ 109 ), the 
validity of Paftcaratra does not rest only on Scripture, 
but also on Perception. 

2. In the purvapakfa the principal opponents introduced are 
what one may already call smarta brahmins, and among 
them especially the orthodox followers of Mimams3. No 
Vedanta opposition will be discussed. 

3. iabda, and its synonyms, have been translated variously 
as Verbal Testimony, Verbal Evidence in general, or 
Scripture in particular, depending on the context. 

4. ptamana has generally been rendered with "means of 
knowledge,” sometimes with "criterion.” 

5. jagali or loke : “in the world of experience, in common 

6. Punctuate after iti which closes the question introduced 
in Pffto vydeasldm ; abhi-ni-uii “ to stick to a partisan view 
(in the teeth of contrary evidence).” I take bala iva as 
sandhi for bate iva, the meaning being that the objector 
takes the view that something limited (the boy) is really 
unlimited (mature adult). 

7. siddhasadhana, one of the defects of an argumentation by 
which proof is sought of that which is already proved or 
established. Space ( akaia ) is, by definition, unlimited 
and cannot illustrate the thesis that something finite can 
be infinite. 

8. vibhu in the sense of “ omnipresent, infinite.” 

9. namely, the Paficaratra postulation that such tantric 
ceremonies as consecration ( diksa ), etc. are means leading 
to the summum bonum. 

10. In the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because 
it has smoke, as in the case of the kitchen. 

Xoama prXuXnyau 

11. Yamuna throughout treats S3tvata and Bhagavata as 

12. pauruftja and apauruftya; the latter has in the sequel been 
rendered with “preterpersonal.” Person here does not 
mean only “human person” but “any being endowed 
with personal features, including God.” 

13. “Eternal Scripture” ( agama ) is preter-personal scripture, 
since any verbal statement originating from a person is 
cotemporal with that person, and the puroafiokfin does not 
admit the existence of an eternal persona] deity, 

14. arihapalli, throughout translated “circumstantial-impli¬ 
cation". It is a kind of inference by which is established 
something that must be established, yet is nor established 
by another means of knowledge; for example: “JDeva- 
datta, who is well-fed, does not eat by daysince he 
cannot be well-fed without eating at all, it is deduced, by 
circumstantial implication, that he eats by night. 

15. namely, the relation of being a means to a certain end. 

16. KMS 1.3.2 apt oa kartfsamanyat pramanam anumanam sjat 
“ smf/i is authoritative, because both imfli and Veda have 
the same agent performing its mandates.” 

17. The morning and evening oblations, the Newand Full 
Moon oblations, and the soma sacrifice, examples respect¬ 
ively of nitja (daily recurring), naimittika (occasional) 
and kamya (desiderative) rites. 

18. astakais the name of the 8th day after Full Moon in the 
winter and iitira months, on which an oblation is per¬ 
formed for the deceased (Manu 4.119; 150). 

19. the crepuscular observances. 

20. the point is taken up in detail infra §§ 119 ff. 

21. respectively yoga, whereby the component parts of the 
word are given their own meaning ; and rudJd, the total 
meaning of a word that has become conventional and 
does not necessarily correspond to the meanings of its 



component .parts. Rathakara means by joga “cbariot- 
raaVer, Cartwright, 1 * by rudhi a caste which is not at all 
characterized by this profession. 

22. adhjajanasiddhabitddhyangatvabharigtndpi. Such a '‘connota¬ 
tion" is, for example, that the rathakara in the literal sense 
of cartwright is disqualified for Vedic ritual, because a 
cartwright is a iQdra; on this point see infra. 

23. upanajarta, which is the first step to his acquisition of 
Vedic knowledge. 

21. Manu 10.23. 

25. the term "by royal decree” shows that it is a tastt profes¬ 
sion. Quotation not identified 

26. not found in Aujanasasmj-ti (AAS 48). 

27. unidentified. 

20. unidentified. 

29. Manu 10.40. 

This point is detailed upon infra ^ 134 fiT 

30. unidentified. 

31. unidentified. 

32. not in Devalaimftl. 

33. unidentified. 

34. not in Atrisrufti ; Avlluka is unknown to me , kalpa- 
devataka can be explained as a professional kalpa priest, 
kalpa either in the sense of ("unorthodox) ritual,” or 
‘astrological mansion’; gapabhogadevataka is likewise 
obscure, but prohably referito unorthodox priest engages! 
in gjpa worship. 



37. namely, dikfa. 

38. namely, the four Vedas, six Ved5rigas, the Purapas, 
MlmSijisS, Ny3ya and DharmnSaslra, 

39. BrS. 2.2.42. 

40. A NaiySyika. Traditionally, Nyaya does not accept the 
MIji)3jj>s 2 view that the Vedas have not originated from 
a person. 

41. The argument is thus ; The Vcdn is <iC personal origin, 
because it is language; language is invariably found to 
originate from persons. The NaiySyika compares the 
Mlmaipsaka’s view in the terms of this argument with the 
standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has 

42. avafara "descent, emergence.” The meaningisas follows: 
Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a 
certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the 
means-end relation) is suprasensible, there can be no 
other authority for it than Scriptural authority. 

43. This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits 
(fiAafa) brought about by observance or non-observance 
of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation. 

44. cf. Udayana, KummSfijalM.I. 

45. Since they are products, they have been produced by a 
person (God) who knew the means by which to produce 
them (dharma and adharma). 

46. This is the Mim3tps3 view which holds that the dharma 
and adharma as instruments in creation are always the 
dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being 
whose body is itself the produce of dharma and adharma 
and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, 
control them. The Mimamsaka admits that the universe, 
being made up of parts, is subject to origination and 
destruction, but never at one time, since all entities 
presuppose former acts that have brought them about. 



The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates 
eternally. No agency is possible which can intervene in 
this eternal operation fromact to act, by either beginning 
or ending the universe. On this cf. Pcakara^iapaftciki, 
p. 137 fF. for the PrSbhakara view, and SlokavSrttika, 
Sambandhaksepaparihara 47-116 for the Dha^a view. 

47. lit. “that which is unprecedented, not known before, sc. 
by other means of knowledge in MimatpsS il describes 
especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act 
which makes it produce its result. 

48. The argument is that one cannot know that the act will 
indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized j 
thus the act’s power— apiirva —cannot he known before¬ 
hand as the instrument of effectuation. By the 
Naiyayika’s definition only one who knows what instru¬ 
ments are effective in production can actually produce. 

49. unidentified. 

50. mantra and arihaoada : the terms indicate that the 
Naiyayika continues to address the Mimamsaka, for these 
of course are Mlmams5 terms, mantra being the Vedic 
formula used at the ritual, arthavada the descriptive, non¬ 
in junctivc passages of Brahmapa and later Vedic texls. 

51. RV. 10. 90. 14. 

52. Yamuna concurs in the Mfmamsaka’s refutation of the 
Naiyayika’s views, to the extent that he too rejects that 
the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he 
will counter the MimaHisa assertion that God cannot be 
proved at all, that in fact there is neither room nor pur¬ 
pose for a God in the universe. For Yamuna, God has all 
the characteristics He has for the NaiySyika, but he 
proves them from Scripture, not reason. 

53. That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of 
valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates 
knowledge of apiirva facts, e.g„ that a soma sacrifice is a 
means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertain¬ 
ing to dharma. 


Xoaua frAmA^yam 

54, the individual soul. 

*55. supra note. 

56. Since the ap&rca power is suprasensible, It can never be 
perceived, and the assumption of a God who 'supervises’ 
and controls this power because he perceives it is absurd. 

57. read na lab/yrate * virodht* pi; the meaning is this: when 
a ecriain fact (the ctcrnality of pots) cannot be proved by 
a ground (recollection) because this ground contains a 
contradiction (it is recollected that pots having existed 
cease to exist), this does not prove that the same ground 
(recollection) cannot prove the eternaljty of earth, 
mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained 
in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain). 

53. adhikaranariddhanla is a conclusion which, as soon as one 
thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator), 
establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience). 
On this question, cf. TarkabhS^a 43. 

59. It is the contention of MlmarpsS that words and their 
capacity of conveying meaning are eternal. 

60. Sequence, of course, supposes priorityand posteriority of 
the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal. 

61. kramavinlarajali; the difference resides in the createdness 
of the Pancaratra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, 
which introduces a difference of degree between the word 
sequences of both corpora of verbal statements. 

62. This is Yamuna’s objection, which states the extent to 
which he concurs in the preceding Mltnaqisa argument 
against Nyaya. 

S3. This starts the discussion of the PrSbhSkara theory on the 
limitations of the validity of verbal statements. First 
general Mlmaipsa views on the subject are discussed. 

64. The validity of Jabda lies in its communicating contents 
that cannot be known through other means of knowledge. 
What I translate as 'facts’ are more literally ‘‘established 



entities,” established, that is, by other means of 
knowledge than iabda. A scriptural statement of the 
kind “grass is green” is not strictly valid in the sense 
that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a 
scriptural statement to that effect. Another proving 
factor, e.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn 
up conceivably and thus make the scriptural statement 
superfluous *, or we may find that grass is not invariably 
green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the 
scriptural statement. Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture's 
being a means of knowledge, is to the Prabhakara 
Mlmamsaka, its being the sole means of knowing a parti¬ 
cular thing. To the Prabhakara this validity is ideal in 
the case of injunctions concerning actions which, supra- 
sensibly, lead to a certain desired end. 

65. The injunction concerning the odana oblation includes an 
injunction concerning the preparation of the odana and 
the fetchingof firewood for the cooking. Since experience 
shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this 
kdrya is not strictly known on scriptural authority. 

66. This objection ignores the priorities among pramapas, or 
means of knowledge; for the Prabhakara, Perception, etc. 
are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of 
perceptible, etc, contents. Generally Perception is prior 
to Inference. To Yamuna, therefore, no priority of 
Perception to Scripture is given, which is expected since 
in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God’s) 
Perception, as in the case of Paficaratra. 

*67. This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both 
the Naiyayika’s and Mlmamsaka’s views: the defects 
consequent upon the Nyaya proofs of God are avoided on 
the basis of scriptural examination, since Scripture can 
indeed validly pronounce on God. 

68. The Prabhakaras, who are notorious for the gaurava 
‘complicatedness’ of their argumentations. 


Aoama prAmanyam 

69. “Denotation# denoting power, denotativeness” in the 
following PrabhSkara discussions have to be understood 
as the power of verbal statements to provide unprece¬ 
dented and non-superfluous knowledge concerning their 
contents. In the PrSbhakara view, a verbal statement by 
itself is denotative only in injunctive forms, while 
substantive statements have denotation either through 
contextual connection with injunctive statements# or 
(but this is not strictly “true” denotation) through repet¬ 
ition of otherwise knowable facts. This view, which has 
obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the 
lirst place, is thereupon extended to ordinary language as 
well, and is thus expressed in the following theory about 
learning language which is here understood. A child 
learns what certain sentences f mean* by observing the 
action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences. 
When he knows no language meaning ( ojutpatti), he may 
acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another 
to “get the cow," and subsequently observing that the 
other is getting the cow: by associating the two events 
he knows that an order to get the cow was the content of 
the first adult’s statement “get the cow.” A remark 
without consequent action (c.g., “ It is hot today,") can¬ 
not convey any such knowledge to one who does not know 
language. The process of the child knowing the sentence 
meaning is here described as arlkafiatti “reasoning by 
circumstantial implication;” since there is no other 
ground for the second man’s getting the cow, it must 
have been the first man’s statement, 

70. Thus Salikamtha, Prakarapapaftcika, p. 182: niyojyaft 
saroakarye yati soakijalvina iudhyalt. 

71. That is to say that the denotativeness of the words 
composing the statement is dependent upon the in junctive 
denotation of the statement as a whole. 

72. The liiiadi verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in 
English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries 
like “should, must, to be to, ought to.” 



73. For example, a sentence : “ He desires to go to heaven,*’ 
which has the verb in the indicative, followed by a state¬ 
ment 11 he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice,” where 
the verb is injunctive, is truly denotative in spite of its 
indicative form, since it is obviously subordinated to the 
injunctive sentence, to which it describes the performer’s 
qualification: only one who desires to go to heaven has 
title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma 

74. This is an example like *'it is hot today;" the young 
father’s happy countenance is not considered an action. 

75. E.g., the sentence " he who desires to go to heaven offers 
the soma sacrifice," is an injunctive statement in indicat¬ 
ive form. 

76. This is the Prabhakara view of the denotativeness of 
single words, summarized in the formula anvitdbhidhdna, 
which is short for kdryanvitabhidhana "denotation of words 
syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence." 

77. This point will be taken up and aonfirmed infra §G4. 

78. E.g., a statement "there are fruits on the river bank" 
does not by itself, seir-sufficiently, create in the hearer 
the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank; 
the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the 
hearer must infer that the speaker knows what he is 
talking about, that he knows that fruit means ‘fruit’, 
river bank ‘river bank,* etc. 

79. This is again the PrSbhakara view. The Bhafia view is 
somewhat different; according to the latter the upani?ads 
are arthavadas (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory 
of elements of injunctions) to the etcrnality of the 
performer’s personality (dtman), which etcrnality is pre¬ 
supposed by the efficacy of the injunction: e.g., the 
injunction " he who desires heaven must offer with the 
soma sacrifice" supposes the immortality of the 




80. Gh Up. 1.5.1. 

81. In this the Pr3bhakara concurs with the Bhatta. Injunc¬ 
tions without time of fruition specified arc not guaranteed 
to bring about the desired effect during the present 
lifetime of the performer. 

82. I read ata tvdrthavaddndm. 

83. On this point see KMS 1.2.1. with Sahara’s bha?ya. 

84. On the Bhatfa view of omniscience, cf. Kumarila, Samb. 
47-59; 114-116. 

85. i.e, the appropriateness or propriety of a word in 
collocation with other words; in the sentence "his 
mother is harren,” ‘barren* is obviously inappropriate. 

86. The identification is considered an arthavada, i.c. 3 lauda¬ 
tory of the sacrificial pole 

87. The relation between God and the texts has to be proved. 

I read j adi ca for apt ca. 

88. unidentified, 

89. RV. 10.90 14 


91. Mahanar Up 11.12. 

92. Kajh Up. 3,9. 

93. SvctUp. 6.9. 

94. Visnu Pur. 1,1.31. 

95. Not in Manusroj-ti; reference perhaps to hfanu 1.9 — 10? 

96. I read tathaPi. 

97. Mu$4 Up. U.9. 

98. Svet Up. 6.7, 

99. unidentified. 

100. supra § 12. 

101. supra §11. 

102. Kumarila, £)okav3ruika 2.114. 

103. BA Up. 4.5,14. 



104 Ch Up. 6.11.3. 

105. GhUp. 6.2.1. 

106. Ch Up. 6.2.3. 

107. Taitt Up. 3.1.1. 

The whole sentence includes tena jioanli, on which the 
present exegesis of bhiita is based. 

108. Bh G. 18.61. 

109. namely, that they are born ( jatani) and die { pray anti ). 

110. Svet Up. 4.5. 

111. BhG. 13.19. 

112. Hath Up. 2.18. 

113. Kajh Up. 2.17. 

114. sc. oTknowledge. 

115. here used as synonymous with PaSupata. 

116. IreadrWyd. 

117. pratijUarlfiak, the object or content of the pratijUa, which 
is the first step of the five-raerabered syllogism, e.g., “the 
mountain has fire” (parvatasyS gnimattvam ). It docs not 
therefore coincide with the Subject. In- the proposition 
both S and P must be siddha, established as existing 
somewhere ; a non-thing like a hare’s horn can be neither 
S nor P. 

118. this “non-apprehension of what should be there ( yoganupa - 
lambhd) is the criterion by which we know the absence of 
a thing. Here it is the absence of truth in Paficaratra 
that needs be proved by yogdnupalambha, if the objector’s 
contention that Pancaratra is invalid-through-reversion 
be correct. 

119. I have difficulty in understanding the argument unless 
I assume an illogicality. By stating as his ground “since 
in agaraa we have its meaning exactly conveyed as it is” 
the objector not only agrees with the preceding argu¬ 
mentation that on inferential grounds Paficaratra is not 



invalid, hut even goes so far as accepting that it is valid 
in other words, confuse non-invalidity with validity. 
Then, because of this validity (svarthasya tathatvava- 
bodhanat), there arises a conflict with a deviating state¬ 
ment of the Veda which has its own validity ; since only 
one can be true, it follows that when Piaficaratra is true 
by inference, it is untrue by Veda. But I don’t see how 
the objector can reasonably infer the validity of Panca- 
ratra, since its meaning or content is admittedly 
suprasensible. Yamuna himself has not argued that 
Inference proves the validity, but that Inference cannot 
disprove the correctness of the thesis. 

120. a hetvantaram constitutes on the part of the debitor a con¬ 
fession of importance since the ground which he gave 
does not hold and he has to produce a different ground. 
By the rules of debate this means a defeat.- 

121. infra §§ 76 f. 

122. The founder of the school of logic, 

123. The Vedie injunction na hxinsydt sarvabhxitani "One should 
not in jure any being" raises the question of the validity 
of injunctions which do require injury to beings. But 
this is a secondary question which does not affect the 
validity of the Veda as a whole. Similarly, the thesis 
“ Pahcaratra is valid" is not disproved by the possible 
mention in the valid Veda of something that conflicts 
with something in PaflcarStra. So far the argument is 
not for validity but against invalidity. 

124. Since pots arc knowable, the ground would also apply to 
prove the eternality of pots and all things that are 

125. Since only earth (as an element) possesses smell, this 
ground has no general applicability. 

126. Like the ground "because it is knowable" which applies 
to things regardless of whether they are eternal or not. 



127. Obviously, if the ground were not known, it could not be 

128. This objection seems to speak to the summary denial that 
the ground is unestablished through reversion. 

129. Be it repeated that the validity, authoritativeness, etc. of 
Verbal Statements (i.e , Sabdapramanja) is founded on the 
basic assumption that statements truly and accurately 
communicate their things-meant (artba), that a word 
accurately conveys its meaning. Among these things- 
meant Yamuna includes facts as well as kdrjas, hence the 

“ following debate with the Prabhakara. 

130. supra §37. 

131. Yamuna here takes up the Prabhakarn’s theory that a 
child learns the meaning of language through the action 
his elders take on hearing a statement, so that the 
denotativeness of language is defined by its injunctive¬ 
ness. He uses the Prabhakara’s example of the factual 
statement: "A child is born to you.” A child who does 
not know language has no way of understanding the 
meaning of this statement because the young father’s 
happiness conveys nothing specific But, asks Y5muna, 
suppose the same child has witnessed his father reception 
of the cheering news and the subsequent preparations for 
a birth ceremony. Since one follows immediately upon 
the other, the child associates one with the other and can 
thus understand the meaning of the statement, though the 
statement itself was no injunction, but a communication 
of an established fact. 

132. Then, one may suppose, the child would not so readily 
associate the birth ceremony with the previous com- 

133. supra §36. 

134. The things-meant or denoted by the word. 

135. Yamuna’s argument is that the injunctive, etc. termina¬ 
tions of the verb denote the injunction as their thing- 
meant ( padartha ); but what makes this Injunction 



‘meaningful’ is not that it is an injunction, but that it is 
connected with someone who is qualified to accept the 
injunction, c.g., in the injunction svargakamo yajeta. The 
injunctive yajtta has no meaning or purpose unless there 
is a “desire for heaven;'* the meaning of the injunction 
thus is connected with the consequence of this desire of 
heaven, namely, that somebody who has this desire is 
prepared to do something about it. 

136. ardhoiarati is a half-«ld woman; the arihajaialiyanydya is 
used to indicate that the opponent wants to have it both 
ways and that consequently his argument,"like a half-old 
and half-young woman, is useless either way. 

137. Misra’s text here has yady api pravrdyanuPapatU.tamaJ/u- 

gamamyaiva iabdaiaktis “the denoting power of language 
is to be known only through the impossibility of 
operation,” which makes no sense. The reading must be 
corrupt, in amipapalti wc may find a corruption of 
vyutpatti, in pravrtli perhaps a corruption of karyartht or 
kdryarlha —. I read conjecturally karydrthe vyutpatti - 

samadkigamartiyaiva, which gives the required sense. 

138. This holds for those statements which are not verifiable 
by other means of knowledge, for if they are verifiable, 
they arc no means of knowledge in their own right. 

139. read na hi kriyakarye vyutpannah sthayi kdiyam. 

14%. sthayi ; the Prabhakara view is that the ktrya has a lasting 
efficacy beyond the inevitably transient action it involves; 
for the karya must remain in order to effect the fruit of 
the action at any time after the completion of the action, 

141. Yamuna objects that we cannot have two altogether 
different denoting powers in ian gauge, one to convey a 
transitory thing, another to convey a non-transitory 
thing. The only possible explanation is that of lakfond 
" figurative usage,” which remains related to the mukhyd 
vrttift "principal usage.** But he will deny the entire 
construction (67J. 



142. This is the PrabhSkara view, which holds that in the 
injunction niyoga svargakdmo yajtta the sddkya (object to 
be realized) is not Jrar|<j, but the entire mjoja (cf. 
Prakarariapahcika, p. 190), so that the statement of the 
injunction would become the means (iddhaaa) to realize 
that sddhya, sc. the injunction. 

143. Cf. Prakaranapaficika p. 182. 

144. Nothing can become a fact (siddha) as long as it is still to 
be made a fact ( sddhya ) by a ^actualizing* means 
( iddhana ); thus as long as it is related with such a means 
it cannot be a fact. 

145. This is the principle of tkavakyaia: a statement can 
contain only one injunction, otherwise there is p akyabhtia'. 
what should be one sentence is split up into two. 

146. Quotations not identified; but for the argument, see 
Prakaranapaficika, p 183 fT 

147. No specific fruits are attached to nttya rites. 

148. mdhalmya, which corresponds to pradhanyo, pradhanatd 

149. BA Up. 5.6,1. 

150. Not to be found in the major Upnnisads. 

151. supra§35. 

152. supra §42. 

153. read i(j> asal for itiyal. 

154. gvetUp. 3.19. 

155. Svet Up. 6.8. 

156. cf supra note. 

157. supra note 86. 

158. supra §36. 

159. This must refer to the 4m ti sa yo ha cat tat par am vein 
•brahma veda brahma bhavati (quoted RJmanuja, Vedartha- 

» sarngraha, 91), which I have been unable to locate. 

160. Taitt Up. 2.1.1. brahmavid dpnoii paiam. 

138 ' 

Aoama prXmX^*am 

161. This must refer to Taitt Up. 2.1.1 so ’fnute sarcan kamin 
taha brahman* vipafeita, but sa sdmagaft is obscure, unless 
one may regard it as a corruption of viftafeita. 

162. Partial quotations from Taitt Up. 2.1.1, Mupd Up. and 
an unidentified source. 

!62a, Nrsirnhapurvatapanl Up. 2.4 (which reads purastad for 
Parastad) and Svet Up. 3.9. 

163. not Identified. 

164. not identified. 

165. Could this refer to Varaha Purana? Gf. infra. 

166. Vi§pu Pur., 1.1.31. 

167. Not in Manusmrti. 

168. A little known Vedic branch (if it was a Vedic tradition), 
from which certain Vaisriava sects derive their authority; 
cf. infra §138. 

169. These quotations could not be identified. 

170. BAUp 4.1.5. 

171. Vispu Pur. 6.4.40. 

172. cf. Varaha Pur., 72.4, which reads padyatt in b. 

173. cf. Varaha Pur. 7026 na tasmdt potato devo bhaoita na 
bhavisyati. It is clear from several quotations from this 
Purapa that Yamuna’s text had different readings, not all 
of them better. 

174. Matsya Pur. 290.15. 

175. The Linga, Vayuand Bhavisyat quotations could not be 

176. Title of one of Yamuna’s treatises. 

177. read sa M sahajasamnedaTtasdkfdtkrladiksdradhonadidharmoh, 

178. External signs worn by Saiva sectarians. 

179. Svet Up. 3.8. 

180. “The Doctrine of the Five Chapters.” 

181. The highest material evolute; the floka is out of order. 



182. The text reads guifhacdramukhasmasanabhatUavasdnah parch, 
which !j a corruption; I read, svholly conjecturally 

183. The text reads yoga dhdranam vejatt hjdi ihiyim ontfcore- 
piircarp tatha, and teems out of order. The sense is clear 

184. corresponds to Varaha Puraria. 70.35 team ea rudramahd- 
bdho mohaiatlrdni karaya I alpdyatam dariajitva mahaydiu 
mahtivarafy . 

185. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.41, which in cd reads nayaslddhanta ♦ 

samjndbhir mayd I a strain iu darlitam. 

186. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.38, which reads in cd Idslrefuabhirato 
loko bahuljena bhaved atah. 

187. nearest is Varaha Pur., 70.42,/add pasupalam Sdstrctji jayale 

188. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.21, yadvtdabahyant karma sydeehastram 
udditja stnjale I tad raxdram iti cikhydlam tan neslam gaditam 

189. cf. Varaha Pur., 70.40, mdm vimor vyatiriktamye brahmatiat 
ea daijoltama 1 bhajante pdpakarmdnas tt yanli narakam nardh, 

190. not identified. 

191. rcadyesdm for t;am. 

192. not identified- 

193. supra §52. 

194. TaittUp. 2.8.1. 

195. supra § 12. 

196. Aitareya Br. 

197. Manusmrti, 4.124. 

193. Mahabbarata J.265 f. 

199. supra § 17 

200. supra § 17 

201. agnava?5oav3, name of a sacrificial cate offered at the 




202. supra § 17. 

203. The author of the Brahmasutras is identified with Vyasa- 
Dvaipayana, composer of the Mahabharata 

204. Mahabharata, 12 340 (129.76) ff. 

205. Mahabharata, 6.66 (3012). 

206. Mahabharata not identified. 

207. Mahabharata not identified. 

208. BrS , 2.2.42. 

209. ‘Divisions’ of fhe Supreme God as Vasudeva, Saipkarsapa, 
Pradyumna and Aniruddha. 

210. tanmatras here in the sense of the “higher evolutes.” 

211. toyenajiuan visasarja bhumydm, MahanarUp., 1.4. 

212. BrS. 2.3.16 (17). Translation: "A Word descriptive of 
movingor unmoving beings, has not a secondary meaning 
(in referring to Brahman], because such a being’s 
existence depends on Brahman’s existence.” 

213. BrS., 2.3.17 (18). Translation: “Theatraan is not born 
because there is no gruti to that effect, and because of 
its eternality, which is proved by the 4rutis.” 

214. BrS., 2.2.43. 

215. Mupd Up., 2.1.3. 

216. BrS,, 2,2.44. 

217. BrS., 2.2.45. 

218. In BrS., 2.2. 

219. asamanjasya, taken from BrS., 2.2.37. 

220. supra §§96, 97. 

221. i.e., as a tatpurufa compound “the beginning (source) of 
(valid.) knowledge*.*' mjaanddibhiiirc ''since He (God) is a 
source of valid knowledge.” 

222. cf. supra § 18. 

223. karmani lyut Papini. 

224. not identified. 



225. in order to understand any statement, one roust first 
know the meaning of the words that compose it; this may 
be called dependence, so that to this extent any statement 
is dependent for its informativeness on other and prior 
knowledge; but this must also apply to Vedic statements. 

226. If the cause (here: God) is above suspicion, the statement 
will be accurate. 

227. gunatah pjamatiyaiydyuktatsud Onabhjupagamac; my under* 
standing is that a statement has its validity hy itself, and 
no secondary validity in the sense that its content must 
first be validated by some other means. The validity 
itself must be proved (namely by the character of the 
personal author or by its preterpersonal origin), but once 
proved, the statement itself is valid. 

228. Vaispavarite observed five times a day: paiieakdlika. 

229. SlokavSrttika, 2.6 7 ab. 

230. ib. 2. 67 cd. 

231. not identified. i 

232. this speaks to 108, that the independent cognition cancels 
the dependent cognition, if there is conflict between 
them. Yamuna makes the point that this is not 
invariably true; that neither dependence nor independ¬ 
ence is a cause of invalidation, saptkfanva pelf dive is a 
dual and requires the correction of kdranani into kirant, 
If my understanding of the text is correct. 

233. namely, because it requires another cognition in order to 
be denied. 

234. namely, in the example of the burning lamp ; is it the 
same flame that burns at si* o’clock and at seven o’clock? 
We don’t seethe flame change or be succeeded by another 
flame. Only inference shows that since there is a differ¬ 
ent amount of oil in the lamp at different times, it is 
different oil that is burning as a flame, so that the flame 
is really different. The senseperception is of the varying 
amounts of oil. 



235. The Naiyayikas. , • 

236. Since Brahma is the creator of the world, he can know 

whether'there were Vedas or not before creation; by 
taking away Brahma’s memory, God in His omnipotence 
could start the myth of the prctcrpcrsonal origin of the 
Veda. ■ , 

237. not identified. 

238. not identified. 

239. Sabarabhasya and KMS. 

240. supra § 17; vtdabdhyagrhitatvfit. I have rendered 

by ‘accepted* to cover approximately the variety of 
meanings that Yamuna detects in the word. 

241. Maniismrti, 8.107. 

242. People who do prohibited acts follow Vedic expiations; 
but if acceptance by people whocommit forbidden acts is 
sufficient to deny the validity of what they accept, ihij 
means that the validity of the Veda would be denied. 

243. ManusmftJ. 

244. supra §17: this Buddhist injunction is outside the Veda 
in one sense. 

245. For the observance of a prohibition is as much a ritual 
action as the observance ofan injunction. 

246. supra § 14. 

247. supra § 16. 

248 supra §59. 

249. Quotations not identified; the group* enumerated are 
jOdras, and yet by Vedic injunction have toobicrvc, i.c., 
to accept, the few Vedic injunction* addressed 10 them 
Do they by their acceptance invafitfate these injunctions? 

250. not identified. 

25). read driakilajujpithlnidfii. 

252. not identified. 

253, supra § 15. 



254. i.e., is the same name used for several groups or only one? 

255. The argument is: if S is P, then P is not therefore S. 
The example is ‘parvato ’gnim3n dhumavattvlt’ if we 
interchange S and P, we get parvato dhumavan agni* 
maltvit, but this is not true, for though there is no 
fireless smoke, there is smokeless lire. Similarly here: 
the fifth maybe a satvata or a vaigya vritya, but being 
the fifth does not make the sitvata a vaiiya vrltya. 

256. In the Manu quotation supra § 15. 

257. explained below, § 130. 

258. Hari has apparently a meaning ‘lion.* Or did Yamuna 
think of Nrsirpha ? 

259. gauh can mean ‘cow' and ‘word.’ 

260. supra § 15. 

261. taddbita suffix, cf. PSaipi. 

262. ‘conventionally’ the two words arc synonymous, ‘etymo¬ 
logically’ they have difTerent meanings. 

263. Pacini. 

264. quoted supra. 

265. supra note. 

266. supra § 15. 

267. not identified. 

268. For the word mean® etymologically “maker of chariots, 

269. not identified. 

270. By refusing to accept a rudhi meaning the authority of 
the Vedic statements concerning all the features or the 
sacrifice made by the now disqualified chariot-maker 
would be lost, and the authorityof the statement that caste 
names may designate more than one caste would also be 

271. cf. Amarakosa, 10.4. 

272. not verified. 


273. which is the prerogative only of the three varflas. 

274. KMS. 

275. supra § 15. 

276. not identified. 

277. not identified. 

278. supra § 16. 

279. cf. Manu, 11.40. 

280. AitBr., 3.46. 

281. not identified. 

282. supra § 16. 

283. This and the following quotations could not be 

284. supra § 16. 

285. a Brahman erudite in the Veda and following its 

286. If he does not believe that God is present in the effigie, 
the offerings arc obviously not used and cannot be 
characterized as left-overs. The priest’s avoidance of 
them would simply amount to sinful waste. 

287. He must make his prohibition specific, in order not to 
prohibit the priest from using food that is otherwise 
wasted. But he cannot determine the specification on his 
own terms. 

288. used flowers and used food offerings. 

289. without divine utilisation. 

290. The paficagavya is a substance in which the 5 products 
of the cow are mingled. 

291. one nadika is a half muhurta. 

292. cake used at Vedic offerings. 

293. namely, in the above statement on the 10 n5d>k3s. 

294. Vilvaksena, to whom puja is performed after the main 

295. as quoted supra § 16. 



296. Mah3bh5rata quotations not verifiable. 

297. The ritual taking of food is considered a performance of 
the prartfgnihotra. 

298. The hotar is the principal reciting priest at the soma 
sacrifice, the adhvaryu the main executive 

299. supra § 17. 

390. namely, at the upanayana ceremony. 

301. aindragneya, name of a srauta ritual. 

302. Name of a work of Y2muna. 

303. Predecessor of Yamuna at Sriranga. 

304. Nithamuni compiled the sayings of the Vaispava saints, 
the Alvars. 

Printed at Prabba Printing House, SangaIare-4 



with a Sanskrit Commentary (Goodha Prakasa) 


Sri U. Ve. Abhinava Desika 



with An Introduction in English 



Formerly Professor and Dean 
Faculty of Philosophy and Education, Annamalai University 

and Translation in English 



Formerly, Lecturer, Annamalai University. 

Published with the Financial Assistance from 

The Ministry of Education and Social Welfare 
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price] 19 7 2 [RS. 12-50 


Analytical Outline of the Three Siddhis 

Mangala sloka 

Conflicting views concerning the finite self 

Conflicting views regarding the pramaijas by which the finite self 

. is established 

Conflicting views .regarding the Supreme Self 

Diversity of views regarding the manifestations of the Supreme Self 

Conflicting views concerning how the Supreme Self is known 

Varying views regarding the nature of moksa 

Conflicting views regarding the means to moksa 

The special features of this treatise 

Determination of the nature of the individual self 

The purvapaksa or prima facie view that body is the soul on the 

evidence of perception. The case for the identity of soul and body 

The purvapaksin’s criticism of the position that the body is not 

the self 

The attempt to show that the body could at once be the subject, and. 

the object of knowledge 

Summing up of dehatma vada position with reasons. 

The refutation of the doctrine of the identitv of body and soul 
Ahampratyaya (the cognition “I” or self-consciousness) does not 
involve knowledge of bodily organs; hence the self is distinct 

from the body 

Even cognitions like T am stout’ establish a self distinct from the 


Identity of body with soul illusory 

Yogic perception vouches for the separateness of soul and body 
Arguments in support of the view that body and soul are 

distinct entities 

The Sankhya arguments against the claim that perception 

establishes identity of body and soul 
Refutation of the CSrvaka criticism of arguments that the body and 

* • soul are different 
















9 * 




The illustration that intoxicating quality arises from the mixture of 

non-intoxicants not apposite 
Example of redness produced by chewing not apposite 
The illustration of parti-coloured cloth unhelpful to the Carvaka 16 
Being distinct from the other qualities of the body, consciousness 

is not an attribute of the body 
Additional reasons in support of the view that the body is not 

the soul 17 

Argument based on negative concomitance indefensible ,, 

The view that the senses are the soul „ 

The refutation of this view 18 

The doctrine that manas is the soul 19 

The refutation of this doctrine >t 

Refutation of the Naiyayika proof for the existence of manas 20 

Refutation of the argument that manas is the non-inherent cause of 

pleasure, pain and the like 21 

Untenability of the view that atma gunas such as pleasure arise only 
in conjunction with some substance other than itself and that 

it is manas „ 

Even if conjunction with such a substance were necessary it does 
not follow that it must be with manas 22 

Manas is no other than buddhi 24 

Manas is not the soul 

The theory that prana is the soul 25 

Refutation of this theory „ 

The theory that consciousness is the soul ' 26 

The Bha$ta view that consciousness is insentient ,, 

There is no such thing as jnatata; hence consciousness is self-luminous 27 

Additional arguments to show that consciousness is self-luminous 28 
The contention that consciousness is itself the soul as there is 

economy of thought ,, 

The contention that the cognition *1 know’ will not prove the 

existence of a soul distinct from knowledge „ 
The contention that like the knower. the known also is unreal 29 
The refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine that consciousness 

is the soul 30 


Impossibility of explaining recognition even on the admission that 
the self is a stream of consciousness 30 

To obviate this difficulty the veiled Buddhist contends that 
consciousness is unborn, changeless and devoid of distinctions 31 

Refutation of the Advaitic view 33 

This is opposed to experience „ 

It cannot be maintained that consciousness does not grasp its own 

prior non-existence 34 

The contention that there are no pramanas to establish antecedent 

non-existence is refuted 35 

Consciousnees is not eternal 36 

The contention that consciousness cannot be proved by anything 
other than consciousness is disproved M 

The contention that if consciousness becomes the object of another 
consciousness it would cease to be consciousness is met 37 

The assertion that if consciousness is without an origin it could have 
no changes is refuted 39 

The contention that if consciousness is unborn it cannot have 
differentiation is refuted ,, 

The contention that consciousness is quality-less stands self-refuted 40 
Even on the view of the veiled Buddhists recognition would be 
inexplicable 42 , 

Refutation of the view that jnatrtva is the result of super-imposition 43 
The contention that jnatrtva resides in ahamkara 44 

This is opposed to every-day experience 

Indefensibility of the position that pratyaktva belongs to ahamkara 43 
The untenablility of the view that akamkara appears as knower 
either on account of reflection or contact with consciousness M 

The contention that ahamkara appears as knower because it 
manifests consciousness as residing in itself 46 

The refutation of the preceding view „ 

None of the three alternative ways in which ahamkara could be said 
to manifest consciousness is tenable 47 

None of these possible modes of the third alternative is tenable „ 


It cannot be maintained that the manifesting entity should 
manifest the object as residing within itself. 

Refutation of the contention of Suresvara that in deep sleep there 
is no consciousness of T 50 

Analysis of your statement establishes just the opposite of what 
you intend to prove 5 [ 

The reflection “I was not even aware of my self’’ does not mean 
the absence of . 1 ' but something else. 

The statement in question undoubtedly points to the existence of 

the “I” and its manifestation 52 

The “I” (ahamartha) persists in the state of release 
On the strength of the sacred text relating to liberation and 
endeavour of souls for securing moksa the existence of “I” 
(ahamartha) is proved 53 

Refutation of the view that the I is an objective element 

c (i. e. it is jada) 

Even in the state of release the self shines to itself as ‘I* 54 

The consciousness of “I” is natural and not due to occasional factors 55 

Ahamkara which refers to the body and which is a product of 

matter is the result of delusion and has to be dispelled 

It is only where the self appears as “I”—T am deva'—T am 

man' the possibility of ajnana arises 56 

The unsoundness of the argument that consciousness itself is the 

soul as it is insentient 57 

The argument that on account of the invariable* concomitance qf 

the knowledge of • P and consciousness they are identical is unsound 58 

Even the contention that since one and the same consciousness 

•presents the invariable concomitance of known, knower and 

knowledge they are identical is refuted. 60 

;The contention that knower and known are one on the ground of " 
invariable concomitance even as different flames are considered 
one on account of similarity 61 

The example of different terms appearing as identical is not helpful 62 
Refutation of the contention that there is no object that does not 

manifest itself. 




Scriptural support for the existence of a soul distinct from 
consciousness 64 

The Pramana by which the existence of the jiva is established 66 

(a) The Nyaya view 

After proving in general terms that consciousness being a guija 
must have a substrate it is shown by a process of elimination 
that it must be a specific entity namely, atma 

Refutation of the Nyaya view ** 

Argument from pure negative concomitance fares no better 68 

(b) The Sankhya view . 

The Sankhya mode of proof stands discredited for the same reasons 69 
Refutation of the Sankhya arguments 71 

The impossibility of a conscious and changeless entity being the 
victim of illusions 72 

The refutation of the argument that the vrttis of the antahkarana 
are superposed on the purusa 74 

The existence of the soul established by sruti and srutyarthapatti 75 

(c) The Mimamsa view 76 

Refutation of this view „ 

The Bhatta view 

• • W 

Refutation of the view 77 

Untenability of the suggestion that jnana is the objects of mental * 

perception „ 

Enquiry into the nature of sukha, duhkha etc 78 

The Bhatta view again 80 

The Prabhakara reply thereto 81 

The Bhatta rejoinder 82 

The Prabhakara position clarified while refuting the Bhatta view 83 

The Prabhakara view that in deep sleep and moksa there is no 

self-consciousness „ 

Refutation of the prabhakara view and proof that the soul 

is self-luminous 83 

The Prabhakara centention that jnana is not self-luminous „ 

Even if prana is self-luminous, the soul does not depend on prana 

for its apprehension 88 

The soul is self-luminous 

The proof that the soul has consciousness as its eternal and* 

'• • essential nature 89 


The purvapak§a-that consciousness ismoneternaliand that 
( there are no grounds to prove that it is eternal 89 

The opponent calling in question thesiddhantin's position 90 

Refutation of the view that the atma (dharmin) and consciousness 

(dharma) are one 91 

Refutationcofdhe view, that consciousness is all-pervasive 92 

Untenability of the view that the soul has a twofold knowledge 

(i) eternal and (ii) non-eternal 93 

The illustration of the remembrance that there was no elephant 
at the tank-bund in the morning cited to prove the existence of 

: consciousness in deep sleep is unhelpful „ 

Nor is the remembrance on waking, ‘I slept well’ helpful in 
proving that there isrself-awareness in deep sleep 95 

£Ehe contention that the self depends on jnana for its manifestation 

; . ■- and that jnana is non-eternal 96 

(The proof that dharmabhuta-jn ana is eternal 

Though jnana. is eternal it has atma for its support 97 

Refutation of the view that the conjunction of consciousness with 
object is prana ,, 

In respect of the self the analogy of the relation of cause and 
effect does not hold 98 

The contentiomthat since dharmabhuta jnana is dependent on 

occasional factors it cannot be eternal 99 

The reply to the foregoing 

Refutation of the view that as cognitions are limited by time 

they are non-eternal 101 

Activities of consciousness altoether of a different nature from 

activities such as locomotion and cooking i02 

The illustration of the body not apposite 
In deep sleep there are no.-activities of consciousness (dharma 
bhuta jnana) 104 

The experiences of the soul in deep sleep need not all be 

Refutation of the contention that if dharma-bhuta-jnana is 

eternal, it would do away with the distinction between bound 

and released souls 106 


Refutation of the view that nidra is a mode of action accounting 

for the experience of pleasure or pain on waking 106 

The conclusion that nidra is no vrtti will not contradict the 

yoga sutra 107 

Granting nidra is a vrtti, from that reason itself it follows that 

consciousness is an essential nature of the self 103 
The self-luminous soul-the substrate of prana-is eternal 109 

The soul being the substrate of praria is svayamprakasa „ 

Determination of the significance of the term prakasa and of the 
nature of its relation to the soul ,, 

The contention that the self is the object of knowledge and not 
svayamprakasa 110 

The contention that atma is the seat of prakasa inferred from 

prakatya 111 

Refutation of that view ,, 

Nyaya refutation of the Prabhakara and Bhatta views and the 
contention that relation of jnana and its visaya is through sense contact 113 
The Nyaya argument that with the disappearance of jnana, 
prakatya disappears is untenable because with the disappearance 

of the efficient cause, the effect need not disappear 114 
That the disappearance of the nimitta karana need not 
necessarily lead to the disappearance of the effect is illustrated 
with the instance of two-ness and the like „ 

Untenability of the argument that numbers commencing from 2 

do not last as long as objects last 115 

Cognition of duality and the like is not constant, since it 

depends on desire to enumerate 116 
Consciousness illumines objects through contact with them 

by means of sense contact „ 
Jnana is of limited nature „ 

Fallacious to consider what is devoid of touch unlimited 117 

Objects, past and future could come into contact with 
consciousness as what existed or what is yet to be >= y. 


The non-apprehension of intervening space explained 119 

The objection that consciousness as a quality cannot leave its 

substrate and proceed elsewhere answered 120 
The prabhakara view of sabda refuted „ 

The Prabhakara view that object is manifested without the 

relation of consciousness 122 

The prabhakara view refuted „ 

The objections to the concept of adiiratva answered 124 

Deciding on the nature of the knowledge relation as samyoga 125 

The examples of sukha etc adduced by the purvapaksin not apposite 126 
Definition of sarira (body) according to the siddhantin 127 

The significance of dhih occurring in the sruti texts cited above 128 
References to origination of knowledge, its loss, doubt, certainty 

and the like explained 130 

Though the soul is self-luminous, there is need of scripture to 

make its nature clearly known 132 

Inquiry into the duration of the soul: The soul is eternal 
Purvapaksa: The Buddhist view that the soul is momentary 


The Mimamsaka view „ 

Laukikapratyaksa cannot prove the existence of God „ 

Nor could yoga pratyaksa prove the existence of God „ 

Impossible even for the senses that have acquired supernomal 
powers through drugs, charms, austerities and yogic concentration 

to establish the existence of God 137 

The Nyaya arguments for the existence of God „ 

Yogic concentration even of the end stage incapable of proving God 138 
No pramana other than perception is competent either to prove 

the existence of God „ 

The Mimamsaka critcism of the Naiyayika view 140 

The argument proves what is already proven 141 

The Mimamsaka objection that since the earth, the ocean etc,, 



cannot be made, they can not be said to have a cause. 

Your argument would only establish the reverse of what you seek 

to prove i.e it would not prove an omniscient Lord but only a 

finite individual „ 

The possibility of the precisely opposite conclusion i.e. that the 

world is not created 143 

The argument that the nimitta karana need not know the 
upadana karana and hence one who is not omniscient could be cause 
The Mimamsaka concludes his argument 144 

The Naiyayika reply to the Mimamsaka contention „ 

Meeting the charge that there is no vyapti 145 

The nature of adhisthana defined „ 

The jiva cannot be the nimittakarana of the world 146 

The untenability of the contention that the argument only 
establishes attributes opposed to omniscience etc. 147 

What is needed for creation is controlling activity and 

not the body 148 

Activity can be initiated without the instrument 
of the body i.e. mere sankalpa suffices 

No need to entertain any doubt on the ground that in the case in 

point many of the characteristics differ from those found in the 

illustrative example 149 

Adducing special illustrations to strengthen the conclusion that 

the divine creator is vastly different from the human agent 151 

Other arguments to establish the existence of Isvara 152 


Enquiry into the significance of the text 155 

“Brahman exists, one only without a second" „ 

‘Advitiya’ cannot be taken as a tatpurusa compound „ 

Nor can it be taken as a bahuvrihi compound 156 

The significance of the expression Advitiya (the view of the 

Visistadvaitin) 157 

Other kruti texts in support of the siddhantin’s view 
Refutation of the view that the world is illusory 158 

The untenability of the view that the world is at once sat and asat 159 
Inquiry into the significance of the text tat tvam asi 161 


The view that consciousness is the cause of the world is untenable 163 
The purvapaksin trying to justify thb above contention with 

examples 164 

The contention that consciousness is eternal ,» 

The contention that consciousness is devoid of attributes 165 


Detailed examination of the advaitic position-consciousess is manifold ,, 

Consciousness cannot be eternal, all-pervasive and unitary 
Untenability of the contention that there is nothing apart from , 

consciousness 166 

The contention that avidya is the cause of the world and that it 
is difficult to define it as different and non-different „ 

What is the significance of the negative particle in avidya ? 167 

What does the term vidya occurring in vidya mean ? 
Asrayanupapatti-avidya cannot dwell in jiva 

Nor is Brahman the substrate of avidya 168 

There is no escape from anyonyasraya dusana by stating that 

vidya is an avastu (unreality) 169 

Avidya cannot be avastu (unreal) ,, 

Is avidya single or manifold; is the bound soul which is its 

substrate unitary or manifold ? 170 

Avidya cannot be single „ 

The contention that Suka and others attained mukti is not true 
Refutation of the above contention 171 

The contention that moksa is an eternally existent state; it has only 
to be rendered manifest through dhyana etc. 

The unintelligility of the notion abhivyakti (manifestation) 172 

Avidya cannot be an obstacle to Brahma jnana 

Refutation of the view that there is only a single soul 173 

The untenability of the view that there is a plurality of jivas, 

each having its own avidya 174 

Being endowed with qualities like self-luminosity and unity, 
consciousness cannot be said to be without a second (advitiya) 

The untenability of the contention that these are not qualities 

but refer to the absence of certain features 176 

It cannot be contended that the world is distinct from sat 


and asat 


The refutation of the view that pratyaksa cannot perceive difference 177 

Is the mithyatva of the world real or unreal? Either alternative goes 
against the advaitic position. 179 

In the very act of denying dharmas, the ground on which the denial 
is made shows Brahman to be endowed with dharma. 180 

Refutation of the contention that the invariable concomitanoe of 
knowledge and the known establishes their - identity. 180 




- r •• 

YAM ' 

r , [ 


V ' ’ ' * ‘ « - 

1. May I have the highest bhakti to Sriman 1 2 (the Consort of Sri 
or Laksmi), the Supreme Purusa who is ever pleased by spuls whose 

sole enjoyment is in rendering service to the Divine, and to whose will 

Matter (prakrti) 9 , bound souls (purusa) 3 , time, manifest material nature,: 
released souls and innumerable eternally perfect souls always conform. 
(St, 1) , •: , 

f t 

There are many conflicting, views concerning the finite self and the 
Infinite Self. With a veiw to making the matter clear, a book named 
Atmasiddhi. (the determination of the real nature-of the soul) is 
written. (St. 2) r. 

That the knowledge of the self is the*'means of attaining trans¬ 
cendental felicity is indeed admitted in all systems. Upanisadic texts 
such as the following,'declaring that the knowledge of the finite self and 
of v the Supreme Self is the means of liberation are found:- “On knowing 
the finite self and the Supreme Controller to be different, and thereby 
becoming the object of His grace, he attains immortality”; 4 5 “If one 
should know the self”; “The knower of the self crosses over sorrow”; 6 
“He who knows Brahman attains the Highest” 6 . Eminent teachers hold 
many conflicting views concerning the finite self and the Highest Person. 

1 As the prayer is for highest form of bhakti to Sriman, it is evident that 
Yamunacharya considers Lord Narayana along with Lakshmi the means of salva¬ 
tion, even as He, in conjunction with her, is the supreme goal. 

2 Visistadvaitism recognises three classes of ji^as - baddha ft he bound), 
mukta (the liberated) and nitya (the ever - perfect). Jainism accepts a similar 

3 Prakrti is the primordial source of the material universe In the state of 
pralaya (dissolution) it is known as avyakla (the unmanifest) in the state of targa 
(■evolution) it is called vyakta (the manifest). 

4 Svet. Up, 1.6. 

5 Chand, Up. 

6 Tait. Up. 




Siddhitrayam „ 

(Conflicting views concerning the finite self.) 

2. With regard to the individual self, some maintain that it is 

* / .t 

the body itself; T others that it is the senses; others, that it is mind (manas); 
others that it is vital breath (prana);still others that it is pure consciousness, 
which is erroneously supposed, to possess the quality of being a knower 
and which does not appear in its real state as the *1* 8 ; 

Others that it is different from body, senses, mind, vital-breath 
and consciousness and that, like ether and the like, it has a non-intelli- 
gent nature, and that it is the substratum of knowledge, pleasure, pain 
and other adventitious and special qualities, and that it is the object of 
selfconsciousness. 9 

Others again say that it is of the nature of pure consciousness 
itself, which appears to possess inausp ; cious qualities, such as love, hate, 
pleasure, pain etc., produced by the limiting condition of the internal 
organ, even as a crystal that is in itself white appears however, to possess 
redness and other qualities imparted to ; t by certain specific limiting 
conditions (say, an adjacent red flower); and that the luminosity of its 
being is neither born nor destroyed; and that it is selfluminous. 10 

1 Others again hold that it has the nature of knowledge and bliss. 
Still others that its nature is of that knowledge which, on account of its 
agreeableness to its possessor, acquires the name of bliss and pleasure. 

(Conflicting views regarding the pramanas by which the finits self is 

3. Similarly (with regard to the means of knowledge by which it 
is established, divergent views have been offered, such as that) it can 
be known through inference 11 ; that (it) can be known only through 
scripture; that (it) can be known through mental perception 12 ; that (it) 
is directly known only as the knower in all cognition of objects 13 ; that, 
as it possesses the nature of knowledge, its luminosity is neither born 
nor destroyed and that it is self-luminous. Though possessed of this 


Charvaka doctrine. 




Advaiia Vedanta. 






Prabhakara school of Mimamsa 





nature (i-e though self-luminous), with the aid respectively of scripture, 
inference, and yogic perception, it is directly perceived in its true nature 
as having a character different from everything other than itself, 
clearly, more clearly, and finally most clearly and immediately. 

Similarly (with regard to its size, the rival views are that) it is 
infinitely big; that (it is) atomic in size; that (it is) of the same size as 
the body; that, though in itself devoid of magnitude, it is limited to the 
size of the body pervaded by it. Again, concerning the manner of its 
pervasion, the different theories are that it pervades only by its 
intelligence and that it pervades by itself. 

Similarly (with regard to its duration, it has been stated that) 
it is momentary; that it endures as long as the bodily heat lasts; that it 
exists till the material world is dissolved; that it lasts till moksa is 
attained; and that it is unchanging and eternal. 

Similarly (with regard to its number), it is maintained that it is 
one and the same in all bodies 14 ; and that it is different in each body. 

(Conflicting views regarding the Supreme Self) 

4. So also about the Infinite Self, some do not admit at all an 
Isvara (God) who directly perceives all things and who is all-powerful. 
Some, while admitting a God, maintain that He is of the essence of pure 
consciousness, which is unchanging and is devoid of the distinction 
of knowledge, means of knowledge, knower, and the known, and of the 
ruler and the ruled and so on. (They hold that) on account of begin¬ 
ningless avidya, he is erroneously imagined to possess knowledge of 
manifoldness, such as akafca, and greatness such as sovereignty. 15 

Others, while accepting this characterisation (of the Supreme Self 
as being of the nature of pure consciousness), state that it is subject to 
limiting conditions, and that, in association with the limiting condition 

14 . One variety of Ekajivavada holds that there is one jiva residing in each of 
the many bodies. 

15 Advaita-ekajivavada and also nanajivavada where Isvara too is a reflection, 
cf Pancadati Ch, X, 



of avidya, for the reason of its having avidya for its essence, it is taken 
to possess manifold distinctions of jivas commencing from Brahma and 
ending with immovable things and that, in conjunction with maya, 
which is under its control and which assumes diverse wonderful changes, 
it acquires omniscience and other glorious qualities. 16 Similarly, others 
uphold the view that God possesses universal Lordship which is in¬ 
variably and exclusively maintained for Him by the modification of inde¬ 
pendent pradhana. This modification has for its cause the fact of pra- 
dhana possessing the quality of sattva par excellence Others assert 
that, although He is free from limiting conditions, He is yet subject to 
modification. Others favour the view that although He does not under¬ 
go modifiications, yet, on account of being reflected by the reflecting 
media of the diverse internal organs which are^aspects of His own maya, 
this intelligent beirlg, who is one only, acquires the forms of Visva, Tai- 
jasa Others hold that the Lord is that Supreme Person 
who has under His control the diverse forms of essence, existence and 
the activities of the threefold jivas and non-intelligent objects, and. who 
is the great ocean of all auspicious qualities, such as jnana, baia, aisvarya, 
virya, sakti, tejas,™ and others which are natural toH : m, invariable and 
unrivalled in excellence. 

(Diversity of views regarding the manifestations of the Supreme Self) 

5. Similarly, even in regard to His manifestations, some 
contend that He has the four forms of Visnu, Siva, Brahma and the 
Sun-God; others hold that His form is threefold or twofold or single, 
after eliminating those forms which are unacceptable to them. 

16 Nanajivavada, on the view that Isvara is the prototype, not a reflection. 

17 Yoga 

18 Advaita where Iswara is the prototype 

19 fmrfac cf. *h i sss sttjt 

| rnrr i =* *r4f<n rt^l - Jtpforcfl 



Concerning the individual manifestations (of God) doubts have been 
raised about their being eternal or non - eternal, elemental or non- 
elemental, whether they exist for their own sake or for the sake of 
others; and doubts too have arisen concerning their attendants, place of 
residence, etc. 

(Conflicting views concerning how the Supreme Self is known) 

6. Similarly, with regard to the means of knowledge some hold 
that He is known from the Vedas alone; 20 others that he is established by 
inference 21 ; others that He is also cognised by extraordinary perception. 

(Diversity of views regarding the relation of the individual soul to the 
Supreme Self) 

Similarly, in regard to the relation of the individual soul to 
the Supreme Self also, some maintain that relations such as that between 
the ruler and the ruled are based on a knowledge of distinctions, which 
is caused by beginningless avidya; and that, in truth, there is only one 
reality. 22 Others hold that though there is non-difference, the jiva is 
other than the Supreme Self. As there is oneness in point of essence and 
distinction on account of limiting conditions, some posit both difference 
and non-differene—difference in so far as it (Brahman) is associated with 
limiting conditions, and non-difference in respect of its essence. 23 

Even when there is diversity, there is the relation of non-difference 
(between God and the soul); several views concerning this relation are 
prevalent—that it is the relation of inherence obtaining between 
whole and part; that it is the relation between sesa and sesi or in 
other words, that between an independent entity and the dependent 
creature; that it is the relation between the owner and the owned, exem¬ 
plified in master - servant relation. 

20 Vedanta 

21 Nyaya-Vaiseshika 

22 Advaita 

23 Bhaskara 

6 Siddhitrayam 

(Varying views regarding the nature of moksa) 

8 . Even in regard to the supreme goal of human endeavour, 

moksa, which consists in the realisation of Brahman, the several views 
maintained are—that it consists in annihilation of one’s self 34 ; 

that it is the destruction of ignorance , 25 that it is the state of aloofness re¬ 
sulting from the complete destruction of all the special qualities of the 
self 26 ; that it is the state of becoming one with Brahman 27 ; that it is the 
inflow of God’s qualites 23 ; that it consists in attaining similarity with 
Brahman 39 ; that it is the fullest revelation of its (self’s) intrinsic attri¬ 
butes of bliss and the like; that it is everlasting service to the 
Lord kindled by the heightened manifestation of unsurpassed bliss aris¬ 
ing from the experience of His qualities, and so on. 

(Conflicting views regarding the means to moksa) 

■: 9. About the means of attaining moksa also, some contend that 

it is attainable by karma-yoga and some that it is realisable by jnana- 
yoga; some believe that it is attainable by either of these (two) helped 
by the other 30 ; some assert that it is rendered effective by both 31 ; some 
hold that to him whose mind is purified by both (karma and jaana), it 
is realisable by bhakti which is ever-lasting and one-pointed. 

Noticing the conflicting views of inquirers who have not * 
determined anything conclusively, not knowing the strength and weakness 
of the proofs of the respective views, and entertaining doubts therefrom, 
wise men will be unable to secure moksa so long as the individual self 
and the Supreme Self are not understood in respect of their nature, the 

24 Buddhism 

25 Advaita 

26 Nyaya-Vaiseika 

27 Advaita 

28 cf Siva-Sankrantivada 

29 cf Siva-sama-vada 

30 Here one of the two is primary and the other secondary 

31 Here both are of equal importance. Jnanakarma-Samuccayavada 


Atmasiddhi 7 

pramanas by which they are established, their* relation (to each other), 
the attainment (of moksa by the individual self), and also of the means 
thereto. For this reason, this work is begun to make these things 
clear. . , 

(The special features of this treatise ) • * 

10. Having the same end in view, aphorisms (sutras) were 
composed by the venerable Badarayana; and these aphorisms (Brahma 
Sutras) have been interpreted by the Bhasyakara 31 * (Dramidacharya) 
whose exposition is concise and profound; and they have'been elaborate¬ 
ly explained by the venerable Srivatsanka Misra who set forth an ocean 
of elegant and incisive and forthright rules of interpretation (ny5yas). 
Nevertheless, as the understanding of persons has been misled by faith in 
the various writings, good and bad and partly good and partly bad, of 
Acarya Tanka 31b , Bhartrprapanca, Bhartrmitra, Bhaitrhari, Brahmadatta, 

3la Dr. Van Buitenen in his edition of VedaHh^anjraha, p. 24. states*. 

Yamuna, at the beginning of his Atmasiddhi gives a list of ancient Vedantins-Strangely 
enough he does not mention the Vrtthi by which Ramanuja set great store and which 
must have enjoyed great authority.........But he mentions a bhasvalert who had explained 

Badarayana’s Sutras ‘briefly and profoundly’....This bhasyakrt is always identified v 

withDramida, the Bhasyakara, for which.-there are no arguments. Ramanuja 

declares that the Vrtthi was an extensive one, Yamuna that the bhcuym was a brief one 
Vrtthi ‘gloss scholion* is mainly distinguished from a bhasya ‘commentary’ by its size, 
a long vrtthi will be very similar to a short bhasya. As Bodhayana’s omission cannot 
be accounted for in this context-where a sub commentary by a Srivatasankra Misra 
another ancient Master, is mentioned-! am inclined to think that Yamuna and 
Ramanuja both referred to the same work by different descriptions.” The logic of this 
identity is far from clear No. convincing reason has been advanced by Dr. Buitenen 
to show that there has been a mixing up of the vrtthi and the bhasya. 

The absence of any mention of Bodhayana vrtthi in Yamuna's work poses no 
problem; it is easily explained on the simple hypothesis that the work was not available 
to him. This would accord well with the traditional account that Ramanuja undertook 
an arduons journey to Sarada Math, Kashmir, to consult this rare manuscript said to 
have been preserved there. 

31b In the same edition of Vedarthasangraha, p. 25, Dr. Van Buitenen 
makes the followmg strange observation. ‘‘Tanka’s name which has the second place 
in Ramanuja’s list does also appear in a list of Yamuna but here he has the distinction 
of being mentioned the first of a series of adversaries and is put on a par with 
Advaitins like Bhartrhari and Sankara and Dvaitadvaitins like Bhartrprapanca and 
Bhaskara.” Evidently, the expression sita tita (good, bad and partly good and partly 

8 Siddhitrayam 

Sankara, Srivatsanka, ne Bhaskara, and others ; and as persons do not 
know things as they are and even understand therii erroneously, the 
undertaking of this work is but proper for a right knowledge of categories. 

(Determination of the nature of the individual self) 

J1. The view to be defended here is that the individual self is dif¬ 
ferent from the body, the senses, manas, prana and intellect; (it) does 
not depend on anything else (for its knowledge); (it) is eternal, subtle 
distinct in each body, and is in its essential nature, blissful. (St. 3) 

(The purvapaksha orprima facie view that body is the soul on the evidence 
of perception. The case for the identity of soul and body) 

I , . v ,• v **' • 

, 12. .» On the strength of perception we consider the body itself to be 
the soul. In thecognition ‘ I know’, the atmaijj who ; s indeed the knower, 
shines,forth as the T; and the body is the object of the consciousness of 
T; as is evident from the cognition ‘I am stout’, T am lean’; in fact, 
stoutness and the like relate only to the body; hence, as the ‘I’ is put in 
apposition with‘lean’, ‘stout’, etc., it must necessarily be admitted to have 
the body for its object. Otherwise, all usage, popular and learned, would 
be meaningless. ;i It cannot be maintained that here (in statements like 
T am stout’) the ‘I’ denotes the body by a figure of speech (laksana), 
because there is no other place where it can possibly be said to have a 
primary significance. 

Again, it cannot be said that if the consciousness of the ‘I* as 
knower has for its object the body which consists of several parts, the 

bad) occurring in the text has escaped the notice of this eminent orientalist: else he 
would not have drawn such a conclusion -Yamuna's list is not made up exclusively of 
adversaries but it, contains a few names of exponents of vedantic thouhgt some 
of whom have composed works which, in his opinion, are trustworthy guides ‘ to a 
Proper ‘understanding of the nature’ of the Real, others untrustworthy and yet others in 
part reliahle and in part unreliable. Again the very mode of reference to Tanka as 
‘Acarya Tanka’ clearly indicates the great esteem in which Yamuna holds this thinker,, 

31c It is noteworthy that reference is here made to two thinkers with almost 
identical names-a Srivatsanka Misra, and a Srivatsanka; of these the former is 
affiliated to the visistadvaiia school and is applauded as having laid down a wealth 
of elegant, incisive and forth-right rules of inter-pretation; while the latter belongs to a 
rival school of thought. 



knowledge of the body should be accompanied by a knowledge of its 
parts, colour, etc. But as such a knowledge of bodily parts and colour 
does not appear, the cognition ‘I know’ would reveal the presence of 
something other than the body. Such a necessity (of the knowledge of 
parts and shapes accompanying the apprehension of an object) is 
found to exist only in the case of perception arising from the external 
senses. The capacity of the mind is restricted to the manifestation of 
the soul’s character of being the seat of internal qualities. In fact, 
(even in the case of external perception) there is no necessity for 
the apprehension of number, magnitude, etc., because though its parts 
are not comprehended, a triad of atoms consisting of many parts and 
possessing visible magnitude is admitted to be the minimum visible en¬ 
tity; and because air is known to be perceived by the sense of touch 
only as the seat of contact (and not as a whole consisting of parts). 
Even when something other than the body is taken to be the 
object of self-consciousness, there is no knowledge of its other qualities; 
likewise, here too (when the body is the object of self-consciousness, 
there is no knowledge of its parts and colours). 

The purvapaksin’s criticism of the position that the body is not the self:- 

13. In each of the infinitesimal atoms consciousness is not met with 
and if it be .accepted (that each super-sensible atom possesses conscious- . 
ness), there will result belief in several thousands of intelligent beings 
in one and the same body; and as the special quality of .the effect can¬ 
not but be based on the quality of the cause, and as consciousness does 
not continue as long as the body lasts, consciousness cannot be a special 
quality of the body. These and other kinds of arguments based on 
reasoning are lacking in force, as they teach what is contradicted by 
direct perception. If it (consciousness) be denied to be a special quality, 
it will amount to its acceptance as a common quality of the body. 
Moreover, qualities such as the character of owning activities dependent 
on desires and of being the seat of the senses and the like, which appear 
in the body and not in such objects as pots, whose non-intelligent charac¬ 
ter is admitted on all hands, reveal that the body itself is the intelligent 




It is not improper to maintain that just as the red colour, which 
is absent in the parts of the areca nut and betel leaf severally, emerges 
in the whole, on account of a particular combination of these, 
even so intelligence emerges in the body, only on account of a 
particular combination of infinitesimal atoms which give rise to it. There 
is no warrant for the objection that in the instance cited, from out of the 
infinitesimal atoms rendered red by the heat generated in the act of chewing 
(betel leaf and nut) in the order of binaries, etc., red colour emerges strictly 
only in conformity with the quality of the cause. Further, although the 
special quality of variegated colour is not found in white, black and 
other threads severally, we deary perceive it in the cloth made out of 
these. How, then, can we assert that the quality of the effect is depen¬ 
dent on that of the cause ? Again, it cannot be said that Over and above 
the colours of the constituent parts there is no other colour known as 
variegated colour in the whole; for, in that case, the whole would 
become imperceptible. If it be said that the whole becomes visible only 
on acc ount of the colours of the parts, it would follow that all effects 
would be deprived of their colours. That would contradict experience 
as also all usage. As the special quality of hardness existing in ice is 
not found to be dependent on the quality of the Causal substance (water), 
the argument commits the fallacy of anaikanta. 

Again, hardness cannot be said to be a particular from of conjunc¬ 
tion, because it exists in two objects, while hardness exists in one^ 
namely, ice and because people who know the nature of things have ad¬ 
mitted hardness to be a form of contact. It may be asked how can the 
body which is an object of perception be regarded as the knower. • 

The attempt to show that the body could at once be the subject and the 
object of knowledge 

What is the contradiction involved in this ? The incompa¬ 
tibility lies precisely here-in regard to one act, it is not possible for one 
and the same substance to be at once the object and the agent of action. 
If this were so, even on the other view (that something other than the 
body is the self), how can the self (the perceived) appear as the T (the 



perceiver) ? If it be replied that it is due to a difference of aspect, then 
it is equally applicable to the doctrine that the body is the self. Besides 
an object (of knowledge, and, for that matter, of any activity) is that 
which shares the fruit of actions which are found in intimate association 
with something other than itself; but the body experiences the results of 
knowledge found intimately associated with itself and hence does not 
j>ossess the character of being an object. Hence there is no room for 
the objection (How can the body be both the subject and object?). 

Summing up of dehat mavada position with reasons > 

Therefore, the followers of Brhaspati hold that the body itself is 
the soul. To that effect their sutra runs—intelligence emerges from the 
elements of earth, water, fire and air just as the intoxicating quality 
springs from herbs etc., 



16. The body cannot be the soul, because (the doctrine of the 
identity of the body with the soul is) contradicated by perception. One 
and the same substance cannot appear as ‘this’ and T to an identical 
person. (St. 4) 

Just as the inward (objective) knowledge of T involved in the 
conciousness ‘I know’ exhibits its object to be distinct from pots and the 
like it reveals its object to be distinct from the body which is the object 
of consciousness ‘this*. Just as the cognition ‘This is a pot’ (marks 
off its object as distinct from the object of the consciousness of ‘I’,) 
even so the outward knowledge ‘this’ having the body for its object,, dis¬ 
tinguishes its object as different from the object of self-consciousness. 
Otherwise, there will be no basis for the distinction between ‘myself’ and 
‘others’. It cannot be urged that one. and the same thing may, from 
different aspects, appear in this manner (as ‘I’ and ‘this’) because Deva- 
datta wielding a stick does not understand himself as ‘This persm poss¬ 
esses a stick’ (but only as ‘I wield a stick’). 

Aham pratyaya (the cognition ‘l’ or self consciousness) does not involve 
knowledge of bodily organs; hence the self is distinct from the body :- 



, Moreover, to a person who has controlled the 
activities of his external senses and attained mental concentration and 
known the self as the ‘I’, the knowledge of organs such as hands, legs 
4 and belly does not arise. And if the body which is b’g and possesses 
paints were taken to be the object of self-consciousness, a knowledge of 
the organs must necessarily accompany it. It is imposs'ble for the body 
which i§ big and which owns parts to be known when none of its parts 
is cognised., The instance of the tryanuka (triad of atoms) which was 
cited as disproving the general proposition (that whenever the whole is 
perceived its parts also should be perce ved) does not really d : sprove it> 
for there is no warrant for accepting the existence of infinitesimal atoms 
over and above the triads wh’ch are devoid of parts and which are per. 
ceivable (in sun’s rays proceed'ng) through the hole of the window. 
(Even granting the existence of infinites'mal atoms) th's general proposi¬ 
tion is not falsified, because it applies only to perceptible parts. Again, 
it cannot be contended that this rule obtains only in the case of the 
complex whole cognised by external organs, as there is no warrant (for 
the same).' Besides, in comprehending a whole composed of parts the 
internal organ, in itself, does not operate. As for the case of air, it is 
known as the seat of touch only, because it has no colour, etc.; besides, 
even here, as in the case of the pot which is being touched, there is 
knowledge of such diverse parts; hence, no conflict with the general rule 
. on this score,-. 

Even cognitions like ‘/ am stout’ establish a self distinct from the, body - 

iThe contention that from statements such as ‘lam stout’, ‘ 1 am lean’, 
the self is found to have the body for its object deserves examination. 
Even there, self-consciousness has for its object some entity which is only 
inside the body; and like the knowledge of,the body gained through 
visual perception, it does not relate to the body only wh : ch has the 
characteristics of stoutness, youthfulness and the like. Hence the appre¬ 
hension of difference anddhe reference‘This is my body’, as in the case of 
the expression ‘This is my house’. This usage (‘This is my body’) being 
based op directly perceived difference, it is not proper to urge that it 
has -to be interpreted figuratively like the expression ‘This, is my self % 



‘This is the body of the doll*. As the word ‘ray’ denotes the self and as 
the two words (my and self in the statement ‘This is my self’) have an 
identical meaning and as there is no dispute concerning this, a figurative 
interpretation is proper. But it is not so here (in the statement ‘This is my 
body) Because a consc’ous entity distinct from the body is established 
by perception, the word T (in the proposition ‘I am stout)’ denotes by 
a figure of speech, the body which is related to the self. 

Identity oj body with soul illusory -. 

With regard to external objects, as there is knowledge of mutually 
exclusive colours, size, number and configuration, diversity is explicit; 
but, in the case of the soul, as there is no knowledge of such divergent 
qualities, to the ignorant there arises the illusion of the body being non- 
diffcrent from the soul. Again, the self has his activities determined by 
’h : s desires; for, he wills, remembers and infers only at the instance of 
h's desires; the body too has its activities, such as lying down, sitting 
and standing, determined by his desires; hence arises the illusion of 
non-difference as in the case of the shell and silver. 

Yogic perception vouches for the separatness of soul and body.. 

Thinking minds, however, perceive the entity known as ‘P which» 
has to be recognised as knower and which is devoid of parts to be really 
distinct from the body which appears as ‘this’ and which is stout and 
consists of parts. 

Arguments in support of the view that body and soul are distinct entities - 

As the knowledge of bodily parts is absent in the consciousness 
‘I know’ either it does not have for its object the body or has for its 
object something other than the body. Wherever there is absence of 
apprehension of bodily parts, the body is not the object of knowledge, 
but something else; as in the case of the consciousness ‘This is is a pot’. 
The knowledge which has the body for its object is, however, different 
(that is, there is not absence of knowledge of parts of the body), as in 
the instance of knowledge of the body accepted by both of us. Again 



the body cannot be the object of self-consciousness, because it is known 
to be ‘this’ or because it is grasped by external senses, as in the case o 
the pot and the like. 

^ i 

The Sankhya arguments against the claim that perception establishes 
identity of body and soul:- 

Moreover, how can he who has known his self to exist for the 
sake of nothing other than himself, and known other objects to exist for 
his sake, take this body which exists for the sake of others, for the rea¬ 
son of its being a collection of parts, to be the self? We directly perceive 
that the entire collection of internal and external objects of experience, 
such as sound and pleasure, exist for the sake of the self; while the self, 
the enjoyer, does not exist for the sake of others; but is the one object 
for whose glory and service everything else exists. Being a collection, 
the body cannot but exist for the sake of others; and all aggregates such 
as bed, seat and chariot are indeed found to exist for the sake of others 
It cannot be argued that as all collections are known to be for the sake 
of the body and the like which are themselves collections, the self also 
should be an aggregate; for, if it were so, the self too would have to 
exist for the sake of others; but it has already been stated that the self is 
directly perceived to exist not far the sake of others. On account of the 
non-perception of the collective nature of the self-a nature which is cap¬ 
able of being perceived-the belief that the soul is an aggregate stands 
condemned. If the self exists for the sake of another collection, the 
latter must also ex ; st for the sake of some other collection and that for 
another and so on ad infinitum. But where an end is possible, an un¬ 
ending chain is unders'rable. Moreover, when a collection exists for the 
sake of someth'ng else, it is not because that other itself is a collection. It 
is only in virtue of his nature as enjoyer the self becomes that other 
for whose sake all collections ex : st. For him who attempts to base his 
reference on all the qualities of the illustrative example, even though they 
may be unserviceable to the general rule, all inference would be impossi¬ 

Atmasiddhi 15 

' sr 

Refutation of the Carvaka criticism of arguments that the body and soul 
are different 

Even though the distinction between the two (the body and self) 
may not be explicit, consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, as it 
cannot exist in it and as being quite unlike its other qualities. As all 
the special qualities existing in the effect are dependent ou those of the 
causal substance, how can consciousness exist in the bciy without depend¬ 
ing on the quality of its cause? 

The illustration that intoxicating quality arises from the mixture of 
non-intoxicants not apposite 

Brhaspati’s teaching—that earth, water, fire and air are the rea¬ 
lities and that from these consciousness arises just as the intoxicating 
quality emerges from herbs, etc.—is untenabie. As power is not a special 
quality, it may be so (that is, need not be dependent on the quality of 
the causal substance). In all substances the quality known as causal 
power concerning the effect, cognisable from their respective effects, is 
a common quality, but consciousness is not so, because it is admitted to 
belong to the body only and because it is a special quality, as it, while 
remaining an effect, is cognised by one form of perception. It is not 
wrong to maintain that, on the basis of their own quality, form out of ’ 
infinitesimal atoms, which are not effects and which acquire the intoxi¬ 
cating quality from the mingling of different substances, intoxicating 
quality arises in their effects. 

Example of redness produced by chewing nit apposite 

The redness caused by betels, etc., is, likewise, produced by cau¬ 
ses which possess the red colour generated by the mixing of different 
substances, after their parts have lost their cohesion (in the act of chew¬ 
ing) ; hence the red colour perceived in each of their parts too. Conscious¬ 
ness is not found in the parts of the body individually, nor have they 
been said to possess it. If that were admitted, as it would follow that in 
one and the same body there must be many thinking beings, it is impossi- ’ 
ble to say which is primary and which is secondary; besides, all refer- 

16 Siddhitrayam 

ence to recognition would be impossible. Just as in respect of what has 
been seen by Devadatta, there cannot be recognition on the part of 
Yajnadatta, here also (what has been perceived by one part of the body 
cannot be recognised by another). 

The illustration of parti-coloured cloth unhelpful to the Carvaka 

The statement made before, namely, that the variegated colour 
found in the cloth is not dependent on the quality of the cause, is erro¬ 
neous. The quality of variegated colour is nothing but that of being 
many coloured; and this (variegated colour) is produced by threads of 
different colours; hence there is nothing objectionable here. Though 
variegated co'our does not exist in each of the threads severally, it is 
certainly noticed in the threads which combine and are known as threads 
of variegated colours. The capacity to produce cloth belongs to threads 
only in their togetherness; thus the variegated colour exists even in the 
cause of cloth; hence there is nowhere any violation (of the rule that the 
qualities of the effect are dependent on those of the causes). It cannot 
be maintained that the whole (the cloth) becomes invisible inasmuch as 
it does not possess any one specific colour, for, it may become percepti¬ 
ble by the very fact of its possessing inherently colour along with big¬ 
ness. Let variegated colour be taken to be one specific colour. Even 
then it is found to be produced by the different colours existing in the ’ 
causes. It cannot be asserted that it is only the consciousness resident 
in the parts that produces the particular consciousness in the body, 
which is composed of those parts, for, consciousness in general cannot 
exist in the parts. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. 
On the same count, the belief that pleasure and other qualities belong 
to the body stands condemned. 

Being distinct from the other qualities of the body consciousness is not 
an attribute of the body 

Besides, as consciousness, pleasure, etc., vanish from the body, 
like the smell of flower and sandal, even when the body continnes to be 
strong and in the absence of counteracting qualities, they cannot 

Atmasiddhi : 


be the qualities of the 'body. Colour and other special qualities of the 
the body, however, do not'leave it in the same manner.) t i - v.\ 

The qualities of the body are perceptible to the individual as well 
as to others and are also to be grasped by external senses; but not so 
consciousness, etc. Therefore, they cannot b2 the qualities of the body. 

Additional reasons in support of the view that the body is not, tfif^soul. 

’ ' • ■ <. <jV r /. 

Further, the body is not the soul, since like a pot,, it has a beginning, 
exists for the sake of others, possesses a particular configuration and has" 
colour, etc., and is an element. Again, because the body has holes and 
- s no t the possessor of the body and is a body, consciousness ’cannot be 
its^quality, as in the case of the-dead body. These and other logical 
proofs lead us to reject the'view that consciousness is a quality off the 
body, rj ■ ' ■ ■' • >.•. * . . 

(Argument based on Negative concomitance indefensible) 

i •'■i v J Uff. • v i . . . . t s 'V, / # . -■»»?!' ,-I** • • ■; 

bh o -Tfifis-the matter having been disposed of in this mannep with the 
aid of the aforesaid reasons which point to the major term on the 
strength of positive concomitance, purely negative concomitance, such . 
as the quality of being the seat of the senses, will be powerless to establish 

the major term. * * c ‘ ' 

(The view that the senses are the soul ) 

'V 1 ' • • • ' • .. . , . j 

' * 17. Then let the senses themselves be (considered as) the soul. 

They are not referred to as ‘this’. Otherwise, (if they were known as 
‘this’) they, like-the body, may be excluded from that which is the object 
of self-conciousness. Unlike the body, the senses possess * neither 
visible colour and other qualities nor big size. If they did, and if self- 
consciousness presented the senses as its objects, knowledge of their 
colour, 'parts, etc., may. be expectedfto arise, as in the case of the know¬ 
ledge of the body. Knowledge which is the result of their activity, like 




the results of bathing, study, etc., must, properly speaking, belong only r . 
to the senses That is why Satyatapas speaks of .‘the seeing eye.’ 35 

The refutation of this view 

18. The theory that the senses are the soul is untenable, as 
none of its forms stands scrutiny. To explain it further—Do the senses 
possess knowledge individually or collectively ? If individually, what 
is perceived by one sense cannot be recognised by another. But such 
a recognition, viz., ‘what I saw I touch’ does exist. That is why the 

ft i • 

senses, even collectively, cannot be said to possess knowledge. No 
object is either perceived or recognised by all the five senses together. 
Again, (if this view were correct) even when one sense-organ perishes 
death must ensue. Besides, if knowledge belonged to the senses, with 
the decay of each of the different senses, remembrance of their 
respective objects could not take place. Moreover, knowledge, though 
the outcome of the activity of the senses, need not inhere in them. For 
sin and the like, though resulting from the activity of weapons, etc., 
inhere in something other (than weapons). Bearing in mind the fact 

th&t if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would 

■ .i.r ! , • • ,*• 

r.. <• 

35. See Varaha Purana, Ch. 9 1, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was 
engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the 
vicinity of the sage’s hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired 
of the sage if he saw a boar near by and said that if the animal could not be traced, 
he himself, his children and his dependents would have to die of starvation. The sag« 
found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's 
hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken 
refuge ; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of 
the hunter.and his dependents. After a moment’s reflection, Satyatapas replied, 
‘Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye thai sees 
has no tongue to report on what it perceives; the tongue that speaks has no eye 
to see. Wherefore do you ask me ?’ 'Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the 
bnar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Visnu and Indra 
respectively and blessed him. . . .. . , 



meet with death, and that (if he spoke the truth), it would be extreme 
cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like 
that. 36 

(The doctrine that manas is the soul) 

19. In that case, let manas (m'nd) be the soul. On that view, it is 
argued the aforesaid difficulties would be got over. Indeed, manas has been 
known to be the controller of all the senses and has been so declared. 
Besides, recognition by a different sense becomes appropriate, since 
manas is the one entity that is the seat of both perception {and recogni¬ 
tion. Even when the respective senses perish, recognition is still possible, 
since manas is eternal. 

(The refutation of this doctrine ) 

20. This theory (that manas is the soul) too is erroneous, because 
manas is an instrument like the eye, etc. Manas has indeed been con¬ 
ceived as the instrument of all knowledge concerning the outer and 
the inner world. From the fact that even when the different external 
senses are in contact with their respective objects, they are not appre¬ 
hended simultaneously, we learn that there exists some other instrument * 
besides the senses, and that, on account of the absence of 
its help, all objects do not appear but some one (object) alone is cog¬ 
nised. 33 Likewise, knowledge of pleasure, etc, as in the case of know¬ 
ledge of colour and so on requires an instrument, because it is either 

a form of activity or of knowledge. How can manas, which is thus 
known to be an instrument of knowledge, be the subject of knowledge? 
To be a subject is really to be independent. Independence consists 
either in the capacity to secure, in accordance with one’s own desires, 

36. Vide note 35. 

37. Prajnayate is found in the Telugu edition, but is wrongly omitted in the 
Benares edition. The presence of the word ca implies that there must be another verb 
besides pratijnayate; and it can only be prajnayate. 

38. Wyaya Sutra, I. i —16 Yugapat jnananutpattir manaso lingam. 



the means appropriate to the realisation of certain ends, or in the acti¬ 
vity brought on by other qualities inherent in oneself. To be an instru¬ 
ment is to be the best means to an end, which is 'invariably associated 
with dependence on others, which, in its turn, cons ; sts in possess'ng acti¬ 
vity that is subject to the control of others. How can we find in the 
self-same manas the association of these two mutually confT.cating quali¬ 
ties? ■ 

Moreover, if it is maintained that manas, which is an agent, 
acquires, the character of an agent in remembering and other (activities) 
with the aid of another instrument, then the d'spute concerns only the 
natne. He alone is called the soul who perceives colour etc., with (exter¬ 
nal senses such as) eyes etc., and (who experiences) pleasure, etc., with 
the aid of the internal organ If the name ‘manas’ be attributed to that 
let it be done by all means. It does not affect us in the least. But it 
would go against linguistic usage. No more need be said in disproof of 
this theory. 

r t ' »* r . 

(.Refutation of the Naiyayika proof for th* existence of manas) 

What, it may be asked, is meant by manas? It has already been 
described as an internal entity which is the instrument of knowledge. 
What is the proof of its existence? The fact that knowledge of all objects 
does not arise simultaneously (it may be said) has already been shown to 
prove the existence of manas. True, it has been so po'nted out; but, how 
does it establish that it is a distinct entity ? Even after postulating it, you 
must perforce admit some other reason to account for the absence of the 
simultaneous remembrance of all things. Impressions born of the expe¬ 
rience of d : fferent objects exist simultaneously in the remembering 
person. Still, all these objects are not remembered, but only someone 
of them is recalled at a time a given. The order in which the causes that 
are responsible for simulating impres ions appear cannot be sa ; d to acco¬ 
unt for this (the non-appearance of all remembrance at once). If that were 
so, to a person whose impressions can be aroused solely by concentra¬ 
tion, all remembrance should appear simultaneously. But, even in the 
case of a person who, with the desire to remember all he has ex- 



perienced, withdraws his manas from all things and meditates in gene¬ 
ral, all things previously experienced do not become the object of re¬ 
membrance. Should it be supposed that the order in which remem- 

- j i 5 • 

brances appear is due either to unseen forces (adrsta) inasmuch as all 
remembrance is either auspicious or inauspicious, or to the fact of the 
soul being of the nature of knowledge, then, the absence of the simul¬ 
taneous appearance of all knowledge, even when the outer senses are 
in contact with their respective objects, would be rendered possible for 
the.same reason ; hence no need to posit a different substance. 

(Refutation of the argument that manas is the non-inherent cause of 
pleasure, pain and the like) 

Again, pleasure and the like which are adventitious, which inhere 
in the soul and which have external objects and unseen forces for their 
efficient cause, must have a non-inherent cause and that is the conjunc¬ 
tion of soul and manas. To believe that this argument establishes the 
existence of an entity known as manas is erroneous; for, the knowledge, 
which is produced by contact with agreeable and disagreeable objects and 
which originates prior to pleasure, pain and the like, and which inheres 
in the soul, may itself be the non-inherent cause. This (knowledge), in 
its turn, has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the organs, 
whxhare (themselves) in contact with objects, with the soul-a conjunc¬ 
tion which inheres in the soul. The activity of the organ which is the 
cause of th : s (conjunction) has for its non-inhentent cause the conjunc¬ 
tion of the soul with the organs-a conjunction which is dependent on the 
effort and unseen forces inherent in the soul. This effort, again, (has 
for its non-inherent cause) the knowledge of the necessity for action 
existing at the preceding moment. The unseen force (has for its non- 
inherent cause) the effort itself. Thus, even the argument that know¬ 
ledge, pleasure, pain, des re and other special qualities of the soul require 

a non-inherent cause does not justify the positing of a different 

Untenability of the view that atma gunas such as pleasure arise only in 
conjunction with some substance other than itself and that it is manas 



From the fact that the colour of the atoms of earth (prthivi) 
originates from the non-inherent cause, viz., conjunction with fire, it 
may be said that the non-inherent cause of the special quality of an eter¬ 
nal substance is only the conjunction with another substance; but this 
argument too is superficial. Wherefrom is it learnt that colour and 
other qualities of earth particles originate from ..conjunction with 
fire? If the answer is:- it is so perceived in the resultant substance, then ? 
inasmuch as pleasure and the like arise after the knowledge of the rea¬ 
lisation of agreeable and disagreeable (objects), what is it that is not 
perceived here ? Indeed, there will be occasion to infer other causes 
only when the perceived causes are found to be defective. And here, 
there is no defect. Therefore, it is well to accept the following formula 
that among the factors well known to be causes, that is the inherent 
cause wherein lies the inherence of the effect; that is the non-inherent 
cause which is closely associated therewith ; and the rest, the efficient 
cause. It is not proper to posit the conjunction of a different substance 
which is gratuitous and not well-known and to consider it the non- 
inherent cause. Such an admission with regard to colour and like the 
residing in atoms is due to non-apprehension of other causes and to (the 
logical need for) conformity with perceived things. But the contrary has 
already been proved here. 

{Even if conjunction with such a substance were necessary, it does not 
follow that it must be with manas) 

Even if this were so, that conjunction with another substance, 
which may be inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance, being 
known to inhere in objects that can be touched and are elemental, the 
argument culminates in the'cojunction with the well-known body, etc.,; 
hence, a ninth substance (manas) need not be posited. 

Again, if indeed, manas were elemental, it must be one 
among (the bhutas or primal elements) earth and the like; but this 
is contradicted by other arguments proving it to be otherwise. They are:- 
Manas cannot be constituted out of the earth, because like the tongue, 


23 i 

it organ instrumental in experiencing taste; it cannot be related to 
water, because like the nose, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing 
smell; similarly, being instrumental in experiencing what is not the ob- < 
ject of the respective organs, it is possible to assert that it is not made of 
fire and the like; hence the non-elemental character of manas. This ar¬ 
gument is inappropriate; for it would establish the opposite (conclusion) 
viz., that it is a distinctive substance (elemsnt). The character of being 
an organ instrumental in experiencing taste, proves that manas is com¬ 
posed of water (rasa), even as it establishes that manas is unrelated to 
earth. Similarly, the other reasons also prove the character of its being 
related to their respective elements, even as they reveal that it is not the 
other elements: ' < 

Further, that organ which grasps a particular quality among sound 
touch, colour, taste and smell — that alone is constituted out of the element 
possessing that quality. Granting, indeed, that this is so, as it is also 
known that organ alone (i.e., that organ which grasps only a particular 
quality) is not constituted of othir elements than its own, by merely 
showing that (you) cannot establish the negative result which you intend 
to convey (viz., that manas is non-elemental). 39 

Moreover, being the common instrument apprehending sound 
and other qualities, manas, like the body, may as well be a single subs¬ 
tance made up the five elements, or it may be two-fold, three-fold and so 
on being made up of different elements. 40 For instance, it is said in 
scriptures, ‘Gentle sir! manas is indeed food.’ 41 It may be argued that 
this scriptural passage does not seek to teach the fact of manas having 
its source in food, but, like statements such as ‘Prana is water’ 42 it only 
seeks to assert the fact of its (manas) owning activities dependent on it 

39. The sense-organ which grasps only one quality may be said to be made 
of that particular element alone which possessess that quality. But this affords no 
basis for the inference that manas is non-elemental ; for, manas apprehends al[ 
the qualities. 

40. The variant reading is ekadvitradimayam, 

41. Ohmnd. Up VI. 5. 

42. Okand Up. VI. 5. 



(food). That is why manas continues to exist even in ;the state of rea¬ 
lisation. Indeed, in the eighth chapter of-the same Upanisad this fact 
has been stated thus: ‘Perceiving with the aid of manas the object of 
his desires, (he) rejoices'’ ; ‘To this person, the manas is the celestial - 

eye.’ 48 Similarly, in the Mahopanisad it is said of the Supreme Deity 
thai ‘He mediates on another object of desire with the aid of manas’. 44 
In the puranas too; it is said,‘He creates the world with the hid of 
manas only.’ 46 

» ■ ! f Pi: /• . - i »•••«. - * 

Manas is no other than buddhi :- 

J . f 

M " 

To the foregoing, it is replied—True, it is so. It was only . said 
that rather than assume a different substance we may as well accept this 
position. But, in reality it is neither elemental nor the ninth substance. 

rvrti o 
« sjj: 

* ' L ’ J ! ( ) ] I * if 1 r » - • i ✓ 

In that event, what does the word ‘manas’ refer to? It refers 

t . /j* ( ■ r ' r s * < , 

only to the intellect (buddhi). That is why the person of (great) intell¬ 
ect is terrrted manasvi. The differences of states of mind are readily 


perceived in this,way : ‘My mind is perturbed’ ; ‘My mind is tranquil.’ 
To conclude; otfr Ancestors’ description of manas as an instrument is 
calculated to bring out the differences of states, just as intellect and 
egoity^(though ultimately one, serve to indicate differences of states.) 

' • i ^ « w i' * '' - l. * 

Manas^is-not the soul:- , /l( .,. { 

.'»< I i.r. >•’ l ■ • ■ 

v r : i The reply is whether, manas is elemental or whether it is a diffe¬ 
rent substance; in either of these two cases, intelligence cannot be attri¬ 
buted to it. 4fi ..'.Hence, there is no use investigating into the nature of a 
substance, when no; statement regarding that has been advanced. 

43 Ohand. Up. VIII 

.•i i 44. • Mahopanisad l. - 

45. Visnu Parana, V, 11, 15. 

46. Is manas an aipect of buddhi ? Or, is it a different substance altogether ? 

Yamunacharya leaves this question open, and thinks that, in any event, manas cannot 

' . -V **->* . ** 

be an intelligent entity. 

' -Atmasiddhi 25 

' ‘ ’ , r * r , - . x r 

The theory that Prana is the soul. 

< . • ’i j .j' '• ‘<5 

21. Then, let vital breath (prana) be (called) the soul. If that 
were so, the apprehension of the body, which is associated with; it 
(prana), as one which is connected with the soul, and the apprehension 
of the body, where there is absence of prana, as one which 
is not associated with the soul will both be " appropriate. 
Departing from the body, going to other worlds, and wandering 
in other bodies would be even more appropriate in-as-much 
as it is prana’s nature to move. Otherwise (i.e, if prana 
isnot the soul) scriptural passages referring to departing, going and 
coming would have to be given a secondary significance, because move¬ 
ment cannot reasonably belong to that which is infinitely big and to 
that which is big but devoid of contact. 

Refutation of this theory 

22. This (theory) too is not correct. Intelligence cannot belong to 
prana, because, like external air, it is only air, and because in the state of 
deep sleep even when the soul is devoid of activity, prana possessess 
activity. Indeed, it is only on account of its activity that "even in the 
case of the person who is asleep, transformation of substances that have 
been eaten and drunk into the sevenfold tissues of the body, 
(dhatus) 4 V inhalation and exhalation take place. Prana is, indeed, 
the air which is mixed up with a little fire, water and food, and which 
resides in the viscera. This (air) too, being exhaled into and out of 
the throat, mouth and nostrils, and being sensed, like pots and others 
similar to it, by the organ of touch, clearly shines forth as the non¬ 

Further, the doctrine that prana is the soul, being refuted in the 
same manner in which intelligence has been negatived of the body, 

47. Dhatu (from the root dha, ‘to hold’j is that which supports or sustains 
the body. It is usual to mention seven dhatus or tissues of the body—chyle (rasa), 
bio d (rakta), flesh (mamsa), fat (medas), bone ('asti); marrow (majjaj ; semen 
(sukraj. Sometimes hair (kesa), skin ftvac), and muscle and tendons fsnayu) 
are added to the list. See Tait, Ar. X 54. 




does not call for separate disproof. Because the soul is not all-perva¬ 
sive, even though it is devoid of contact, departing, going and other 
(activities) conforming to the direction of effort and unseen-forces, 
may appropriately belong to the soul, as (they belong) to manas; 
hence, the passages declaring these activities as belonging to the soul 
are not to be taken as carrying a secondary significance. As this will 
be taken up again in inquiring into the size (of the soul), let this suffice 
(for the present). ' <. . . r < 

The Theory that Consciousness is the soul 

23- Then, let consciousness itself be (taken as) the soul, because it 
is not non-intelligent. The quality of non-soul is found in pots and the 
like to be concomitant with the quality of being non-intelligent. The 
quality of being non-intelligent, which is foreign, to consciousness 
excludes its concomitant (the quality of being non-soul) from con¬ 
sciousness. The quality of being non-intelligent belongs to conscibus- 
0j ne$s, ,bepause consciousness shines merely by its own being. Indeed, 
■*, while^it exists, consciousness, unlike jars and the like, does not remain 
without shining;, if. it fails to shine, it may be acknowledged that its 
shining is dependent upon something other than itself. 

Ov'.-jii 3i\U rjoi.rjfduz , _ . . • , 

The Bh&tta view that Consciousness is insentient. 

Lo<: ZOlllZk* v j; ' v 

.Luel: ..-I Perhaps you may hold the following view:.... Even when conscious¬ 
ness has arisen, it is the object' only which shines forth. When we have 
.< the knowledge ‘This is blue’ 43 we are not at .the same time, conscious 
•it also of a consciousness, which is not blue and which is different from 
r -what may be pointed to by the word ‘this’. Hence, by the very 
existence of consciousness the object is illumined as in the case of the sen¬ 
se-relation (where the object is brought to light, though the relation itself 
'is not manifested). Immediate’y after, by noticing therein (in the object) 
a peculiar illumination, 49 which is adventitious, consciousness is inferred. 

_j. . .... 

48. In older philosophical works, more especially in Buddhistic writings, i t 
was usual to take nila as an illustration for an object. In later works, ghata does 
duty for nila. 

49. According to the Bhatta School ofMImomsc, when cognition of an object 
arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or 

Atmasiddhi 27 

There is no such thing as jnatata; hence consciousness is self-luminous 


This view is untenable, because, unlike colour and other qualities, 
that illumination, which is an attribute of things and which is something 
different from consciousness, is not apprehended even by keen observers. 
As all worldly experience and usage is explicable solely in terms of 
consciousness,which is admitted by both of us, it is not proper to posit 
that (illumination). 

j If the knowledge of objects be admitted to be devoid of the mani¬ 
festation of knowledge and knower, sometimes the following experience 
must occur; ‘This is a pot; it is not known whether I know it or not.* 
But it does not occur like this. 

In respect of the apprehension of objects, past and future, if there 
is no speech and no action, the manifestation of such objects cannot be 
proved by inference. And the manifestation of consciousness which 
is based on the manifestation of objects would be even more 
impossible. If there are no speech and action, the manifestation of 
objects is not established by inference, because it appears to have been 
known prior to them (speech and action). 50 To explain—Being prompted 
by somebody, it is only after concentrating (the mind) and recollecting 
that a person replies, ‘Now it is remembered by me.’ It cannot be 
maintained that the aforesaid speech itself is the cause of this recollec- 

made known (prakafca-vi&ista). It is from this illumination or manifestedness» 
(prakatya or jnatata) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus 
it is held, that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its result. For 
a refutation of this view see Vedanta Desika’s Tattvamuktakalapa f page 394. See 
also 8arvarthasiddhi. 

50. Against the view that cognition is inferred from its result, namely, jnatata, 
it is urged that, in respect of objects past and future, as we cannot perceive the 
prakatya, we cannot infer the knowledge of such objects. To this it may be re¬ 
plied that though the jnatata of past and future obj :cts is not perceived, it may be 
inferred from the speech and action concerning them and that from the jnatata 
thus inferred, knowledge of those objects can be easily inferred. This reply is un¬ 
satisfactory, because if speech and action do not exist, jnatata cannot be inferred, 
and much less can consciousness of objects, which is based thereon, be inferred ; if 
they exist, they are not found to prove jnatata, for the objects appear to have been 
known previously. 



tion, because it is a pre-condition of this (speech), and because of reci¬ 
procal dependence. Which shameless fellow will maintain that the 
knowledge of an object is inferred from statements concerning itself? 

Additional argument to show that consciousness is self- luminous :— 

. » ’ 

Further, the statements and different properties found in that 
through whose connection these arise in another object are dependent 
upon the existence of the former itself and not upon its connection. 
For instance, the reference to existence arising in the case of earth and 
the like, on account of association with existence, does not arise in the 
case of existence itself through the connection with (another existence); 
the visibility found in earth and the like, by virtue of connection with 
colour, does not arise in the case of colour itself through the connec¬ 
tion with (another) colour. Thus statements, such as, it ‘ shines forth’, 
and qualities, such as, knowability found in pots and the like, arise 
from connection with consciousness; and these (statements and quali¬ 
ties) found in consciousness are not dependent on the connection with 
consciousuess, but are dependent on its own being. Hence, conscious¬ 
ness itself (should be considered as) the soul, as it is self-luminous. 

The contention that consciousness is itself the soul, as there is economy 
of thought. 

Further, whoever admits a knower apart from knowledge admits also 
consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness were non-existent, the reference 
to the knower would not be appropriate. If this is so, as it is admitted 
by both parties, let that (consciousness) itself be the knower. What 
is the use of that other entity which has been assumed ? 

The contention that the cognition ‘1 know' will not prove the existence of 
a soul distinct from knowledge. 

It may be urged that from the statement T know’ it is evident 
that the soul appears to be distinct from, and to be the seat of, 
consciousness. True, but as it is determinate (savikalpaka) percep- 



tion, it cannot be admitted as a valid perception. 5t Proceeding on the 
assumption that the knowledge of distinctions is real; that being which 
is of the nature of luminosity and which is referred-to. as - ‘ I,cannot 
be taken to be a separate entity, because of the invariable association 
of awareness (of knowledge and knower) to which no exception has 
been noticed, and because the entity which is admitted by you to 
be distinct from consciousness cannot be said .either: to possess, the 
quality of luminosity or not to possess it. For, if the cannot 
shine forth, as that will go against its nature; if the,latter, it will 
amount to consciousness itself. 

The contention that, like the knower, the known also is unreal. 

• t , 

Even in the matter of setting aside differences among percived things, 
the very same mode (of reasoning) will apply. Therefore, the avowed 
Buddhists as well as the disguised Buddhists (declare) that-the self- 
luminous consciousness alone truly exists and that it alone is the soul, 
and that this consciousness, on account of the capacity of the immediately 
preceding cognition known as vasana (impressions of previous experience), 
and on account of beginningless ignorance (avidya), has for its object the 
erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and the known. 
For instance, the avowed (Buddhists) say-“Although consciousness, in it* 
nature, is devoid of distinctions, yet on account of erroneous knowledge, 
it appears as possessing the distinction of object-consciousness and sub- 

51. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) perception 
merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svalaksana) and does not 
grasp its qualifications. This is passive reception of sense impressions. But the 
sense material thus received is invariably subject to a process of mental ela¬ 
boration. The forms of thought ('vika'pa), which are of five kinds—generality 
(jati), quality (gu^a), action (karma;, name (nama;, and substance (dravya)—are 
superimposed on the svalaksaija, so that every object perceived has to appear 
tarough those forms. We cannot help perceiving an object otherwise than as be¬ 
longing to a class, bearing a name, as characterised by an attribute and as related to 
another substance. This is determinate (savikalpaka) perception. As it makes con¬ 
siderable additions to the material presented by sense, it may be said to distort the 
real. Hence, the Buddhists think that, strictly speaking, it is not perceptual in 
character, cf. kalpanapoda mabhrantam pratyak§am nirvikalpakam vikalpovastu 
nirbha sadasamvadadupaplavah. 



ject-consciousness. 63 The disguised Buddhists, for instance, say—The 
spotless] reality eannot be the cause of the world, because (then the; 
world would have no cessation. Hence, maya alone is the originators 
of the distinctions of the knower and the known. 

The refutation of the Buddhist doctrine that consciousness is the soul 

24. The reply (to this view) is:— Consciousness manifests itself as 
perishing every moment and as being different in regard to every object. 
If that (consciousness) were the soul, how could a person recognise on 
the subsequent day what he perceived the previous day, as, ‘ I saw this’? 
This cannot be met with the aid of different objectless consciousnesses 
alone, for the statement that knowledge is characterised by objectless¬ 
ness has for its meaning what is contradicted by every form of know¬ 
ledge, such as perception and the like. If the middle term (which in 
this argument is no other than consciousness) possesses an object* *; there 
being no distinction between this consciousness and all other conscious¬ 
nesses, they would also be similar (i.e., possess objects); if it (the middle 
term ) be objectless, then, as there is no middle-term, the conclusion 
Qannot be established. As the doctrine that consciousness is objectless 
has been cendemned at length both in the Purva and Uttara Mimamsa 
sections, 5 ? and as the yatharthakhyati has been established in Sastra, 54 
it isr not dealt with here. 

ft . t l - r ••• .- . r • -.'-w r., 

Impossibility of explaining recognition even on the admission that the 
self is a stream of consciousness > 

J H * 1 - 1*. : . --K ' ‘ 

That is why even on the Buddhist’s admission that consciousness 
is a stream, the justification of recognition fares no better. If a stream 

.52. Quoted in. Madhava’s Sarvadarsana Sangraha, in the chapter on Bauddha 

1 53. Mimamsa 8utra, I. i. 5; Sahara Bhast/a. pp. 28-30, Anandasrama Series;" 
Slokavartika, Niralambana section, pp. 24-90, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; Feionfoi 
Sutras, II.; ii. 27. 

• ; 54 . Nathamuni’s Syayatativa is the Sastra here referred to. The opening stanza 
of that work refers to itself as a sastra— ■ ; 1 

. '.n*> yq vetti yugapat sarvam pratyaksena sada svatah 

tam pranamya harins sastram nyayatattvam pracaksmahe. 



of consciousness which is different from (momentary) cotisciousiless 
and which endures, and which remembers is admitted, it will amount 'fto 
giving up his own (Buddist’s) position and accepting another’s; °if it 
is not admitted, recognition becomes inexplicable/"Indeed, in regard 
to:what is experienced by one person, i regcognition cannot arise in an¬ 
other. It cannot be maintained that the illusion of recognition arises 
in the knower on account of the non-apprehension of difference due to 
- c dose similarity, as in the case of the flame and^the dike.’ Indeed, there 
(in the case of - the flame), to one and the $ame individual who per¬ 
ceives the earlier and the later entities /and who, on account Of their 
< possessing similar shapes, fails to notice their ' differences,! the illusion 
is but natural. But here, in as much .as the several consciousnesses 1 'are 
described in Buddhism as being ignorant of any information about 
one another, and as perish ng without a remainder, neither L the charac¬ 
ter of being the seat nor that of. being the object of the 0 illusion of 
-f identity can arise in these (consciousnesses); because, Oven' rf theire be 
^ great similarity, one person cannot regard what has been ^'performed 
f by another as having been executed by himself. Hence, an intelligent 
entity, who is the seat of the stream of; consciousnesses that appears 
and perishes, and who exists at the time of recognition, must - 0 be 
i admitted. 

To obviate this difficuTtflWhe veiled: Buddhist contends that conscious- 
i ness is unborn, changeless and devoid of distinctions :zo u:?. ?. rr.r fw 

< *. t ;\rf , * I /• y * f' 

Here one may point out that consciousness is not non - eternal, for, 
its antecedent non-existence is not ascertainable. Its being unascer- 
tainable follows from the fact of consciousness being self-established. 
Indeed, in the case of what is self-established, antecedent non-existence 
and the like cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another. 
That which manifests, by itself, its own non-existence must do so either 
by being existent or non-existent. If it (consciousness) exists, as there 
will be no non-existence, how can it establish (its antecedent non¬ 
existence)? On the other alternative (if consciousness is non-existent), 
by reason of its very non-existence, it is even less capable of establishing 
(its antecedent non-existence). Hence, it (antecedent non-existence of 

32 Siddhitrayam 

consciousness) is not established by consciousness itself. Nor is it 
proved by another, for, consciousness cannot be the object of anything 
. else. If it were the object of consciousness, it would, like the pot, etc., 
cease to be f consciousness. Therefore, (that is, as the antecedent 
non-existence of consciousness is not established either by itself or by 
another), consciousness has no origin. And, as it has no origination, 
other positive changes have also to be denied. 55 For, ’they are 
-.concomitant therewith (origination). That is why plurality of conscious¬ 
nesses is also to be denied. The absence of the pervader (vyapaka), 
namely, the character of having an origination, involves also the denial 
i of what is pervaded by it (vyapya), namely, plurality. For, what is 
unborn cannot possess differentiations. Moreover, because differentia, 
mutual non-existence and the like are objects of consciousness, like 
colour and other qualities, they cannot be attributes of consciousness. 

•;* Therefore, nothing that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute. 56 
n Therefore, consciousness alone, which is devoid of all kinds of differen- 
1, c ©s and which is attributeless and which has luminos ty alone for its sole 
r essence, and which is unchanging and eternal, is both the finite and the 
infinite, self. f It has, for instance, been said ‘that consciousness which is 

i unborn; un-knowable and which is the nature of the Infinite Self ... . 

.’ Their technical jargon (has it) that (consciouness) alone is the 

ultimate purport of the Vedanta texts. The Vartikakara 57 for instance ‘ 
•- says that scriptural testimony teaches that consciousness alone,, 
which is supposed to be the result of those means of knowledge tha f 
, have external things for their objects (/. e., perception, inference, etc.), 
is the gist of upanisadic texts. If something other than this (cons¬ 
ciousness)-were postulated (to be the object of perception, and other 
u , pramanias), there would result the non-authoritativeness of the Vedanta 

/ -ZTTH vxTTU 5 ~ 7 " ~ ’ 

'• r Bhavavikara may also be taken to mean changes of positive entities. See 
St utaprakasika, 181-2. 

•' v -> ^ v t * ' - t v ; 

56. The reading in the Benares and Telugu editions is anumeyah- 

t (. Sure^vara/A.D. 800; is the Vratikakara^ here referred to His chief works 

are the Xai§lcarmya Siddhi and Brhadaranyah?pznisad-Bhd$ya-Vattika. The latter 
- work has been com nented on by Anandagiri in his Sastrapra'casikz and by Ananda- 
puma in his Nya <, akalpa lattka. 

Atmasiddhl 1 


text*; and .hence something other than consciousness ought > cot :I to: be 
postulated,*'* •■•ri,-'-—-- ri • '■‘n. u'i r.q/o ?•.*« : vr:'i 'lo zo’-L‘£ 

j -j = w -L- ' ,; b ' • /■ ’ • \r, l:. -'.V '>••>/'Ofl f’ifi'Y r . r u 

Refutation of the Advaitic view 

•* ‘ ,V . v 

*<.' rr I*;*’ *» • - *’I r r: - 4 , . j*, : r , , JV. : j • T !<,/.; 

Those who have understood (the true nature of) the self (assert} 
that this doctrine does not conform either to worldly .experience or to 

<, . * ; < • . > j / V ;< * ' *• • J f / , . • 

the.yedas,_ .• •. • 'j •< t o-l-t-s 

This is opposed to experience ‘ . r 

. ' » To explain further-what is termed consciousness is well-known to 

possess the character of manifesting by its {very- existence some object to, 
its own substrate (i,e, the substrate of knowledge), to have the,-word* 
jnsna,-avagathi, anubuthi as its synonyms, to have an object and 
to be the quality of the knowing self. It ivmdeed,. ; in this .manner that; 
the experience T know this’ occurs to all beings individually. • As in the 
case of pleasure, pain and the like, the origination, existence and des¬ 
truction^ consciousness manifest themselves directly. 

r * . • ** \ r? • V " ' ‘Lf 

~ ' « Vi -J }< I • . T ‘ 

The existence of consciousness in the states of deep sleep, ' drun¬ 
kenness and swoon cannot be accepted, as it is negatived by effectual non¬ 
perception. If in those states also consciousness were to exist, then * at 
the time of waking, it should be remembered; but {as a matter of fact) 
it is not remembered. That is why . the person.who wakes up , realises,r 
on reflection, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything/ 
Though there is no general rule to the effect that there should be remom* 
brance of all the things experienced and though there is ' absence 1 of 

- r ' v 3f. This translation of thesa'two "'verses f 159 th and'ldfthj from the. Bphada 
raoyakopam§ad-'bhasya-Vartika is bated on Anandagki’s commentary. According to 
him the first verse means that granting that pratyak?a and other pfamapas hpve exter-, 
pal things for their objects, still their result, viz.. consciousness. Is the gift ofthe-vedan- 
tic texts. The second verse states that the pram an as cannot have external things ai 
thelr objects/fof; otherwise the ved antic texts would lose their authoritativeness, inas¬ 
much a& they powerless to establish differencelesi Brahman.; Hence, the pra— 
m a pas cannot have for their object anything other than vedantic teaching, namely, con¬ 
sciousness. } ^ r B^h^5rappkppaniftd*bh|sya vartifca, An,andasraq?^ ( Sprigs* p v?i 5I 


94 Siddhitrayam 

death and other 1 powerful causes responsible for the obliteration of 
traces of previous experience, the uniform non-remembrance establishes 
only the non-existence of experience (during states of deep sleep, etc.). 

Nor may it be said that even though there is manifestation of 
consciousness, non-origination of its remembrance may be due either to 
the absence of delimiting objects or to the extinction of the object of 
self-consciousness. For, the absence of one thing and the non-apprehen¬ 
sion of that (thing) cannot possibly be the obstacles in the way of the re¬ 
sult which is caused by the manifestation of some other object. Even if 
there be the manifestation of these three (consciousness; Objects and self- 
consciousness) the Manifestation of each of these is the cause of the re¬ 
membrance of its respective object. Again, the object referred to by *1 , 9 
^hfch secures permanency on the strength of recollection, cannot be 
said to meet With death in deep sleep and other similar states. That is 
why on waking there is the judgment ‘All the while I slept well’. 

; ‘.An; ' • ’ ' 3 i ’ 

Moreover, something known as consciousness (samvid) which is 
devoid of objects and substrate cannot exist, as there is absolute non- 
apprfehension (of the same). Those who have understood the true im¬ 
port of words maintain that the words samvid, anubhuti, jnana, praka&a 
and the like are relative terms. 59 Indeed, neither in common speech nor 
in scripture do we meet with the usage of roots, such as janati without 
being associated with *an agent or an object, 

It'cannot be maintained that consciousness does not grasp its own prior 
Jion-existence' 'V • • 1 ' " , 

■T< It was maintained that from consciousness its antecedent non- 
existence'cannot be proved, because when what is self-established exists, 
at the same time its antecedent non-existence cannot exist, being oppo¬ 
sed to it. . But.this contention is superficial. For, there is no rule to the 
effect that only such objects as exist at the time of consciousness are pro¬ 
ved by it; (were it so) the past and the future would become unknowable; 

r * * : . * -' • 

59. A relative term depend* for its meaning on its relation to some other name. 



If it is contended that when the antecedent non-existence of con¬ 
sciousness is established, it must be contemporaneous with consciousness 
(we ask) has it been perceived like this anywhere? If it is so (perceived), 
as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is ^established thereby, 
the negation of antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) is not proved. 
The statement that the antecedent non-existence (of anything) is contem¬ 
poraneous Swith that thing is a mad man’s declaration. Indeed, this 
quality, namely, that of bringing to light objects that are contempora¬ 
neous with itself is the nature of perceptual knowledge arising from the 
senses. But this is not the nature of all forms of knowledge nor of all 
means of knowledge. 

For the same reason, the following (contention) also stands con¬ 
demned. If the means of knowledge is real on its own right, inasmuch 
as it is self-luminous, it must exist at all times; therefore, its object too 
must exist at all times; for, the means of knowledge is always associated 
with the bject of knowledge. For, the association of means of know¬ 
ledge with objects of knowledge does not consist in the invariable relation 
of the objects of knowledge with the means of knowledge at the time of 
its existence; but it consists in the negation of the unreality of that parti¬ 
cular form of things in which the latter have been apprehended as existing 
in a certain place, time, etc. That is why the statement that memory 
has no external object, because even when external objects have perished 
memory is noticed, becomes a prattle. 

The contention that there are no prammas to establish antecedent non¬ 
existence is refutea :- 

It may, however, be said that the antecedent non-existence and 
the like of consciousness are not ascertained by perception, because it is 
not something present at the time of perception; and that it cannot be 
established by other means of knowledge, since there are no signs (linga) 
and the like. If this wire so, the character of being self-established 
would not prove the absence of antecedent non-existence; indeed, it has 
now to be maintained that there are no means of proving it. But it has 
already been said that it is impossible to hold that there are no means of 

36 Siddhitrayam 

proving it, for non-existence is established by effectual non-perception 

Consciousness is not eternal 

Moreover, perceptual knowledge establishes existence of its object 
at the time of its own existence, and not the existence (of the object) at 
all times. Hence, it has to be stated that consciousness manifests itself 
only as being limited by time, taking the form ‘I exist only at this mo¬ 
ment, not at other times.’ Otherwise (if knowledge were not limited by 
time, its object too, namely) the pot and the like would be eternal. Simi¬ 
larly, inference and other kinds of knowledge (must be limited by time; 
otherwise, they would reveal their objec/s also to be eternal). And it 
has already been said that a pure consciousness, which is devoid of the 
distinctions of perception and inference, and which is objectless and 
supportless cannot exist 

This contention that consciousness cannot be proved by anything other 
than consiousness is disproved 

The contention that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness 
cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness on the ground 
that consciousness cannot be the object of anything else is inde¬ 
fensible; for (one's own) previous knowledge is made the object of 
present cognition, as in the judgment ‘At one time I knew’. Besides, 
the consciousness of other persons is inferred from reasons (linga) 
such as, the invariable rejection and acceptance respectively of disagree¬ 
able objects. And, if it is not admitted that the consciousness of others 
Is inferred, there would result the impossibility of all scriptural and 
worldly usage, in as much as it would be impossible to grasp the 
meanings of words. 60 Further, approaching the guru and the like would 

60 . The meanings of words may be understood from vyavahara. Thus, for exam¬ 
ple, a youngster notices the pupil fetching a cow when his master utters the words 
‘Fetch the cow’, and immediately concludes that the action of fetching the cow was the 
result of the pupil grasping the desire of the master when he uttered the words ‘fetch 
the cow.’ At that time, he takes the words in one mass as conyeying one complex 
whole of meaning. Which word in that whole stands for the animal, and which 
•ignifics the action is not apprehended then. Later, when the teacher says ‘'fetch the 



be impossible, for there could be no apprehension that he is possessed of 

The contention that if consciousness becomes the object of another 
consciousness, it would cease to be consiousness is met: 

The belief that if consiousness is the object of anything else, it 
would cease to be consciousness is untenable. The character of being 
consciousness consists in the quality of manifesting itself solely by means 
of its own existence to its substrate; or in the quality of being the means 
of manifesting (by its own existence) its object (to its substrate). 61 These 
two characteristics (of consiousness, namely that of manifesting itself and 
its object to its substrate), which are established by one’s own experience, 
do not fall away even when consiousness becomes the object of another 
consciousness. How then can it be maintained that consciousness 
ceases to be consciousness (when it becomes the object of another 
consciousness) ? Pots and the like, on the other hand, do not possess the 
quality of being consiousness, simply because they do not possess the 
aforesaid characteristics and not because they are objects of experience. 

Further, (even on your view) that consiousness does not possess 
the character of being the object of another consciousness, the same 
difficulty, namely, that it will cease to be consciousness, does exist as in 
the case of the sky-flower, (which is not an object of cognition; and. 
which is not a cognition). 

horse’, a different animal is brought. Again, when he says ‘tie up the cow’, a different 
action follows. By observing varied actions resulting from the different utterances, 
the youngster understands that the word ‘cow’ denotes an animal of a certain descrip¬ 
tion, that the word ‘horse’ an animal of another kind, the word ‘bring’ denotes the 
action of bringing, and so on: 

61. In commenting upon these definitions, Sudars anacarya observes that it 
consciousness is defined as that which manifests itself, this definition would also apply 
to pots and the like, for, they too manifest themselves. To exclude them, the qualifi¬ 
cation ‘to its own substrate’ is added; the pot manifests itself, not to its substrate, the 
ground on which it stands, but to the knowing person. Again, the further qualification 
‘solely by means of its own existence’ is added in order to exclude certain attributes 
of the self, such as, atomic size, eternity and so on, which are manifested to their 
substrate, not by themselves, but by an act of knowledge. The Sri Bhagya would add 



The quality of being consciousness cannot be attributed to the 
self, for it possesses the character of being the seat of consciousness. Nor 
can it be said that it (the self) is not the object of consciousness; for, 
though it is self-luminous like consciousness, it is admitted to be capable 
of being known by oneself and others. The objection that, if the self is 
knowable, it would cease to be self would, as stated before, equally 
apply even to the view that it is not knowable. 

If it is contended that it is only the non-existence of the sky-flower 
(rather than the fact that it is not the object of experience) that is res¬ 
ponsible for the sky-flower not being soul or consiousness, then let it be 
held thaj^even in the case of pots and the like, it is only their character 
of not being the seat of consciousness and of their not being opposed to 
ignorance 63 that is responsible for their being non-soul and non-con- 

yct another qualification ‘at the present time’ with a view to excluding past states ef 
consciousness. Even without this addition, past states of consciousness stand excluded 
■ince every past experience is revealed not by its own existence, but by another act of 
knowing. But this qualification serves to emphasise the fact that any state of cons¬ 
ciousness can manifest itself by its own existence only at the time it exists, and that a 
past state of consciousness can be apprehended by another state—a fact denied by the 
opponent. *At the present time’ denotes ‘the time when the relation of consciousness 
to its object exists*. Since a state of consciousness cannot manifest itself, solely by its 
own sake, to any person other than its own substrate, the words ‘to its own substrate 
become necessary. This definition is acceptable only to those who maintain the 
svayamprakasatva theory; hence, a second, which will be acceptable to all is offered. 
The qualifications ‘to its own substrate’, ‘fcy its own existence’ aid at the present time 
have to be supplied in this definition also. ‘Means of manifesting’ would apply a'so to 
the potter’s stick, wheels and other instruments; and hence the qualification *to its own 
substrate*. The knowledge arising from one sense organ can not be the means for the 
manifestation of an object revealed by another sense; visual perception, for example 
does not manifest that which is the object of auditory perception. Hence the need for 
the words‘its own object ’ The qualification‘by its own existence’ serves to exclude 
the Sense organs, which are instrumental in revealing objects, not by their own be ng, 
but in so far as they give rise to knowledge As in the case of the first definition, 
here also the expressions ‘at the present time’ and ‘its own substrate’ arc intended to 
exclude respectively past states of consciousness and the experience of others. 

62. It is not necessary that if external objects, such as pots, exist at all they 
ought to be known. Hence, they arc not considered to be opposed to ignorance 
(ajnanavirodhi. Knowledge, however, is opposed t to ignoranee (ajn2navirodhi^ : 
because when it exists it must necessarily shine forth. 



sciousness.' Should it be contended that-if consciousness! is the object of 
consciousness the two qualities (namely, the j: quality rf()f : npt : j being; the 
seat of consciousnesss and of not being opposed to ignorance) niust be¬ 
long to it, (we reply) that even on the view that consciousness is not the 
object of consciousness, it wpuld likewise possess -those <two qualities, 
(as in the case of the sky-flower). No further need to expose how 
ridiculous these devious and flimsy arguments are. 

•*! ' v t.:-." • tv-' M .ir ■/> 

The assertion that if consciousness is without an origin , it could have 
no changes is refuted:- v 

' Again, the assertion that as consciousness has no origin, Other 
modifications of it are negatived is fallacious; for, (the implied general 
proposition, namely, that whatever has no origin has none of the other 
changes, is falsified by the contradictory instance 'of antecedent non¬ 
existence, because,) although antecedent non- existence Has no 1 Origin, it 
is found to have an end, Even if the qualification ‘positive entity* 
be added^the falsity (of the general proposition as modified viz., All 
positive entities having origin have none of the other changes) will be 
proved by the ignorance (avidya) which is admitted by -you.' For', this 
ignorance even though it has no origin, is subject to manifold changes 
and terminates through the rise of knowledge. If it is said that its modifi" 

cations are unreal (we ask) do you admit changes which are ultimately real 
and believe in any entity having an origin and still being ultimatelyjreal? It 
is only if these are admitted, the qualification ‘ultimately real’ can be 
fruitfully applied either to the major or to the middle term. If these are 
admitted, then yOur case has, indeed, been ably defended by one skilled 
in logic! ; * . 

*. .. t ' *. - • • 

The contention that if consciousness is unborn, it cannot, have 
differentiations is refuted 

The statement that what is unborn cannot possess differentiations 
is not correct; for, the distinction of the self, which & assuredly unborn > 
from’the body, senses and the like has already been established; and 
because ignorance, which is admitted to be beginningless, hasjiecessarily 



to be taken as being distinct from the self. 6 * If ti is said that this 
differentiation is phehomenal, (we ask) have you observed any-where 
real distinction to be invariably concomitant with origination? 8 * It will 
bd shown presently that the distinctions existing between various kinds 
of knowledge and objects of knowledge, which are established by un¬ 
contradicted experience, are ultimately real . 85 ' > 

The contention that consciousness of qualitylessi stands self-rtfuted:- 

W'H. •' Vi -WUX’S. .it. V.\ . ... .. 4 - > - 1 . 4 . 

The contention that consciousness does not possess the attributes 
which are objects of knowledge, and that the attributes which are known 
do pot belong to consciousness as its qualities is proved to be fallacious 
by the qualities of self-luminosity, eternity and the like, which are 
established^ by ^priptural testimony, inference and other means of know? 
ledge to exist in consciousness, and which are acknowledged by your¬ 
self . 88 ,.I£ cannot be pointed out that these, attributes are in reality, 
only pure consciousness; for, even though it (consiousness) is admited 
to exis^tj conflicting views with regard to these attributes are noticed. It 
is-only.after admitting the, existence of consciousness that .disputants 
maintain its inferability, momentariness, and the like. Besides, con¬ 
sciousness and these attributes are in their essential nature distinct. 
Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own-existence* 

63. AH system* of Indian thought, with the exception of the Carvaka darsana* 
accept the distinction of the self from the body, senses and so on; and the opponent 
admits, in addition, the distinction ofthe ielf from avidya. Hence, 'he cannot deny 
Vijatlyadheda. • I( r ; ? ;j 

64. In order to prove that consciousness admits of no real distinctions, because 
it has no origin, the negative concomitance (vyatirekavyapti) - whatever has. real 
distinctions must have an origin—must be cited. But as the opponent does not admit 
real distinctions, he cannot point to any instance of this negative generalisation. Hence, 
his argument commits the fallacy of vyapyatv§siddhiY Moreover, if the distinction of 
avidya from the self is not real, it follows that ignorance itself may become the self. 

65. The distinction between objects of knowledge necessarily points to distinction 
between kinds of knowledge This shows that sajatiyabhsda is realc 

; 66. The admission that consciousness possesses the attributes of self-luminosity, 
eternity and O tho like,.implies, that consciousness admits of internal differences 

* * ' • .* •• ' ;r . . •'fra • *? .. *»?• 'i i * j • r• t r.‘ » / • •• , •_ r. — > >1 *'* *A 



manifests some object to its own substrate, But self-luminousness consists 
in shining forth or being manifest solely by means of its own existence 
to the soul. It has already been established in Samvit-siddhi 67 that 
‘shining forth,’ which is implied therein, Is a quality common to ; 
all sentient and insentient things alike. If you were to (confuse this 
‘shining forth’ with prakatya and) say that it is not admitted by 
Vedantins, (we point out that) the expression ‘shining forth* refers to 
the quality of being fit to be an object of reference Eternity, again 
is the quality of existing at all times. Unity is limitation by the 
number ‘one’. 

It is not proper to suggest that as these attributes (self-luminosity, 
eternity and unity) constitute the negation of non-intelligence, of spatial 
and temporal limitations and of plurality respectively, the aforesaid 
difficulties are got over. For, even if they are of this nature, as they will 
still be the attributes of consciousness, you cannot meet the charge of 
anaikanta (straying reason). The denial of non-intelligence, non-eternity, 
plurality and the like would be empty statement signifying nothing if 
the several qualities opposed to these were not present in consciousness. 
Ignorance (avidya), which is knowable, is found in the self; and this is a 
position admitted by you. (Hence, it cannot be ; maintained that the 
attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its 

Further, after suggesting the relation of consciousness to something 
with the aid of the genitive case - ending found in the word asyah 
(occurring in the statement nasya meyo dharmah) to assert the attri- 
butelessnes of consciousness will, like the attribution of the quality 
of being a barren woman to one’s mother, convey the opposite meaning* 
If consciousness is admitted to be manifest, it will follow that it possesses 
attributes; otherwise, (if it is not admitted to be manifest) it amounts 
to positing an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. If it is said 
that manifestation itself is consciousness, (we ask) ‘Oh, Ye! tell us 
whose manifestation it is. If the reply is that it is not the manifestation 

67. The expression 'samvitsiddhaveva sadhitam* indicate* that Samvitsiddhi. 
was composed before Atmasiddhi. 




of anything, then, it cannot be manifestation at all, for, manifestation, 
like the quality of being a son, always refers to some entity and belongs 
to somebody. If it is said that it (manifestation) belongs to the self, 
(we ask) what is the meaning of the genitive case - ending? 68 Hence, to 
maintain that a consciousness, which has been described as above and 
which has a character similar to that of sky-lotus, is the ultimate end of 
the Vedanta will only lead to the destruction of the Vedas themselves. 69 

• t *• r 

*V- ^ , 

Even on the view of the veiled Buddhists , recognition would be inexpli¬ 

Further, even if consciousness were eternal, the impossibility of 
recognition would still persist; for, recognition which takes the form— 
*1 experienced this at one time’—indicates that there is a conscious subject 
existing at earlier and subsequent times. But, in your view, conscious¬ 
ness is mere consciousness. With regard to itself, consciousness cannot 
be its own subject and its own object. 

v ' .* • V. 

It cannot be maintained that jnaiftva is superposed on consciousness: 

.. . * r. 

Should it be argued that, even though consciousness is ultimately 
only consciousness, but falsely appears as an experiencing subject just as 
the shell appears as silver, and that (this consciousness itself cannot be 
said to be illusory, for) without a real basis no illusion can arise, this 
argument is unsound. On this view, the conscious ‘I’ would shine forth 
as equivalent to consciousness, taking the form ‘consciousness is' I,’ 70 even 
as silver, the yellow colour, the quality of being existent in the mirror, 

Vi 68. Panini’s §a§thi §e§e-declares that the genitive case - ending invariably refers 
to some relation or other. The expression ‘soul’s manifestation 4 (atmanah siddhihj 
must, therefore, indicate that there is some relation between soul and the quality of 
manifestation. Hence, it cannot be maintained that the soul is attribbteless. 

69. There is a pun on the word vedanta. 

70. When a piece of shell is mntiken for silver, the illusion takes th; form 
•This is silver,’ and not ‘shell is silver’; for, so long as the specific qualities of an 
object are known,- no illusion with regard to it can arise. Likewise, when cons- 
cionsness erroneously appears as the‘I,’the illusion must take the form ‘This is I’ 
and not ‘consciousness is I’, Hence, it may be asked: How can it be asserted that tho 
illusion concerning consciousness would take the form ‘consciousness is I’? Our reply is 



duality and the like appear falsely as being the form of the lustrous 
object presented before us, the conch, the face, the moon and the like* 
This consciousnesss which always presents itself as something distinct 
(from the conscious subject) is marked as taking the form ‘I am conscious’ 
and as being the distinguishing attribute of the altogether separate entity 
known as T, just as the stick is found to be the attribute of Devadatta; 
when the judgment ‘Devadatta holds a stick’ does not have for its 
object the stick only, how can it be asserted that (in the analogous case) 
this consciousness of ‘I’, which reveals the entity called T as owning 
consciousness, has for its object consciousness only, which is, in fact, 
a mere attribute. 

Refutation of the view that jnatrtva is the result of superimposition: 

How (we ask) did you arrive at the conclusion that the character of 
of being a knower is an illegitimately transferred quality (adhyasta)? If it 
is replied that this like the sta ement ‘I am stout’, presents itself only to 
him who erroneously identifies the self with the body, (and as such, the 
character of being a knower, like stoutness, is superimposed on the self, 
we rejoin that) since the consciousness too, which you regard as the self, 
presents itself only to that person who has that (confusion of the self with 
the body), this consciousness also must likewise be a superimposition. If 
it be said that, since consciousness continues even after the dawn of 
true knowledge of reality, it cannot be illusory, (we ask) ‘Sir, does 
the self really cease to be a knower after the acquisition of true know¬ 
ledge?’ 71 Oh! if that were so, it would be far better not to be a knower 
of the real than to be a knower of the real; for, at least in the state of 
illusion, he would perceive, many a happy thing. 

that in the case of shell-silver it is not the shell aspect of the presented object, but 
some other aspect that causes the illusion. But in the case of consciousness, as the 
opponent describes it to be attributeless, it cannot be said that some aspect other than 
that of being consciousness leads to the illusion. Hence, it has to be admitted that 
even when its specific aspect of being consciousness is known consciousness gives rise to 
the illusion of ‘I’ and takes the form 'consciousness is I.’ See Sruta Prahasiha, 

71. Scriptural passages describing the state of release definitely declare that the 
released soul continues to be a knower. Hence, it cannot be maintained that with the 
rise of true knowledge the quality of being a knower vanishes. 



The contention that jnatrtva resides in ahamkara: : ^ 

You may maintain that to be a knower is to be an agent in the act 
of knowing, to be liable to change, 72 to be non-intelligent, and to reside 
in the knot of the ahamkara, 73 and that the self is the enjoyer of the fruits 
of the knowing process, a non-agent, a changeless entity, the witness 
(saksin) 7 * and pure luminosity; and that the character of being an agent 
and the like cannot be the attributes of the self; for, like colour and other 
qualities, they are knowable and that if the quality of being an agent 
belongs to the self, even though the latter is an object of the conscious¬ 
ness of T, it will be impossible to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that 
the quality of being non-soul, of existing for the sake of others, of being 
non-intelligent and the like would belong to the self even as they belong 
to the body; and that the distinction of the knower, who is the object of 
the consciousness of ‘I’, and who enjoys the result of the activity of the 
body, from the body, which is well known to be the agent in all secular 
and sacred duties, is noticed; and that similarly here also it is reasonable 
to admit that the witnessing inward self is distinct from the knower 
denoted by the term 4 1’. 

This is opposed to everyday experience. 

This argument (of yours) is illogical, for, apart from the inward self 
which shines forth as the knower in the judgment ‘I know’, no other 

72. Knowledge is an activity and it has a beginning and an end; hence, the 
quality of being an agent in the act of knowing must have a beginning and end, that 
is, must be subject to change. 

' * • / 

73. Ahamkara is spoken of as a knot (granthi) either because it is the root 
cause of the tangled mass of illusions or because it binds the jiva closely to the 
manifold illusions which are, in fact, its own handiwork. 

. 74. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality. Brahman, which is one, 
undifferenced, eternal and self-luminous consciousness (caitanya), is particularised by 
the antahkarana in two ways. When Brahman is determined by antabkarpa as a 
qualifying attribute fvi&esana) it is called the jiva; when it is determined by 
antahkarana as a limiting adjunct only (upadhi). it is called the saksin. The 
antahkarapa is inseparably bound up with jiva, but is separable from the saksin. 
The sak$in performs the office of manifesting the odjects known as well as the knowing 
subject. Since all diversity takes its roots in ajnlna, the sak§in which illumines objects 
of experience and the experiencer, is spoken of as the "witness of ajnana.’ i 

I * 


t • 




v $elf which is pure luminosity only and which is termed -‘Witness’ -is 
apprehended. The character of inwardness as attributed to the 'Self 
(pratyaktva) consists precisely in the quality of being ‘I* found in that 
entity which by virtue of its being the seat of knowledge, is marked, off 
from the body, senses, mind, vital breath and consciousness", artd which, 
contrary to the procedure of outward objects, proceeds, as it Were, and 
shines for its own sake. 73 The character of being a witness as attributed 
to the same (self) consists in being a direct knower (an eye-Witness). 
Indeed, one who is not knower is not spoken of as witness; * 1 Since all 
objects that are manifested reveal themselves to the knOwer who shines 
forth as T, the experience—‘I know’, ‘It presents itself to me’—is shared 
by every self. 

< Indefensibility of the position that pratyaktva belongs to ahamkara: 

The quality of being a knower cannot belong to that modification o 
unmanifest ’prakrti (avyakta) which goes by the ' name .of egoity 
(ahamkara), nor to that known as intellect (buddhi); for as in the case of 
the body, the quality of not being an intelligent entity, the character of 
liability to change, insentience, the quality of existing for the ' sake of 
? others and other similar reasons make it impossible (for the quality of 
jnatrtva to belong to either egoity or intellect:) 

The untenability of the view that ahamkara appears as knower either , 
on account of reflection or contact with consciousness. 

Nor can it be said that the quality of being a knower may well be¬ 
long to egoity or intellect on account of the reflection of intelligence; 
for, what is not open to visual perception is not observed to have refle¬ 
ction. Besides, on your view, the quality of being a knower does not 
really belong to consciousness. If jnatrtva really belongs to consciousness, 
on account of conjunction with consciousness, this quality may appear 
in another substance (say in egoity or intellect) or be apprehended 
therein, ‘even as heat appears in the iron-ball on account contact 
with fire. 

75. Outward objects present themselves for the sake of the knowing subject, and 

1 not forthcir own .sake. The self, on the contrary, shines for its own sake. Svasmai 
bhasamanatvam pratyaktvam. Parasmai bhasamanatvam paraktvam. 



The contention that ahamkara appears as knower , because it minifests 
consciuosmss as residing in itself 

Yon may perhaps maintain the following view: “ In manifesting the 
self which is none other than pure consciousness, the egoity (ahamkara), 
although of non-intelligent nature, manifests the self as residing within it¬ 
self ; for it is the nature of manifesing entities to reveal the objects that 
are being manifested as residing in themselves, just as a mirror, a sheet 
of water, particular instances of a class (say, the short, the hornless cows) 
and the like reveal the face, the sun, cowness, etc. as dwelling in them¬ 
selves respectively. The erroneous view that finds expression in the judg¬ 
ment ‘I know’ is the result of that (i.e., the ahamkara being a manifest¬ 
ing entity reveals consciousness as residing within itself; in other words, 
ahamkara appears as the possessor of knowledge. That is why in states 
of deep sleep and release, there is manifestation of the self in its true na¬ 
ture of pure consciousness only without the revelation of the T. That is 
also the reason why the quality of being non-soul has to bo predicated 
of the T. Suresvara’s statement runs to the effect—‘If the quality of be¬ 
ing ‘I’ belongs to the self, it must persist in states of deep sleep and re¬ 
lease ; for the reason that it does not persist, it must be taken to belong 
to something else \ 76 ” This (argument) lacks coherence. 

The refutation of the preceding view :— 

To say that the ahamkara which is essentially insentient manifests 
the self-luminious soul is as illogical as to assert that a spent coal 
manifests the sun. In fact, the manifestation of all objects is known 
to depend on consciousness, which is not insentient and which you 
consider to be the soul. The assertion—that the non-intelligent 
ahamkara, which itself depends for its revelation on consciousness, 
reveals such a consciousness, which manifests all subjects without an 
exception and which has as its essential nature a luminosity that knows 
neither birth nor extinction, nor any other modification-will be ridicu ed 
by those who have understood the real nature of the soul. 

76. Nziskarmya Siddhi. Bombay Sanskjt and Prakrit Series. No. 38. Ch. II 
Stanza 32. p. 70. 



Further, the relation of being the manifesting and the manifested 
entity cannot obtain between ahamkara and consciousness, for they are 
opposite in nature. 77 If the self is admitted to be capable of being 
manifested, it would imply that, like the pot. it would cease to be con¬ 
sciousness. Do not say'that the surface of the hand, which is itself mani-; 
fested by the sun’s rays, is seen to manifest those rays themselves; for, 
the surface of the hand is responsible only for the accumulation of thos 
rays. 78 The sun beams thus accumulated are distinctly perceived; hencee, 
they are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. 

None of the three alternative ways in which ahamkara could be said to 
manifest consciousness is tenable:- 

Again (we ask) what is the nature of this ‘manifestation’, which 
is said to be effected by the ahmkara in respect of the self which is 
essentially consciousness? It cannot be said to be the origination of 
consciousness; for in as much as it is self-dependent, it must be admitted 
not to depend for its existence on anything other than itself. Nor can it 
be said to be the illuminaiion concerning consciousness, since it is not 
cabable of being apprehended (by another consciousness). Indeed if it is 
cabable of being experienced (by another consciousness), it would imply 
that it, like pots, etc., would cease to consciousness, 


None of these possible modes of the third alternative is tenable :- 


For. the same reason (i. e, that consciousness is not the object of 
another consciousness), manifestation cannot be said to be the assis¬ 
tance rendered to the instruments of knowledge (concerning conscious¬ 
ness ). This assitance may be (of three kinds) — (/) It is either such as 
results from the removal of those obstacles to the rise of knowledge 
which reside in the object to be known, like the service rendered to the 

77. Consciousness and ahamkara have opposite natures. The former has the 
character of manifesting all objects without an exception; while the latter, being 
distinct from consciousness, depends for its manifestarion on consciousness, 
H nee, it is impossible for ahamkara to manifest consciousness. 

78. This analogy is unsound, because, unlike the sun’s rays, consciousness is 
not spread out and cannot be said to be collected by ahamkara. 



eye by light through the dispelling of darkness. (//) Or, it is the 
help arising from being the means of contact between objects known and; 
the sense-organs, like the help rendered by the particular instance,; 
mirror, etc., to the eye and the like, which reveal respectively general 
qualities, one’s own face, etc. (w) Or, it is the help which accrues from 
the removal of the impurities residing in the knower, like the service 
rendered by (virtues such as) tranquillity, restraint and so on to the 
iSastras, which are the means of the true knowledge concerning the 
Infinite and the finite self. 

(It cannot be the first kind, for) there is nothing resident in con¬ 
sciousness which impedes the orgination of knowledge (of consciousness) 
and which could be removed by ahamkara. (You cannot reply that 
ajhana dwells in consciousness and is dispelled by ahamkara, for) 
inasmuch as ignorance would have the same abode and the same object 
as knowledge, it is impossible to locate it in the witness which you have 
admitted, and which is devoid of the two qualities (of being the seat of 
knowledge and its object). Indeed, pots and the like, which are 
devoid of the possibility of knowledge, are never spoken of as possessing 
ignorance. Similarly, for the reason that the quality of being the knower 
neveir belongs to pure consciousness, it can never possess ignorance. 
Even if it is so (i. e., even if consciousness possess ignorance), it is not 
admitted that ignorance is removable by ahamkara, since ignorance can 
be put an end to only by knowledge, and since it has been so admitted. 
Besides, knowledge terminates the ignorance which concerns its own 
objeet only, 79 As the quality of being the object of knowledge has not 
been attributed to consciousness which is regarded as the self, the 
ignorance residing therein can never be destroyed by anyone at any 
time. (The ignorance which you speak of as existing in consciousness 
may be either defined as the antecedent non - existence of knowledge 
or considered as indefinable). Ignorance, which is of the nature of 

79. When knowledge arises it dispels only that ignorance which centres round 
the object known. For example, when the shell is known as shell, this apprehension 
terminates the illusory cognition of that object which existed till then. If knowledge 
is said to put an end to all ignorance, it would have to be admitted that knowledge of 
the true nature of the shell dispels every form of illusion. See Sruta Prahasika 

Atmasiddhi 49 

the antecedent non—existence of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an 
obstacle to the rise of knowledge. 80 That the following statements— 
•Ignorance is positive in nature; (it is) indefinable; (it is) the material 
cause of the world; and so on—are merely incoherent prattle will be 
shown in the section dealing with the relation (of finite souls to the 
infinite self). Hence, it cannot be said that the manifestation of consci¬ 
ousness is effected by the ahamkara whose essential nature is removal of 
defects in the objects known. 

(It cannot be the second, for) as consciousness is beyond the reach 
of the senses (the assistance rendered to the means of knowledge by 
ahamkara) cannot consist in being responsible for the contact (of the 
objects known with the senses). (Nor can it be the third, for) as the 
entity known as ‘I* is (in your view) the knower, it cannot be cleansed 
of its impurities by itself. 

It cannot be maintained that the manifesting entity should manifest 
the object as residing within itself. 

Nor can it be said that it is the nature of the manifesting entity to 
reveal the manifested objects as residing within itself; because such a 
nature is not observed in the lamp and the like (which manifest things 
without exhibiting them as residing in themselves); and because, know¬ 
ledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the * 
nature of promoting the manifestation of things as they really are. That 
knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have 
the aforesaid nature follows from the doctrine of the self-validity of 
knowledge (svatahpramanya) 81 ; and if this is not admitted, there would 
ensue lack of certainty in anything. 

80. The antecedent non- existence of an object cannot be regarded as an obsta¬ 
cle to the origination of that object. 

81. On the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge four views 
have been held. According to the Sankhyas the validity and invalidity of know¬ 
ledge are both inherent in it. The Nyaya-vaise§ika takes the opposite position and 
contends that both the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external 
factors.. On this view, knowledge^ in itself, is neither true nor false; it is rendered 
valid or invalid by outside factors. The Buddhists take invalidity to be intrinsic 




(With regard to the analogy of the particular instance, vyakti. cited 
by you), such a manifestation (of the universal as residing in the parti¬ 
cular instances) is due to the fact that the universal is only the charac¬ 
ter met with in the instances, and not the fact of those instances being 
the manifesting entities, as it has already been shown (that the case of 
the lamp flame) falsifies the view (that all manifesting entities reveal 
objects as taking their abode in themselves). (As for the analogy of 
the mirror, etc.) mirror and similar objects are only responsibile for the 
mistake, namely, the reflecting of the ocular rays, and are not manifest¬ 
ing agents of faces and other objects. 82 The real manifesting agents 
however, are only light and the like. Although light is the real mani¬ 
festing agent the false impression (of the face appearing within the 
mirror) is the outcome of the mistake of the deflection (of the ocular 
rays). But here, the capacity to produce a similar mistake (in the self- 
luminous consciousness) does not belong to the entity known as T. 
If it is so, (it. e. if that capacity belongs to the T), then perception and 
other forms of knowledge would lose their validity; and hence, nothing 
would be true. Therefore, what constitutes the inward self is not pure 
consciousness, but the entity ‘I’, which reveals itself as a knower. 

i . ,i. 

Refutation of the contention of Suresvara that in deep sleep there is no 
consciousness of 

As regards your contention that in deep sleep and release the self 
manifests itself only as mere consciousness and does not appear as T 
the belief that in deep sleep such a condition of consciousness prevails 
(i. e., consciousness shining forth without an object or a substrate) has 

to knowledge, and validity extrinsic. The Mimasakas and Vedantins, while ad¬ 
mitting the Nyaya-vai^esika view in regard to invalidity of knowledge, maintain that 
validity is inherent in knowledge. 

82. The general proposition ‘all manifesting entities reveal their objects as 
residing within themselves’ was sought to be established on the strength of instances 
such as mirror, etc. In refuting this view, it was first pointed out that there are 
instances against this generalisation. Now it is shown that even the instnces cited by 
the opponent do not prove his case. The mirror, for example, is responsible only 
for reflecting the ocular rays, and not for manifesting the face. The real manifesting 
agents are light and the like. 



already been refuted. Since even in deep sleep the self does present 
dtself up to the time of waking only in the form of the ‘I’, (the mani- 
festatin of the T cannot be said to be absent in that state) 83 . If 
it is said that on account of the absence of consciousness of external' 

’ objects, and prevalence of darkness (tamas) in deep sleep, the T does 
not present itself clearly and distinctly, (we reply that) it must be ad¬ 
mitted that even the consciousness posited by you does not, likewise, 
present itself clearly aud distinctly in that state. No one who has risen 
from deep sleep is found to recall the experience which occurred to him 
during sleep, namely, ‘I am not I (ahamkara.; nor am I anything else 
(the knower or the known); but I am only pure consciousness and I 
stand as the witness of ignorance.’ 

If you were to say that from the reflection ‘For so long a time I 
knew nothing at all’ such a position (namely, that in deep sleep there 
is presentation of pure consciousness only) is made out, (we ask) how 
(is it made out)? (If your reply is that) this follows from the expression 
‘nothing at all’(occurring in the aforesaid reflection, we rejoin) in that 
case, the manifestation of consciousness also would have to be denied* 

Analysis of your statement establishes just the opposite of what you 
intend to prove. 

While in the judgment, ‘I knew nothing at all,’ the word ‘I* 
denotes clearly the self which is manifested in deep sleep and the* 
words ‘knew nothing at ajl’ negative (all) knowledge on the part of 
that T, the fool who manitains (that the self - same judgment 
establishes) that in deep sleep there is manifestation of pure conscious¬ 
ness along with the absence of the presentation of ‘I’ does not know its 
contradiction to experience. It has already been said that there can be 
no knowledge without an object and without a substrate. 

The reflection “I was not even aware of my self” does not mean the 
absence of ‘/' but something else :— 

You may ask : Do we not, on waking, get the knowledge ‘I who 
slept, was not even conscious of my self’? (Does it not indicate that 

83. Ekarupeija also suggests that presentation of the self as ‘I’ is common to 



in sleep there is absence of the manifestation of T)?. True , (we reply)! 
that knowledge (namely, the reflection ‘I was not even conscious of 
myself’) after indicating by the word ‘myself’ the self, which, in the 
waking state, is understood as-being characterised by caste, stage in life, 
etc., shows that the T, which shines forth in sleep, which is not clearly 
experienced, and which manifests itself for its own sake, is not known 
in such a manner (i. e. as characterised by caste, stage in life, etc.); but 
it does not show that the ‘I’ whose essential nature is to be the knower, 
is itself not apprehended. Indeed, our reflection is to the effect: ‘I did 
not even know myself as having slept in a particular place and as pos¬ 
sessing certain characteristics.’ 

The statement in question undoubtedly points to the existence of the 
‘T and its manifestation. 

Moreover,,your position indeed is this, namely, that in deep sleep 
the self exists as the witness of ignorance. And it has already been 
said that to be a witness is to be a direct knower. This witness too is 
nothing but the T which is apprehended in the judgment ‘I know’; 
how then, could this ‘I’ not be apprehended in the state of sleep? 
That which Illumines itself for its own sake appears only as the ‘I’; 
hence, it follows that the self, which shines forth even in sleep and other 
similar states, appears only as the ‘I’. 

The ‘I’ (ahamartha) persists in the state of release:- 

To maintain that the ‘I’ does not persist in the state of liberation 
is unsound; for, it amounts to asserting, as is done in Buddhism, but in a 
somewhat different way, that release consists only in the annihilation 
of the self. The ‘I’ is not a mere attribute of the self; if it were an 
attribute, it may be said that even after its destruction the self exists in 
its true being; as it persists on the dissolution of ignorance. In fact, the 
true being of the self is nothing but the T; and knowledge appears to 
the self as an attribute of the latter as . is evident from the judgment 
‘knowledge has arisen in me’. (It has been shown that even granting 
your position that the self exists as a witness of ignorance in deep sleep 
it does not follow that the T disappears in that state.) There is no 



need to argue the point, when something other than the witnessing con¬ 
sciousness (saksicaitanya) is the self. 

On the stength of the sacred text relating to liberation and endeavour of 
souls for securing moksa the existence of T (ahamartha) is proved. 

Moreover, he who considers himself to be afflicted by the miseries 
of worldly existence, whether in truth or in error, and thinks ‘I am 
suffering pain’, and in whom the desire for release has arisen,-making 
him reflect: ‘How may I become tranquil and blissful, setting aside this 
entire collection of miseries?’, he alone enters upon the means for 
realisation. If (on the other hand) he were to realise ‘I should be no 
more if I practised the means (for the attainment of release)’, he would 
run away at the very mention of the topic of release. Asa consequence 
of this, since there can be none possessing the requisite qualifications 
(to enter upon the study of the scriptures), the entire upanisadic texts 
and all the 3astras relating to liberation would lose their validity, 84 

If you were to say that mere luminosity which is indicated by 
the word ‘I’ would persist in the state of release, (we ask) ‘Of what use 
is it?’ For, no sensible person would exert himself under the influence 
of the idea ‘Though I shall perish, there will remain some luminosity; 85 

Refutation of the view that the “7” is an objective element (i.e. it is jada) 

For the same reason, even the contention-that in self-conscious¬ 
ness (which expresses itself in the judgment ‘I know’) that element which 
is not referred to by the word ‘this’ (i. e. the non-objective element* 
pratyagartha), which has consciousness for its sole essence, and which 
is luminosity, is the self; and that in the same self-consciousness what 

84. The validity of scriptures consists in their generating true knowledge in 
the mind of the aspirant. If there were no qualified pupils to study them they 
would lose their validity 

85. Cf„ Sri Bhasya. 

Nirastakhiladuljkhoham anantanadabhak svarat | 

Bhaveyamiti moksarthi grvaijadau pravartate 11 
AhamarthavinaSa^cet mok§a ityadhyavasyati | 

Apasarpedasu mok$akathaprastavagandhatab | | 

Mayi na§tepi mattonya kacit jnaptiravasthita | 

Iti tatpraptaye yatnab kasyapi na bhavisyati 11 



has to be considered as objective element (yusmadartha, para gar tha), 
for the reason that it depends for its manifestation on consciousness, is 
the ‘I’ referred to in the judgment ‘I know’—stands condemned. 86 It 
is also contradicted by direct perception, (for the judgment *1 know’ 
implies that knowledge is an attribute and that the ‘I* is its possessor, 
and that knowledge is an objective element (parak), while the T is a 
non-objective element, (pratyak). 

The statement that the intelligent entity refered to in the judg¬ 
ment ‘I know’ is an objective element (parak) is as self-contradictory in 
its meaning as the assertion ‘My mother is a barren woman’. Nor 
can it be said that this intelligent entity depends on something else for 
its manifestaion (and is hence parak, i. e., non-soul, for, being of the 
nature of consciousness, it is self-luminous. 

Since luminosity, by the very fact of its being luminosity, must 
necessarily pertain to something or other, as in the case of the luminosity 
of the pot, etc , mere luminosity cannot be the soul. Therefore, that en¬ 
tity alone which shines forth as the knower and termed T is the self. 

Even in the state of release , the self shines to itself at 

This self, even in the state of release, shines to itself only as the 
‘I’, for it shines for its own sake. (There is the general principle that) 
whatever shines for its own sake is found to shine only as the ‘I’; for 
example, the self which is subject to the round of births and deaths is 
admitted by both the contending parties to shine in such a manner. 
Whatever does not appear as ‘I’ does not shine for its own sake; as 
pots and the like. The released soul does appear for its own sake. 
Therefore, it appears as the T and in no other way. 

86. Two arguments of the opponent are here referred to. The first seeks to 
prove that consciousness is the soul, for the reason that it is a non-objective 
element; that it is non-objective is inferable from its being self-luminous; its self- 
luminous nature follows from its being consciousness. The second tries to establish 
that the entity ‘I’ is not the self, because it is an objective element. That the T is 
an objective element is shown by its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation. 
Its dependence on consciousness for its manifestaion is inferred from its being distinct 
from consciousness. 



The consciousness of ‘ T is natural and not due to occasional factors.- 

It cannot be said that if the released self appears in such a manner 
(i. e., as the ‘I’) it would imply that it is involved in ignorance and 
samsara; for, this would contradict the nature of being a released soul; 
moreover, the consciousness’, of T does not have for its cause the 
quality of being subject to ignorance and samsara. Since even persons 
like Vamadeva, who have had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety 
by means of the direct realisation of Brahman as the* self of all, are 
found to have the consciousness of ‘I’, the latter cannot, in fact, have 
ignorance for its cause. The scriptures say - ‘Seeing this, the sage 
Vamadeva understood*. I was Manu and the Sun ,87 ‘I alone exist and 
shall exist.’ 88 From the following passages and others like them it is 
clear that a similar reference to Himself as T is noticed even in the 
case of the Highest Person, who is not afflicted even in the least by ignor¬ 
ance and other evils in any manner and at any time. (The following 
scriptural passages are found) ‘Let me enter these three divinities (i. e., 
fire, water and food); 39 ‘May I become manifested and be born’; 90 
‘He thought: May I create the worlds” ’ 91 (It is said in the Gita) 
‘Since I transcend the destructible (ksara) and am also superior even 
to the Indestructible (aksara), I am proclaimed in the world 
and in the Veda as the Highest Person’; 92 ‘I am he who lifts them 
‘I am the giver of the seed, the father’; 94 ‘ I know the things past,; 9 , 
and so on. 

' Ahamkara ’ which refers to the body and which is a product of matter 
is the result of delusion and has to be dispelled — 

(It may be asked) ‘If the ‘I’ really constituted the self, how could 
the Highest Lord have included ahamkara among the elements that 
go to make up the material embodiment of the self (ksetra), and how 
could he have classed it among the evils to be rejected? 98 (Our reply 


Bfh. Up. I. iv. 10. 



Gita. XV. 18. 


Atha. Up. I. i- 



Gita. XII. 7. 


Chand. Up. VI. iii. 2. 



Gita. XIV. 4. 


Chand. Up. VI. ii. 3. 



Gita. XII. 26. 


Ait. Up. I. i. 



Gita. XVI, 18- 



is) the teaching of the Highest Lord found in the verse (of the Gita 
XV. 5) commencing with the words ‘The great elements, the ahamkara 
to the effect that ahamkara is to be included among th objects 
that constitute the material embodiment of the self (ksetra) really refers 
only to that modification of unmanifest prakrti by whose instrumen¬ 
tality the body, which distinct from the real self denoted by the word 
‘I’, is erroneously taken to be ‘I’. And this ahamkara, which is res¬ 
ponsible for our slighting persons who are worthy of respect, and which 
is termed conceit, is often referred to by sastras as meriting rejection. 

It is only where the self appears as ‘1’ - ‘I am dev a' - /am man - the 
possibility of ajnana airses- 

Therefore, it is proper to conclude that the consciousness of ‘I’, which 
has nothing to contradict it, has really the self for its object; and that, on 
the other hand, the consciousness of ‘I’ which arises in regard to the 
body that is not the soul, is ignorance. (In agreement with this) it has 
been said by (Para£ara).the grandson ofVasistha: ‘O thou! the giver of 
delight to thy family! Hear from me the essential nature of ignorance; it 
is the consideration of the not-self as the self.’ 97 (Our position squares 
well with ParaSara’s definition of ignorance; but yours does not; for,) 
the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness occurs to 
no one. Even to you, who maintain that pure consciousness alone is 
self, the consideration of the non-soul as the self will be possible, if 
there is the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness. 
As is proved by perception (the judgment ‘I know’ establishes knowledge 
to be an attribute and the ‘I’ to be its possessor), and as it results from 
the application of the aforesaid reasons (such as, if pure consciousness 
alone persisted and the ‘I’ disappeared in the state of release, no one 
would strive for realisation), and as scriptural texts (declare that even 
released souls refer to themselves as ‘I’), and as there is the possibility 
of ignorance (only on our position), it follows that the self which is the 
knower presents itself as the ‘I’. 

97. Vispu Puraiia. VI. vii. 10. 



The unsoundness of the argument that consciousness itself is the soul as 
it is insentient 

With regard to (your) assertion that consciousness itself is the self 
because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent, it has to be pointed 
out (that you must explain) what you understand by ‘not non- 
intelligence’. If it is replied that a non-intelligent entity is that which 
may (at times) fail to manifest itself, even though it be existent, and 
that an intelligent entity is that which has an opposite nature, namely, 
an existence invariably associated with manifestation (we point out 
that) since pleasure and the like are not considered to be soul even 
though they are not non-intelligent your reason is fallacious. Indeed, 
when pleasure, pain, desire and the like exist at all they never fail to 
present themselves. (If an intelligent entity is defined as) that which 
depends for its manifestation on its own existence, (we point out that) 
since the lamp and the like are not taken to be the soul even though they 
depend for their manifestation on their own existence, your reason is 
fallacious. Besides, as a manifestation different from consciousness 
is not admitted (by you) your hetu (reason), namely, intelligence 
occurring in the argument that consciousness itself is the soul, because 
it is intelligent) becomes unestablished (i. e. commits the fallacy of 
svarupEsiddha); it also contradicts your theory (that consciousness is 
attributeless). If it is your view that pleasure and the like, although * 
invariably associated with manifestation, are bound to be non-intelligent, 
for the reason that, like the pot, they manifest themselves for the sake of 
others, and are in consequence, to be considered as not-soul, (we ask 
in reply,) Do you mean then to suggest that knowledge too manifests 
itself for the sake of something other than itself, namely, 
the knower, the T ? The judgment ‘I know’ establishes this, even as the 
judgmental am having pleasure’ (proves that pleasure presents itself for 
the sake of the ‘I’). Therefore, the quality of being not non-intelligent 
(ajadatva), taken in the sense of the quality of manifesting for one’s own 
sake, does not exist(asiddha) in consciousness (which is the minor term 
or paksa in your argument). Hence, it is only the entity known as 
T, which is not non-intelligent, and which manifests itself for its 
own sake by its own existence that constitutes the self. The luminosity 


5 * 


of consciousness itself is dependent on its connection with the self. That 
is why knowledge, as in the case of pleasure, pain and the like, mani¬ 
fests itself to that intelligent person who is its own substrate, and not 
to anybody else. The self, on the contrary, does not present itself for 
its own sake by depending on its connection with some other soul or 
some other entity. This will be explained presently. 

* • 

The argument that on account of the invariable concomitance of the 
knowledge of '/’ and consciousness they are identical is unsound — 

You cannot maintain that the invariable association of the mani¬ 
festation of ‘I’ with consciousness prevents us from taking the ‘I’ to be 
a distinct entity; for, on the same count, it might as well follow that con¬ 
sciousness itself cannot be taken to be a distinct entity. Since it (con¬ 
sciousness ) invariably manifests itself along with the ‘I’, it would 
follow that consciousness also is not an entity different from ‘I’ and 
that it is unreal. 


Moreover, since in each item of knowledge we meet with the 
absence of the invariable association of the manifestation of ‘I*, the 
invariable manifestation of T with any particular item of knowledge 
does not exist. 

Besides, there is neither an object (visaya) apart (from its 
knowledge) nor pure knowledge divested of any relation to all parti¬ 
cular objects; if either existed, then the invariable concomitance of the 
manifestation of knower with knowledge could be posited. 98 And even if 
the property common to all knowledge (jhanasamanya) is existent, it 

95. Having pointed out that the sahopalambhaniyama itself is impossible for 
the reason that there is the presentation of the ‘I* even in the absence of any parti¬ 
cular item of knowledge, Yaraunacarya proceeds to establish the defective nature 
of the illustrative example, which the opponent must cite in his argument, namely, 
wherever there is invariable apprehension of two things together there’must be 
non-difference between them, as in the case of knowledge and its object. In order 
to prove that knowledge and its vi§aya are non-different, the object by itself and 
the knowledge by itself must be taken and shown to be invariably concomitant . But, 
in truth, neither exists apart from the other. 'Hence, the illustrative example is 
subject to the charge of being unproven. 



is not considered to be a positive entity by the Buddhists." We shall 
show that even in the absence of all (knowledge due to mental) modifi¬ 
cations, the soul exists as a self-luminous entity. From the assertion 
that the two (i. e., knowledge and knower) are one, there arises a contra¬ 
diction in the opponent’s own statement; for, the word saha (with) 
is used only when two entities enter on an identical course of action, as in 
the instance ‘with the pupil, the preceptor comes’. Further, after refer¬ 
ring to the two (i. e. blue and its awareness) by the expression mla- 
taddhiyol^ to assert (their) identity by the word abhedab. (non¬ 
difference) 100 is like stating that one’s mother is a barren woman. 

Besides, in view of the fact that qualities such as non-intelligencc 
and the like are denied to consciousness, and in view of the fact 
that the knowledge of the soul in bondage is invariably apprehended 
along with the all-embracing knowledge of the omniscient being 
(sarvajna) (your hetu) is liable to be charged with anekanta d o§a. 101 
If, in their case (i, e., between the knowledge of the soul in bondage 
and that of the sarvajna), non - difference is admitted, the quality of 
non - intelligence and that of having a form and the like would have to 

99. The Buddhists cannot hope to escape the difficulty by saying that between 
vi$ayatva (the property of being an object of knowledge) and jnanatva (the property 
common to all knowledge ) there is invariable concomitance, for they do not consider 
samanya (universal) to be a positive entity. Its admission, they say, leads to all sorts 
of absurdities. The universal is, at best, a working fiction, a useful device in 
thinking. When certain things are regarded as similar, it is not in virtue of their 
possessing some common features, but because of their distinction from the rest. The 
perception of a cow, for example, does not indicate that cowness, as a positive quality, 
exists in that creature; it only signifies that it is different from all non*cows (apoha) 
See Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts- 

100. Tbe reference here is to the Buddhistic dictum—sahopalambhaniyamada- 
bhedo nilataddhiyofc. 

101. By drawing attention to the fact that the hetu (sahopalambhaniyaraa) is 
present even in cases where the sadhya (non-difference) is not known to exist, 
Yamunarya exposes the fallacy (i. e. anekanta) vitiating the argument of the 
opponent. The latter may try to meet this by admitting that even in those casts the 
sadhya is really present. In reply to this, Yamuna says in the next sentence that 
this admission leads to absurdities. 



be ascribed to consciousness, and the quality of being a bound soul 
would have to be attributed to the Buddha. 

Even the contention that since one and the same consciousness presents 
the invariable concomitance of knower known and knowledge they are 
identical is rejuted — 

As shown before, even the contention of their (knowledge and 
knower) being invariably the objects (visaya) of one and the same 
knowledge stands condemned. 103 Besides, here the non - existence o 
the hetu in cases where the sadhya is known to be absent (vipaksa) 
cannot be established; for there may be the invariable presentation of 
knowledge, the known and the knower in one and the same knowledge, 
and still there may not be non-difference between them. 103 What is the 
inconsistency here? Do (objects of knowledge, such as) blue and the 
like depend for their apprehension and consideration on knowledge 
either because they are not self-luminous or because of their non- 
differenGe (from knowledge)? As, in this manner, it becomes a matter 
for doubt, it is impossible to determine that there is this non-difference. 
And this generalisation (that everything depends for its manifestation 
on consciousness) obtains only in the case of objects known and not in 
that of knowledge or the knower. 

Besides, the conflict (of this theory) with perceptual experience is 
obvious; for, in every knowledge, the distinction of the knower from 
knowledge is apprehended. (At this stage the opponent may object and 
say that the distinction of knower from knowledge cannot be perceived, 
since the counter-correlative (i. e., knowledge) is not perceived; and that 

102. To obviate the contradiction invoived in sahopalarabhaniyama to which 
attention of the opponent was drawn, he shifts his ground and employs a different 
hetu, namely, niyamena elcajnanasiddhatvam. 

103. The opponent argues that knowledge and the knower must be identical; for 
they are invariably apprehended together in one and the sams knowledge. Against 
the possible objection they may be so apprehended and still may not be identical, he 
must adduce the indirect proof (tarlea) that if they were not identical, they could - not 
be apprehended together in the self-same knowledge. It is shown here that he is 
unable to do so. 



even if it is admitted to be perceptible on the strength of the doctrine of 
svayamprakasatva, it does not help, since it is not visible. To this we 
reply) in the matter of the perception of difference there is no necessity 
for the counter - correlative ( pratiyogi ) to be either perceptible or visible; 
for when the direct perception of difference is possible with the aid of 
the mere thought of the counter - correlative, a particular variety of this 
knowledge is not required, in as much as it is not responsible (for the 
perception of difference). (We may go a step further and say that) even 
when the counter-correlative is not apprehended, things are directly per- 
oeived as being distinct in themselves; 104 and this will be testified to by 
everybody from his own experience. 

The contention that knower and known are one on ground of invariable 
concomitance even as difjerent flames are considered one on account of 
similarity - 

(The opponent may ask) since, by trampling on the head of the 
perception of difference which is alive, (we) notice the universal con¬ 
comitance between the invariable manifestation (of two things) Together 
and their non-difference, how can the sublation of non-difference be 
effected by perception of difference ? If it could be effected, even the 
inference regarding the difference of the flames (at sucessive moments 
would be stultified by the recognition of their identity. (The reply 
is that) the fool (of an opponent) is ignorant of the distinction (between 
these two cases.). Indeed in the case of the flame, the perceptual 

104. The apprehension of the generic property (jati) of a thing, say a pot, is 
nothing more than the apprehension of the distinction from other things, i.e., non¬ 
pots; and it prevents erroneous identifications. In fact, difference (bheda) is nothing 
more than generie property (jati). To grasp the generic property in ^itself it is 
unnecessary that the counter-correlative (pratiyoai) should have been percoived But 
the generic property., in its aspect of eliminating erroneous identifications is known 
as bheda (difference), and is, certainly, found to pre-suppose knowledge of the 
pratiyogi. See Sri Bhasya. Ananda Press edn. p. 29 ; see also verses 13-14- of 
Adravyasara in Tattvamuktakalapa and Sarvarthasiddhi ‘yada punah adhyasa 
nivartakatvarupadharmlntaravaiSijtyena vyavahriyante, tadl bheda iti ueyante 1 
tena tesameva dharma^am vastusvarupena vyavahriamsnadmjne pratiyogisapek§atvam | 
adhya«anivartakatvarSpadharmantaravai$istyena vyavahriyamananam pratiyogisa 
pekjatvam iti | 



knowledge, which arises when there is continuity of the defects in 
the settled causes (of knowledge) in capable of sublating the inference 
which is based upon defectless perception. To make the point clear—it is 
found that, on account of close similarity between the different flames 
that are extinguished and lighted immediately after and which exist in 
the parts of one and the same which the remembrance “This is, certainly, 
that flame which I saw before” occurs to one who has not noticed their 

The example of different terms appearing as identrcal is not helpful- 

Therefore, even in other cases (where the flames are not extin¬ 
guished and kindled afresh), as there is the occurrence of a series of the 
complete set of causal factors, which have no counter-acting circum¬ 
stances, and as there is the separation of parts (of the causal cond : tions) 
it is to be concluded that such a knowledge (of identity) has for its 
object closely similar and incessantly flowing flame-series. Similarly, as 
the cognition of diversity in regard to one and the same thing 
is found in the case of seeing the moon double and the like 
as being occasioned by the swerving from the normal mode 
of the working of the sense-organ, 105 and as having its object 

105. Either through pressure of the finger upon the eve or on account of some 
defect in the visual mechanism, the rays of the organ of sight (nayanara^mi) split 
and travel in two directions, there by creating, for all practical purposes, two mu¬ 
tually independent apparatuses of vision. One apparatus apprehends the moon in 
her proper place, without, however, apprehending her unity; the other, which 
moves some what obliquely, apprehends, at first, a place close by the moon, and sud- 
sequently the moon herself. without, however, noticing the intervening space sepa¬ 
rating this place and the moon. These two perceptions-one manifesting the moon 
in her proper place, and other in a place close by-arise in such quick succession 
that the perceiver fails to notice the order of their occurrence, and thereby omits 
to note their varying natures. Thus, the double apparatus causes two apprehensions; 
and as the apprehensions differ, there is also difference in the character of the object 
apprehended. The mistake here lies in the failure to notice the fact that the duality 
found in the places is unrelated to the moon. Hence, the perception of two moons. 
The PrabhaVara account, which is closely similar to this, would, however.,-, say tha^ 
the double apparatus yields a duality of apprehensions, but it fails to grasp that the 
duality present in the apprehensions is unrelated to the moon. Compare: 
•netravrttih vittigatadvitvam candranca agrhitabhedam grhijatiti Prabhakarah | yatha 



contradicted by the simultaneously arising dcfectless cognitions 
of many persons, this (perception of diversity) is not capable of setting 
aside the inference of identity in those cases. But here,' the knowledge 
which immediately apprehends the distinction of the knower, knowledge 
and the known is not of such a nature; hence, here it certainly does pre¬ 
vent the very possibility of the birth of the inference of identity. 

v But, here it is not proper to say that identity is inferable on the 
mere basis of the invariable manifestation of two things together; 106 for 
we know of no obstacle preventing the existence of this hetu ( probans) in 
cases where the sadhya (that which is to be proved) is absent 
It may as well be that this invariable apprehension is due to 
objects depending for their manifestation on consciousness. Since the 
reference to the deviation from the normal mode of working of the senses 
serves no purpose for the reason that (knowledge and knower) are not 
cognised by the senses, (you cannot point out ■ that the perception of 
difference, like the perception of two moons, is due to the deviation 
from the normal mode of working of the senses). As the existence of a 
sublating cognition is denied by effectual non-perception, (the percep¬ 
tion of difference cannot be declared to be false). 

Moreover, consciousness is well-known to be the manifestation of , 
objects; 107 and that it is self-luminous is beyond dispute; hence, such an 
invariable manifestation of knowledge and the known is unavoidable. 

tamvitsiddhau Pradhakarama’opanyase “nctravjttir dvidhabhuta dve tu afti vitan- 
vati | dvitvam candranca yugapat nirbhasayati tatra nah” | iti deSagatadvitvam 
candrafica agrhltabhcdam grh^auti utotra vai§atnyam | ‘ Srutaprakatika The verse 
quoted from Samvitsiddhi is not found in the printed books and manuscripts 
examined so far. 

10S. Upalabdhisahityani'aniyaira and sahopalambhaniyama are identical. The 
fallacy of anekanta vitiating this hetu was first exposed. Here it is shown that the 
inability to cite indirect proof applies to this, at it does to the other hetu,, namely, 
niyamena ekajnanasiddhatvam. 

♦The Benares edition .eads vitti; the vrriant reading found in the Telugu edi¬ 
tion and in some manuscripts has been preferred. 

107. See note 104. 



The contention that distinction (of objects from one another) can be 
established without the aid of consciousness is not likely to be put for¬ 
ward by any one who is not mad. Let this violent shaking of the doct¬ 
rine which is opposed to experience suffice. 

Refutation of the contention that there is no object that does not 
manifest itself - 

' * Since the notion that the manifestation of objects, such as, blue 
and the like, which, in their nature, are not self-luminous, (is effected 
by consciousness) is vouched for by experience, it requires no other 
proof. The self, on the contrary, is essentially self-luminous. On this 
count alone,- the self * cannot be knowledge, as the former is self- 
dependent. It has already been stated that knowledge is dependent (on 
the self), that it is occasional* that it exists only so long as the causes, 
such as, the eontaet of the senses with their objects, persist, and that its 
nature is to pertain to some object or other. The self, on the contrary, 
is independent, and is the knowing subject; it shines as the-T in every 

Even when it is of this nature, if the self is termed knowledge, 
on the ground that it does not depend for its manifestation on something 
other than itself, you are welcome to say so. Even when it is so 
(described), surely, this knowledge is the possessor of knowledge, and * 
not such a pure consciousness (as is held by you). 

Scriptural support for the existence of a soul distinct from consciousness: 

Indeed, for that very reason, the Chandogas (those who chant 
the Sama-veda) declare “ He who has the awareness of ‘let me smell 
this 4 he is-the self.’[ 10d Similarly, after the question “what is the soul?” 
has been raised, Vajasaneyins offer the same definition ( of the soul, 
namely ‘,He who is in the midst of the senses and vital breath, who has 
knowledge for his essence and who is the light inside the heart, he is the 
person.*’ 109 It is only in the manner indicated already that the true 
nature of the soul has been here described as follows—„He who is 

108. ChandUp. VII. xii.4. 109. Bfh. Up. JV. tit, 7. 



experienced by everybody, who is filled with knowledge concerning di¬ 
verse objects, who resides among % the senses and breath as their 
director, who is the inward light in the region of the heart, and who 
shines for his own sake as the‘I,’is the purusa.” The followers of' 
Atharva veda say “ Truly, this entity, the Seer' hearer/ smeller, taster, 
thinker (mantr),' knower (boddhrj, doer (karta), he Who has knowledge 
for his essence, is the purusa. ” 110 Similarly, the'following and other 2 
passages are found :—“ Lo ! whereby would one understand‘the under¬ 
stander?” 111 “The seer sees neither death nor sickness, nor the' evil in- the 2 
world ’? 112 ; “ He (the highest light to which the jiva reaches up) is the 
Supreme Person. ” “ The jiva experiences him in diverse ways . . . not 
thinking of the body cast behind 1 in the midst of his kin ”; 11S 
“ Even so. the sixteen parts (kalas) of the experiencer (jiva), which 
depend (for their existence, nature and continuance) on the Highest 
Person, on reaching Him, become incapable of entangling Him in plea-' 
sure, pain. etc. ” 114 “ Different from that made of mind is another inner 
soul consisting of knowledge. ” 115 

» ✓ * f 

L i l 

Even while defining Brahman, in the text— ‘Brahman is satya, jnana 

..’ the word jnana does not refer to mere knowledge, but to the 

possessor of it; for, if it referred to the former, according to the sutra-liti 
ue — it would follow that the first syllable must have the principal accent. 
But this word, jnana has its principal accent on the last syllable. The 
word jnana being so accented will be appropriate only if it has, at its 
termination, the suffix ac, which conveys the same meaning as the suffix 
matup. Otherwise, it would not be (appropriate). We shall explain this 
very clearly while treating of the Supreme Self. The Aitareya Upanisad 
also, after describing Brahman in the words ‘ prajnana is Brahman % 
refers to the Lord as the possessor of supreme intelligence by the expres¬ 
sion * he (Vamadeva), by means of this Self possessed of intelligence. * 117 
Therefore,sjt is clear that this soul is truly the knower. 

114. Prasna. Up. V 

115. Tait. Up. II. 4 

116. Astadhyayi. VI. i 193 

117. Ait- Up. Part V. -t ; 

1 10. Piakna. Up. IV. 

111. Byh. Up. II. iv. 14. 

112. Chattel. Up. VII. xxvi. 2 

113. Chdnd. Up.. . VIII. xii 3 







(a) The Nyaya view that the soul is established through inference— 

25. What is the means of knowledge (pramaria) by which this in- 
dividul self, which is distinct from the body and the like, and which is 
intelligent, is established ? Aksapada, who is master of the science of 
logic, thinks that it is inference. What he says is— • Desire, hate, plea¬ 
sure, r pain and knowledge are the reasons pointing to the existence of the 
soul. * 118 Has invariable concomitance between these and the soul, like 
that between smoke and fire (dhumadhvaja), been observed anywhere ? 
Indeed, if so, as the knowledge of the self is obtained thence itself, what 
is the need for inference ? (The opponent replies) no invariable con¬ 
comitance may have been observed in particular (between qualities such 
as desire* etc., and, the soul); but, in general (i.e., between qualities and 
their substrate), it may be noticed. To make the point clear... Desire 
and other qualities, like sound and so on, are inferred to be dependent 
upon something, for the reason of their being effects, non-eternal (entites) 
attributes, and so on, That which is the substrate of these (qualities) is 
the self. That desire and the like are qualities is inferred by elimination. 
Being non-eternal, they cannot be either generality ( samanya ), or parti¬ 
cularity (yisesa), or inherence (samavaya), or non-existence (abhava). As 
they are inherent in all-pervasive substances, they cannot be either sub¬ 
stance {drawa) or action ( karmi ). That they are specific qualities 
(yisesaguna ) is established by the fact that at all times, like colour and 
other qualities, they, while being non-eternal, are grasped by one of our 
senses. '7 

. After proving in general terms that consciousness , being a guna, must 
have a substrate , it is shown by a process of elimination that it must be 
a specific entity, namely atma :— 

The Reasons concomitant in affirmation and negation (< anvayavya - 
tirekino hetavah), which, in this manner, indicate only (the need of) some 
substrate (for desire, otc.), are narrowed down in their scope in such a 

118. Icchadveiaprayatnasukhajiiananyatmano linani Nyaya-Sutra, Ii 10 



way as to refertothe soul by £he reasons which are conconmitat in nega¬ 
tion only (kevalayvatirekisadhanaih) and which disprove the view that they 
are qualities of substances other than the soul. That this is so is evident 
from the following .-—Desire and the like are not the qualities of the 
primal elements (mahabhutas), because they are perceived only by one¬ 
self, or because they are not to be grasped by the outer senses. The 
qualities belonging to the primal elements, such as colour and the like, are 
perceivable by oneself and others and are perceived by the outer senses"; 
but desire and the like are not so (perceivable); hence, they are not the 
qualities of primal elements. Again, space (dik), time and mind (manas) 
do not have specific qualities; and their attributes are not open to percep¬ 
tion ; hence, desire and the like are not their qualities. Reasons, such 
as the following—since they are not dependent on the causal substances; 
since they do not exist as long as the body lasts—(reasons) which were 
cited before, and which refute the view that they are specific qualities of 
the body, are to be brought forward and applied here also. Therefore, 
desire and the like are not the qualities of the body ; for, while there is 
evidence contradicting the view that they are the qualities of the body, 
they are qualities. Whatever does not possess the sadhya does not have 
the aforesaid sadhana either, as in the case of colour. Desires and the 
like, however, possess the aforesaid hetu, and hence, they possess *the 
sadhya. * 

_ a 

Or, the thesis to be proved (instead of being ‘Desire and the like are 
not the qualities of the body’) may be the following—Desire and the like 
are qualities of some substance other than the body, which is the point 
under dispute. 119 The aforesaid hetu and illustrative example may be 
cited (in the case of this thesis also). Positive concomitance too may be 
shown in a somewhat general way. That which is a quality, when there 
is evidence contradicting the view that it is the quality of a given entity, 
is the attribute of something other than that given entity, just as sound 
is the quality of something other than earth and the like. In this way, 
just as ether (akasa) is proved (to be the substrate of sound), the self is 
established (to be the substrate of desire and the like.) 

119. The point in dispute is not the existence of the body, but its possessing desires 
etc. 4 as attributes. 



if. Jf.Muj' Refutation of the Ny ay a view v 

V* *Jj 4 1 £ fi* V- fJ ' v ' i*| * / » { * v, * «; 

26/ Some consider that this (view) is not correct. To elucidate 
this point with • the aid of reasons concomitant in affirmation and 
negation (anvayavyatireki) it was only made known that there must be 
.some support (for desire and other qualities), which might be either the 
body or some other substance. By this reasoning alone the soul is not 
established (to be that substrate). )nj , > , % 

Argument frdm pure negative concomitance fares no better :— 

it '*RiT\ . tri i 1 '> \ \{) • j 

The reason concomitant in negation alone ( kevalavyatireki ) 
doeVnot even possess the quality of being a correct reason ; for, as in 
'the fallacy called 'asadharana, there is absence of the probans in inst- 
‘ ances where the sadhya is surely met with (sapaksa). 120 The objection 
that on this admission, even the reason concomitant in affirmation alone 
cannot be considered as, correct : for, as in the fallacy known as 
saaharana, there is the failure to show the absence of the reason in the 
? 'c6unter-example (vipaksa) 121 ~(this objection) -does not stand. Since, 
even in'the absence of suspected limiting conditions (upadhis), such as 
v space, time and the like, the co-presence (of the hetu and the sadhya) is 

•n;120. ; In thp^rgument; * sound is eternal, because it is sound ’ the hetu is vitiated 
by the fallacy of asadharapa ; for, it is not present in any sapaksa ('i.e., . similar 
examples where the sadhya is present) even as it is not present in the vipak§a. Simil- 
„.arly„ in cases where reasons ( ,concomitant jp. negation alone ( kevalavyatireki ) are em- 
plpyed^ there being no sapaksa, it is impossible to show the presence of the hetu in 
«apak§as. Hence', kevalavyatireki is considered fallacious. It is defective for another 
* reason also’. In order to show that wherever the sadhya is absent the hetu is also absent 
- the SldhyA thus* first have been understood previously ; but'it is not met with any- 

• where} Hence,, the Vedantins dismiss kevalavyatirki-as being faulty. Cf. ‘sadhyabhavo 
*. vipakg^ kathamiva viditaty tasya sadhyaprasiddjieh’ Tattvamuktakalapa, Buddhisara ,, 
versa 53 v See also tfyaya-Parihuddhi (Memorial edition, pjp 66-75) and Didhlti. The 
Vedanta Tarlbhasa rejects kevalanvayi also, on the score that the kevalanvayi requires 

* J a sadhya which is present everywhere and sueh a sadhya is ihadmissible on the theory 
,',that Brahmaii is nirgu^a. l bf. * (Ui. *• f...r ' » ; 

l21r : The opponent says—In'the argument'the mountain has fire, because it is 
knowable*, the hetu is defective (sadharna), because it is not absent in the vipaksa. 
Similarly, in arguments employing reasons concomitant in affirmation alone (kevalan¬ 
vayi), there being no vipaksa, the absence of the hetu in the vipaksa cannot be cited, 
Hence, kevalanvayi also is a defective process of reasoning. ?- 



found, it is definitely ascertained that the hetu hastfhe character of. being 
connected with the sadhya. From the mere observation of the absence 
of the sadhya when there is the absence of the hetu, it - is not possible to 
ascertain that the "hetu has the character of being connected y with the 
* sadhya. As the non-existence of 'the Sadhya is met with in innumerable 
places, it is impossible even to take note of them all If 
even in a single place the hetu were to be present in some manner*, the 
universality of the connection cannot be maintained. Besides; it is a 
matter for doubt whether the non-existence of the; sadhya- is due to the 
absence of the hotux>r to some other cause. Even thssthesis (that dpsire 
and the like) are the qualities of some entity other thau earth and ,the 
like maybe charged with having an unproven attribute {aprasiddha- 
videsana), for that other entity has not been proved. . -| r . <- si 

•V/ , 

(b) The Sankhya View 
' The Sankhya mode of proof stands discredited for the same reasons 

27. By the same reasoning, even the various reasons (such ?as 
r collocations exist for the sake of others) are to be understood as having 
1 been set aside. : ! 


i i 





The Sankhya proofs for the existence; of soul. 

r * t . ' ' * • 

Let us analyse them in the order of their presentation.' “ Since* 

r . , ^ ^ . ? * J# . ; • J. •»» • * / - . 

collocations exist for the sake of something other than themselves, since 
(in this other) there is the absence of the three gunas and the like; since 
there must be control (of" these collocations), since there must be an 

f ^ v# * * - ' t •- "’;t * -tj v t,. * ; 

, jexperiencer, and since there is activity for securing aloofness"'(fropa 
sprakrti), the soul exists. ’* 122 This means—Being collocations, alfr&c body, 
• the senses and so on, like a bed, a seat, a house, etc., exist for * the sake 
of something other than themselves. The character of being a collocation 
attributed to the body and the primal elements is f vouched for by 
perception. That the same character (of being a collocation) belongs to 
unmanifest prakrti (avyakta), mahat, ahamkara and the senses, as to 
the body and elements, is to be inferred from the fact that the former 
are of the nature of pleasure, misery and delusion. 

122. ? Sankhya-Karika. verse lTj. 

.► j* 


> i i 



(A possible objection is that) when the senses are admitted to be 
^derived from ahamkara and when the meaning of what is accepted 
as the sadhya, namely, the quality of existing for the sake of another is 
the quality of existing for the sake of another which is itself not a collo¬ 
cation, the respective reasons for the above only prove the opposite, and 
"hence, they are subject to the fallacy of ubhaya-vi4e§aviruddha. in (The 
Sahkhya replies) this objection cannot be raised. Since the presence 
•or. the absence of the senses is dependent respectively upon the presence 
©r the absence of ahamkara, since there is support of scriptural passage 
such as. “ The senses are considered to proceed from ahamkara. ” 124 
since there Is contact of qualities, viz., brightness and lightness 195 (with 
"thesenses),, the fact that the senses have for their source that variety of 
ahamkara where-in the sattva quality predominates and which is known 
as vaikarika is well supported by evidence ; hence, it would be improper 
to deny this fact. Even so, the belief that the self is not a collocation is 
unshakdbles. for the reason that (1) if the soul were itself a collcatio 11 
c*s it would have to exist for the sake of another collocation, there would 
ctesult an unending series, and, as a consequence, many things for which 
evidence is lacking would have to be assumed ; (2) the quality of being 
a collcation is not responsible for an entity being a Sesi (i. e. one for 
whose sake others exist); and (3) inference itself would lose its validity, 
if also the qualities found in the illustrative examples are taken into con¬ 
sideration. 126 When the refutation ofthestatements-that the senses do not ‘ 

proceed from ahamkara ; and that the body, senses and the like exist for 

, * 

123. It is interesting to note that this identical argument has been cited as an 
' example of ubhayuvisesmriruddha (i. e. Dharmadharmyubhaya vi$g$aviruddha),,. by 
t Rumania Bhatta in his Sloka-Varttika Anumanapariccheda. si. 105-7. The six varie¬ 
ties of *j>n</</Aa-Pharmasvarupabadha, DharmavHe§abadha, Dharmisvarupabadha, 
Dharmivi£e§abadha. Dharnaadharmyubhayasvarupabadha and Dharmadharmyu- 
bhayavi5e§abadha—have, in later times, been reduced to one. since all of them, in the 
last resort, only prove the opposite of what is intended to be proved. 

124. Vi§nu Pur a pa. I. ii.47. 

125. Sattvlm laghu praksakaaii^am Spkhya-Karika . verse 13. 

126. Cf. yadi vivakjitarthavyatirekega anutnanasya avivak$Uamapi vi§ayab» 
manvetasyam kalpanayam sarvanumanam vyahanyeta. By ay a- Vartika (Chowkamba 
edn. pp. 344-45). See also Nyayavartikatatparyafika (Benares edn. p. 600). 



the sake of other collocations—is effected on the strength of some evid¬ 
ence, it will not necessarily follow that even the facts of their being a 
collocation and of their existing for the sake of others, which are uncon¬ 
tradicted, should stand condemned. Thus, it is evident that the soul, 
which is itself not a collocation, is free from the three gunas (sattva, 
rajas and tamas) which are associated with the quality of existing for the 
sake of another—a quality which never fails to be present whenever the 
character of being a collocation exists. 

Being of th nature of pleasure, pain and misery, the body and 
the like are controlled by some other entity, even as the chariot and 
other objects by the charioteer and the like. Further, pleasure and 
pain, which are respectively known as agreeable and disagreeable 
experiences, point to a person who is pleased or displeased, even as the 
servant and the foe (imply a person who is ministered unto or one who 
is hated). Since the body, etc., are perceptible, like pots and similar 
objects, they must have a perceiver 127 distinct from themselves. Ai 
shown before, the absence of the three gunas from the soul, who is 
(thus known to be) a controller, a knower of agreeable and disagreeable 
things and a perceiver, is definitely ascertainable. 

Similarly, as all things commencing from the body and ending 
with unmanifest matter (avyakta) are of the nature of the three gunas, 
the state of release, which is essentially the annihilation of all miseries, 
is impossible of attainment by them; but, since the Sastras and wise men 
endeavour to attain (release), there must be a soul (purusa) that is 
distinct from the body, that is not a collocation, and that is untouched 
by the three gunas. 

Refutation of the Sankhya Arguments 

28. Even here, although with the aid of reasons, such as that collo¬ 
cations exist for the sake of others, the existence of some other entity 

127. In interpreting bhoktj-bhavat, some have understood bhokta as enjoyer, 
•nd some, as perceiver. Both the interpretations have been mentioned here. Seo 
Sankhya-tattva-kaumudi, Karika, 17. 



(than the body), who is a controller and perceiver is established, 
yet, (with their aid) the qualities of not being a collocation and of not 
possessing the three gunas, which are admitted by you, cannot be deter¬ 
mined as belonging to it. To explain—The positing of a series of 
collocations, made on the strength of the observation that a collocations 
always exists only for another collocation, like the positing of a series of 
causes having no beginning, made for the reason that something is an 
effect, is not wrong. 

It cannot be said that (the quality of being a collocation) is not 
responsible (for anything being a sesi, an independent being for whose 
sake others exist); for, in respect of any collocation, the soul, which is 
not a collocation, which is unattached, which is bereft of all 
modifications and which is mete consciousness itself, which is un¬ 
changing and for which no service is rendered by anything else, cannot 
be that other for whose sake the collocation exists. That which is served 
or produced by another becomes the sesi in respect of that other. That 
which serves or produces anything exists for the sake of the latter. 123 
But, since the purusa admitted by the Sankhyas is not so (served or pro¬ 
duced by a collocation), how can he be regarded as being that other in 
respect of the collocation? What is more, how can the collocation be 
treated as existing for his sake? If it be said that though the purusa is 
not really rendered any service, he imagines himself as being served, 
(we reply) by all means let him imagine like that; how does it help to 
establish that he is being served? For the reason that children imagine 
ether to possess the dirt found in a region, the character of being dirty 
will not belong to it. 

The impossibility of a conscious and changeless entity being the victim 
of illusions 

Further, to whom such an illusion occurs and how must be investi¬ 
gated. It cannot occur to the power of consciousness; for, the illusion, 
which is a mode of change and which is the root cause of a hundred ills, 
cannot arise in the exceedingly pure consciousness, as it is devoid of al 

128. Cf. Jaitnini-Sutra. III. i. 1— §esilj pararthatavat 



modifications. The internal organ (antahkarana) too, for which buddhi 
is another technical expression, cannot experience the illusion ; for, like 
the body, it is non-intelligent. 

If it be urged that, though it is non-intelligent, the internal organ, 
being transparent, receives the reflection of consciousness and 
becomes a conscious subject, as it were, (we reply) not so; 
for, reflection and its reception cannot properly belong (respectively) to 
consciousness and buddhi, which are alike formless. If it be contended 
that to be a reflection is to be like it, (we ask) what is 

meant by * being like ’ (consciousness) ? If the reply is that 

it consists in having a nature similar to that of consciousness, (we 

rejoin) if, indeed, that were so, when buddhi attains similarity with con¬ 
sciousness which is free from all modifications, it too becomes devoid of 
all modifications ; and hence, it would be impossible to account for the 
contact of modifications, such as, illusion, pleasure and pain, which are 
met with in every soul. v 

If it be said that buddhi has a nature similar to that of conscious? 
ness only in so far as it possesses consciousness, (we reply) not 
so; for. on your view, the soul is, in fact, consciousness itself 

and not a conscious entity ; the venerable Patanjali, for instance, asks 
‘If consciousness alone is the soul, what is it that is referred to here, and 
by what?’ 

If it be urged that * being like ’ (consciousness) means ‘being like 
not-non-intelligent, (we reply that) it has already been shown that 
not being not-intelligent is nothing more than the quality of 
being a knower and that the explanation of ‘ being like * (a 
conscious entity) is sought to be made in terms of itself ; 189 
and hence, this (interpretation of ‘ being like ’) is pointless. 

129. “Being like a reflection of consciousness, it becomes a conscious entity 
as it were” was the reply to the question “How can the antaAkaraua, which is 
non-intelligent, be a conscious entity and experience illu sions?“ “Being like a 
reflection of consciousness'' when explained, finally amounts to ‘being like a conscious 
entity.’ Thus, the answer reduces itself to a tautalogous proposition “Being like a 
conscious entity, it becomes a conscious entity,, as it were.’ 




Further, how (we ask) can he who maintains that the existence of 
buddhi is dependent upon the nearness of. consciousness posit its 
being not-nor^-intelligent ? And, when this particular quality, known as 
the character of being a knower-a quality associated with some object 
or other-does not exist in either consciousness or buddhi, which are con¬ 
sidered to be the orginal and the basis of reflection, it cannot occur in 
the reflection. This reflection theory has already been refuted while dis¬ 
carding the view of the heretics in disguise. 

The refutation of the argument that the vrttis of the antahkarana are 
superposed on the purusa. 

It may be said that, though the purusa (self) is changeless, the 
antahkarana itself, which possesses wonderful and diverse activities, such 
as pramana and viparyaya 130 ' produced by the power belonging to the 
nearness of the purusa, exhibits its activities and different objects to tho 
purusa; hndthereby, he comes to be called witness (saksi), enjoyer 
(bhokta); just as the gathering of generals possessing extremely great 
yalour exhibits to the piaster its activities, such as entering the enemy’s 
<jamp and causing consternation therein, and, as a consequence, he 
comes to be termed a monarch, a man of valour and a conqueror. 

But, this view is unsound. In fact, it is only for the sake of the 
seer that the visible object is found to exist; arid for the Sankhyas or for 
their followers, the heretics in disguise, who alike maintain that consci¬ 
ousness the soul, the quality of being the seer is not real. And, 
the quality of being a 3esi (one for whose sake others exist) cannot, be 
brought about by the fictitiously imagined quality of being the seer. Be¬ 
sides. Jt has already been said that even this fictitious imagination cannot 
arise. (As for the analogy), the king, who commands -his generals, in 

130. Pramana , viparyaya. vikalpa , nidra and smrti are the five vrttis of the 
antahkarana. For an account ol these see Yogs.-8utras 1.5-11. 

* The word parakramryah has been formed in accordance with Panini's sutra 
•vinmatcrluk’ (v. iii 65;. Compare the stems srajiyas* * tvaciyas. Atifcayena para- 
kramavat parakramiyah ("one possessing) extremely great valour). 

All printed books and manuscripts read pratibalavilolacadivrtti; bus prati- 
belavilolanadivrttim is obviously a better reading. 



a general or in a specific manner, in those activities, and who acquires 
the fruits resulting therefrom, such as, sovereignty, and who engages in 
activities such as purchasing, receiving and inheriting, 151 which are 
responsible for the relation of being owner and property, is not an 
analogue to the soul, which is inactive, and which is rendered no service 
by anybody; hence this view is valueless. 

The different arguments seeking to prove that the soul is distinct 
from the body and the like are well-known to be stultified (antaka lata), 132 
in as much as their subject-matter is shattered by perceptual knowledge, 
such as, ‘I am stout,’ ‘I go,’; for this reason, those well-versed in the 
vedas, having no faith even in the view that the proof of the soul is 
afforded by inference, assert that this proof is furnished by the vedas 

The existence of the soul established by sruti and srutyarthapatti. 

In fact, scriptural passages. such as the following, 
directly reveal the distinctness of the soul from the body and the 
like. “ The soul (atma) is not this ; it is not that. ’* 133 “ The bodi¬ 
less, the scatheless, the sinewless, the pure (Buddha), unpierced by sins 
(apapaviddha) ” ; 134 "Some go into a womb for assuming bodily form; 
others become immovable objects ” ; 135 “He is never born, nor does he 
die ” ; “ Indeed, only this (body) which is devoid of life dies ” 136 i 
Verily, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain so long as he is 
embodied ; when he is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him.” 13T 
Even the injunctions prescribing means for realising heavenly bliss and 

131. Perhaps, in preference to birth fjanana,) mention may bo made of con¬ 
quest (jayaj, since, in the case of kjatriyas. conquest is regarded as a special title to 
ownership, cf. svami rikthakravasamvibhaga parigrahadhigameju | brahmariasya 
adhikam labdham | k§atriyasya vijitam | nirvi?{am vaiiyasudrayolj. Gautama Dharma- 
BUtra. X. 38-41. 

132. The fallacy of atitakalata or kalatyayapadesa has* in later Nyaya termi¬ 
nology, come to be called badha. 

1 33. Brh. Up. 

234. Isa. U p. g. 

235. Katha. Up. V. 7. 

256. Chand. Up.V I. xi. 3. 
237. Chand. Up. VIII xii. 1. 



the like, which are to accrue after bodily death, lead to the positing of 
an eternal, conscious entity, that is distinct from the body, and so on ; 
hence, the individual soul has for its means of proof the scripture and the 
presumptive testimony connected therewith ( drutyarthapatti ). 

(c) The Mimamsa view :— 

The existence of the jiva deduced from sense perception 

29. (One may ask) why should this heavy load be placed on the 
head of the vedas, whose sole aim is to teach the means for realising the 
good and avoiding the evil ? Indeed, we know the soul with the aid of 
the testimony of perception itself, which is the basis of all pramanas, such 
as, inference and scripture. From cognitions such as, ‘This is my body,’ 
* I know this,’ it is evident that this seer shines forth in direct perception 
as being distinct from the body also, just as he is distinct from objects 
known, such as, the pot. 

Refutation of this view 

30. (We reply) do not say so; for that is perceptual knowledge 
which arises from the contact of the senses with objects ; 138 and from 
their contact with the inward soul, which is devoid of colour and other 
qualities, and which is exceedingly subtle, unlike their contact with out¬ 
ward objects, the senses are incapable of originating knowledge (con¬ 
cerning the soul). It has been so declared in the vedas : ‘‘ The self-ex¬ 
istent (svayambhuh) made the senses proceed outward (and thus troub¬ 
led them). ” 139 All objects revealed by the senses will invariably be ac¬ 
companied by the quality of non-intelligence ; therefore the knowledge 
born of the senses is incapable of touching the soul. 

The Bhatta view 

The existence of the soul established through perception by manas 

31. It may be said, “ Let the external senses not come into con¬ 
tact with the soul and present it, since they are elemental (bhautika; ) 
but the manas, being non-elemental, may enter into contact with the 

138. indriarthasannikarsotpannam jnanam ..pratyaksam. Nyaya-Sntras, I. i. 4. 

139. Katha. Up. IV. 1. 



soul and present it. (Against this, we reply) it is not so ; for, if that too 
be a sense-organ, it must inevitably be elemental It has been so declared 
in the vedas : * Gentle sir! the manas is, indeed, made of food (anna) ” 
140 ; when dealing with manas it has been fully explained. 

It may be urged : “ Certainly, there is a cognition of T— a cog¬ 
nition which is direct awareness. And this (cognition) cannot but be 
what has arisen from the senses. The claim of manas in regard to (the 
manifestation of) pleasure and the like, even though they do not fall 
within the scope of the external senses, is well established. Hence, it is 
but proper that the cognition of ‘I ’ should have this for its cause. This 
can be expressed syllogistically. The soul, like pleasure and so on, is 
to be grasped by mental perception; for, while it is not capable of being 
grasped by the external senses, it is still an object of perception. 

Refutation of this view 

32. (Our reply is) it is not so ; for, from the case of fsamvedana) 
jnana, (where the sadhya is absent while the hetu is present), it is found 
that this argument commits the fallacy of vyabhicara (To escape this 
fallacy), you cannot point out that jnana is not open to perception ; for 

without depending on anything else, it manifests itself as ‘I know ; and 
it has already been stated that if it were not an object of perception, it 
would, in fact, cease to be knowledge. 

Untenability of the suggestion that jnana is the object of mental 
perception :— 

It cannot be contended that, since it is an object of mental percep¬ 
tion, jnana too is fit to rank among similar examples (sapaksa) ; for 
this contention will not stand scrutiny. (If that is your view), you must 
point out whether even the knowledge concerning the knowledge of an 
object is produced exactly at the time when, by virtue of a certain con¬ 
junction between soul and manas, the knowledge of an object takes 
birth, and whether (it is produced) by the selfsame contact, or whether 
it is produced at a different time and by a different contact. ^Regarding 
the first alternative), the origination of the two (i. e. knowledge of an 

140. Chand. Up. VI.v.4. 



object and knolwledge concerning the knowledge of that object) at the 
tame time is impossible. If that were so, the birth of a collection of 
limitless items of knowledge, each of which has the other for its respec¬ 
tive object, would have to take place at the same time. But it does not 
take place. If it takes place simultaneously, the distinction made bet¬ 
ween being an object of knowledge and owning the object (visayavisayit- 
vaniyama/i) would become baseless. (Regarding the second alternative), 
if it (knowledge concerning knowlege) is made known by a knowledge 
arising at a different time, it would cease to be an object of perception; 
for, as knowlegde is momentary, the earlier knowlege will not last till 
the rise of the knowledge which reveals it. If it lasts, all cognitions 
would have to exist at all times. If it be urged that it is incompatible 
with its effect (i.e. if it perishes as soon as its effect springs up), (we 
reply that) as its effect namely the mental inpression arises inmediately 
after, it will not exist at a different time (i. e. at a time when the revea- 
ling consciousness arises). Hence jnana cannot be an object of mental 
perception. And it cannot be said that it is obvious that the argument 
commits the fallacy of yyabhicara. Besides, as the quality of being 
grasped by the senses is invariably concomitant with the quality of being 
non-soul, your argument commits the fallacy of viruddha also (i.e. is 
guilty of employing adverse probans). Further the illustrative 
example cited in the argument is defective in not possessing the sadhya; 
for, pleasure and pain are not admitted to be objects of perception. 

Enquiry into the nature of sukha, duhkha etc:- 

And it is not so admitted, because pleasure and pain are nothing 
more than the flourishing or the decaying state of the senses. Indeed, 
whne the senses are not perceptible, their flourishing or decaying state 
will not be the object of preception. 

In the case of pleasure and pain, as in that of the senses, or again, 
in that of the different states of mind (manas) on the view of those 
who maintain that manas is inferable, the false impression that they 
are directly perceived is due to the power of long continued experience. 141 

141. With continued practice one infers the existence of pleasure, pain tho 
states of mind and the like so effortlessly aad quickly and without noticing the 



The section dealing with pleasure and pain (sukhaduhkhadhi- 
karana ): 142 or the discussion of the description of the soul (vide p. 8) as 
being in its essential nature blissful (svatassukhi) found in this work 
itself 143 ought to be explained to those who, following the Buddhistic 
doctrine, believe that pleasure and pain are included in the category of 
knowledge, for the reason that they are produced by causes which .'.are 
non-different from knowledge, and to those who, by accepting the system 
of Kanabhaksa (the exponent of the VaiSesika system) believe that they 
are the special qualities of the soul (andmot the flourishing and theklecay- 
ing states of the senses), 144 ’ - » 

• - .J 

several steps of the argument, that one comes to th : nk that he directly perceives 

142. Sukhaduhkhadhikaram is the sixth section of the first pada of 
Nathamuni’s byayatattva-sastra, a work which is not extant now. Yamuna refers to 
a few other adhikarai?as of this ^astra. In fact, his Atmasiddhi may be regarded 
as a brief exposition of Nyayatattva. Compare Nyayasiddhan]ana, Buddhipariccheda 

** Ny3yatattva-prakaranam hi Atmasiddih ” 

143. This discussion over svatassukhl is included among the portions of 
Atmasidhi lost. 

144. Those who identify pleasure and pain with the flourishing or the decaying 
states of the senses mean by * ** senses ’ the internal sense Cmanas) and not the outer 
senses ; for, pleasure and pain are nothing more than the tranquil and the disturbed 
states of manas. cf. "tatha ca antahkaranaprasadavasaydayoreva sukh&tvaduhkhatva- 
vyapade^adar&anat . tatprasadavassdaveva sukhaduhkarupavityarthah. ” Ranga-* 
ramanuja tika on Nyayasiddha vjana, Buddhipariccheda. 

r Though this view is defended here and elsewhere in Atmasiddhi, it cannot be 
considered to be his final view, for, later o.n, he says that all reference to certainty, 
doubt, pleasure, pain and the like has for its object either same particular form of 
contact of knowledge with its object or knowledge possessing that contact, cf. 
Nyayasiddha rtjana, Buddhipariccheda " . . . sukhaiuhkheca natmadharmau itylditu 
vaibhavena matantarena va abhihitara anyatha kathamevam upasamhararambhe bruyat 
* tadevam atmasvabhavabhutasya caitanyasya vi?ayasam51e§avi^aesagocara eva ni^caya- 
^amSayadi vyavaharabhedah tadviie§abhaji caitanyeva. ” Ramanuja says, in Vedar- 
thasamgraha, * that knowledge, which is in contact with a particular object, and which 
is considered the cause of pleasure or pain, is really ptesasure or pain itself and not its 
cause. Besides knowledge, nothing else which could be called pleasure or pain is 
noticed. * * yena vi§ayavisesei>a vi£e$itam jnanam sukhasya janakamityabhimatam 
tadvisayajfianameva sukham tadatireki padarthantaram nopalabhyate ‘ 

*The reading tatcalanam found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is 
manifestly wrong; it has been altered into ceta^calanam. If, however^• the original 



Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, aver¬ 
sion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, 
with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. 
Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects with a view 
to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness,) when directed to¬ 
wards objects, with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aver¬ 
sion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by conciousness of past pains. 
Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. 
Since these (i.e.. terms namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and 
others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with 
definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length. 

It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one 
and the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, 
the quality of being at once the preceiver and the perceived. If the dis¬ 
tinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, 
(for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; simi¬ 
larly, for these latter, other parts, and so on ad infinitum. Besides, the 
quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul. 

The Bhatta view again :— 

(Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to 
mental perception). A consciousness, like the following : * I perceive 
the pot ’ posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the 
awareness of the peroeiver, 115 by those whose intellect has been blinded 
by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some 
occasions (at least); for (often) only the several objects which are near 
the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness per¬ 
tains to the self is established by mental perception, and which is asso¬ 
ciated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality 

reading.must stand, the sentence "bhutaduhkhajnanena taccalanam fcokab” must 
come after and not precede the sentence “agamitajjfiaaena ceta?calanam bhayam.” 

Niramkusasya is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense. 

14-5. cf. tad&tminamevsvet aham Brahmasmi, Bfh. up. I. iv. 10. 



found in the object (known)—a quality which is occasional, which is ref¬ 
lated to the soul, such as, prakatya and prakasa 146 

U V f* • ; i its | :• \ / 5 j * , ‘ <£ . ; 

The Prabhakara reply thereto :—h * , !;' • . , .« > 

To this it is replied—“It is indeed, surprising that the confusion' 
namely, that in respect of their own experience the self does not notice 
any difference at the ..time objects are apprehended' should occur to 
eminent investigators.; ' It has already been stated (vide p. 27) .that,the 
following experience—“This object is’really such and such; we do nojt 
know whether it is known or not; not do We know whether it appears, to 
me or to others” doeS—not exist at any time, and that when there is 
no appehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience 
would also have to occur. If there Is no appehension" of the knower 
the special'feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather 

than in what Afhftro _ aJz _j 

and not *1 know’; for, when there is the observation of .the special feature 
(prdka\ya) produced in the object by knowled^e, and when its (i. e„ of 
prdka\ya ) invariable concomitance with knowledge is brought to mind, 
and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be 
inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring 
knowledge has already been pointed out. ^ Besides, the view that the 
soul is open to mental perception is . refused by the very fact that 
knowledge (which is said to be inferred) ’is grasped by. the self as 
belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any 
reference to the .self,: then, between what is known by oneself : and what 

is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction. 147 - 

— ' ■ * — - v;fr fTcr-rr > - ^ —I _ ' ■ >> ■ 

/ 146 . Briefly stated, this vi«w maintains that ; on some 'occasions, at • least;: we.get 

a consciousness lik.ew'i perceiye the pot ? ;-it involves three ifactors-iHe 'B, knowledge 
iand the pot.>. pf these,- the second isjnfurred from/the illuminhtibra (prakatya) found 
in the object known; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding 
the T,, as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown 
that it is pot open t,o inference, it must, by a prp.cess of elimination, be concluded 
that it is open to mental perception. ‘ - : ' 

- ” ‘ ’ ■ ■ ~ 2 ' ‘ ' ‘ 1' ‘ *-f i\ *. »i; fit ::'f; t' i , : • : . 

on 147. Every one-of the statements mafo-by;! the opponent is refuted. 
is 6hown that the knowledge of ‘lSas ;f perceiver ! .cannot, be, occasional,'; and nth at. 





The Bhatta rejoinder 

How. it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is 
known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when 
there is non-apprehension of the knower? Indeed, the distinction of 
what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not depen¬ 
dent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be 
rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes 
birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This 
demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of 
objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainab’e on the 
basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge 
such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with 
objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self toe deserves 
to be included among the causes of knowledge; for in the manner of 
the senses and the like, it (i e., the self) may act as the cause (of know¬ 
ledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to mainta : n that the 
manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. 
Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of 
another; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle 
would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even 
knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective 
shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the, 
senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the 
possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.? 143 Even the 
contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere 

in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition, the apprehension of the self 
and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the 
aid of prakatya. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency 
in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred, it is necessarily 
inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge, the 
self also is apprehended; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental 

148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing 
to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed; just as when things 
are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves 
not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmamfested, there is absolutely no 
room for the presentation of its substrate, the self. 



taking the form ‘I know this’ does not fit in with experience; and is 
forthwith refuted. 

The Prabhakara position clarified while refuting the Bhatta view > 

If that be so 149 , let it be granted that the self is manifested as the 
knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-lumino- 
sity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because the 
refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation 
on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible 
manner; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to 
be unmanifest. How knowldge never fails to be manifest has been 
elaborately dealt with in the Prathamadhikarana 150 Hence, it is need¬ 
less here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something 
else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that 
during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of 
knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be 
admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge. 
Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self 
also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to 
possess the quality of revealing other objects. 

The Prabhakara view that in deep sleep andmok§a there is no self- 

(If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its * 
manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the 
self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even when know- 

149 . If the consciousness of the self as the pcrceiver in every cognition of objects 
is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself 
and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which 
is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, 
when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also. 

150. Tee elaborate treatment of the nature of jftana set forth in Prathamadhi- 
karaija of Nathamuni’s Nyaya-tattva-sastra is, unfortunately, not available But 
there are some extracts from this work in Vedanta Desika’s Nyayasidhahjana. cf. 
•Nyayatattvetu Prathamadhikaraije lak^apantara^i bahSni du§ayitva “atyantavegi- 
tatyanta sank§myam nirbhara'a thata svasattakala bhavyaptilj jnane laksma catus- 
tayam” iti svoktalafcsavopasamharah kftah’ Buddhipariccheda, p, 249. 



ledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self is revealed may be 
rendered intelligible by arguments, but (it) does not satisfy the m : nd of 
those who think and act in the light of experience. Again, to the released 
soul knowledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state). 
If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of re¬ 
lease is eternal, being independent of causal conditions, then, there must 
be perpetual release; and those scriptural passages ( which teach the 
existence of jriana in this state) must be considered to be arthavadas . 151 

There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause wh ; ch could 
account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to 
the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with 
impressions of knowledge and actions, And it is not right to maintain 
that, as the mind (manas) is an eternal organ, through its con junction 
itself knowledge is caused in that state; for, although, like ether, mind 
is. in its essential nature, eternal, it being the originator of jnana by 
acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and de¬ 
merit. 152 Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the 
means of knowledge; for although it is an eternal sense organ the mind 
like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge. 

Nor is the view tenable—namely, that contact with manas, which is 
assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instru¬ 
ment of knowledge; for, it contrad'cts scriptural passages whish declare 
that all good and bad deeds perish” ; for example : the deeds of this 
person (i. e., the released soul) perish”; 153 “Then he who knows 
(Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless...”, 154 

151. Arthavadas are those scriptural pisaage whieh do not directly convey 
positive or negative lnj tactions, but which, by extolling proscribed or censuring for¬ 
bidden acts, aim at infusing in the mind of the listeaer a keen desire to engage in his 
•acred duties at the earliest opportunity. 

152. Even through the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (alcaba) it is only 
the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (harms iskuli) 
tnat can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In 
the same way. though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not 
always, but only when associated with merit and demerit. 

153. Mutiia up. II. ii. 8 154. up. III. i. 3 



If final release were the result of good deeds there would be a further re¬ 
turn (to the state of bondage). Besides in view of the following scrip- 
tual passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds) "The 
uncreated (Purusa) cannot be attained by whit is created (i. e. deeds). 155 
“Hence, just as here the world won by good deeds perishes.” 156 

Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by 
its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself; for, 
that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the posi¬ 
ting of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were 
itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence 
of the soul, persist therein at all times ; and as a consequence, the stream 
of births and deaths would not arise at all; hence, there would be no 
distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful 
to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, sense and other 
impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed that, 
must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, 
even when the entire set of causal conditions is present So far it has 
not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jhana, While the 
bedy and senses are well-established to be the can»3 of knowledge, for 
the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, 
to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to 
to jiiana is a mad man’s assertion. Therefore, jhana must be said to be , 
absent in the state of release ; and the scriptural passages speaking of 
the existence of jhana, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state 
must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge 
of the self, 157 and interpreted in accordance with gauni vr//i. 158 
Therefore, since there is invariable presentation of the self at the very 
time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in 
the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all 
knowledge of objects. 

155. A/wp^o. up. 1. ii. 12. 156. Chand. up. VIII i 6. 

157. cf. atma va are dra§tavyab mantavyati nididdhyasitavyah. Bfh 
up. VI. iv. 6. 

158. In the proposition‘Devadatta is a lion’, the term ‘lion’ cannot, obvi¬ 
ously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta 

86 Siddhitrayam 

Refutation of the PrabMkara view and proof that the soul is 
self luminous 

Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedanta do 
not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of 
narrow mind which results from ignorance of the true nature of the 
self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation 
of objects ; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is cap¬ 
able of being presented ; for, neither of these is the object of the cogni¬ 
tion of objects ( visayajnZna ). That which is not the object of a given 
consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness, just • as taste 
could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and 
knower are not the object of visayajnana; hence, they too are not 
manifested by it. 

The Prabhakara contention that jnZna is not self-luminous 

(The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being mani¬ 
fested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known; 
(and ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on 
knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the 
knower is only the knower ? It has already been shown that they are 
not open to mental perception ; and the impossibility of inferring them 
has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge mani-* 
fested ? (The opponent’s reply is) it does not depend on anything else ; 
because consciousness is self-luminous. 

(The reply to the above is:) it is not so; for, consciousness too 
cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for 
some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your 

possesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the correspond¬ 
ing qual ties of the lion. This interpretation of the word lion is in accordance 
with what is known as gaur^i viltl. Gaupi vrtti has been defined by Khapdadeva in 
his famous Bhaftadipika and Kaustubha thus : 'SvaSakyasamavetavattS gau$- 

vrttih—samavetavatvafica kvacit Eropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamana jatiyaj 
gunavattasarabandhenah iti bheda. ; Jaimini’s Pilrva-Mimamsa-Siltra, I. iv 23 
mentions six varieties of gaujn vrtti : ‘tatsiddhi jati sarupya prasafnsa bhuma linga- 
6 amavaya iti gupasrayah” 



view'is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? 
It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, 
(it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness 
which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and 
not to others: for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) ij 
amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is depend¬ 
ent upon the relation of consciousness to the self ; for, the presence or 
absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence 
or absence of this relation. 

If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, 
self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated 
with the different correlates ( pratiyogin ) and not for its own manifesta¬ 
tion : (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion ? If at any time 
consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the 
correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion ‘ but such a presenta¬ 
tion is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of 
the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a 
correla.ive; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of 
knowledge apart from these. 

If it be maintained that the manifestation of jnana is dependent 
upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails, 
to present itself ; (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self 
absent? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would, 
on your view, be self-dependent; for when they exist, they never fail to 
be manifested. 

If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-lumin¬ 
ous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted 
by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things 
other than itself; and if you were to ask where isjthe need for positing 
self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, 
the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external, becomes 
intelligible, (we may as well reply; ) Let the self alone which is admitted 
on all hands to be the witness (saksin) of all objects and their cognitions 



be considered self-luminous; (and ask you in turn) where is the need 
for several entities of that description ? •.• . ? v , r ., r ,| 

Even if prana is self-luminous , the soul does not depend on prana for 
its apprehension . 

Moreover, the view that the revelation of what 'stands, witness .to 
a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by 
everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the 
knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items 
of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established; 
even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended; for, 
it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which 
he stands witness; just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed 
by the pot. As the conscious eniity is the witness of all object-cognition 
it cannot be directly revealed by them-. , ov 

The soul is self-luminous 

■ " ' ' •• .,• :o'3 


All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a mani 7 
festation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on 
something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul. owns a mani¬ 
festation concerning itself—a manifestation which is not dependent 
(upon something similar to it or on anything reavealed by itself). No 
object is found to depend for its manifestation on some other entity 
which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by. that 
object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation 
some other pot; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise,, 
light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light; nor 
does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on 
light itself; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is 
dissimilar to it. Similarly, sense-organ also does not require (for * its 
manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the 
sense-organ for their manifestation; but it requires consciousness, which 
is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness; in its 
turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other conscious¬ 
ness ; nor on the sense-organ and the like;- whose manifestation is 
dependent on itself •/ but it requires the self-dependent soul,-which is its 



substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner 
the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other 
self nor does it require consciousness, sense-organs, and the like; whose 
presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the 
essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than 

The proof that the soul has consciousness as its eternal and essentia 

*■ ' » . 

To the soul which has been shown to have consciousness as its 
essential nature consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. 
On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, consciousness 
comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot, 
knowledge of the cow and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue 
of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as 
different illuminations/such as the illumination of the pot, the illumi¬ 
nation of the cloth and so on; even so, consciousness which is an attri¬ 
bute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires 
different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the 
cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these 
(different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As 
they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which . is a conscious 
entity, they become perceptible to the self; eyen as, on the view of those 
who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self 
the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to 
the self. 

The purvapaksa that consciousness is non-eternal and that there are no 
grounds to prove that it is eternal 

Those who know the Nyaya and Vaisesika dadanas and the Neo- 
Mimamsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is 

* The reading asadharanasajatiyanthantarapeksah. found in the mss. and printBd 
copies makes no sease Hence the following emendation svasadhyasadhyasadharana - 
jatiyarihantarapeksah has been suggested. 

tatudvittitvam is »he reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to 
tattaccittatvam found in the Cowkamba and Tclugu editions 




an occasional quality of the soul: because consciousness depends (for 
its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as 
the contact of the senses with the objects : and because experiences, 
such as, *1 know,’ ‘I knew’, are known to be limited by time: and be¬ 
cause the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake 
and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would dis¬ 
appear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even 
in states such as sleep and turiya 159 . Further, in respect of con¬ 
sciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinc¬ 
tions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then 
(i. e. if conciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of mani¬ 
festing (objects), either all objects would shine forth in one and the same 
knowledge or none at all there being no distinguishing feature favouring 
one object rather than another.) When it is admitted to have a 
different character (i. e, when it is occasional), the distinction of know¬ 
ledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on 
this principle, namely, that knowlebge which arises from the sense organ 
or probans or something similar coming into contact with a particular 
object, pertains to that only becomes reasonable. 

The opponent calling in question the siddhantiris position .— 

It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medi¬ 
um of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects, 
and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge 
pertaining to such and such an object; and that as the process of being 
coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by 
time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, 
sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. 
When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be 

159. The psychology of the Upanisads mentions four states of the soul —jagrat 
(waking), svaptn ("dreaming), susupti (deep sleep) and turiya. During the waking 
state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are 
inabeyance a but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quies¬ 
cent. Turiya is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the 
ordinary man - . While it resembles sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of 
normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this 
/ state the self reveals itself fully 



coloured (by it) . If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding out¬ 
ward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured (by it), 
(the reply is :—) not so: for, in the case of a formless object, such as 
ether proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How 
can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance 
wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere? Nor does the object enter 
into (consciousness) for the object is perceived by everybody as being 
located in the place outside. Besides, in the case ef (formless) entities, 
such as generality, the same difficulty (i. e. impossibility of proceeding 
outward or coming in) holds good. 

Refutation of the view that the atma ( dharmin) and consciousness 
( dharma) are one :— 

It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, 
exists in two forms, viz., in a dense, and in a sparse form ; of these the 
entity in the dense form is the self; and it has the words pratyak, cetana , 
ksetrajna and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse 
form, referred to by the terms caitanya, jnana and the like, is called, by 
courtesy, a quality for the reason that it is dependent on the pratyagar- 
tha (the inward entity in the dense form); even as the luminous entity 
in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like ; while the same en¬ 
tity in its sparse form is referred to as prabha (radiance) and jyotih 
light); proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appro¬ 
priate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light ( aloka ): for, cons¬ 
ciousness is only the sparse region of the self, 

But this view is untenable ; for, qualities, such as, those of exist¬ 
ing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, 
which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact 
(with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner 
if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the cha¬ 
racter of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of 
having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to 
make such an admission ; for it would result in reducing the self to a 
non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands 



condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Arhata (Jaina) doct¬ 
rine, need not detain us any further. 

Refutation of the view that consciousness is all-pervasive 

It may be contended that the self, is, in its entirety, related to con¬ 
sciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways ; 
that it is all-pervasive; and that although it is of this nature, all objects 
do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding 
from the quality of darkness ( tamas ); and that when, with the aid of the 
sense-organs, wherein the sattva quality predominates, this darkness 
(tamas) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the res¬ 
pective objects shine forth; and that thus, without there being any pro¬ 
ceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, 
all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes 

Even if this were so, the senses and probans ( hetu ), like jnana, 
could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsi¬ 
ble only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping 
tamas). and not for originating knowledge (It is no escape to say that) 
the illumination of objects is itself knowledge; since (in that case) the 
objects also for the reason of their being illumined would have to be 
considered the knower. 

Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of con¬ 
sciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as 
knowledge, the same didiculty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the 
object would have to be considered as the knower) persists, since con¬ 
junction exists in both (the self and the object); and, in addition, there 
is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of know¬ 
ledge is experienced, to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), 
as is evident from the experience ‘I know this now,’ ‘I do not know this 

Do not say that, just as in the ease of the sun which is unchang¬ 
ing and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for mani¬ 
festing objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be 



the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, 
and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). 
For. in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and - 
expansion, contact with objects and separation therefr'om, are possible ; 
and hence the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the 
manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a 
quality ; hence, in this case, there is ho adequate basis for the conside¬ 
ration of the self rather than the object as the knower. 

Untenability of the view that the soul has a two-fold knowledge, (i) 
eternal and (ii) non eternal 

It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold 
—one relating to itself, the other to everything else; and of these, the 
former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very ex¬ 
istence of the self and persists at all times; while the latter, whose very 
existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses 
which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as 
the knowledge of such and such an object—a knowledge whose presence 
or absence is based'respectivcly on the presence or absence of the casual 
factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into 
those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To 
this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for 
the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally. 

The illustration of the remembrance that there was no elephant 
at the tank—bund in the morning cited to prove the existence of 
consciousness in deep sleep is unhelpful: 

(One may ask : Does not the following argument prove that 
consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul ?) 

It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness 
of self always exists ; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is in¬ 
ferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is 
remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of 
a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time, there must neces¬ 
sarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case 



of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having 
prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed 
then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining 
at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time; for in¬ 
stance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning . 160 
The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consci¬ 
ousness of objects—a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep 
sleep and the like; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed know¬ 
ledge concerning itself. 

The reply is ‘not so’. For, in the light of instances such as, the 
hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a per¬ 
son, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as 
is evident from his experience ‘In was not present there in the morning, 
it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with anekanta dosa , 
For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, 
(i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be know¬ 
ledge of its locus—a locus which exists simultaneously with the non¬ 
existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence, of the 
knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)—which, had it existed, 
must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even 
without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two 
conditions may possibly exist; for, at the time of waking, there is the 
knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance ; 
and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience exis¬ 
ting at the time of sleep also—an experience, wnich is as clear and dis- 

160. It is well-known that in the walking statae consciousness always exists. If 
it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow 
that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following 
analogy is employed. Jnst as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no 
elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank 
which s the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remem¬ 
bers on walking th u he had no cognitinn of objects at the time of sleep, he must neces¬ 
sarily have krown. in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence 
of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep » 
swoon and the like, there is consciousness In other words,, consciousness is an eternal 
property of the soul. 



tinct as waking experience and which- is capable of being remembered 
(if only it existed). 161 

Nor is the remembrance on waking “/ slept well ” helpful in 
proving that there is self-awareness in deep sleep:- 

It cannot be said that experiences, such as ‘I slept well,’ prove the 
presence of the cognition of ‘I’ in the state of sleep; for, experiences such 
as *1 slept well’ (found in the waking state) are based on the considera¬ 
tion of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses; 
and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep); even as know¬ 
ledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It 
cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while 
the * I, ’ is experienced). They too are certainly experienced thus : 
“ I, belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, 
in such and such a form.” 162 

Moreover, even if the cognition T slept well’ were admitted to be 
a recollection, the remembrance of ‘I’ pertains only to the self which is 
known at the time of sleep to be in association with the vrtti, known as 
nidra — a vrtti based on the quality of tamas (darkness) which makes for 
the absence of other vrttis, like pramana and viparyaya —even as it is 
known in the waking state to be in association with some vrtti or other; 
it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself ( svaprakaid ) 
or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its 
innate quality; as there is. no warrant (for stating that it refers to either 
of these). The revered Patanjali thinks that nidra (sleep) also, like 

161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at 
noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not 
have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank 
at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed,, 
would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no conscious¬ 
ness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time 
of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects. 

162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit thatits- 
caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a considera¬ 
tion of the state of the person on waking. Similarly A it could be said that the cogni- 



pramana, viparyaya and so on, is a form of vrtti. 163 Hesays, “ Nidra 
(sleep) is the vrtti which has for its object tamas, which is the cause of 
the non-existence of other vrttis, (like waking and dreaming .”) 164 

The contention that the self depends on jnana for its manifestation 
and that jnana is non-eternal:- 

The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.—The knowledge 
of the self—the matter under dispute—is dependent upon the cognition 
of objects, because it- is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self 
found in one who is awake . 165 Knowledge is an occasional quality; for 
it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be 
maintained that pleasure, pain and like are not the qualities of the self; 
for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth 
as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides ; as 
knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other sub¬ 
strate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we 
may say ‘I am happy’). 

The proof that dharmabhutajnRna is eternal:- 

Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare 
that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul; for, it is a quality 
dependent on the soul itself; just as illumination is an innate quality of 
light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no 
other form. That which is'devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, 
as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul, 

tion ' I slept soundly’ does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, 
but is based on a cons.deration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time 
of waking. 

16 3. Vyasa Bhasya on Yoga-Sutra 1.10 and Vacaspati Mirra’s pka thereon 
deal with the question whether nidra must r*nk as a vrtti alongside of pramana and 

164. Patanjala Yoga-8utra I. 10. The translation of this sntra is based on 
Vacaspati MiSra’s tika See also Nagtji Bhatta’s Yoga-Sutra-Vrtti. 

165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon 
the cognition of subjects, even so, in sleep also the conciousness of self must depend 
on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of. objects then, there 
cannot be consciousness of the self. 




becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know; for, (if that were so) 
in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of 
Ka/iada and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all 
special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. 
There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails 
to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it. Effects, 
such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be 
associated with one connected with a body, will lead to the conclusion 
that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified; 
even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it 
resides in the fire associated with wet fuel; or as paddy-sprout leads to 
the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice 
associated with the husk Further, whsn it is possible to differentiate 
the sou! from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness 
alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know. 

Though jnana is eternal it has atma for its support :— 

It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self; 
because the nature of cousciousness is to depend upon a substrate and 
a correlative, while the self has an opposite character ; and because the 
self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly ; and be¬ 
cause on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (t arka) and 
scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the 
quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed 
with knowledge. 

Refutation of the view that the conjunction of consciousness with 
object is prana :— 

Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, 
owing to the extraneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on 
its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that 
consciousness itself (which possesses the relation) may (as a consequence 
of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. 
For in as much as the relation dwells in both the relate, the object too 
would have to be regarded as knower. 




It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both 
the relata. the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to 
only one specified member of the relata (i e. consciousness ), just as in 
the case .of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal 
relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken 
to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i. c. in the 
case of cause and effect) the relation is the form of invariable mutual 
dependence of the producer and the produced. 

In respect oj the self t,he analogy of the relation of cause and effect 
does not hold :— 

If it be said that hero also the same mutual dependence prevails, 
we reply not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for 
mutual dependence. Why (wo ask) does the object stand in need of 
consciousness? And why, again, does consciousness require the object? 

If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of 
siddhi. we ask) what is meant by siddhP It cannot denote origination; 
for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots 
and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are 
complete in themselves, such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, 
etc ; (hence; they do not require for their origination consciousness 
also, (rf it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only conscious¬ 
ness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on 
consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are 
nothing but thoughts ( vijhana) has already been refuted. To maintain 
that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination 
would indeed be ridiculous. 

If you were to say that siddhi denotes manifestation, (we ask) 
Well sir! do you then contend that because it depends upon objects for its 
manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation 
which is dependent on objects? Your understanding of the nature of 
the soul would indeed be praiseworthy !’ 



(Nor could the cfoject depend on consciousness for its manifesta¬ 
tion ; for) it has alreadSbeen shown that manifestation cannot be a 
quality different from consciousness and residing in objects. 

Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be 
said to be dependent on consciousness alone : for (in that event) there 
would be the manifestation of all objects at all times, Indeed, all the 
causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not rise ' on 
some occasions only, (i. e.. since consciousness which is the cause of 
manifestation is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). - If the 
specific quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional 
property, then it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself 
under a different name. 'Thus,' the conclusion is inevitable that the 
soul is the possessor of consciousness and not mere consciousness. 

The contention that since dharmabhuta jnana is dependent on occa¬ 
sional factors it cannot be eternal:- 

(The objector may ask) since khowledg^. which has been admit¬ 
ted to account for the manifestation of different objects at different 
times, is occasional and is of the nature of a process or aptivity, how can 
it be treated as an essential quality of the self? To make the matter 
clear:-— When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in 
some ebjects (e. g., the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e. g. 
Devadatta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are 
effects; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceed¬ 
ing and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those to 
whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer that 
the manifestation of objects which resemble these (i. c, reaching the 
destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar to 
the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person to 
whom the manifestation is peculiar. 

The reply to the foregoing ;— 

It is not so ; for in view of the fact that the ownership of land 
and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs 166 and 

166 . It is likely that abhavaprapta .is a haplo graphical error for nabkibhs 

vaprapta .As the expression nabhibhava is used in the Dharma Sastras in the sense 



not in virtue of any activity (on the part of thejjfyner), and in view of 
the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field 
—an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field be¬ 
longs—is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid hetu ) may be 
said to be vitiated by anekanta dosa. In order to escape this fallacy 
it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his 
ownership inasmuch as he is devoid of activity ; 167 (but this sugges¬ 
tion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time 
(which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal 
factors). The statement that when they (i. e. time, activity and the 
like) exist, the effects follow (and hence they are considered to be 
causal factors is equally applicable to the case of ownership. 168 If it be 
said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the 
activity involved in being alive, (we ask) “My dear sir, as this activity 
is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the 
like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a pecu¬ 
liar activity on the part of the owner?” 

of relationship, the text as emended, would mean ‘on account of the mere fact of a 
person being a near kinsman.’ 

167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the 
opponent advances the following argument:—Any result which, while remaining in 
one objeet, is peculiar to another ca isal substance, must be produced by aa activity 
which is occasional, peculiar and inher. nt in that cau»al substaace. Manifestation 
while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e. g. Devadatta) ; 
therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in 
the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge 
is an occasional quality of the knower. 

The anekanta dosa vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of owner¬ 
ship, where the hetu is present, while the sadhya is absent. Though ownership is pe¬ 
culiar to the causal substance, namely the owner, it need not be produced by any acti¬ 
vity on his part. 

The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance 
cited the hetu is absent together with sadhya. In other words, he may say that as the 
owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal 

168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. 
Hence, though devoid of activity, the owaer is certainly a causal factor in respect of 
his ownership. 



Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar'quality, 
it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of 
objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved ? If 
it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) mani¬ 
fested (and hence life is not responsible for this manifestation of ob¬ 
jects, we ask you in reply) *‘Ooes the aforesaid ownership follow 
whenever life exists ? ’ 169 If it be said that the existence of grains, 
such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also(i, e. in the 
case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the 
like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised 
and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can 
be said,) ;— the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person 
has for its cause a special attribute belonging to the peron; and (in 
conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute res¬ 
ponsible for the manifestation of object is consciousness, which be¬ 
longs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us. 

' ' t • • f * ? * j * 

J , : \ > 

Refutation of the view that as cognitions are limited by time they are 

It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be 
inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions— 
such as, ‘I knew’, ‘I know’,—which, on account of the fact that they 
are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For 
the instance of the sun’s light renders this argument liable to be charged 
with anekanta dosa. Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions ‘The 
sun illumines this place,’ ‘The sun illuminated it’ and ‘The suit will illu¬ 
mine it .’ 170 

If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essen¬ 
tial quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground 

16#. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is 
either lost or given away to another. 

170. Thus even though light is an essential proporty of the sun, it appears 
limited by time. Even so, consciousness* though an essential property of the self, may 
still be limited by time. 



that its contact with the regions to be illumined is occasional, it may be 
replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the 
capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit 
the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self; and it 
is for this reason that the following become intelligible;— the depen¬ 
dence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, 
the future and the present and all referencss to the same. 

Activities of consciousness altogether of a different nature from activi¬ 
ties such as going and cooking:— 

(The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this 
case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions—. ‘I knew,’ 
‘i know’ and ‘I will know’), like the distinction of the light of the sun 
or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and 
that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, 
it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself) ? (We reply 
the soul is certainly perceived as having that nature (i. e. as having 
consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed unlike the clod of 
earth, the soul is never found to be a non-sentient nature. That 
which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as 
its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality 
<of {sparfa) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does 
not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be per¬ 
ceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are 
perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which 
do not form part of their essential nature). 

The illustration of tho body not apposite:— 

If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invaria¬ 
bly manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so. 
for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. 
In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines 
forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the 
latteu is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with con- 
ciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property). 



fOur reply is) it is not so: For what is said of the analogous 
instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine 
forth only as being associated with the body; for to adepts in yoga 
whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become 
quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the ‘I,’ without 
there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the 
cognition ‘I know’ devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and 
configuration of the body must have something other than the body 
for its object. Further when the bodies become differentiated into 
several classes, such as. devas and men, in accordance with past deeds, 
and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that 
a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of 
the soul). Although there is continuity of the subtle body (ling isarira), 
the charge of vyabicara cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is 
not perceived, 171 

Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of 
the soul, it should be manifested in the state of sleep and swoon, 
(we reply) ‘not so'; for none of the possible interpretations of this state¬ 
ment will stand scrutiny, To make the matter clear ;—When this un¬ 
welcome position is said to result, do you mean by prakasa, (1) the 
quality which is commonly present in alt objects and which is generated 
by jAana and which has for its synonyms terms praka\ya and the like, 
or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge ? On the 
first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, 
because no such quality (known as prakatya) exist*. The non-existence 

171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany 
the soul at all times; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accom¬ 
pany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul 
does not always shine forth along with the body To this the reply is that as the 
Imgasarira is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably 
along with the lingasarira 

♦The Benares and Telugu editions read tadviprakarsam ; and the Telugu edi¬ 
tion refers in a foot-note to a variant reading tadaviprakarqam. In fact the reading 
suggested— tadaviprakarsam —is correct. 

♦From the context it is clear that vyahara is preferable to the variant reading. 



of prakatya has already been clearly indicated while establishing the 
self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non- 
origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, 
tamas (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been 
said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought 
to light. Indeed when the purusa possesses consciousness as his essen¬ 
tial nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is accep¬ 
table to us ; hence, to suggest this as a. defect in our contention is no 
charge at all. 

In deep sleep, here are no activities of consciousness (dharma bhuta - 

jnana ) 


If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were 
admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the 
prevalenc of everyday activities in these states as in that of 
waking, (we reply)‘not so’. For the soul is not the object (visaya.) of 
any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the souf 
(which you think, would result) ? Indeed, the soul is incapable ol 
being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested 
that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we 
ask) “Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate ( ninika.lpa.ka .) knowledge 
or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like 
them ever discussed (by them) ?” If it is argued that the non-origina- > 
tion of discussion in regard to these casss is due to the absence of 
auxiliary causes, such as the efficient condition of the senses, the desire 
for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is 
equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query 
to the person who cannot be questioned. 178 

The experiences of the soul in deep sleep need not all be remembered :— 

If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur, (we 
reply) ‘not so’ ; for the states of sleep, and swoon are not forms of expe- 

172. Compare-YaScobhayossamo do?ah Pariharopi vs samah | Naikal? par- 
yanuyoktavyah Tadrgarthavicaraije 11 

When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it 
could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that 
difficulty as a charge against the other. 



rience ( vrtti ). To explain;- Should it be stated that knowledge of the 
self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at 
a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form ‘I experien¬ 
ced it thus.’ as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) 
‘not so.’ For swoon and the like are not experiences (vrtti). Indeed, 
swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching, are not parti¬ 
cular modifications (vrttis) of the intellect, If they were such modifi¬ 
cations, they would give rise to impressions (samskaras) which are res¬ 
ponsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing 
but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of jhana, devoid 
of modifications (vrtti), when the senses have been withdrawn from their 
activities on account of the quality of darkness (tarn is) which is in the 

It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having jhana as its 
nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions ; for, as the soul 
would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (samskaras) 
release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has ser¬ 
ved its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself, 
remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the sam¬ 
skaras); and it is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar 
objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction 
of consciousness of the self can ever exist; for consciousness of 
the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That 
there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. 
1 hus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its 
remembrance take birth? 

(1c may be pointed out that the cognition ‘1 who existed yesterday 
am the selfsame ind.vidual even to-day’ clearly indicates that there is 

remembrance of the self; to this it is replied—). Even the awareness— 
‘ I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day’—which 
is mixed up with remembrance must bj said to be concerned with the self 
limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and 
other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also 
indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ); (only) with the aid of knowledge which i* 



clear and distinct and which is determinate (. savikalpaka ) is the basis of 

remembrance (i. e. tne so.mskara ) produced ; when that is so, how could 
it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of 

the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and 
distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is 
no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort 
involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist). 

Refutation of thi contention that if dharmabhutajnana is eternal , it 
would do away with the distinction between bound and released souls :— 

It cannot be maintained that if ( in sleep ) the self exists 
in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would 
be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one 
case (i. e., in sleep) impressions ( vasanas ) born of kleias 173 as well as 
the obscuration of the gunas exist, while in the other (i. e. in release), 
they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep 
and asamprajhata samadhi (super-conscious samadhi) there would have 
to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the 
state ef super-conscious samadhi that has acquired complete detachment 
( vairagya .), 174 that possesses the most intense samskaras conducive to 
restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon 
the state of final release, must be distinguished from the self existing 
during sleep. 

Refutation of the view that nidra is a mode of action accounting for the 
experience of pleasure or pain on waking:- 

If sleep is not a form of vrtti, how (it may be asked) can remem¬ 
brances, such as, ‘I slept soundly,’ arise to the person who is awake7 
Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experien- 

173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read samprajnatasamadhdvapi. 
But judging from the context, asamprajnatasamadhavapi appears to be the proper 
reading, ft is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is 
followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it. 

274. Compare Yoga-8utra II. 3. AvidyasmitaragadvcsabhiniveSah klesah., 
* G&dham mddham is a variant reading. 



ced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, ‘I slept well, ’ 
‘My mind is perturbed,’ ‘My limbs feel light’ have for their cause the 
impressions ( bhavanas ) produced by experiences relating to the quality 
of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is prepon¬ 
derant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cogni- 
tions-such as ‘I slept uneasily,’ My mind is whirling,’ ‘My mind is unste' 
ady'. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva 
and rajas, there arise the following recollections— * I have slept wholly 
oblivious of everything’. ‘The limbs of my body feel heavy.’ ‘My mind is 
as it were, robbed away,’ ‘And it is. as it were, covered over'. 

(We reply) all this is true enough : but your question has already 
been answered thus ;—Assuredly, these cognitions do not have im¬ 
pressions ( vasanas ) for their source; but are based on the consideration 
of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind 
(manas); and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such 
cognitions take the following form.— ‘On account of the fact that my 
mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper 
assimilation of food, ‘I slept well’; (hence, they must be inferential). 
(Even if they are remembrance), the remembrance may become in- 
te ligib e, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several 
desirable and undesirable objects—a thought which exists at the 
moment (o! sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account 
of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during 
sleep; hence, nidra need not be a separate vrtti. 

The conclusion that nidra is no vrtti will not contradict the yoga-sutra:- 

(You may ask) how, then, could the sutra of the great sage have 
come in at all?—‘‘Nidra (sleep) is the vrtti, which is the cause of the 
non-existence of other vrttis.” 175 (The reply is) as the context aims at 
stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the 
nature of the vrttis, as in the case viparyaya (which, though not a 
vrtti, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a 
false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals 

175. Videp. 95. 



cannot be met with; for all knowledge is invariably associated with 
an objective reality. 176 And this fact has clearly been proved in the 
adhikarana’. 177 and later it will be established again. As sleep ( nid> a) 
is a hindrance to the soul ( cit) which is to attain release, it is men¬ 
tioned as something that deserves to be suppressed 

Granting nidra is a vrtti , from that reason itself it follows that cons¬ 
ciousness is an essential nature of the self. 

Let it be granted that sleep {nidra) is a vrtti having for its object 
the most highly developed tamas. and tnat it is lesponsiblo 
for the absence of other vrttis mentioned already; such as, 
pramana ; 178 let it also be granted that the congnitions arising to 
the person awake are remembrancer Even then, the fact does remain 
that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the 
reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.* 

(The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as 
well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, 
(and.ask) how can it be asserted that knowledge is an essential property 
of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge? (The 
reply is:—this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that 
without knowledge which exists in the very nature of the soul, tamas 
which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest 
to the soul; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might 
be said that though knowledge is absent, tamas may be manifested with 

176. Compare Yoga-Shtra I. 8. ‘Viparyayo mithyajianamatadrupapratistham.* 

177. Evidently the reference is to an adhikarana in Nathamuni’s Nyayatattva 
Sastra. As the author is ganerally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhi- 
karaiia to which he refers, in all probability, he would have mantioned the name 
here also. But unfortuntely, it has been lost, cf pp. 79,85 and 112. 

* The Telugu and Benares editions read tatha satyanadarata. The former refers 
in a footnote to a variant reading tatha na satyanavarata. The emendation we suggest is 
tatha satyapyanavarta. 

178. Vide note No* 163. 



the aid of the senses or manas or the samskaras; but this is untenable) 
For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (mmas) are 
quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than 
remembrances does not belong to the impressions (samskaras). (Nor 
can it be said that tamas may reveal itself; for tamas is not self- 
luminous; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the 
soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than ta nas. 
For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the 
manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it 
or not, that predom nant tamas or any other quality residing in the soul 
becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being 
patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), 
forms an essential feature of the soul • 

The self-luminous soul-ihe substrate of prana - is eternal- 

Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)—The soul possesses an 
eternal illumination; for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal 
illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades 
(vyapa/ca)— the quality of being other than a knower—cannot find a 
place for itsdf in the so il which p >s3css)s the quality of being a knower 
—a quality opposed to the vyapaka (i. e. the quality of being other than 
a knower) 1711 

The Soul being the substrate of prani, is svayamprakasa- 

The possession of illumination as an innate property is 
attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an 
illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is in¬ 
variably associated with the quality of being other than a knower. 

Deter ni nation of the significance of the term 'prakata’ and of the nature 
oj its relation to the soul:- 

What is meant by this illumination (prakaia) which is said to be 
eternal and innate to the soul? And what exactly is the nature of its 

l/V. The syllogism may be stated thus - Notaing possessing non-eternal 
illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not 
possess non-eternal illumination. Cf. Ved. 55. II. iii. 31. Pumstvadivattvasya 



relation to the soul? If illumination means knowledge itself and if 
the relation is that of being the container and the contained (a l ray as ra- 
yitvom), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite 
the invariable concomitance of the absence of the s&dhya with the 
absence of the hetu, pots and the like must be cited as illustrative 
examples in the following way:—Whatever possesses a non-eternal 
illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other 
than a knower; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something 
specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same 
general category, it would result in the admission that occasional know¬ 
ledge resides in pots and the like. 

The contention that the self is the object of knowledge and not sv.ayam - 
prak&ia — - 

In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation 
(in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and 
being the subject (visayavisjyibhava), then, the sral 
would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the 
quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant 
with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, con¬ 
sciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul. 

If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in 
the case of insentient objects, the reply is ‘not so’ ; for even when some 
other soul- is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is 
noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all 
objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only 
to cases other than oneself; for even in regard to oneself, when 
it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of 
scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is 

Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of 
being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same 
- activity are contradictory ; just as in the case of a needle, with regard 
to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced are 



contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its 
features—such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all 
things, the possesion of consciousness as its essential nature—that the 
soul ( pratyagartha ) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through 
inference or through instruction.Since the illumination described as being 
innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction 
cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be 
at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, -the 
self, like the examples relied upon, such as, sabda (the word), cannot 
be said to be self-established. 180 

The contention that atma is the seat of prakada inferred from prakatya- 

As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not 
knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which 
is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient-a quality by whose 
aid all understanding and reference, namely, ‘ It is illumined arise in 
regard to all objects; and that the relation of this illumination to all 
objects, without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being 
the container and the contained; and that, on the strength of the afore¬ 
said reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and 
essential to the soul. 

Refutation of that view :— 

But this view has already been refuted. There is no prakasa dis¬ 
tinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said ‘It is 

* ifcO. (j) The reading in the text is pnksasyeva iabdadefy; but the correct reading 
should be sapaksasyeva s abdadefr. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which 
babda, dipa, etc., are relied upon as illus'rative examples (sapa.ksa). The syllogism may 
be set forth as follows:—atma svavi§ayah; svaprak56atvat, fcabdavat dipavat ca. It 
may also be added that the Vaiyakaranas hold that a word (sabda) illuminates itself 
while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (sabdibodha) which 
does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare Bhartrhari—na sosti pratyayo loke 

(ii) Vipaksasyeva szbdadeh is the reading suggested by some. Atma is the paksa 
in this argument; pots and the like constitute the vipaksa fi.e. examples where the 
sadhya, namely self, luminosity, is absent), Sabda also must be classed among 
counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the 

sentence would have to be modified as follows;—.the self, like the counter 

examples, such as sabda, cannot be said to be self-established.’ 



manifested’ is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of 
rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises know¬ 
ledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower 
and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference ‘It is manifested’ 
should apply in an identical way to all these three. 

If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. 
if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this prakasa for 
its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness 
to the soul? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but prakasa; 
for even objects, such as pots and like, would become conscious entities, 
inasmuch as they possess prakasa. If it is said that (consciousness and 
prakasa are different and that) prakasa is that which is manifested to 
the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge 
(samvit) ? Indeed, samvit is itself consciousness; and it is not possessed 
of knowledge. 

. If it be said that this quality (i.e. prakai i ). dependent upon the 
relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what 
exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of prakasa ? 
It cannot be that of being the container and the contained; for, then, 
pots and the like would have to be deprived of prakotya. Nor can it be 
the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object appre¬ 
hended. for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The 
impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of 
the Bhrantyadhikarana 181 (of Nyayatattvd) where the statement of 
the conclusion (siddhanta) commences and from Samvit liddhi. More¬ 
over, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject (v/sa> itva) was 
the cause of prakasa. since this quality does not exist in the soul and 
in non-sentient objects like pots, it (prakasa) would have to be denied 
to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects. 

The view that siddhi is nothing but being the seat of prakasa.) 
which is dependent upon jhana, and that it is with the aid of that siddhi 

181. While discussing the n iture of error, Sarvarthasiddhi (Buddhisara; refers 
to this adhikarana. See the Tattvamuktakaldpa, Sarvarthasiddhi p. 404. 



that knowledge is Inferred to exist has already been refuted, (The defect 
of mutual dependence— anyonyas r aya —involved in that view can by no 
means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self- 
luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of prakaia'). 

Nxaya rejution of the Prabhakara and Bhattz views and the contention 
that relation of jnana and its visaya is through sense contact. 

Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self- 
luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the 
manner in which objects become fit for discussion. 

Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could 
generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a prakzsa or discussion 
is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the 
proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons 
(linga ). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce 
its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining 
to the pot—such as, fetching water—cannot be treated as having for 
their bases or superintendent ( adhisthana ) what is identical with the 
potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there 
is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors—such as, the 
contact of the senses—perish, knowledge of colour and the like 
disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding 
outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects, 182 
just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. 
If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is depen¬ 
dent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be 
dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should 
the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact 
of the senses with objects falls away ? 

182. Compare §ri Bhasya on Ved Sii II. ii. 27-nabhava upalabdhelj—samban- 
dhasca sarayogalak§aijah. see also the Tattvamu ktalcalapa p.652. Dravyam prag 
buddhirukta paramiha visayaissangamadimirupyah samyogam Bha§yakarah 
prathamamakathayan nyayatattvanusar<zt. A 




The Nyaya argument that with the disappearance of jnana, prakatya 
disappears is untenable because with the dis&pparance of the efficient 
cause, the effect need not disappear. 

The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits prakasa 
as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by jnana. 
For knowledge is the efficient cause of prakasa. Then, why (it may be 
asked) should the prakasa of the objects disappear at the disappearance 
of knowledgs ? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts? 

That the disappearance of the nimitta karana need not necessarily lead 
to the disappearance of the effect is illustrated with the instance of 
twoness and the like. 

It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of 
number (sahkhya) and the like. 133 For with the disappearance of the 
enumerative cognition ( apeksabuddhi ) there does not result the disappear¬ 
ance of numbers. Like number l (unity), the other numbers, namely, 
2 , 3 and so on. for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long 
as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single 
entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or noneternal, 
(i.e. the number 1. unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts 
is admitted by all disputants. While the generaliiy, namely, numberness, 
exiists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and , 
ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to 
number l in lasting as long as the support lasts) ? 

An objection may be taken to this argument;—Since number 1 is 
not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from 
the svarupa (i. e. the object wherein it is said to dwell); 184 the example 
cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the hetu. 

183. The analogy may be expressed thus:—When the enumerative cjgnitioa 
( apeksabuddhi ) which is jhe efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so o.i disappears 
these numbers vanish; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause 
of prakasa ceases to be, prakasa also falls away, 

184. This objection is met by Vedana DaSika in the Tattvamuktakalapa (Adra- 
vyasara thus—‘aikyam svabhedamahuh katicana na bhidaityekameveti dr§t6b 



(The reply Is) not so. Unity (No. 1) is certainly a number; for it per¬ 
sists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being jt, 
is sought to be identified.) If No. 1 were identical with the very being 
of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects, 
as is suggested in the expressions, one pot, one cloth and so on. Indeed, 
there is no equation of the being of the pot ( ghatasvarupa ) with that of 
the cloth to the effect ‘The pot is cloth’; but that equation of No. 1 
with the pot (as is evident in the expression ‘one pot’) exists. Being 
contradictory to other nembers, unity, like No. 2, must necessarily be 
a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 
in the form ‘Unity is No. 2 . 

Untenability of the argument that numbers commencing from 2 do not 
last as long as objects last 

It may be contended that, like contact (samyoga), the numbers 
commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because 
while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a 
contention is liable to be charged with anekanta dosa in the light of the 
instance of‘diversity.’ For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, 
diversity will never vanish. 183 It cannot be said that diversity is nothing 
but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of 
anekanta by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are indenti- 
cal). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there 
would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is 
merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is 
merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy.) For (in 
that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality 
{tucc ha). 

bhedadrstyaikyamohal? taditi ca vacanam tattra tatrabhyupetam anyetvetat svasatt- 
vam viduritarasamuccityavasthanuvEitatn tatpaksepi svartipadadhikamidamiha 
dvitlvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5. 

185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by anekanta dosa is here 
explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the sadhya is absent t the hetu 
is still met with. 



Cognition of duality and the like is not constant , since it depends on 
desire to enumerate. 

Even though the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being 
dependent upon enumerative cognition (< apeksabuddhi), their non¬ 
apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative 
(pratiyogin ) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is 
only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses 
and establishes contact with objects that the dependence of prakasa. on 
the presence of this contact could be rendered intelligible. 

Consciousness illumines objects through contact with them by means of 
sense contact. 

Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests 
the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the 
lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the 
objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that conscious - 
ness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting 
into contact with them.) 

If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be 
endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, 
being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting • 
into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by ‘from’ when it 
is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity? 

Jnma is of limited nature. 

If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, 
while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution 
of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, conscious¬ 
ness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i. e. all-pervasive), 
there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on 
the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one 
seme-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that 
sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. 
That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul- 



taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness: 180 for its 
rapid permeation of different senses (one after another) is perceived as 
if it were simultaneous, Therefore, it is to be concluded that the 
character of possessing a form, in the sense described above, belongs to 

Fallacious to cow ider what is devoid of touch asumtari ( unlimited) 

If it is urged that form {murti) is the quality of possessing touch, 
and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot possess any 
activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with 
anekanta dosa, in view of the instance of sound (dabda). For the 
sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid 
of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far 
dis ant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that manas, 
though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by 
the Naiyayikas who have understood the categories ( padarthas ) and by 
the Mimamsakas who have inquired into the import of propositions. 

Objects, past and future, could come into contact with consciousness 
as what ep existed or what is yet to be — 

How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which ate 
nonexistent, come into contact with consciousness? (Weask you in turn) 
how do they become the objects ( visaya) of knowledge ? The same 
explanations that you offer with regard to these 187 —such as (their be¬ 
coming the object of knowledge means just this : ) their becoming mani- 

186. Co-npare the definition of jhana »— ‘atyantavegitatyanata sauksmyam 
nirbaratatatha tatha. . . —given ni Prathamadhikarana of Nylyatattva and quoted 

in the Ny&yasiddha h jana, Buddhipariccheda. Vide infra p. 95 and note 150. 

187 Vedanta De§ika quotes these passages and discusses them in the Nyaya- 
siddhanjana. Rangaramanujaswami also comments on them. They identify the 
first (i. e , the view that objects, past and future, become the object of jnana) as the 
view of the Naiyayikas, and the second (i. e. the view that these objects possess 
prakatya) as that of the Bhattas. See Buddhipariccheda* p. 266. 

118 Siddhitrayam 

fested, or their possession of qualities like number—may apply here 
also. 188 

Moreover, since such obects may even be said to exist at this very 
moment as ‘things that have perished’ and ‘things that are yet to be,’ 
what is the difficulty in stating that consciousness comes into contact 
with them in the light of their having such a type of existence. 139 Just 
as the eye comes into contact with the Dhruva and Simsumkra 190 
mandalas existing in vastly remote regions even so, in regard to entities 
existingat vastly remote periods of time, consciousness comes into contact 
with qualities, such as Svayambhu existingat the beginning and end 
counter to kalpa (world epoch). Hence, there is nothing that could run 
to everyday experience. 191 

Further, for the reason that they are manifested by consciousness, 
things .past and future, like knowledge and the knower. cannot be 
considered to be beyond the reach of knowledge. 

188 The illustration (drstanta) of number may be claborared thus:—When 
.one says There were four mangoes, three of them have been lost,’ the No 3 is 
associated with non-existent objects. 

189. The Bhatta Mimimsakas, according to whom vyakti and jati are diff- 
ent and non-differcnt fbhedabheda), maintain that objects, past and future, exist even 
now in the form of jati and that they may well be said to possess prakatya Similarly, 
it may be said that such objects have an existence of some sort. Once that is 
admitted, it is easy to show that conscionsness may come into contact with them. See 
NyayasiddhaAjana, Buddhipariccheda p.267. Compare: ‘atitanagatam svariipasosti 
adhvabbedat dharminam.' Yoga-Sutra IV. 12 and Vacaspati Mi3ra’s commentary 
thereon and also the Vyasa BhaSya. 

ISO. The Hindu tradition has it that the Lord Narayana, in the from of the 
celestial body, Simasumara (also called Sisumara), controls all the heavenly bodies, 
and that he acts as their support from his abode in the heart of Simfcumara and that 
many of th' devas dwell in the several organs of SimSumara, (e. g. Agni, Mahendrai 
Ka?yapa and Dhruva shine forth, without ever setting* from the tail region of 
Sisumaraj, and that whoever sees this celestial body gets rid of his demerits (papj) 
See the Visnu Puraiia , Am§a II, ch. 9 and 12 and the Bhagavatapurana V Skanda 

191. In all probability, the proper reading is nalikdm rather than nalokam. 
On either reading, the meaning is substantially the same. 



The non-apprehension of intervening space explained. 

Moreover, (against the possible objection that if consciousness can get 
into contact with objects far removed from us by vast stretches of space 
and time, it must be in contact with those of intervening space and 
time, it may be replied that) as consciousness moves with extreme rapidi¬ 
ty, the false impression arises that there is no awareness of (objects 
existing in) the intervening space and time; just as the false belief 
arises, namely, that there is no apprehension of the contact (of the 
point of light) with different points in space or its - separation therefrom 
—a contact and separation which proceeds in a definite sequence and 
which resides in the circle traced by the fire-brand (alatacakra). 

Besides, consciousness, proceeding outward having come into 
association with that form of the different senses, reasons (hetu) and 
impressions ( samslc&ras ) which is invariably related to their respective 
objects, gets into contact with those objects only which are respective¬ 
ly related to these (i.e., the senses, etc.); just as the significatory 
potency of words, such as the cow is related only to the universal aspect 
(of things), even though on hearing a word, like the cow, an object 
constituted of universal and particular features presents itself in a single 
cognition : or just as the vedic injunction deals only with that aspect of 
the bhuvana which is unknown, having neglected the part already 
known 1911 Therefore, here it is legitimate to maintain that consciousness , 
proceeds through the senses towards their respective objects. To this 
effect the Adorable Krsna says, “It (the manas) forcibly drags consci- 
ousnesss along, even as the wind drives the boat on water.’’ 19 ' 2 And 
Manu says, “From among the several senses even if one sense organ 
were to proceed out-ward, thereupon the person's knowledge also 
would move outward, even as water would flow from the hole found 
in the leather bag. ” 193 

191 a. For example, the injunction, 'dadhna juhoti', aims at specifying the 
kind of oblation to be offered at the Agnihotra, rather than at emphasising the need 
for performing that homa, the necessity for the latter having been already learnt 
from the other vidhi, ‘agnihotram juhoti’. 

192. Bh. Gita. II 67. 

293. Manusmj-II 99. 



The objection that consciousness as a quality cannot leave its substrate 
and proceed elsewhere answered 

The objection raised—nameiy, how can consciousness, which is a 
quality, proceed elsewhere, leaving its substrate?—is hardly reasonable; 
for it has not been maintained that it leaves its substrate. Conscious¬ 
ness proceeds hither and thither by way of the senses without ever 
leaving the self. That its reunion (with the self) would become impossi¬ 
ble were it to lose contact there with has bean set forth in the ( Nydya-- 
tattva) 3astra. 

(It could even be shown that qualities may leave their substrate 
and proceed elsewhere; for) qualities, such as, sound, odour, the rays of 
the sun and the lustre of the gem are found to be endowed with move¬ 
ment and to leave their substrate. Indeed, sound (sabda) is exceedingly 
subtle and elemental, and has the quality of proceeding long distances. 

The Prabhakara view of sibda refuted- 

A possible objection is the following - tfaMa (sound) is all-perva¬ 
sive, like ether; but, with the aid of dhvani (vibration) which helps to 
reveal it, it appears as if it dwells in a particular place, and as if it moves 
about. And it may be put in syllogistic form thus-ia&da is all-perva¬ 
sive; for, like the magnitude of ether, sound, while residing in one sub¬ 
stance. is the quality of ether. (We reply) ‘not so’; because iabda is 
not a quality cf ether. It really belongs to the air in motion (vayu)\ 
for, like touch (spar4a) which pertains to the air in motion (vayw), 
£aZ>da invariably originates along with va yu. Any quality which 
invariably originates along with a given substance must necessarily be 
considered to be a quality of that substance alone; even as colour and 
the like, which invariably originate along with a substance are treated 
as its qualities. And s.mnd invariably originates along with va yu, in 
as much as both invariably originate together from the contact of the 
drumstick with the drum or from the separation of the parts of the 
bamboo caused by its splitting. 

Besides, iabda does originate; for, like smell, it is grasped by the 
senses and is also a quality. Moreover, it is created by human activity; 



for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity 
has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like 
are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against 
the principle of economy (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming 
that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate 
that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of 
economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a manifester reveals simul¬ 
taneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a 
single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing 
at an identical place, namely, the nu uber, size, etc., and vessels, like the 
water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjuction 
and disjunction of the plate and the like is not of such a nature, it can¬ 
not be a factor for manifesting sound. 

He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason 
for certain sounds being man.fested while other sounds are not; because 
sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It 
has already been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are 
apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the 
mantifester also must be unitary. Since in the present case the mani¬ 
fester is not unitary, the va yu originating from human effort must be the 
cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of 
sounds has admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct 
sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and* 
because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the 
multiplicity of sounds arising from difierent acts of pronunciation must 
be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simul¬ 
taneously in sounds (varna), such as ga —qualities, such as that of 
possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of 
being long and short-fail to differentiate their substrates? (It cannot 
be urged that the recognition, namely. ‘This is the self-same sound 
which was met with before’ points to the identity of the sound and also 
to its eternity; for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising 
from the source being identical and'not on the identity of the sounds 
themselves; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is 
based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The 
reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced. 




for, like conjunction and so on, it is apprehended only after such activity 
has taken place. Nor can it be fancied that human effort and the like 
are merely aids to the manifestation of sound; for that would go against 
the principle of economy' (of thought). Indeed, rather than assuming 
that they are the cause of the manifestation of sound, to postulate 
that they are the causes of sound itself is to have the advantage of 
economy (of thought). Whatever serves as a mhnifester reveals simul¬ 
taneously everything which resides in one place and is graspable by a 
single sense organ; for example, the lamp manifests everything existing 
at an identical place, namely, the nuaber, size, etc., and vessels, like the 
water-pot. In as much as the air in motion produced by the conjuction 
and disjunction of the plate and the like is not of such a nature, it can¬ 
not be a factor for manifesting sound. 

He who maintains that sound is eternal cannot give a reason 
for certain sounds being man.fested while other sounds are not; because 
sound dwells in partless ether and is the object of the auditory sense. It 
has already, been pointed out that when the locality (in which objects are 
apprehended) is one and when the apprehending organ is single, the 
mantifester also must be unitary. Since* in the present case the mani- 
fester is not unitary, the va yu originating from human effort must be the 
cause (and not the manifester) of sound. That is why a multiplicity of 
sounds has to be admitted, each act of pronunciation producing a distinct 
sound. Because what is once produced cannot be created again, and 
because there is diversity in the complete sets of causal factors, the 
multiplicity of sounds arising from different acts of pronunciation must 
be admitted. Besides, how can qualities which are known to exist simul¬ 
taneously in sounds ( varna ), such as ga —qualities, such as that of 
possessing the principal accent and the secondary accent, and that of 
being long and short-fail to differentiate their substrates? (It cannot 
be urged that the recognition, namely. ‘This is the self-same sound 
which was met with before’ points to the identity of the sound and also 
to its eternity; for) even this recognition is based on the similarity arising 
from the source being identical and'not on the identity of the sounds 
themselves; even as the recognition of the flame (as self-identical is 
based on the similarity of the flame-series, and not on identity). The 
reasons which prove sound to be diverse have already been adduced. 


122 Siddhitrayam 

The Prabhakara view that object is manifested without the relation of 

The following objection may now be raised:-(The upshot of the 
discussion is) prakaka is either-the conjunction of consciousness (with 
the object) or some peculiar property resulting from this (conjunction). 
But in regard to the manifestation of consciousness neither of these 
alternatives holds; for relation always pre-supposes difference in the 
relata. Therefore, consciousness cannot enter into relation with consci¬ 
ousness. This conjunction with consciousness cannot occur to the soul 
either ; for the latter is the substrate of the quality, namely, conscious¬ 
ness. In fact, the relation between the attribute and its substrate is not 
the relation of samyoga (conjunction); but really, it is samavaya 
(inherence); for it is of the nature of the relation existing between 
inseparable entities. Samyoga (conjunction), on the contrary, is either 
the coming into relation of two objects well-known to be disparate, a 
relation dependent upon activity, or the closely contiguous existence of 
the aforesaid objects, which do not stand to each other in the relation of 
cause and effect. 

(In order to obviate this difficulty), if prakasa is taken either as 
one of these relations, namely, conjunction or inherence of consciousness 
with objects or any one of the other possible relations of consciousness to 
objects, then the defects of (such a definition) being too narrow ( avy&pti ) 
or too broad ( ativyzpti ) may be cited, according to the circumstance 
of each case, in respect of the knower, knowledge, the known, the body 
and the senses. 

The admission of prakasa as a separate entity, having been effec¬ 
tively discredited by non-perception ( anupalabdhi ) does not call forth 
any other adverse comment. Therefore, it is but proper to admit the 
following—that entity concerning which there arises knowledge capable 
of initiating a thought and discussion of it may be spoken of as being 

As the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regarding all 
these three (i. e., knowledge, the knower and the known) is an essential 



feature of consciousness, the diversity in the manner in which the cause 
(i.e., consciousness) operates (in these three cases) cannot be raised as 
an objection. It cannot be asked why such and such a nature belongs 
to such and such an object. 

If so (i.e., if the tendency to initiate thought and discussion regard¬ 
ing all the three is an essential quality of knowledge, the difficulty raised 
on p. 104. namely, How can knowledge which is inherent in the soul 
generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a prakasa or discussion?) 
may be sought to be overcome by the suggestion that knowledge may, 
with the aid of various operating causes (such as the senses), be respon¬ 
sible for vyavahara concerning the object, even though the latter be devoid 
of any relation (to consciousness), whether it be conjunction (samyoga) 
or inherence (samavaya). 

The Prabhakara view refuted 

(To this it is replied) it has already been shown (vide p. 104) that 
an entity does not enter on its own activities by depending on it3 efficient 
cause. It the term prakasa were to signify knowledge conducive to thought 
and discussion (vyavaharanuguni samvedana ), then, the diversity in the 
significance (pravrttinimittabheda) suggested by this term cannot be got 
over. If the expression vyavaharanuguna samved ina is taken as a bahuvrihi 
compound (i.e., if it denotes that which possesses knowledge conducive 
to vyavahara ). prakasa would have to be denied to consciousness; for 
there is no knowledge (which th ; s knowledge may be said to possess). If 
the expression is taken as a karmadharaya compound (i e., if it denotes 
‘the character of being knowledge conducive to vyavahara), prakaSa 
would have to be denied to the knower and the known; for they do not 
possess the character of being knowledge. And the character of being 
conducive to the starting of an action is to be ascertained from the action 
itself; but, prior to an action there is) the knowledge (prakasa) that the 
object concerning which there is activity is already cognised and that 
there is discussion concerning the same. 

The true significance of prakasa 

If so. what is the significance of the term prakasate (shines forth)? 
Indeed, we do not know of a prakasa which exists in common in the 
knower, the known and knowledge, and which has the tame form in all 

124 Siddhitrayam 

these three, and about which no objection could be raised. (To this) 
it is replied.—evidently, you are not acquainted with the Prathamadhi- 
kararia of Nyayatattva. While pointing out therein that remembrance 
arises only in the event of there being experience, it has been clearly 

stated by the author (Nathamuni) that prakasa means not being remote 
(i adxuratmm i. e., nearness) from experience, a nearness which is the 

cause of smrti (remembrance). 194 It amounts to this, namely, that 
prakasa means not being remote (aJura) from experience. 

The objections to the concept of aduratva answered 

(The objector may ask :) What is meant by adura ? Does it 
mean ‘different from’ or ‘opposed to’ or ‘the absence of’ that which 
is remote? Again, isadura/va (not being remote) a qualification (v/sesarta) 
or an wpalafcsana.? 193 If it is a qualification (v/sesana) in each of the three 
alternatives alike, consciousness or prakasa will invariably be preced¬ 
ed by the awareness of not being remote from experience. But, as a 
matter of fact, it is not so. If it is an what other nature 
prakasa possesses besides this upalaksana. must be pointed out. 
But it has been said that this nature is not apprehended. (To this) it is 
replied, ‘Enough of this misplaced excitement.’ 

Let a.nubh&va.dura mean either‘different from that which is remote 
from experience’ or ‘opposed to that which is remote from experience’. 
And to be manifest is to be different from that which is remote from 
experience or to be opposed to that which is remote from experience. 196 
Why has all this prattle been indulged in ? 

If 4. The qualification 'the causes of smrti' is purposely included in this defi¬ 
nition of prakasa. Otherwise, all objects which ate presented to experience would 
have to possess prakasa. In actual fact, that is not the case. Though several objects 
are within the focus of attention, all of them cannot be said to be manifested; for, 
clearly, we are not interested in them all. Hence, only those objects which fall within 
the range of experience leading to remembrance can be said to possess prakasa. 
Compare 'pathi gacchatah kasthalostadijnanotpattya kasthalostadi§u satopi- 
anubhavaduratvasya prakasapadarthatvabhavat smrtinimitiamityuktam. ’ 

195. Upalaksana is a characteristic which reveals certain aspects of a thing 
already known to possess other aspects. 

196. This verse is quoted in Nydyasiddhdiijana . In hP tika on Syayasiddhlfi- 
jana, Rangaramanuja interprets prakaSatvam as prakasamanatvam. Our translation 
is based on this interpretation. He also suggests the emendation ‘praka^otra.’ 



Like external illumination, even the cognition e It is manifested’ is 
no other than the awareness of the nature of knowledge and of the object 
connected thereto—-a nature opposed to that of being remote from con¬ 
sciousness. There also the thought and reference ‘It shines’, arising in 
respect of the rays of light and the regions of space wherein they pervade, 
are based on the quality of not being remote from light. Just as, in the 
one case, the dispelling of darkness is due to the quality of not being 
remote from light, here also the dispelling of ignorance is due to the 
quality of not being remote from consciousness. That is why at a 
subsequent time recollection of the object known as also of the knowledge 
itself arises, There being no room for the question as to the precise 
nature of the relation of consciousness (i.e., whether it is or 
samyoga). it follows that the question raised is one that ought not to 
have been asked at all. 

Deciding on the nature of the knowledge relation as samyoga 

Besides, samyoga is merely close contiguity, which, in its turn, is 
synonymous with nair antary a (not being separated by intervening space). 
And it is only this samyoga, which obtains betwee r inseparable ( ayuta - 
siddha) objects of which one is self-dependent and the other dependent, 
that is referred to by the technical term ja navaya in the system of the 
Vai^esikas : hence, the question whether the relation of consciousness 
with objects is samyoga or samavaya, proceeding as it does on the » 
assumption that samavaya is a separate entity, does not arise. In the 
section dealing with relation (sambaneavimarda)} 91 we will presently 
show how inherence (samavaya) could be brought under conjunction 

Or, prakasa may be understood in a different sense as denoting the 
capacity to initiate thought and discussion—a capacity dependent upon 

It must be understood that the definition of prakafca set forth is this stanza 
applies oniy to the prakasa residing in objects perceived by the senses, and not to 
that found in objects inferred or to that residing in knowledge itself. 

197. The section dealing with the relation of the finite soul to the Infinite Self 
is included in the portions of Atmasiddhi lost. Already, on an earlier occasion, refer¬ 
ence has been made to this section. Vide p. 49. 



the quality of not being remote from consciousness. Even when its 
causal conditions are present in their entirety, either on account of the 
presence of obstructing factors, or on account of the absence of the capa¬ 
city for being manifested, prakasa does not arise in the other qualities 
of the soul (besides its consciousness), such as being all-pervasiVe and 
being unattached, and in the body, senses and the like; just as the colour, 
taste and the like of the water of the Jamna, which is in contact with 
the eye, are not manifested. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, 
the self has consciousness for its structure and consciousness for its 
nature. The self cognises the rest with the aid of the senses. 

The examples of sukha etc. deduced by the purvapaksin not apposite. 

Even the charge levelled against us, namely, that consciousness, 
being a special quality of the sou!, must, on the analogy of pleasure 
{sukha) and the like, be an occasional quality proceeds from complete 
ignorance of the true nature of qualities. For the qualities which are 
dependent upon the very being of anything will last as long as their sub¬ 
strate lasts ; but the knowledge of pleasure and pain is not dependent in 
this manner upon the very being of the self. It has already been shown 
how consciousness is responsible for the self being what it is. 193 Pleasure 
and pain, on the contrary, are not the qualities of the self; 199 for they 
have been shown to be no other than the flourishing or decaying 
state of the senses (vide p 78). This point will be further elaborated 
when establishing that the soul is in its essential nature blissful, a 
fact signified in J the last word 200 i, e., sva.t&ssuki, occurring in the 

198. This text has been quoted by Vedanta DeSika in his Nyayasiddhanjana. 
Rangaratnanuja interprets it thus—jfianamatmatve upadhib prayojakamityarthah. 
TataSca yavatprayojyam prayojakavasthanavaSyambhavat bodhasya svabhavikatvadi 
siddhyati iti bhavab”- See Nyayasiddhanjana, Buddhipariccheda p. 238. 

199. Surely, this is not his final view on the matter; for in a subsequent pas¬ 
sage he declares that certainty, doubt, pleasure and pain are forms of knowledge 
and consequently, qualities of the self. Here, either he defends a view other than his < 
own or shown off his competency to prove any position ( vaibhavavada). See note 14 4 
on p. 79. 

200. See note 1 43 on p. 79. 



stanza commencing with dehendriy a mana pray a). Hence, the defect of 
not possessing the sadhana (means of inference) vitiates the illustrative 

Desire and aversion also' 201 are the different states of manas and 
are not the direct qualities of the self, indeed, it is learnt from the 
scripture; ‘‘Desire, will, doubt, faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, 
contempt, conjecture (dhih), fear—all this is truly manas’’. 202 This fact 
has also been stated in the Gita in the verse commencing with the words, 
“Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain.” 203 . 

Definition of tarira {body) according to the siddhantin 

As the expression cetanadhrtih (occurring in this stanza) is one 
word, it is the definition of ksetra (body), The body is, in fact, the 
collection (of the primal elements) which is supported by conscious¬ 
ness. 204 It amounts to stating that the body is what enters on its 
activities only with the aid of consciousness appropriate thereto. That 
is why descriptions such as the following are found in the Antaryami 
Brahmana —“ for whom the earth is body...for whom the water is 

201. When pleasure and pain are shown to be defective as illustrative examples* 
one may cite desire and aversion instead. Here it is shown that these fare no better, 
for they too are equally liable to be charged with the defect of not possessing the * 

202. Brh. I v. 3 and Maitri up. VI30. 

203. How, it may be asked, does this verse from the Gita declaring that desire 
and aversion constitute the ksetra bear tesimony to the view that they are the qualities 
of manas ? Possibly the author thinks that once this verse excludes the possibility 
of their being the qualities of the self, it could be shown, on the strength of the 
Bykadara^yaka text, ‘etat sarvam mana eva,’ that they belong to manas. 

204 Analysing the expression cetanadhrtih int ocetanaya dhrtih, Yamunacarya 
arrives at rhe meaning ‘a collection supported by consciousness.’ But in the 
Gita Bhasya, Ramanuja splits it into cetanasya adhrtih and interprets it to mean 'a 
collocation which has sprung up as the seat of the soul (who enjoys pleasure and pain 
and who seeks worldly experience or liberation therefrom)’. On either interpretation, 
cetanadhrtih denotes only the body. 



body., for whom the soul is body...” 205 Such descriptions are met with 
in the pumnas also,—“All these constitute His body” 206 . 

The significance of dhi\fi occurring in the sruti texts cited above. 

(The upanisadic passage quoted above reckons din h, which is obvi¬ 
ously a quality of the soul, as one among the properties not belonging to 
the soul. Hence, the objector asks) what is meant by dhih (in that 
text) ? (The reply is) it means conjecture (utpreksa.), and does not 
have knowledge for its significance. For in the same upanisad it has 
been declared that knowledge is an essential quality of the soul. Indeed, 
the scriptural texts assert.—“There is no cessation of the knowing of 
a knower (because of his imperishabillity)”; 207 ‘'There can be not 
cessation of the seeing of a seer, because of his imperishability.” 203 This 
scriptural text, which establishes that there can be no destruction of 
knowledge for the very reason that the knower is imperishable indicates 
hat knowledge is dependent upon the very being of the knower. 

It is not right to contend that (in the text in question) the seer 
(drasta ) is taken as a qualification of seeing ( drsti ), i.e., it is not right 
to interpret the text thus—‘There can be no destruction of seeing which 
is no other than the seer’); because, in that event, there would be im¬ 
propriety in the use of the masculine gender, and because the hetu would 
come to be identical with the sadhya (i.e., there would be no hetu worth 
the name). 209 

20 5. Brh. up. Ill, vii. 

206. Vtsnu Puratia, I, 22, 86. 

yani mSrtanyamurtaoi yanyatranya'ra va kvacit | 

„ santi vai vastujatani tani sarvl^i tadvapuft. II 

207. Brh. up. IV, iii, 30. • , \ 

208. Brh. up. IV, iii, 23. 

209. Two difficulties stand in the way of taking drasta as a qualification of 
df§ti- (i) If drasta were to qualify drsti, both the words must be in the same gender; 
but drasta is masculine, while drsti is feminine, fii) Again, on this interpretaion, 
the text would mean—‘There can be no destruction of seeing whieh is no other than the 
seer because it does not perish.’ Clearly, it is vitiated by petitio principii. 




Even if the term d rsti aims at revealing the very essence of the 
soul, the charge of there being no hetu is unanswerable. 310 Moreover, it 
would amount to the abandoning of your position. It is but right to 
adduce as hetu the proposition that the soul is eternal—a proposition 
established by several incontrovertible arguments and supported by the 
sSstras. When an object exists, whatever depends upon the very being 
of that object cannot but exist; even as yellowness of light cannot but 
exist when gold or the lamp exists. Therefore, this is the true meaning 
(of the text under consideration)—at no time, whether in the state of 
worldly existence or that of release is there cessation of knowledge, 
which is an essential feature of the soul, and which, as a result of its 
diverse forms of relation with different objects, external and internal, 
acquires different names, such as seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, 
hearing, reflecting, touching and conceiving, and which shines of its own 
accord. (The scriptures declare): “Just as a lump of salt, without any 
distinction of parts, whether they be not-inner or (they be) not-outer, 211 
is filled right through with the same taste, even so this soul, right 
through, without any distinction of parts, is constituted of knowledge 
(prajncinaghana); “ his own luminosity, by his own light’’; 312 
“O King”, said he, “this atman is self-luminous” 213 The Chandogas 
say that even in the state of release “The seer sees neither death nor 
sickness, nor the evil in the world. Verily, the seer perceives all.” 314 ; 
“The jiva enjoys not thinking of the body cast behind in the midst of 
his kin” 215 ; “He who, with the aid of manas, the celestial eye, experience* 
all enjoyments and feels joyous” 216 . And other texts like the following— 

210. If the term drsti, whose gender d'esnot vary in accordance with that of 
the object which it qualifies ( niyatalinga ), is taken as an adjective qualifying drasfa, 
the grammatical difficulty ma/ be got over; but the fallacy of petitioprincipii still 

211. Brh up. VII, v, 13. This text enumerates the parts of the lump of 
salt in this neguive fashion for two reasons ;—(I) If the positive mode of expression 
viz., inner and outer parts, were used, parts in the middle region would be left out. 
The negative expressions secure exhaustion.. (2) Again, as the soul is niravayava , 
(partless), the analogy of the lump of salt would be in order only if it uses the negative 

212. Brh. up. VI, iii, 9. 215. Chand. up. VIII, xii 3. 

113. Bph. up. VI, iii, 6. 216 , Chand. up. VIII t xii t 5. 

214. Chand. up. VII xxvl, 2. 




“The puru§a does know things, but he fails to know what he ought to 
understand”—which declare that even in the state when all the senses 
are destroyed knowledge belongs to the soul strongly affirm that know¬ 
ledge belongs to the soul. Statements like the following are found in 
the purantas also—“The soul is constituted of bliss and jnana and is 
undefiled.‘’ 217 Passages sucti as the following are found in the itihasas— 
“It (the soul), is the light of all lights.” The revered Saunaka says, 
“Just as the lustre of the gem is not created by cleansing it of :its 
impurities, even so knowledge (which -is the very essence of the soul) 
is not created by the shedding of imperfections. Again, water or space 
is not created by the digging of a well. Only that which has all along 
existed is rendered manifest. How can the non-existent ever come into 
being ? Likewise, qualities, such as jhana, are not created but only 
manifested by the destruction of evil qual ties ( heyaguna)-, for, in truth, 
they are . the eternal qualities of the soul’’. 218 For this very reason 
the Sutrakara says, “That is why (the individual soul is) a 
knower”. 219 

References to origination of knowledge, its loss, doubt, certainty and 
the like explained. 

The usage of the different expressions, doubt (sam&aya) and cer¬ 
tainty (nikcaya) and the like 220 has reference either to the different 
relations of objects to consciousness, which has thus been shown to be 
the essence of the soul, or to the consciousness that has entered into 
those relations. 221 Indeed, certainty is the close conjunction of conscious¬ 
ness with a single object. Loose conjunction of the same with several 

217. Vis nu-Pur aw, VI, vji, 22. 

218. V snudharmottara 104 55-57. Compare Veddnta-sbtra —sampadyavir- 
bhavassvena sabdat. IV. iv. ■'I. 

219. Veddnta-shtra']] iii 19. 

220. ‘And the like’ includes pleasure and pain. 

221. One does not usually speak'of objects with consciousness as being either 
doubtful or certain. On the contrary, it is knowledge that is described as being either 
doubtful or certain. Hence the second alternative. See Rangaramanuja's fika on 
Nyayasiddhanana, p. 274. 



objects simultaneously constitutes doubt. 229 The conjunction following 
from impression of previous knowledge (jhanavasana) constitutes 
recollection ( smr\i ); and so on with the rest. It has already been stated 
that what is called knowledge is the conjunction of the object with 
consciousness which is an attribute of the soul. 

It cannot be said that since conjunction exists in both (the object 
and consciousness), the object also would have to be considered the 
knower. For conjunction with the object is not met with in the object 
itself. Indeed, the object is in conjunction with consciousness, as with 
external light. Although illumination is only relation with light, the 
source of light alone, such as the sun, rather than the pot and the like 
is considered to be the manifester. If it be suggested that in as much as 
light is dependent upon the sun, the latter alone is considered the pos¬ 
sessor of this quality (light) and that the manifestation of other 
objects is due to the conjunction with this quality, (we reply) if that 
be so. in the present case also, the description ‘He knows’ legitimately 
applies only to the self who gets into contact wtth objects through 
the aid of consciousness, in as much as the latter is his quality. From 
all this it has to be concluded that the soul has certainly consciousness 
for its essential nature, and is aware of itself at all times ; and that 
in regard to other objects (besides itself), owing to various causal 
conditions, it has to be said ‘He knows’, ’He does not know*. 

* Drdhasamyogah samsayah is the reading found in all manuscripts nnd printed 
books. The correct reading is ad^ha samyogah. See Nyaya Pari&uddhi, Memorial 
Edition, page 30. 

222. When we are in doubt as to whether the distant object is a post or a per. 
son, consciousness is in conjunction with two objects—the post and the person. As 
two mutually contradictory presentations cannot be given simultaneously in a single 
cognition, some maintain that in the state of doubt there are really two cognitions ; 
and that these arise in such a quick succession that they appear to be almost simul¬ 
taneous. On this view, the conjunction of consciousness with the object is adfQha 
(unsteady). Even on the view that in the state of doubt there is but a single cogni¬ 
tion presenting two objects simultaneously, the cenjunction of consciousness with th« 
objects may be characterised as adf^het. Here adj'dhtiamyoga will mean 'conjunc¬ 
tion involving mutual contradiction’. Sec Nylya-Pari$uddhi fj Memorial edition, p. 30. 

-132 Siddhitrayam 

Though the soul is self luminous , there is need of scripture to make 
its nature: clearly known. 


; Although the soul shines forth as having consciousness for its 
essential nature, yet, like the fish which moves about in the deep lake 
or the milk mingled with water, the soul does not shine forth clearly and 
distinctly. That is why the several arguments which have been advanced 
by' the teachers of old, and which are consistent with the reasons 
employed for demonstrating the true nature of the soul, and the scriptural 
texts are held in esteem. Not deriving any satisfaction from these, 
(for, after all, they could only lead to paroksa jnana). persons who 
have got rid of the veiling obscurities and evils by the practice of yama 
(restraint) niyama (discipline) and other means of yoga 223 endeavour to 
secure immediate knowledge ( aparoksa jhana) of the distinctness of the 
self from everything other than itself—a knowlege which arises from 
(1) the removal of impurities, such as, tamas and rajas, by the process 
of purification by fire ( putapaka ), in other words, by the prac ice of 
inental control, and (ii) the predominance of the sattva quality. Since 
the fact that this immediate knowledge arises at the culmination of the, 
highest stage of concentration is not called in question by any of the 
rival disputants, no attempt is here made to establish it. Thus, with the 
aid of scriptural testimony, inference and perception resulting from the 
practice of yoga, the soul which is in itself self- luminous, is manifested 
more clearly and explicitly. 


The soul is eternal. 

Purvapaksa ; The Buddhistic view that the soul is momentary. 

33. Henceforth, the inquiry into the duration of the soul may be 
taken up. Maintaining that momentariness follows from the very fact 

223. Yama (restraint), niyama (discipline), asana (posture), praijayama (con¬ 
trol of breath), pratyabara (withdrawal of senses from their objects), dhararia— 
(concentrationt. dhyana (meditation), and samadhi (realisation), constitute the 
eightfold (astanga) yoga. Of these, the first, namely, yama signifies non-injury 
fahimsi), truth-speaking (satya), abstinence from stealing fasteya), brahmacarya 
and giving up of possesions (aparigraha). Niyama denotes the cultivation of virtues, 
»uch as, purity (sauca). contentment (sariitosa), fortitude (tapas), study (svadhyaya) 
gnd devotion to God (Hvara-pranidhana), See Yoga-sutra II, Z8-S2. 



of existence, and holding (also) that the root cause of all miseries is only 
the belief that the soul is eternal, the followers of the Buddhistic 
doctrines assert that the soul is momentary ; and their argument is as 
follows ;—Whatever exists is momentary; the soul exists; (and, therefore, 
it is momentary.) Should it be asked how momentariness follows form 
the mere fact of existence, (it may be replied) -because existence cannot 
be attributed to what is not momentary’. Since it is impossible to 
attribute existence to what cannot lead to fruitful activity, not even that 
of being the object of the comprehension of the Omniscient Being, the 
existence of objects is no other than the quality of leading to fruitful 
activity. And this (fruitful activity) is invariably associated only with 
momentariness: since it cannot be met with in that which is not moment¬ 
ary : for herein its invariable associates, namely, action all at once and 
action in a successive series, are absent. 

How could these, viz , action all at once and action in a successive 
series, be regarded as being associated with fruitful activity ? How. 
again, could they be said to be absent from what is not momentary ? 
(It is replied) ‘Well, listen (to what follows)’: Objects may be said to 
bring about fruitful activity in one of two ways, either all at once or in 
succession and there is no other possibility. In the case of these two 
(alternatives), as in that of being and not-being, if one is absent, the 
other is bound to exist; hence in the matter of objects generating fruitful . 
activity, there could be no third possibility; therefore, fruitful activity 
is invariably associated with action, successive or non-successive. And 
activity taking place all at once, and action that is successive cannot be 
met with in what is not momentary . 

* * * * * 

* * * * * 

Note : 

All the manuscripts of Atma siddhi examined are incomplete 
and end here. Evidently the rest of the work has been irretrievably lost. 


‘ ?; ^ t*v 

In order to establish the truth that the.-universe runs its 
course under the control of some one person, let us. at the wery-outset, 
state the prima facie view on the matter. . ; nc: 


In regard to this question, the MImamsakas say :—A person 
endowed with the capacity to perceive all things directly cannot be 
posited; for such a person is beyond the reach of all the prama^as that 
could possibly help to prove his existence; (besides) there are*several 
conclusive means of proof running counter to belief in such a 
person To make the matter clear—(It may be asked) is ^perception 
or some other pramana that proves h's existence ? (If the reply is : 
perception, there is the further question) is it ordinary perception 
{laukika-pratyaksa) or super-normal perception {yaugika prat yaks a)? 

Laukikapratyak§a cannot prove the existence of God 

The objects of ordinary perception being specific for each 
of the senses and being limited (to the here and now), it cannot 
serve to prove the existence of the supreme soul; for, with its' 
aid, all objects (without an exception), knowledge concerning them, and 
so on, cannot be apprehended, The instrument of knowledge which 
could reval a person endowed with the capacity to perceive everything 
must necessarily have for its object (1) all things, notwithstanding their 
distance, their time of existence and nature, and notwithstanding the 
factors obstructing their apprehension, (2) knowledge concerning* all 
these, and (3) the capacity to have this knowledge. When it is impossible 
even to think of such an illimitable greatness ever becoming the object 
of ordinary preception, which operates as a rule (according to the specific 
capacities of the different senses) in certain objects whieh are capable of 
coming into contact with the senses at the time, how could we imagine 
ordinary perception to be the effective means of proving the existence of 
a person (endowed with such greatness)? 

136 Siddhitrayam 

Nor could yoga pratyaksa prove the existence of God. 

Nor could the perception of the yogin be a means of proving nis 
existence. For, if it is a mode of perception, it too can only reveal 
present objects. Were it to comprehend objects, past and future, it 
would, like intuitive insight ( pratibha ), scarcely be perception. Besides, 
(there arises the question) is the knowledge of the yogin born of the 
senses or not ? Even on the view that it is sensory knowledge, there 
crops up the further question, is that knowledge born of the outer senses 
or of the internal sense ? It cannot originate from the outer senses: for 
it is well-known that the outer senses, provided with the auxiliary 
causes, namely, contact with the objects appropriate thereto, give rise to 
knowledge concerning those object. That is why there is no possibility 
of knowledge concerning all things, (e. g.) silver, bygone objects, and 
whatever is screened from view arising from the senses, such as, the 
tongue. With objects, such as silver, that do not exist at the moment, 
there can be no contact : for contact presupposes two bases, and in the 
absence of either basis, there is no possibility of contact. Therefore, 
contact with objects is required (for perception arising from the outer 
senses), When the auxiliary cause is absent, how would the senses be 
capable of directly apprehending objects, such as by-gone things? 

This may be expressed in syllogistic form :—That which produces 
a certain effect, when in association with a gwen auxiliary cause, cannot 
produce it in the absence of that auxiliary cause; for example, the 
seed which produces the sprout, when in association with 
the soil and moisture, does not produce the same in the absence of 
soil and the like The external senses, in association with the auxiliary 
cause, namely contact with objects, lead to knowledge. Therefore, in 
conformity with this principle the outer senses do not also lead to 
knowledge of the past object or the future one. It has, therefore, to be 
concluded that-ihe knowledge generated by the external senses cannot 
override the rule herein mentioned with regard to objects (that they 
should be present at the time, unclouded and appropriate to the senses). 

Nor can it (i.e., the knowledge of the yogin) originate from the 
internal sense. For it is only in the domain of pleasure and othe-j 


Isvara Siddhi 


internal states that the mind holds complete sway. If even in regard 
to knowledge of external objects the manas were admitted to be the 
unfettered and unaided instrument, then, the outer senses would become 
superfluous. It would fellow therefrom that none could be either blind 
or deaf. 

To express it in syllogistic form :—Without seeking the assistance 
of the outer organs, manas, whose precise mode of apprehending exter¬ 
nal objects is under dispute, cannot enter upon the province of external 
perception: for in regard to this field the activity of manas is dependent 
upon the outer senses. That whose activity in a certain sphere is 
dependent upon a given entity cannot act in that sphere independent of 
that given entity ; for example, the eye, whose proper functioning is 
dependent upon light, does not operate in its province, (viz., that of 
colour) in darkness. 

Impossible even for the senses that have acquired supernormal powers 
through drugs, charms . austerities and yogic concentration to establish 
the existence of God 

It is impossible for the senses even occasionally to transcend the 
limitations which are known to prevail with regard to the object by 
virtue of the merit acquired through the efficacy of the drugs administer¬ 
ed by perfected souls, of mantras (charms), austerities (tapas) and * 
yogic concentration. For these (i.e., drugs, etcj have for their result 
only the manifestation of the capacity inherent in the different senses; 
and this capacity is well-defined (for each of them). Though the ear 
may have acquired excellent powers through a hundred drugs properly 
administered, yet it is incapable of apprehending such diverse 
qualities as colour and taste. 

To put the matter in syllogistic form:—The excellence of the skill 
belonging to the senses, external and internal, concerning which there 
is dispute, does not transcend its limits or bounds ; for it is sensory 
excellence like the one perceived by us. Hence, sensory knowledge cannot 
make known bygone things and the like. 


138 Siddhitrayam 

Yogtc concentration even of the end stage incapable of proving God. 

Though the knowledge that arises at the culmination of the highest 
stages of concentration shines forth clearly and distinctly, whether it sets 
forth something additional to what is revealed in previous experience or 
embraces nothing more than that, such a knowledge has to whirl in the 
eddy of the one or the other of the two streams of remembrance ( smrti ) 
and illusion ( vibhrama ), and has no chance whatever of reaching the 
‘ shore of validity (primary a ). There is much less chance of trying to 
enchance its validity by stating that, it is perceptual knowledge. If it 

TOt h \m cwM ft timrawi 

with regard to objects ? If it were to transcend these, how could it still 
be perceptual in character ? Hence, perception cannot be a valid means 
of proof in regard to the person endowed with superhuman power of 
experiencing all things. 

No pramana other than perceptirn is competent either to prove the ex¬ 
istence of God. 

It cannot be any other pramana either. (If it be) is that other 
pramana infernce or scripture (u.eamn)? If it is inference, \s that 
visesatodrsta or samanyatdrsta ? (It cannot be vikesi;odrsta\ for) 
concerning the existence of God ; who is beyond the reach of all the 
means of proof, no inference can arise; since the birth of the latter is 
dependent upon the assurance of universal concomitance (avinabhava) 
between the hetu and the sadhya, which, in its turn, presupposes the 
direct perception of what is proved. Indeed, those who are ignorant of 
fire would be incapable of understanding smoke as a universal concomi¬ 
tant of fire. Nor is a mark of inference {l n<? i) of the sanZnyatodrsta 
variety available in inferring the existence of a person who is competent 
to create all things and to perceive them directly. 


The world, concerning which the question is raised;—Is it, or is 
it not, due to divine creation?—is subservient to a single intelligent 
entity; for, like the body of one who is free from disease, it is constituted 
of non-sentient matter. Further, as the world is an effect, the ability 

Isvara Siddhi 


to create all things and perceive them directly must be inferred to 
belong to its author. 

Indeed, all effects such as pots, water-jars and houses are found 
to be created by intelligent beings who know the material and the auxili¬ 
ary causes and also know for whom and for what purpose they are 
intended 1 . The objects under discussion, such as the earth, the moun¬ 
tain and the wide ocean, are effects; hence it has to be concluded that 
they, too, have for their cause an intelligent entity. 

It cannot be contended that their being effects is itself unestablishd 
for this is well established on the strength of reasons such as the 
arrangement of the parts. AW objects, commencing from wholes which 
are not themselves the parts of other wholes (antyavayavi) and ending 
with the diads ( dvvanukas ), are known to be constituted by the peculiar 
combinations of diverse parts which decrease (in number) in accordance 
with the scale of wholes; hence it follows that ultimately four 
different kinds of infinitesimal atoms are the material causes of the 
world. As for the auxiliary cause ( upakarana ), it must be the unseen 
powers ( a.dtsta .) in the shape of merit ( dharma ) and demerit ( adharma ) 
existing in all individual souls ( ksetrajna ) for the initial movement 
(parispanda) of the infinitesimal atoms has for its non-inherent cause 
(asamavayik&rapa) their conjunction with the manifold souls associated 
with unseen powers in the form of merit and demerit ( adrsta ) which 
are appropriate to this movement. As regards the purpose (of creation), 
1 it is the limitless and manifold forms of help rendered to the jivas, a 
help which is in the shape of diverse, fruitful activities performed by 
them. The self-same jivas who derive this help are the very persons 
for whom (sampradana) the universe is intended. For the reason that 
these jivas are incapable of perceiving the merits and demerits 
even though they are inherent in themselves, why should it not be 
inferred with the aid of a mark of inference ( linga ) of the samanyatodysta 
variety that there is a Supreme Person, who as understood from the 
Adhikarana-siddhclnta, is different from these finite souls, who is 
competent to create all the worlds, who is endowed with a knowledge 

1. Compare Pa^inis sutra-karmai?5 yamabhipraiti sa aampradanam. I. iv. 32. 



of all things, which is of the most excellent kind and which is natural to 
him, and who is endowed with lordship and power of unsurpassed 


The Mimamsakas ridicule this line of thought as being the out¬ 
come of arguments which are unsustainable and which are framed by the 
imagination of one who is ignorant of the methods of inference. To 
make the matter clear—What is the precise significance of the statement 
that the body, the world and the like are subservient to a single conscious 
entity? If it is said that it signifies dependence upon that entity, (it 
may be asked) what is it that is dependent upon h : m ? Is it their origin 
or continuance or activity ? On the first two alternatives, the illustrative 
example cited would be defective in not possessing the sadhya. Indeed, 
the body is not dependent for its origin and continuance upon 
a single intelligent entity. All persons who share in the enjoyment of 
the pleasures and pains dependent upon a given body must also, equally 
with the person who owns it, be responsible for its origin and 
continuance ; since they are endowed with unseen powers (adrsta) 
appropriate to that enjoyment. 

The continuance of a complex whole like that of the body, which » 
is in4he form of the inherence of the whole in its parts, requires no 
intelligent being apart from the peculiar inter-relation of the parts 
themselves. Continuance, understood in the sense of breathing, which 
stands in need of an intelligent person, is not met with in the earth and 
the like, which are offered as the paksa (minor term) in your argument; 
hence we fail to discern a uniform type of continuance existing in com¬ 
mon in both the minor term ( paksi ) and the illustrative example 
(, sapaksa ). 

Should it be said that ‘dependence’ means having an activity 
subject to the control of a single intelligent entity, then, in consideration 
of instances like huge boulders or trees or cars which could be moved 
only with the strenuous effort put forth by several strong persons, the 

Isvara Siddhi 


argument is liable to be charged with the fallacy of vyabhicara. Again, 
when the conclusion (namely, that the world presupposes an intelligent 
cause) follows from the very fact of the cosmos being constituted of 
(matter), the addition of the qualification ‘endowed with a knowledge of 
the material cause and so on’ is superfluous. 

The argument proves what is already proven 

If the aegument were to establish only dependence upon a 
conscious entity, then, the arugument is liable to be charged with the 
defect of proving what is already well-established; for this world has 
been created by our own past deeds {karma) as something fit for 
enjoyment by conscious be ; ngs, experiences (bhokta). It is proper to 
admit that the agency for the creation of the world belongs only to the 

conscious beings posited by both the rival disputants, for this hypothesis 
has the merit of economy of thought {laghava). 

It is impossible to deny agency to finite souls, on the score that 
they are not acquainted with the material cause and the like. For all 
intelligent beings are quite competent to perceive directly the material 
causes, namely, the elements like earth, and the auxiliary causes such 
as sacrifice (j a/ha) and gift (dina). 


Direct perception of the infinitesimal atoms which are the ultimate 
building materials is not required for agency; because earth and other 
elements possessing at all times, as at the present moment, partial 
growth and decay which take place occasionally and gradually, do not 
secure at any time total annihilation or creation. 

(It is futile to contend that as yaga and dana become the causes 
of creation only through the mystic power [apurva) which they generate 
and as this power is imperceptible to the jiva, he cannot be the agent; 
for) the mystic potency of activities which is referred to by terms, such 
as ‘apurva', may not be perceptible; but, surely, the act itself possessing 
this power is open to perception. In fact, the potter and other agents 
engaged in producing objects, such as jars, do not enter upon their 



respective activities only after having directly perceived the potency to 
produce the effect residing in their material and auxiliary causes, such 
as, the lump of clay and the wheel. However, in producing objects that 
are desired, the utilisation of their respective material causes would be 
impossible to those who are altogether ignorant of their potency. But 
here, the manifold potencies of activities are learnt through scriptures 
Therefore, let it be held that finite souls severally are the agents in 
creating everything in the world with the aid of their own deeds. 

The Mimamsaka objection that since the earth, the ocean etc canmt be 
made, they cannot be said to have a cause. 

Moreover, only that which it is possible to make, and whose 
material cause can possibly be known, is found everywhere to have a 
conscious being for its agent. For the reason that the earth, the 
mountain and the mighty ocean do not possess this nature (i e . it is 
impossible to make them, and their material cause cannot to known), 
it is difficult to imagine how they can be regarded as the respe:tivo 
effects of different causes. It is even more ‘ duficult to conceive how 
their material and auxiliary causes could become the objects of direct 
perception. Only an effect like the jar or the water-po\ which is known 
to be dependent upon an intelligent entity acquainted with material and 
other causes, is capable of leading to the inference that an effect must 
have for its cause a sentient being possessing_a knowledge of that kind * 
(i.e., knowledge of upadana , upakararia and the like.) 

Your argument would only establish the reverse of what y iu seek to 

prove i.e. it would not prove an omniscient Lord but only a finite 

Further, in as much as an effect like the jar is known to be 
produced by a person who is different from God and who possesses 
- limited powers and knowledge and who is endowed with a personality, 
and who has desires which are unfulfilled, the reason ( hem) cited by 
you, establishing as it does a kno.ver answering to this description, is 
^iaole to be charged with viruddha dosa. For it establishes the very 
reverse of ommiscience and lordship .over the universe which is sought 

Isvara S iddhi 


to be proved as belonging to the person who is suggested to be the cause 
of the world. 

(The Mimamsaka continues :)—There is no room for the objec¬ 
tion that if this were so there would be an end to all reasoning. For, 
if the thirg proved ( [lingin]) is open to any pramaria other than that on 
which it is at the moment based, this other pramaria. itself would dispel 
the contradictory features suggesting themselves on the strength of the 
mark of inference ( linga .). In the present case, however, when a person 
who transcends the reach of all other pramanas and who is competent to 
create all things is desired to be proved, the reason ( hetu ) will, in addition 
to proving him, establish also all those features which possess invariable 
concomitance ascertained on the strength of positive and negative 


The possibility of proving the precisely opposite conclusion i. e. that the 
world is not created. 

The activities of a person in his senses are always invariably 
characterised by thought of personal gain or love to others. Since, in 
the case of God, none of these exists, the creation of the world cannot 
justifiably be ascribed to him. As all his desires are already fulfilled, 
he does not create the world for his own sake. Since at the time of 
dissolution ( pralaya ) the jivas are destitute of senses, body and other 
means of enjoyment, no sorrow could be experienced by them; as a * 
consequence, creation cannot be the result of the mercy evoked by the 
perception of persons afflicted by sorrow ; hence, with the absence of 
the vi apaka (the invariably concomitant], namely, personal gain and 
mercy, t^ieremust be the absence of the vyapya (that which is inherent), 
namely, the activity of a sensible person. He who creates the universe 
out of mercy must have created it in such a fashion that pleasure alone 
is present in the universe. If it were suggested that he pays due regard 
to the past deeds of jivas, his independence would be lost. 

The argument that the nimitta karana need not know the upadina 
rana and hence one who is not omniscient could be cause . 

Besides, there is no rule to the effect that agency belongs only to 
that person who directly perceives the material cause and the like ; for 

144 Siddhitrayam 

in respect of activities, such as knowing, agency belongs to the soul even 
though the latter is ignorant of the auxiliary causes. 

The Mim&msaka concludes his argument 

Hence, in as much as the hetu, namely, ‘be'ng an effect’ is liab’e 
(for the considerations mentioned just now) to be charged with the 
defects of being unestablished ( asiddhd), adverse (viruddha. and 
afle&an/a (straying), it is impossible that the. universe should have for its 
cause a person like the one suggested by you. 

This may be expressed in syllogistic form thus:—(l) Phenomena, 
such as, the earth and the mountain, are not effects, for the reason that, 
like ether, they are thoroughly unlike what are well-known to be effects 
or for the reason that here, unlike the case of jars, the knowledge of 
material and auxiliary causes is impossible to secure. (2) The 
infinitesimal atoms are imperceptible; for, unlike jars and the like, they 
are exceedingly subtle substances. (3) The period under discussion (.e 
pralaya) is not characterised by the absence of the world: for it is also a 
period like the present one. (4) The body, the world and the like do 
not have God for their agent; for. like the jar. they are effects (5) 3od 
is not an agent, because he has no purpose in creating the world, or 
because, like the released soul, he is not possessed of a body. 


To these arguments of the Mimamsaka the Naiyayika replies — 
The character of being an effect cannot be denied to earth 'ks Of 
and other substances; because, like the jar etc., they are endo.vcd w th 
parts, or with activities while they are yet bigin magnitude, or win 
forms while they are big in magnitude, or with wider and narrower 
generality (samanya-visesa) while they are open to external percep.ion 
and because of other reasons like this. We know of no distinct feature 
associated exclusively with a particular configuration of parts, about 
which it could be said ‘This mode of configuration alone is an effect, and 
none else is.' 

Isvara Siddhi 


Meeting the charge that there is no vyapti 

The contention that that alone can be said to be created which It 
is possible to produce and whose material and auxiliary causes can 
possibly be known may be true enough; but the capacity to do and the 
power to know can only be inferred from activity and knowledge. And 
since these have been shown to exist in respect of the earth (ksiti) and 
the like, on the strength of the reasons adduced already, it is clear that 
there is no special feature that could mark off the body, the world and 
the like from well-known effects, such as, the temple tower and the wall. 
No restriction to the effect ‘The scope of activity is only this much’ is 
noticed to limit activity to certain objects alone; and if such a 
restriction exists, we may assert that this cosmos is impossible of 
production. If it is proved to be an effect, it necessarily follows that 
there is a person who is competent to perceive directly its material and 
other causes, and to control and direct the same. 

The nature of adhitshana defined. 

As in the case of the control of his own body and (senses) by the 
jiva, here also (i.e., in regard to the cosmos) control ( adhisthana ) 
consists merely in the proximity (to the cosmos) of a God possessed of a 
will conducive to its activity. With regard to substances (dravya) this 
proximity takes the form of conjunction ( samyoga ) ; and in regard to 
their qualities, it is inherence ( samavaya ) in that wherein there is con¬ 
junction ( samyukta ). 

Coming to activity ( pravrtti ), that of infinitesimal atoms is merely 
change of place (parispanda). With regard to merit ( dharma ,) 
and demerit (arf/tarma), their activity is simply their coming into associa¬ 
tion with appropriate platfe ( desa .) and times (&ala) and other auxiliary 
causes helpful to the starting of the fruits of deeds. 

It is wrong to maintain that the fruits of activities result from 
merit and demerit themselves;* for these and all other things not controlled 

*In the printed books and manuscripts this sentence reads thus, without tho 
■egative particle. ‘tabhyam dharmadbarmabhyam phalam.* But from the context 
it is clear that the text should be ‘na ca tabhyam...* 




by an intelligent entity cannot effect anything by themselves; since they 
are devoid of sentience. Though provided with auxiliary causes, such a* 
place and tithe. the axe not controlled by a carpenter, an intelligent 
being, is indeed incapable of making objects like the sacrificial post 
(yupa). For the reason that instances such as seed-sprout are already 
included in the paksa (minor term), the suggestion that in view of the 
case of seed-sprout (where the non-sentient seed, not controlled by any 
intelligent agent, produces the'sprout by its own effort) the foregoing 
argument commits the fallacy of vyabh.ica.ra is the outcome of the ignor¬ 
ance (of the methods of inference) found in persons who are merely 
versed in the vedas. On the same count, the attempt to level the charge 
of vyabhicara by citing the instance of pleasure 3 and the like stands con¬ 
demned. . . 

* -*• ■ r * ( " * 4 rr 

t . : 

The jiva cannot be nimitta karapa of the world 

It is not right to attribute control to finite souls themselves simply 
because they are accepted by both the rival disputants; for the jiva’s 
incapacity to perceive what is subtle and what is screened from view is 
well-established. (Rather than admitting a separate entity. God. would 
it not be better to attribute this capacity to perceive the subtle and the 
hidden to finite souls themselves ? The answer is in the negative) for 

^ i, 

what is posited must everywhere be in conformity with, and not con¬ 
tradictory to, what is known. It is not well-establishedjthat the incapa¬ 
city to perceive the subtle and the veiled belongs to God. as it belongs 
to the jivas; because by means of other pram anas the capacity to per¬ 
ceive them is proved to belong to him. The person whose existence is 
proved on the strength of the argument already advanced is surely as¬ 
certained to possess in his essential nature the capacity to perceive all 
things and to direct them; for ‘being an effect’ is invariably concomitant 
wtih. ‘dependence upon a competent agent.’ 

— —- - " ' 

2. Since pleasure and other affective states, which are devoid of consciousness, 
produce, even in the absence of any control from an intelligent person, their appro¬ 
priate bodily,responses, such as smiling, flow of tears and several organic and visceral 
changes, it may be ujged that the argument is vitiated by vyabhicara dosa. 

Isvara Siddhi 


The untenabiitly of the contention that the argument only estabishes 
attributes opposed to omniscience etc. 

The objection raised already (vide p. 142), namely that, as the 

hetu points only to limited capacity and fragmentary knowledge and to 
the absence of lordship,' it establishes only the reverse of the qualities 

intended to be proved, is highly superficial: for. clearly, the hetu in 
question does not lead to the inferring of limited powers and the like. 3 
In fact, for its own production any object that is being produced does 
not require on the part of its agent either the incapacity to effect other 
things or ignorance concerning them; for, in as much as it would only 
lead to the inference that there is a person competent to make it, the 
absence of thecapicity to produce other things does not follow there¬ 
from. 4 When the production of an effect may well take place solely 
with the aid of knowledge and power concerning the same, it is quite 
unnecessary to consider what is wholly unrelated to it and what has 
nothing to do with it, namely the absence (of knowledge and power) 
concerning other effects, as being responsible for its production. 

Further, it has to be carefully ascertained whether what is said to 
be invariably concomitant ( vyapaka ), namely, ‘ignorance of other 
things and incapacity to effect them,’ concerns all things other than the 
effect in question or certain things only. It cannot be ignorance pertain¬ 
ing to all things; for we know of no such ignorance. Indeed, the potter* 
is not ignorant of everything excepting the pot. If it be urged that the 
ignorance pertains to certain things only, even this suggestion fares no 
better; for, so long as the object of ignorance is left unspecified, the 
argument is liable to be charged with yya.bhic3.ra dosa in view of the fact 
that even in the absence of ignorance concerning any given object, agency 
is still possible. No one object has been specified in order to be able 
to assert -‘Only that person who is ignorant of such and such an object 
is fit to become an agent.” 

3. The reading found in all books is *... asatnarthyam jnsnam...’ but it ought 
to be ‘...asamarthyamajnanam...’ 

4. All books examined read 'kevelavyatirekasiddheb,* Perhaps a better, 
reading would be ‘kevalam vyatirekasiddheb,' 



There is no need to contend that the agent should only be a 
person endowed with a body ; for this contention is liable to be charged 
with anekanta dosa in view of the very fact of the activity of assuming 
a body. Indeed, the soul does not take up a body while being already 
associated with a body; for. then it would be impossible for the yogin to 
take up several bodies simultaneously. When discussing the nature of 
the soul it has been shown that it is only after relinquishing the former 
body the soul enters upon another solely with the assistance of vital 
breath ( prsirn) which is induced to activity by past deeds which procure 
a fresh body. 


What is needed for creation is controlling activity and not the body. 

Moreover, the body which is the object of the controlling activity 
on the part of the self, the controller of the body, cannot intelligibly be 
included in the very body of the definition of the controller; for one 
and the same thing being at once the hgent and the object in the self¬ 
same activity involves a contradiction. If it be maintaihed that control, 
which is simply the possession of an effort conducive to the activity of 
the body, is known to belong only to him who is in conjunction with 
the body which is sought to be controlled, it has to be replied: ‘let it be 
admitted that the controller should be related to the object controlled, 
since the control of a given object is * impossible to him who is 
unrelated to it.’ (It may be asked) How is it determined that this 
relation need not be the bodily relation ? (The reply is) “It is for this 
reason, namely, that other objects also, such as the measuring rod, 
are controlled by one who is merely related to them.. 
Therefore, apart from what is required for the controlling activity, 
namely, mere relation to the object controlled, no other relation like 
the relation to the body, need be countenanced. And it has already 
been pointed out that relationship to material and auxiliary causes of 
the cosmos exists in God. 

Activity can be initiated without the instrumentality of the body i. e. 
mere samkalpa suffices 

It may be objected that the causing of any particular form of activity 
in things other than the body is done only with the aid of the body; for 

Isvara Siddhi 


it is found that the power in the staff, wheel and the like belongs to the 
potter and other agents only in virtue of factors, such as contact with 
the hand. This objection too is untenable; for the extraction and the 
scattering of the poison that has entered one’s body is observed to be 
effected by another person by the mere exercise of his will.' r ~. 

When the body is absent how, it may be asked, could the will to 
cause movements in other things arise ? (The reply is) Then is it con¬ 
tended that it is the body that wills ? If that is so, in its absence there 
will be no will. Should it be urged that the body (does not itself will, 
but) is the instrument ( karana ) in the act of willing, it may be replied 
‘‘not so”; for the mind ( nianai ) is the instrument of willing. 

Has God, then, a manas ? (The answer is) “Quite so”. If it be 
said that in that event, certain common features, such as the possession 
of a body, merit and demerit and the absence of sovereignty, would have 
to be attributed to God, the reply is “not so.” For this objection is set 
aside on the very strength of the fact of the world having a competent 
agent, a fact inferred with the aid of the hetu that it is an effect. 
Moreover, since even when the body perishes contact with manas 
has been admitted, in as much as it is an eternal organ of sense, the 
argument is vitiated by anekanta dosa. In fact, only that much which is 
relevant to the inductive relation and which is in conformity with what 
is perceived is admitted Since a person whose body occupies a limited 
area, whose knowledge is limited and whose action is subject to merit 
and demerit, is incapable of creation the world composed of the primal 
elements and what is constituted of these, and possessed of a structure 
inconceivable even by our minds and an extent which is boundless, it 
has to be concluded that there is an agent who is endowed with illimita¬ 
ble knowledge, sovereignty, and power and who, without requiring 

the body, is capable of creating all the worlds with the sole aid of his 
will. ^ 

No need to entertain a ny doubt on the ground that in the case in point 

many of the characteristics differ from those found in the illustrative 

If it be said that in instances such as the jar ho invariable relation 
between the character of being an effect and an agent of this descrip- 



tion is observed, (we ask in reply) is the relation of smoke with fire of 
a description which exists on the dense hill side, which is never experien¬ 
ced before, which is huge in volume and fed by an enormous 
quantity of fuel, ever noticed in the kitchen? If it were so, on the 
perception of a particular kind of smoke it could be inferred that on the 
hill-top there is fire of that description. If it be said that when a certain 
kind of smoke is found in a given place (to be concomitant with a 
particular kind of fire) that kind of smoke will be capable of leading to 
inference of that kind of fire in that locality alone, and that a fire of a diffe¬ 
rent description, even when it is not noticed in the illustrative example 
could still be inferred with the aid of the inductive relation of smoke in 
general with fire in general, in consideration of the inductive relation of 
the paksa wherein it resides (in this argument it is the hill), (we ask) how 
is it that when we maintain the same position it fails to appeal to your 
mind? Here also the character of being an effect, which is known in 
examples, such as the pot. to have an invariable concomitance with 
dependence upon a competent agent, when noticed in the case of earth 
and the like, points to an intelligent agent, who is capable of producing 
them and is hitherto unknown. Just as by ignoring the place where fire 
is found, the time of its existence, the fuel by which it is fed, the size, 
and other characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of smoke 
with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is established; 
even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the agent, such as 
the absence of lordship ( anisvaratva), the possession of fragmentary 
knowledge, the characteristics of fire, the invariable concomitance of 
smoke with fire alone which is responsible for its very existence is 
established ; even so by eliminating the special characteristics of the 
agent, such as, the absence of lordship (anisvaralva). the possession of 
fragmentary knowledge, the character of owning a body, of being 
subject to merit and demerit, and of being human, universal concomi¬ 
tance of an effect with an intelligent agent merely, who is competent to 
make it, is ascertained. Hence, there is no special feature marking off 
these two cases, 

Isvara Siddhi 


Adducing special illustrations to strengthen the conclusion that the 
divine creator is vastly different from the human agent. 

/ * • , * i . 

(Difficulties arise when it is insisted that all the special features 
found in the illustrative example should be found in all the cases 
coming under that vyapti. For example) :—When an object, which is~ 
in conjunction with an all-pervasive substance and which possesses move-' - 
ment. is known without exception to be everywhere associated with the 
possession of touch, how can the mind 5 whose conjunction with the 
soul is inferred from conscic>usness, pleasure and other special qualities of 
an eternal substance, be devoid of touch (sparsa) ? When what is com¬ 
posed of wind and what possesses visible magnitude is found to be 
invariably concomitant with the character of being the object of the 
sensation of touch and is also found to have a particular abode, how 
can the opposite character be met with in the sense of touch? 6 

When either the colour (rupa) or the contact ( sparsa) of fiery 
objeets must invariably be explicit, how could it be admitted that these 
two are never explicit in the eye, which is inferred to be fiery, for the 
reason that it is the instrument for cognising colour ? 

If it be said that it is so admitted (i, e, that the eye is devoid of 
explicit rupa or spar da) for the reason that the belief in the special* 
qualities (i.e., explicit rupa or sparsa) appropriate to the respective 

5. The Naiyayika raises this objection against the Prabhakara school, and not 
against the Bhstta school, of Mimamsa; for the former believes that manas is atomic, 
while the latter maintains that manas, like the atman, is all-pervasive (vibhu). And 
on the Naiyayika view that there cannot be any samyoga between two vibhudravyat, 
manas cannot be in conjunction with the soul. 

0. Some entities constituted of vayu, such as prana, viyana, udana and 
samana, dwell only in particular regions of the body. For example, prana is said to 
dwell in the heart ( hrdi ); and samana, in the navel (nabhi). And the air outside is 
cognisable by the sense of touch. The sense organ for touch, however, has the 
entire body for its adhi^thana and not merely a particular region thereof. Nor is it 
ths object of the sense of touch. 



cases is contradicted by effectual non-apprehension ( yogyanupalabdhi ), 
even though the character of being fiery is attributed to these (i.e,, the 
eye and so forth) whose existence is inferred from a knowledge of their 
activity, and for the reason that on this admission (namely, that the 
special features found in the illustrative examples should be inferred to 

* i 

exist in other cases as well), there would be an end to all inference; (it 
may be replied) well, if that be so even in the case under discussion it 
may be admitted that these qualities do not belong to the creator of the 
world, because the special qualities of the potter, which in your opinion 
would have to be attributed to the creator of the earth and the like, are 
likewise contradicted by non-apprehension and because snch an admis¬ 
sion would mean an end to all inductive generalisation. Thus, the two 
cases are in every respect similar, except your prejudice. 

Other arguments to establish the existence of Isvara 

In fact the following arguments are met with (1) The infinitesimal 
atoms and so forth, the precise manner of whose activity is under dis- 
pure, act under the direction of an intelligent'person; for they are non- 
sentient and whatever is anon-sentient object, acts in this way; for 
example, the ball and other non-sentient objects. (2) All activities, 
internal and external, concerning which there is difference of opinion, 
presuppose the perception of their material and auxiliary causes; be¬ 
cause, like the activities of the examples cited in the previous argument 
they are effects. ( 3) The infinitesimal atom is perceptible; 7 because, like 
the jar, it is an object of knowledge and is an entity. (4 ) The world is 
dependent upon the will of a person; for, like our own' body, it is 
devoid of consciousness. (5) All intelligent persons act only under 
the control of a single intelligent entity (i. e., God): for by standing 
in need of contact with their bodies they enter upon their activities, like 

7 In the Chaukamba and Telugu editions the following variant reading for the 
text commencing after the word and ending with 

is suggested;- 



Isvara Siddhi 


the sense of touch and so forth. (6) The world, which is the object of 
all this dispute, points to a single Supreme Person; because, like a 
country ruled over by a supreme monarch, the world consists of sentient 
and nonsentient entities. 

* * * * * 

* * * * * 

The text of Isvara-Siddhi available is only this much. 

33T*Mr fs}^nr?3 ifk 

jpi ^trw^mq^frr ft 

^^Tsq- I ^ ^ |<RT: (1) %?!%% W™ 


snh , ?rf%^3[lhfTT^^?t i (2) tr^ffaRU 

Except for the two new arguments which this passage sets forth at its end, it contains 
no substantial change. These arguments are;- 

(1) The world existing at all times, the past, the present and the future 
possesses a continuance and a destruction which arc subject to a person endowed 
with a group of qualities, such as power appropriate thereto; because it has mani- ♦ 
fold wonderful shapes inconceivable even by the mind ; for example, pictures and 
dolls which are well—known to have their continuance and so forth subject to a 
very competent person. (2) All things denoted by the expression vibhbti possess the 

characters of being supported by (adheyatva), being controlled by (vidheyatva), and 
existing for the sake of (besatva) a person; for, in the manner of one’s own body, they 
constitute his body. 





Enquiry into the significance of the text “Brahman exists, one only 
without a second\ 

It is contended that the upanisadic text “Brahman (exists) one 
only, without a second” denies the existence of everything other than 
Brahman. Against this contention we argue as follows:—In what light 
is the compound word advitiya. to be understood? Is it a tatpurusa. or 
a bahuvrihi compound ? 

4 * 

'Advitiya' cannot be taken as a tatpurusa compound 

If it is the former, the significance of the latter part of the 
compound word must be considered as primary. Does the latter par 1 
declare that Brahman is different from’ or ‘similar to* or’‘opposed to* 
dvitiya (the second)? In none of these alternatives does the text deny 
the existence of something other than Brahman. A second entity is 
clearly established if the word advitiya signifies ‘different from* or 
‘similar to.* If it means‘opposed to the second’, then Brahman must 
be either a first or a third entity; for what stands opposed to the second 
is ‘the first* or ‘the,third.’ Therefore, hosts of objects, three and more, 
along with the single entity untouched by duality (i.e., all objects with 
the exception of the second) do assuredly exist uncontradicted. 

Since the term ‘the second* (dvitiya) has the implicit designation 
0 upalaksaria ) of also the third, the fourth and so forth, it may be urged 
that the negative particle denies everything other than Brahman (and 
not merely the second). But the reply is “Not so.” The denial of a 
second entity should not be inferred from this expression; it only asserts 
that Brahman is something -different from’ or ‘opposed to’ or ‘similar 
to the second.* 1 

J. Tadanya-tadviruddha-tadabhavesu nafi. 



If it is said that Brahman may be described as that which has no 
trace of duality, then words such as satya which define Brahman would 
turn out to be erroneous definitions (for they imply substance-attribute 
relation). If the expression advitiya were to denote merely the absence 
of a second, Brahman would be self-existent, and, as such, the negative 
particle could not be associated with the term Brahman. 

‘Being without a second’ cannot be a qualification of Brahman. 
Were it a qualification, it would (as already shown) follow that Brah¬ 
man is either 'the first or the third entity. 

Nor can it be taken as a bahuvrihi compound 

Even if the word is taken as a bahuvrihi compound, it would 
follow that all objects exist. All objects of the three worlds, which, in 
relation to Brahman, could be spoken of as the first, the third, fourth 
and so on, would exist safely without any danger of ever being 
contradicted; for all that is denied is merely the possession of a 

Moreover, if the word is taken as a bahuvrihi compouud the 
significance of the negative found in the compound cannot be said to 
be associated with anything else; for it is only in the event of there . 
being a true relation (of Brahman) with something else that the genitive 
case implied in the compound {that for which there is no second) would 
be appropriate, (rt is only if the phrase ‘not having a second' could be 
attributed to something, that a dvitiya could be taken as a bahuvrihi 

The phrase ‘The absence of a second’ does not mean Brahman 
itself nor an attribute thereof. For it is essentially negative, while 
Brahman is really not negative. Nor could it be an attribute of Brahman; 

(for according to the opponent, Brahman is devoid of qualities). 
Thus the existence of the world is not contradicted by scriptural texts 
speaking of reality as non-dual, The existence of the world is established 
by the sources of knowledge ( pramanas ) relevant thereto. Their 
verdict is further confirmed by scriptural testimony. 

Samvit Siddhi 


The significance of the expression Advitiya (the view of the 
visistadvaitin .) 

The real significance of the text—“Reality exists one only and 
without a second (advitiyay'— may now be explained. The person who 
is considered advitiya is one who neither has. nor had, nor will have 
an equal or a superior capable of being counted as a second. How 
could the world be referred to as a second when it is but a small fraction 
of the entire collection of entities which constitute His possessions and 
which are under His sway (vibhava) ? The statement “The paramount 
ruler of the Cola country now reigning is without a second in this 
world”—is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him. It 
does not deny the existence of his servants, sons, consort and so on.' 
Similarly, the whole host of devas, asuras and men. the four-faced 
Brahma and the cosmic egg form but a small part of a drop from the 
ocean of the greatness (mahima) of the possessions (vibhuti) of 
Lord Visijui who is the Lord of all, who is touched neither by sorrows 
(klesas) nor by merits, demerits (karma) or (vipakaf and so forth, and 
who is the seat of the sixfold qualities of knowledge (jnana) and the like, 
and .whose greatness cannot even be conceived by the mind. Which 
person, who counts with his fingers the oceans as seven, is capable of 
counting the waves, foam, bubbles and drops of water found therein ? 


Just as the presence of the rays of the sun is not contradicted by 
the statement—“There is but a single sun in the sky. and not two’’— 
and just as when objects are counted the number (sankhya), which is 
different therefrom is not counted, in the same way in which the 
objects are counted, even so when Brahman is declared to be without 
a second, the existence of His possessions is not denied. Texts such as— 
“All beings constitute but a quarter of Him, three-fourths remaining 
immortal in heaven” 3 —declare that the entire cosmos is but a mode of 

Other druti texts in support of the siddhantin’s view 

Sruti and smrti texts, such as the following, purport to show 
that the world is a mode ( prakara ) of Brahman. “His possessions are 

2. Yoga Sutra, 1, 24. 3. Puru§a-Sukta. 






so immense. He is greater than these”. 4 “That wherein he does not 
cognise anything other than Brahman is the highest of all ( Bhuma )”; 5 
M He is sure to be afflicted with fear who sees anything as different from 
Brahman (i. e.. anything as not belonging to Brahman)”; 8 “He before 
whom the cosmic egg and the entire universe pale into insignificance, 
just as an atom does before Mount Meru.” 

The world cons : sting of objects which are liable to modification 
and which are either moveable or immoveable exists for purposes of 
speech. The unchanging and ultimate cause of all these is sat alone. 
Just as sparks are not different from fire wherefrom they take their 
rise, even so the effect is not different from its cause. That the effect is 
not different from its cause is shown by numerous illustrations, such as 
clay, iron, seed and so forth. Without being nourished by Brahman’s 
power, fire would not be capable of burning even a blade of grass; 
water would not be capable of drowning; and the wind would be unable 
to move. “By an understanding of the one Supreme Being, all become 

With the aid of scriptural texts such as the foregoing and smj-ti 
texts based thereon, it is learnt that the world constituted of sentient and 
non-sentient objects derives its very being from the fact of its having 
Brahman for its soul The possessions of Brahman are not contradicted 
by these passages. 

Refutation of the view that the world is illusory: 

Should it be contended that their existence is denied, then it 
would follow that all activities, sacred and secular, nay even the 
knowledge of Brahman would cease to be; because everything (other 
than Brahman) would be illusory. I have already refuted the contention 
that although objects are in fact illusory, perceptual experience and the 

4 . 


6 . 


Chcind Up., VII. 24. 1. 

Tait. Up., II. 7. 

Samvit Siddhi 


/ike are not contradicted, in so far as objects are said to possess 
phenomenal reality (vyavah&rika satyatva). Thus, it follows that, since 
the world is the possession of Brahman, its existence is not contradicted 
by the knowledge afforded by the upanisads. namely, that Brahman is 
* without a second. 

The objector might ask: If the world exists, how could negative 
judgments (such as ‘ There is no jar”) arise? We ask him in reply “If the 
world were non-existent, how could affirmative judgments (like “There 
is a jar“) arise?. 

The untenability of the view that the world is at once sat and asat.. 

(Should it be said that since both negative and affirmative cogni¬ 
tions do arise, the world is at once sat and asat, it is replied that) sat 
and asat cannot characterise the self-same entity; for they are contradic¬ 
tory qualities 

When contradictory qualities are attributed to the self-same entity 
on the strength of contradictory cognitions of‘existence’ and ‘non 
existence’, there is no certainty as to which of them is true. For this 
reason, the Jains declare that existence and non-existence could be 
attributed to the world. 

' * * 

Since the cognition of non-existence presupposes awareness of 
existence, the Sankhyas maintain that the world is a always characterised 
by existence. 

In order to get over the contradiction presented by the mutually 
opposed qualities arising from the cognition of existence and non-exist- 
tence, some thinkers, rejecting both the features of reality and unreality, 
assert that the world cannot be defined either as sat or as asat (, sad a- 
j atfawr vacan iya.) 

Finding that in regard to different times and places, both existence 
and non- existence could characterise jars and other objects, yet others 
believe that both existence and non-existence may characterise the world 
on the basis of certain well-defined spatial and temporal differences. 



When doubt is engendered as a result of the keen controversy that 
rages between these rival theorists, a decision in regard to this matter 
is arrived at by us in accordance with the Mimamsaka theory. 

*If a person were to cognise the jar as being at once existent and 
non-existent, then only could the contradictory features of satv a and 
asatva be attributed to the jar simultaneously. Since our cognitions 
take the following from—“This exists here at this moment'’ or ‘‘It is not 
here at present’’—as a consequence of differences of space, time and 
states, it has to be inferred that, on the basis of such distinctions of 
space, time and states, satva and asatva could be attributed simultan¬ 
eously to the jar. Hence, it may be concluded that reality and unreality 
may both be attributed to the jar and the like on the basis of differences 
of space, time and so forth. This doctrine need not now be considered, 
as it has already been refuted. 

Relation with space and time is intelligible only in the case of sat 
(i.e. The asat could not be in contact with space and time). How, 

then, could it be maintained that the unreal acquires reality with the aid 
cf its relation with space and time ? For relation ( sambandha ) is what 
is found in two relata. Thus the real (sat) always possesses t,he feature 
of reality. It is impossible for causal factors, however powerful, to 
create the quality of existence in what is essentially unreal. Hence the 
universe which has a beginning and end must be included in the category 
of reality. It has already been said that what does not exist at the begin¬ 
ning and in the end must also be non-existent in the middle. Therefore, 
from the eertain fact of its existence now, let it be admitted that the 
world exists at all times. 

Since unreality can never be created, it always belongs to the 
unreal, as in the case of the sky-flower. There is no distinction between 
what is absolutely non-existent and what does not exist at an antecedent 
time in so far as the aspect of non-existence is concerned, (i. e., 
differences of space, time and state could neither make the unreal real; 
nor could they make the real unreal). 

Samvit Siddhi 


Inquiry into the significance of the text tat tvam asi. 

(The opponent may ask.—) When in the sixth chapter of the 
Chandogya Upanisodf taking the instance of Svetaketu, it is declared 
“Tat,tvam asi,” how could the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ be assigned their 
primary meanings ? The finite soul which is afflicted by helplessness, 
misery and sorrow is referred to by the term tvam. The omniscient 
Being, who has a will that is ever-realised and who is the sea of illimit¬ 
able bliss, is the significance of the word ‘tat.’ How could these two 
which are opposed to each other even as light is opposed to darkness, be 
equated ? 

* * * * * 

0 0 0 0 0 

When the qualities found in the object referred to by the term ‘tat* 
and those belonging to the entity denoted by the term ‘tvam’ (are wholly 

opposed to one another?).the view that the terms ‘tat’ and ‘tvam* 

refer to an identical entity has been completely rejected. Whether 
characteristics such as ignorance and omniscience, suffering and enjoyment 
be taken as attributes ( visesanas ) or as secondary marks ( upalakqanas ) 
of the conscious entity, in any case, the meanings of the terms tat 
and tvam must be different; since, otherwise, contradictory features 
would have to be attributed to an identical object. 

Nor is treasonable to argue that here, as in the judgment ‘‘This 
is that cow”j part of the primary meaning of the two terms is left out so 
that the terms tat and tvam signify only pure consciousness; for since to 
the self-luminous object two contradictory features could be attributed 
on the basis of limiting conditions such as time and place, the statement 
“This is that cow” is quite legitimate; whereas in the case of self-lumi¬ 
nous consciousness there is none of the limiting conditions like time or 
place to justify the attribution of opposite qualities. 

* * * * * * 

* * * * * 


Moreover, since in respect of self-luminous consciousness which 
is wholly without distinctions of any kind, there is nothing to generate 
the illusion of difference, which is the root cause of misery, the tiastras 


Samvit Siddhi 


suggesting that none of its alternatives (i.e. bheda being the very essence 
of the object or different therefrom) is tenable. 

Further, since non-difference is what dispels the difference of its 
two substrates and since difference constitutes one objeet not being an¬ 
other, you yourself admit the essence of objects (ya.stu-sva.rupa) as being, 
distinct from bhedabheda, talk of the various alternatives as untenable 
and are thus vanquished by the inconsistency involved in your own 
position. All attempts to refute distinction by needless discussions, 
such as—Is it distinct or non-distinct ? Is it related to the very essence 
of objects or not?—are falsified by perception and experience and are 
thus mere waste of lungs. The cognition “blue” is the same as the 
awareness “lotus”; for we directly get the apprehension “this is a blue 
lotus”. When conjunction (samyoga) is the object of perception ^ is 
erroneous to raise unnecessary questions such as ‘‘Does it relate distinct 
objects?’' even so when scripture and perception assert the relation 
of identity ( tadatmya ) of tat and tvam, such meaningless questions relating 
to it are knocked down by scripture in the shape of a stick (danda). The 
scripture which is self-existent, (not the work of any person) and which 
is free from all defects earnestly and repeatedly declares that the finite 
self and the supreme self are identical in this sense. 

(That the finite self and Brahman are not absolutely identical, as . 
the opponent believes, and that even in moksa the jiva retains its dis¬ 
tinctness is shown by the following description:) Dwelling in the depths 
of Brahmanubhava, the released soul experiences illimitable joy. 

Since the enjoyer perishes at the time the fruit of his labours is 
realised, moksa would hardly be sought by man. If pure consciousness 
alone is left over, we ask: For whom is moksa? 

* * * * * 

* * * * * 

The view that consciousness is the cause of the world is untenable. 

Moreover, which consciousness is it that has assumed the form of 
the world? It could not be the knowledge of the jar; for even in its 
absence the world is perceived. It is not proper to urge that before this 



knowledge arises and after it perishes in moksa the world does not exist; 
for this is contradicted by perception. Nor could it be the knowledge 
of something else; for, after that knowledge perishes, other objects are 

The purvapaksin trying to justify the above contention with examples- 

The opponent may say that consciousness is one and indivisible* 
that there is no apprehension of consciousness within knowledge, for 
objects such as jars are distinct, while consciousness is not, since it is 
always present. (We may ask ) In view of the fact that when the cloth 
is cognised, jar does not shine forth, how could it be said that know¬ 
ledge is always present ? The opponent may reply that it is only f ' 
jar that is not manifest but that knowledge clearly shines forth, l 
objection that consciousness does not shine forth as something di. 
from jar, the opponent asks what is the precise significance of 
expression -‘something distinct from the jar '? (He goes on to add), 
it denotes consciousness, it does shine forth; and if it signifies something 
else, such an entity is not said to shine. (He continues) moreover 
consciousness which, in tts essential nature, is without a form and which 
is self-luminous is falsely taken to be manifold for no other reason 
except the multiplicity of objects known. Distinctions are neither ob¬ 
jects themselves nor their attributes; nor are they open to perception 
and inference. The belief in the multiplicity of objects known, such 
as the jar, is illusory. Hence, (the opponent asks) how could knowledge 
become manifold on the basis of phenomenal entities like the jar? 
And much less could that distinction in knowledge be considered 

The contention that consciousness is eternal:- 

(He goes on to add) Further, self-luminous consciousness has no antece - 
dent Tion-e\istcncQ(pragabhava)(i.Q., consciousness is without a beginning 
and is eternal); (for should the antecedent non-existence of consciousness 
exist, it must be apprehended by consciousness itself or by some other 
means; but) the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not 
apprehended with the aid of consciousness itself or something else. The 

Samvit Siddhi 


first alternative leads to a self-contradictory position; for when con¬ 
sciousness is, its own non-existence cannot be. When consciousness 
does not exist, a congnition for which it is itself responsible—cannot 
arise 7 . The second alternative, namely, that the antecedent non-existence 
of consciousness is proved through some other source fares no better, 
for, consciousness is not the object of anything else. (i,e. Any pramana 
that is to prove the non-existence of consciousness must first cognize 
consciousness before it could speak of its non-existence. But 
consciousness is self-luminous and not the object of anything 

The contention that consciosuness is devoid of attributes. 

Besides, since distinction and so forth are knowable, like colour, 
they cannot be the attributes of consciousness. Hence, conseiousness is 
without a second. It is self-luminous. Therefore, those \Vho know 
Brahman maintain that the foregoing questions regarding the various 
alternatives, based as they are on the belief that consciousness is 
manifold, are all the pranks of ignorance. 

Detailed examinatiom of the advaitc position—consciousness is 

To this we reply “Well! all this dogmatic teaching may carry 
conviction with (bltnd) believers; we are lacking in such faith and search 
for logical reasons to convince us. Like pleasure and pain, all items of 
knowledge concerning various objects and obtained by different persons 
are directly apprehended as being distinct from one another. 8 Distinction 
is not denied to conjunction (famyoga). desire (zcc/ia) and so forth 
whose distinction is revealed by the relata. Nor is it admitted that they 
are not open to perception. 9 

Consciousness cannot be eternal , all—pervasive and unitary 

“If consciousness is admitted to be eternal and all-pervasive, then 
all objects should shine forth at all times or none at all. It would not be 

7. Vide At/na-siddhi p. 35. 

8. This and the succeeding stanza nave been clearly elucidated in Srutapra- 

aYika, Jijnasadhikarana p. 89 (Nirnayasagara Press Edition.) 



appropriate to seek to explain why certain objects alone shine and not 
others on the basis of the proximity or otherwise of objects known; for 
like ether (akada), consciousness is admitted to be all-pervasive. Nor 
could this be explained on the basis of the differences in the causes of 
knowledge; for knowledge is eternal and has, consequently, no cause. 
Nor yet could it be explained on the basis of the diversity of knowledge 
itself; for you advocate the theory that knowledge is single. It would 
then follow that knowledge of sound and the like would have to arise 
even in the case of the deaf and the blind. Besides there would be no 
room for the distinction of teacher and pupil.” 

Untenability of the contention that there is nothing apart from 
consciousness. ■ 

The opponent may object and say, “On our theory there is no 
•all objects' distinct from consciousness. Hence, there is no propriety 
in your dogmatic charge that all objects should always be revea'ed”. 

To this we reply, ••Well, tell me whether they appear 
but are not different from consciousness. If the former, your 
explanation of worldly and sacred knowledge is attractive indeed. 9 
Since, on your theory, neither words nor their meanings shine forth, 
(it would be impossible to understand the world and much less the 
teaching of the scripture). If the latter, your view that consciousness 
is single would be in jeopardy; for, if the world with its manifold forms 
is consciousness itself, then consciousness too must be equated with the 
world and would thus come to be manifold 10 

The contention that avidya is the cause of the world and that it is 
difficult to define it as different and as non-different 

The opponent may say that since the world is the handiwork of 
avidya (which cannot be described as being distinct or nondistinct), 
there is difficulty in deciding whether it is distinct or nondistinct from 
consciousness. But this is untenable; for avidya is like a waxen jewel 
which is in contact with the fire of reasoning. To explain the matter 

9. Compare Satadusapi, Samvidadvaitabhangavada (33) 

10. Compare Prakaranapancikd t 8. 

Samvit Siddhi 


fully—.If avidya is said to be merely the absence of knowledge (i.e., if it 
is a negative principle) its nature would be indefinable ( nirupakhya - 
svabhavu), it cannot be responsible for anything (i.e. for creating the 

What is the significance of the negative particle in avidya ? 

(If avidyQ is something distinct from vidya (i.e. if it is a positive 
entity) it would be ludicrous to hold that it is indescribable. (Your) 
statement that avida cannot be described as being distinct or non-distinct 
from vidya , but that it is really an entity different from vidya is indeed 
a fine piece of reasoning! If you were to urge that even 
this character of its being distinct from vidya is illusory, we reply that, 
if so, avidya itself would in truth be vidya. And we may ask: when 
consciousness is pure and is not insentient, while avidya is the reverse, 
why is avidya not considered to be distinct from vidya ? 

What is the term vidya occurring in avidya ? 

Is vidya , whose negation is said to be avidya, consciousness itself 
or the known or the knower ? If it is either the known or the knower, 
avidya cannot be removed by either of these; for avidya (ignorance) 
cannot be dispelled by anything other then knowledge. If vidya is 
knowledge itself, avidya could not possibly exist, since knowledge is 

Further, if avidya is the opposite (contradictory) of vidya 
ignorance cannot exist anywhere; for the entire world is pervaded by 
vidya which is without a second. If avidya is said to be a negative 
principle, or something other than vidya or something opposed to it, 
then (you have to abandon the theory that consciousness {samvit) is 
without a second. 

AsrayanupapaXti-ayidysi cannot dwell in jiva. 

Moreover, for whom is this avidyal (You may reply that it is) 
for the jiva. (We ask) who is a jiva? If you were to say the jiva is that 
to whom avidya is ascribed, (we reply that) this leads to irreconcilable 
mutual dependence (anyonyasraya): for there could be no avidyH in the 



absence of the yiva, and there could be no jiv a without avidya. It could 
not be said that this is similar to the relation of seed and sprout; for it 
is impossible to ascribe origination to the yiva. 

Nor is Bra.hma.Tt the substrate of avidya. 

If avidya is said to relate to Brahman, (we ask) how could the 
omniscient Being be subject to delusion? The character of being afflicted 
by the delusion that the body is itself the self—a delusion born of avidya- 
cannot be attributed to Brahman whom the scripture. declares to be 
omniscient and whose omniscience is said therein to constitute his 
essential nature . 11 

Should it be urged that, since it implies apprehension of diversity 
omniscience must be considered illusory, (we ask the opponent): For the 
same reason, why should we not treat omniscience, like sa.bdanta.ra, and 
so forth, as being other than unreal? Just as iabdantara, abhyasa , 
sankhya 1 * and so on. which imply apprehension of difference and 
which mark off one sas/ra from another and are considered real, why 
should not omniscience be treated likewise (i.e., as real )? 13 

If ignorance were to exist in the omniscient and the eternally free 
being, even as darkness exists in light, then ignorance could never be 
removed therefrom by anything whatsoever. 

If it be said that the texts referring to omniscience and other 
qualities have only validity (vyavaharikapramanya), while those speak¬ 
ing of non—dualism alone have absolute (tattvi&a-prawawya) we reply 
that for such a distinction there is no other bn sis excepting your own 
dogmaiic assertion. 

11 Compare Satadusani xada 19. The alternative which conceives avidya as 
samsargabkava is here criticised 

12. Vide Purva-mimamsa. II. ii sections 1, 2, 7, 8. 9, II. iii. li. 

13. cf. Srutaprakasika. Jijnylsadhikara^a— -‘sastrabhedahh karmabhedo v§ ” 
The Prabhakara view is that the second chapter deals with Sastrabheda ; while the 
Bbatta theory it that it is devoted to a discussion of Karmabhed a. 

Samvit Siddhi 


(If avidya is treated as the mutual non-existence of jr&na 
(knowledge) it will have vidya for its pratiyogin (that which is denied) 
and Brahman for its asraya (support ); and since jnana (knowledge* 
samvit ) is identified with Brahman itself, your position really amounts 
to this, that Brahman is at once the asraya and the pratiyogin of avidya. 
Against such a position we ask:) How can Brahman which is through 
and through of the same nature and which is the Highest Reality possess 
the two mutually opposed qualities of being the asraya (basis) and the 
pratiyogin (what is denied) of avidyaV* If the opponent were to reply 
that, in its aspect as the jiva ( pratyak ), Brahman is the basis of avidya, 
and that in its essential nature it is the pratiyogin, (we ask) whence these 
two aspects ? To the possible answer that this distinction of 
aspects is the result of avidya. we reply that, since avidya, 
in its turn, depends on this distinction, your position is once again liable 
to be charged with the defect of mutual dependence (i.e.'the fallacy 
of mutual dependence vitiates both the alternatives viz.,* that avidya 
relates to the jiva and that it relates to Brahman). 

There is no escape from anyonyasraya dusana by stating that 
av.dya is an avastu ( unreality ). 

Should the opponent contend that his position really escapes the 
defect of mutual dependence {any ony at ray a) in as much as avidya is an 
unreality {avastu) we ask: Then in which entity {vastu) do you notice 
anyonyakraya) to be a vitiating factor? (i.e. one who rejects everything 
other than Brahman as illusory cannot cite an object (va stu) where this 
defect is met with). The character of being a vastu is not responsible 
for the charge of any ony at ray a being levelled; but when a thing is said 
to depend for its very existence on its own product, this defect arises. 
Therefore, it is no proper reply to urge that since av/dya is an unreality 
your position is not open to the charge of anyonyasraya. 

Avidya cannot be ava stu {unreal) 

Moreover, if avidya is wholly unreal (avastu), we ask: How then 
does it come to be responsible for worldly activities (vyava/zara) ? Wholly 

14 . cf. Sattiusani vada 19. Here the view that treats avidva as anyonyabhava 
(mutual non-existence of knowledge) is critically considered. 




fictitious entities like the sky-flower are never noticed to serve the ends 
of practical life (arth&kriyakari). And your very statement that avidya 
is a fiction hardly establishes that it is fictitious. If the opponent were 
to argue that reality is denied to avidya by the negative particle found 
in the compound word ‘a-vastu\ we reply that the negation is negated 
when single, uncompounded words (vyas/a) like ‘jar’ and ‘cloth’ are 
used to refer to the world which is the handiwork of avidya. Therefore* 
the opponent must not think of saying that avidya is neither real nor 
unreal and that, while distinctions are unreal, they appear to be real 
on the strength of avidya. 

Is avidya single or manifold? Is the bound soul,which is its substrate 
unitary or manifold ? 

State wehther the avidya posited by you as generating and 
explaining the world-process is single or manifold. State also whether 
its substrate, viz., the soul in bondage is only one or many. 

Avidya cannot be single : 

If avidya is single , this unitary ignorance, having already been 
expelled by the realisation of Brahman attained by Suka, your effort, 
to secure final release ( moksa ) would indeed be wholly unnecessary. 

The contention that Suka and others attained mukti is not true. 

It may be argued (by you as follows—) “In reality there never 
existed persons such as Vamadeva and $uka; it is only if they existed, 
it could be argued that avidya. having already been dispelled by their 
realising Brahman, does not exist at present. Distinctions such as 
“released souls” and “south in bondage" are projected by my ignorance; 
for they are perceived, like the world of multiplicity cognised in my 
dreams. The scriptural text, asserting that final release was attained by 

them (i.e., Vamadeva and others) as a result of the realisation of 
Brahman, is as invalid as dream utterances concerning mukti'\ 

Samvit Siddhi 


Refutation of the above contention 

We may meet this line of argument thusr-How. is another person 
who contends that the world is projected by his avidya refuted by you ? 
The self-same reason which you advance to prove that the universe is 
projected by your avidya is also open to him like jarvay/iasidd/ii (ie. 
even as the claim that the Buddha is omniscient can also be made on 
behalf of Kapila). 

As your doctrine is thus torn by mutually contradictory assertions, 
you seem to argue not because you have a case, but because you must 
be saying something. Just as the statements relating to their (i.e., 
Vamadeva and others) release are no better than dream utterances, your 
propositions also (viz. that the world is a creation of your avidya and 
that you must, therefore, endeavour to get rid of it) must share the 
same fate. Hence, your effort to secure moksa must indeed be futile. 
Again, if you could maintain that the scriptural passage mentions that, 
as a result of Brahma-jnana, mukti was attained by Vamadeva and 
others even when it was not attained, we might equally well say that 
your statement also speaks falsely of mukti as realisable in the future, 
when, in fact, it is not to be realised. The very examples you adduced, 
namely, utterances found in dreams, could be cited in support of the 
opposite contention. 

(Perhaps your reply is—) “Such a position, viz. that mukti is 
not something to be realised in future is not unaccepatble to me, because 
the self is eternally free from bondage and because freedom is ever 
existent.’’ Against this it may be urged that since, on this view, all efforts 
to secure Brahma-vidya are wholly superfluous, your position amounts 
to invoking in ceremonies just those devils which are intended to be 
exorcised by them. 

The contention that moksa is an eternally existent state ; it has only to 
be rendered manifest through dhyana etc. 

The opponent may contend that, although moksa is an, eternal 
state, it is obscured by ignorance and appears, on that account, to be 
nonexistent; and (he may. add) that the fruit of knowledge; is the mani- 

172 Siddhitrayam 

festation of moksa (which has so far remained concealed). The pre¬ 
sence of gold on the hand being forgotten, it is searched for; and after 
realising that it has all the while been on his hand, a person rests 
content. Even so, it is because of the failure to realise the true nature 
of the self which is ever free, that bondage is caused to the samsarin, 
and the nature of the self is manifested by knowledge of Brahman. 

The unintelligibility of the notion of abhivyakti (manifestation.) 

Our reply to this is—Tell me what is meant by manifestation 
(abhivyakti) which is said to result from the knowledge of Brahman 
Is it consciousness which is the very essence of self-luminous intelligence? 
Or is it the knowledge “I am Brahman’* ? It cannot be the first; for 
consciousness which constitutes the very essence of Brahman, being 
eternal, cannot be the result of Brahma-vidya. Nor could it be said 
that “manifestation” is merely the knowledge “I am Brahman”; for 
on your theory, such a knowledge is itself Brahma-vidya. And how, we 
ask, could it be treated as the result of the latter ? 

Moreover, on your view, this knowledge arises from upanisadic 
texts such as ‘That thou art’ (tat tvam asi). And, on the principle 
that whatever has a beginning must have an end. the fear (that moksa, 
may be lost at any time) may afflict even the released soul. 

Avidya cannot be an obstacle to Brahma-jnana. 

Besides, the wise have defined pratibandhaka (obstacle) as that 
which prevents the appearance of the effect even in the presence of all 
the causal factors necesssary therefor. In the present case, what was it 
that was ready to emerge through the operation of its causal factors 
but failed to appear being prevented by the obstacle of ignorance 
(avidya)? It cannot be mukti; for it is ever-existent. Nor could it be 
the knowledge ‘‘I am Brahman”; for, in the case of souls in bondage, 
the full complement of causes necessary for the birth of the apprehension 
••I am Brahman” not being present, how could it be said that this 
knowledge is counteracted by avidya ? As. a matter of fact, thi:$ 

Samvit Siddhi 


knowledge does not arise at present, not because it is prevented by 
counter-acting forces, but because of the absence of causal factors. 
Hence your position is beside the point. 

Refutation of the view that there is only a single soul. 

Further the belief that there is only a single soul (in the universe) 
is really unacceptable; 19 for, on your view, ignorance (avidya), 
association therewith and the character of being jiva are only illusory 
(i.e , when the very notion of is deemed illusory, its being single 
must be equally so). 

The suggestion that the jiva is one. since it appears to be so, is, 
contradicted by experience: for souls bound to samsara do appear to us 
to be innumerable. The activities in which bound souls are engaged till 
the cessation of the cycle of births and deaths are not later shown to be 
false and are thoroughly unlike dream experiences. The unity of 
the self sought to be established by reasoning could be disproved by 
reasoning iteslf. 

^ * 

Other souls which possess conflicting thoughts and activities and 
whose existence is inferred from their diverse behaviour cannot be argued 
away any more than each person could explain away his own existence.’ 
The fire whose existence is inferred is certainly different from observed 
instances of fire. Similarly where is the difficulty in considering that the 
souls whose existence is inferred from the behaviour of others are distinct 
from the self of which each person is directly aware? If it is not 
conceded that the presence of other selves is inferred from their beha¬ 
viour, all activities, sacred and secular, would cease. 

* * . * • « 

It is futile to contend that the distinction of consciousness into 
‘knower’ and ‘known’ is due to manifold limiting conditions. For (if 
that were so), the distinction between the various parts of the body 

15. cf. &afa</0sflpi, vada 61. 



such as the head and hands must lead to a belief in a plurality of selves 
within the selfsame body. Besides, if there be only one soul (in the 
universe), it must experience what is happening in all places, just as the 
injury to the head, hands or feet is felt by the organism, 

(On the basis of the observed fact that the soul does not 
remember its own experiences in former lives, the opponent may assert 
that it is unnecessary for the self to know, what is happening elsewhere. 
To this we reply that) the self does remember its experiences which took 
placed in the remote past (in former lives) because of factors, such 
as death, torment in hell and birth-pangs. But as regards what takes 
place simultaneously (there being no remembrance), the substrates 
of these experiences cannot be mixed up. How then could the delusion 
that there is only one soul arise ? 

♦ * ' * 

* * * 

* * * 

* * * 

The untenability of the view that there is a pluraliy of jivas each 
having its own avidya. 

It cannot be maintained that social activities can be explained 
on-the,basis of a plurality of souls each of which creates, with the aid 
of its individual avidya, objects perceptible only to itself. How could 
/Ivflf, who are severally confined within their own dream creations and 
who,are totally ignorant of the activities , of others, carry on worldly 
activity which is. possible only to a group of persons interacting with 
one another ? 

Being endowed with qualities like self-luminosity and unity , 
consciousness cannot be said t o be without a second (sidvitiya.) 

Self-luminosity, unity, all-pervasiveness and eternity posited by 
you as the characteristics of consciousness really contradict your thesis 
that consciousness is without a second (adv/tiya), It is idle to argue 
that these are not the characteristics of consciousness, but that they 

Samvit Siddhi 


constitute its very being; these features of consciousness namely, self- 
luminosity, unity and the like are distinct from one another; besides, 
while the existence of consciousness is accepted on all hands, keen 
controversy rages regarding its nature (or characteristics). It cannot 
be urged that these are illusory and. hence, do not contradict the 
theory of non-dualism. For these qualities are learnt from upanisadic 
texts which aim at revealing the true nature of reality. 

If. as you say. bliss, self-luminosity, eternity, greatness and the 
like are really the essence of Brahman (and not its qualities), let this 
position be clarified by you. (You must say that) terms such as ‘bliss* 
either stand exactly for what the word Brahman signifies or that what 
are signified by them belong to him (i.e., they are its attributes) ; or 
they alone go by the name of Brahman. 

(None of these alternatives is tenable; for) on the first alterna¬ 
tive. there would be no need to employ these different expressions in 
daily life and in scriptures (the term Brahman being quite sufficient). 
Bes des. as already pointed out. while Brahman is posited as the cause 
of the world, rival philosophers dispute its nature; hence, they (i.e.. 
Brahman, bliss and so forth) must be distinct. The second alternative* 
is scarcely belter; for with these for its qualities. Brahman would, 
certainly come to be regarded as having distinctions. On the third 
alternative, since each of these (i.e., bliss and the like) is itself 
Brahman, there would be a plurality of Brahmans. To obviate this 
difficulty, it might be said that all these together eonstitute Brahman 
even as a collection of trees constitutes a forest. (But even this would 

fare no better, because, on your theory. Brahman is a partless whole 
of reality.) 

0 o o o 

(It is unreasonable to argue that these descriptions really teach a 
partless whole of meaning (a khandartha), just as the statement “The 
sun is resplendent and luminous” denotes a single, partless reality). 



For the luminosity and splendour existing in the sun are really diffe¬ 
rent; and you cannot cite anywhere an instance in support of your con¬ 
tention that a partless whole of meaning is conveyed by the text. 16 

The untenability of the contention th&t these are not qualities but refer 
to the absence of certain features- 

It may be urged that, since the terms jhana. ananda and the like 
merely refer to the absence of non-intelligence, suffering and so forth, 
and thereby denote only a unitary entity. Brahman could not be said to 
be possessed of distinctions. But this is futile; for this absence must 
be either real or neither real nor unreal, (None of these is acceptable, 
for) the first alternative would imply that Brahman is endowed with 
distinctions. On the second alternative, it would follow that Brahman 
is non-intelligent. And the third alternative has already been refuted. 
Besides, on that view, Brahman would scarcely be different from 
objects like the jar. Moreover, so long as the terms Jnana, ananda. 
and the like are not taken to signify the features opposed to non-intelli¬ 
gence and the like which are said to be excluded they could not really 
be said to have been eliminated; even as terms signifying the character 
of non-intelligence (ja.datva) are incapable of denying these qualities. 
(Taking his stand on the view that negation is merely the perception 
of an object when some other perceptible entity is not cognized (e. g. 
the negation of the jar is no other than the perception of the bare 
ground) the opponent may argue that Brahman is non-dual, since the 
absence of non-intelligence is no other than knowledge of pure Brahman, 
and not an attribute thereof. But even then it would follow that 
Brahman has distinctions (since knowledge of Brahman will not convey 
the idea of the absence of non-intelligence, sorrow and the like so long 
as intelligence, bliss and the like are not attributed to it). 

It cannot be contended that the world is distinct from s&t and asa.t 

Is it perception and the like or scripture that establishes the theory 
that the elements and what is born of them are distinct at once from 

16. cf. ^atadu§api A vada 38. 

Samvit Siddhi 


reality and unreality ? Each one knows for himself that perception 
and Other pramanas reveal their respective objects as something specific. 
The cognition of a blue flower in front of the perceiver is not of the 
same form as that of a white crystal. The apprehension of milk as 
something sweet is not of the same kind as that of morgosa as something 
bitter. Thus, all items of knowledge, sacred and secular, are marked 
off from one another. 

(The opponent may argue as follows). “True, distinct cogni¬ 
tions do arise; but they have no basis in fact.’’ (To this it may be 
replied that) if the presence of varied cognitions is admitted, the cause 
of these must be ascertained. And the senses and reason are their well- 
known causes; for these cognitions arise whenever they are present. 

The refutation of the view that pratyaksa cannot perceive difference:— 

The opponent may hold the erroneous view that distinction 
{bheda) cannot be the object of perception, since the object itself 
{svarupa) and its distinction from other things ( bheda ) cannot be appre¬ 
hended either simultaneously or in succession, and since these two 
apprehensions are not identical.” This false view is due to the failure 
to realise that svarupa and bheda are non-different. 

In the light of the pratiyogin (that which is denied), the object 
itself which is revealed by perception is responsible fon the apprehension 
and belief in multiplicity (bheda-vyavahara) ; just as the knowledge of 
an object in itself leads to manifold negations and just as an object six 
inches long may (in the light of objects longer or shorter than this) be 
considered short or long. 

17. (Akhaijdavakyarthabhangavada.) 

Those who do not subscribe to the notion of difference {bheda) may argue as 
follows,- ‘Whoever accepts the notion of difference believei that it is open to perception. 
Let him state clearly whether the apprehension of an object itself (svarupa-grahaqm) 
and the apprehension of its distinction from other objects ( bheda-grahana ), which are 
both the result of perception, are identical with or different from each other. If they 
are distinct, it may be asked, does perception grasp an object or its distinction from 
others or both these ? If perception is said to grasp both, there is the further question ; 

O ° 




Thus the character of possessing distinctions cannot be denied 
to the world since it is perceived to possess diverse well-defined shapes 
and forms. 

* * * * 

(Having shown that perception does not establish that the world 
is sadasadvilaksana the author proceeds to show that scripture also 
fails to establish that point.) 

Since scripture speaks of what has to be accomplished (kdrya 
it cannot be considered an authority in this matter (i.e., with regard to 
matters of fact, namely, siddha). Even if it be considered authoritative 
in this regard it cannot be said to teach this unintelligible doctrine; for 
the different elements of your doctrine do not fit in with one another. 

(Here it is shown that inference too fails to establish that the 
world is indescribable as sat or asat ). 

It is argued that avidyl and its products cannot be described as 
unreal (asat), since they are perceived and that it is equally difficult to 
define them as real (sat), since they are later contradicted. But this 
does not stand to reason; for (it may well be asked) why should not the 

Are both these grasped simultaneously or in succession ? Svarbpagrahaqa and 
bhedagrah&Qa cannot be identified as one; for to treat them as identical would amoun t 
to attributing to the self-same experience the contradictory qualities of not depending 
on a pratiyogin (in the case of svarupagrahaqa) and depending upon pratiyogin fin the 
case of bhedagrahar}*). It it equally difficult to treat them as distinct; for, if perception 
were to grasp the objecs (svarupa) only, clearly it cannot apprehend bhtda. And 
perception cannot grasp difference only; since the cognition of difference presupposes 
apprension of svarupa. Nor is the view that perception apprehends both svarupa and 
bheda tenable; for this apprehension must be either simultaneous or successive. But 
it cannot be simultaneous, since knowledge of difference presupposes cognition of 
svarupa and remembrance of pratiyogin ; while svarbpagrahana does not stand in 
need of any of these. Nor could svarupa and bheda be grasped in succession; since 
perception is momentary and cannot last until the experience of bheda which occurs 
only at the next moment. 

Vide Prameyamih of Vatsya Varadaguru, Aanamalai University Journal. 

Samvit Siddhi 


world be treated as real (sat), since it is perceived, and as unreal (asat), 
since it is later contradicted? Hence it is clear that this notion of avidyi 
( ignorance) is posited by you in ignorance. 

Is the mithyatva of the world real or unreal ? Either alternative goes 
against the advaitic position. 

Is the character of unreality (mithyatva) attributed by you to the 
world of multiplicity unreal or real ? It cannot be the former; because 
if the unreality of the world is itself phenomenal, then the reality of the 
world becomes irrefutable. It cannot be the latter, because if mithyatva 
were real then your theory of non-dualism would have to be given up. 
As already pointed out, ail pramanas are known to us as marking off 
their respective objects from their opposites (asat) and from their 
distincts (arthantara). For example, when there arises the awareness, 
‘The jar exists.” it rules out the assertion of the non-existence of the 
jar or of the attribution of clothness to the jar. 

The opponent may try to meet this by arguing as follows.—“In 
the cognition “The jar exists’, the word ‘jar’ conveys either the same 
meaning as ‘existence* (Brahman) or something else. If it is the former 
it would follow that reality is non-dual; (because other propositions like, 
this, ‘the cloth exists', “tree exists” and so on will convey the same 
idea, viz., existence); if it is the latter what is signified by the term 
•jar* must be incapable of being defined either as sat or asat (,sada - 
sadanirvacanlya), (because the term ghata would then imply some¬ 
thing distinct from existence (sadvilaksana) and would at the same time 
be (asadvilaksana) something positive. 

To this we reply that, if so, you would have to admit that 
Brahman also, like the jar, is indescribable as sat or asat ; for the 
cardinal teaching of the upanisads is “Brahman exists” (asti Brahman). 
And you yourself have established, with the aid of vedic texts speaking of 
Brahman being bliss (ananda). reality (sat), and knowledge (jhana), 
that Brahman is distinct from bliss and the like. (Logically, in your 
statement: The world issadasadanirvacamya* the term‘‘world’* must 



lignify something different from what is describable as sat ro asat) 
Therefore, it is impossible for you to speak of the world as being distinct 
from reality and unreality. What is said of one instance should apply 
to all identical or parallel instances. 

The knowledge of satta (existence) arising in the case of objects 
like the jar does reveal the reality of diverse configurations of objects. 

Existence (satta) is no other than the continuity of objects along 
with their specific and well-defined forms or configurations which are 
responsible for their distinction from similar ( sajativa ) as also from dis¬ 
similar (yijatiya) objects, (i.e. from objects of the same class as also 
from those belonging to other classes,) And it (satta) is no independent 
entity. How, then, is it at all possible to speak of non-dualism ? It it 
impossible to deny the apprehension of diverse configurations. 

In the very act of denying dharmas , the ground on which the denial is 
made shows Bvahman to be endowed with dharma. 

As regards your statement: What is known (i.e. satta ) cannot be 
an attribute of knowledge (Brahman), (we ask:) From this statemens 
is anything established regarding samvit (consciousness) or not? If it 
is the former, your doctrine of non-dualism would have to be sacrificed; 13 
if it is the latter, your effort is wholly wasted. 

Therefore, various cognitions which are clearly and readily known 
to be distinct from one another cannot be identified with objects like the 
jar which endure (i e., are not momentary, like cognitions.) 

Refutation of the contention that the invariable concomitance of know¬ 
ledge and the known establishes their identity . 

IS. A variant reading is ‘paksapsta’. On this reading the text would mean— 
“If the former, you must be considered partial fin as much as you attribute 
nirdharmakatv a ('the character of having no qualities) to Brahman, while denying all 
other attributes even when they are: established by various prama^as,) of 
Srutapr&kahikS. 3 

Samvit Siddhi 


The opponent may argue that objects are not distinct from know¬ 
ledge, since they are invariably cognized together. The wise declare 
that the term self-luminous (. swayamprakasa ) denotes that which is 
able to manifest itself without depending on anything else. That object 
which remains unmanifest so long as another does not present itself 
cannot be considered to be distinct therefrom; just as the falsely per¬ 
ceived double moon is non-different from the real moon. 19 When know¬ 
ledge (yi/nana) is not manifest neither the self nor the object is revealed. 
Therefore, the world-process is an illusory presentation of knowledge.; 
To this we reply that distinctions, being established by perception which 
is of superior validity, cannot be explained away by your reasoning;) 
To explain it fully.—In the cognition “I know this’’, each person 
realises in his own experience clearly and distinctly that the three— 
the knower. the known and knowledge—shine forth separately and 
without being mixed up with one another. Inference cannot go against the 
evidence of perception. Surely, it is neveir inferred that fire does 
not burn, since it is a substance. 

Moreover, (in your argument that since thought and things 
always go together, they must be identical), the hetu (reason) is liable 
to be charged with the defect of viruddha. For ‘going together’, 
necessarilly implies two objects. Surely knowledge cannot be said to 
be manifest along with itself; (it can only be* manifest along with 
some object or other). Further, if (on your theory there is no universal 
(samanya) apart from the different particulars) what goes by the name 
of knowledge must be unaccompanied by what may be called knowledge 
in general, each item of knowledge must be said to be manifest in 
association with all objects; but it is not so. 10 

19. cf. Sahopalambhaniyamadabhedo ciladaddhiyoh | 

BhedaS ca bbrsnti vijnanai dfsya indfivivadvaye || 

to Though this stanza is found earlier in the printed books and manuscripts, 
this appears to be the proper place. 



The opponent may argue that in the state of deep sleep, the stream 
of pure consciousness alone shines fosth uncontaminated by objects such 
as the jar. Therefore, objects are not distinct from knowledge. Know¬ 
ledge (samvit) alone is real; while objects are unreal. 

To this we reply that it is the prattle of one who fails to realise 
the contradiction in one’s own statement; for there could be no 
invariable presentation ©f thought and things together, if the two were 
really identical. Moreover, if consciousness could manifest itself without 
objects, the latter too must present themselves in the absence of 
consciousness; even as the jar may manifest itself without the presentation 
of the cloth, which, in its turn may present itself without the awareness 
of the jar. 

The Gitartha - sangraha 

Sri Yamunacarya 

1) In the scripture known as the Bhagavad Gita, Narayana, the Supreme Brahman, is 
declared. He is attainable by Bhakti alone, which is to be brought about by the observance 
of one's own Dharma, aquisition of knowledge and renunciation of attahment. 

2) In the first hexad, the performance of desireless Karma and JhCna, with the practice of 
Yoga in view, is enjoined for the realisation of the self. 

3) In the middle hexad, Bhakti Yoga, which can be brought by Karma and Jnana is treated for 
the attainment fo the exact knowledge of Bhagavan, the Supreme Being, as He is. 

4) In the last hexad, which subserves the two preceding hexads, is treated matter (Pradhana) 
in the primordial condition, matter in its evolved state, the self (Purusa), and Isvara the 
Ruler of all. Besides, the disciplines relating to work, to knowledge and to devotion are 
again dealt with by way of supplmenting and completing what has been taught earlier. 

5) The treatise was initiated for the sake of Arjuna, who was overtaken by misplaced love 
and compassion and also perplexity as to what was Dharma and what Adharma, and who 
took refuge in Sri Krsna. 

6) The knowledge of Sankya and Yoga, which comprehend in their scope the eternal self and 
disinterested activity respecevely, leading to the state of steady wisdom, is taught in the 
second chapter for removing Arjuna's delusion. 

7) In the third chapter is taught the neen for the performance of works without attachment to 
any fruits other than the pleasure of the Lord and for the protection of the world, ascribing 
the agency to the Gunas or placing it in the Lord of all. 

8) In the fouth chapter the following matters are treated: 

His nature is explained by the way. Next it is taught that Karma Yoga has an aspect other 
than action, i.e., knowledge - aspect. The varieties of Karma Yoga and the eminence of 
knowledge in it, are emphasised. 

9) In the fifth chapter are set forth the ease and quick effeciacy of Karma Yoga, some its 
elements and the mode of knowledge of Brahman, i.e., the individual self. 

10) In the sixth chapter are taught the practice of Yoga (concentration and meditation), the 
foufold divisions of (successful) Yogins, the means to success in Yoga, and the supremacy 
of Yoga concerning Himself. 

11) In the seventh chapter is taught the exact knowledge of Himself, His concealment by the 
Prakati, the surrender to Him as the means to overcome this, observations on various 
types of devotees and the superiority of the man of wisdom among these devotees. 

12) In the eight chapter are discussed the distinctions of what are to be understood and 
acquired by each of the three clasess of devotees - those whko are after prosperity, after 
the true nature of the self and after the feet of the Lord. 

13) In the ninth chapter are treated His own eminence, His undiminished supremacy as the 
Divine even whe He assumes embodiments as Incarnations, the exellence of Mahatmas or 
devotees who seek God alone, and the discipline of Bhakti of devotion to God. 

14) In the tenth chapter are described in detail the infinite auspicious attributes of the Lord 
and His absolute control over everything, so as to generate and develop Bhakti or 
devotion to God in the minds of aspirants. 

15) In the eleventh chapter, it is stated that the divine eye which can give an immediate 
vision of Him as He is, was given to Arjuna, and accordingly it is stated that Bhakti is the 
only means of knowing and attaining Him in the way described. 

16) In the twelfth chapter, are taught the superiourity of Bhakti Yoga, the means thereto, the 
direction for the one unqalified to meditate on the self, the details of the qualities to be 
acuiried and modes of Sadhana to be practised for that end, and the immense love of the 
Lord for the devotees. 

17) In the thirteen chapter, the nature of the body, the means for the realisation of the self, 
investigation of the nature of the self, the cause of bondage, and the discrimination 
between the self and the body are dealt with. 

18) In the fourteenth chapter are explained the various ways in which the Gunas bind the self, 
how they are the agents in respect of all works, and how to eliminate their hold. It also 
explains how the Supreme Person is the basis of all the three ends attainable, namely 
heavenly, soverginity, the abidance in the pristine state of the self, and dwelling in the 

19) In the fifteenth chapter in Supreme Person is declared to be other than the self both in Its 
state of conjunction with non - conscient matter and in Its state of pristine purity, 
because He pervades, sustains and rules over them and the universe. 

20 ) The sixteenth chapter deals first with the disctinctioin between the divine nature and the 
demoniac natures in order to establish what is truth and what is right conduct, which can be 
attained by submission to the Sastras. 

21) In the seventeenth chapter the following are dealt with: what are not ordained by the 
Sastras and for that reason wholly demoniac; what are ordained in the Sastras as varied in 
accordance with the Gunas; and the characteristic of what are established in the Sastras 
as threefold in terms of 'Aum', 'Tat', 'Sat'. 

22) The last chapter presents the mental state required for ascribing the agency to the Lord, 
the necessity of cultivating the Sattvic quality, the spiritual culmination of discharging 
one's duties, and Bhakti Yoga which forms the essence of the Gita Sastra. 

23) Karma Yoga is resorting to austerity, pilgrimage, charities, sacrifices and such other acts. 
Jnana Yoga is the abidance in the purified self by those who have controlled their minds. 

24) Bhakti Yoga is abidance in meditation and other forms of adoration with one - pointed 
love for the Supreme Being. The three Yogas are interconnected. 

25) The obligatory and occasional works are associated with all the three Yogas, as they are 
of the form kof worship of the Supreme Being. All these Yogas serve as the means for the 
vision fo the self through Yoga. But Bhakti Yoga can be practised even before gaining the 
vision of the self. The aspirans can repeat His name, sing hymns, visti holy places, etc., 
even with superficial love of the Lord. 

26) When one's nescience is removed and one perceives the self as subservient to the 
Supreme, one attains supreme devotion and through it alone reaches His realm. There 
is Vaidhi - bhakti or discipline - bound devotion, next Para - bhakti (higher devotion of 
love) and then the final stage Parama - bhakti or pre-eminently suprem love. 

27) Bhakti Yoga helps to attaing prosperity or comprehensive sovereginty, if one desires ti. If 
one desires the self, all these three Yogas serve that purpose, which consist in the 
attainment of pure Isolation (Kaivalya). 

28) The attitude, that the Bhagavan is the ultimate end, is common to all these types of 
devotees. But if one aspires exlusively for the Lord overlooking the other two till such 
attainment, the attains Him completely. 

29) The Jnani is one who is exclusively devoted to the Lord. His very existence dpends on 
Him. Contact with Him is his only joy, separation from Him is his only grief. His thought is 
focused on Him alone. 

30) When one has begun to find life's sole satisfaction in meditation on the Lord, the vision of 
Him through such meditation, speaking about Him, saluting Him, singing about Him and 
praising Him - then the operation of the senses, intellect, mind and vital forces get 
concentrated on Him. 

31) Looking upon all disciplines from performnces of duties to the practice of Bhakti as meant 
only for pleasing the Lord and not with any extraneous motive, one should abandon all 
dependence on any other means than Him (the Supreme Person), and remain without 
any fear of inedaquacy of such resignation in respect of his salvation. (The doctrine of 
Prapati is taught in this verse). 

32 ) Such a person finds his sole happiness in exclusive and continual service to God. He 
attains His realm. This work (Gita - Sastra) is meant mainly for such a devotee. Such is the 
summary of the meaning of the Gita. 


Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

Translated by Sriman Kusakratha dasa 

Yamuna Devi 

Ahichchhatra, Uttar Pradesh, 5th c. Gupta 


tattvena yas cid-acid-isvara-tat-svabhava- 
bhogapavarga-tad-upaya-gatir udarah 
sandarsayan niramimita purana-ratnam 
tasmai namo muni-varaya parasaraya 

I offer my respectful obeisances unto the best of the sages, Parasara, who mercifully 
composed the gem of the Puranas (Vishnu Purana), and in that book taught the truth 
about the nature of matter, spirit, the Supreme Personality of Godhead, material sense- 
gratification, liberation, and the means of attaining liberation. 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 


mata pita yuvatayas tanaya vibhutih 
sarvam yad eva niyamena mad-anvayanam 
adyasya nah kula-pater bakulabhiramam 
srimat-tad-anghri-yugalam pranamami murdhna 

Sri Nammalvar, the origin of our disciplic succession, is the object of great respect for 
all Sri Vaishnavas, and for us he is our father, mother, wealth, sons, daughters, and 
everything. Bowing my head, I offer my respectful obeisances to his feet, which are as 
beautiful as blossoming bakula flowers. 


yan murdhni me sruti-sirahsu ca bhati yasmin 
asman-manoratha-pathah sakalah sameti 
stoshyami nah kula-dhanam kula-daivatam tat 
padaravindam aravinda-vilocanasya 

I shall now glorify lotus-eyed Lord Krishna's lotus feet, which are splendidly manifest 
on my head and on the heads of all the Vedas, which are the place where all the 
pathways of my desires converge, and which are the Deity and the great treasure of our 


tattvena yasya mahimarnava-sikaranuh 
sakyo na matum api sarva-pitamahadyaih 
kartum tadiya-mahima-stutim udyataya 
mahyam namo 'stu kavaye nirapatrapaya 

I am so proud and shameless that I shall now offer respectful obeisances to myself, a 
poet intent on praising bthe Supreme Personality of Godhead whose glories are like a 
great ocean, even a drop of which cannot be properly understood by Brahma, Siva, and 
all the demigods. 


yad va sramavadhi yatha-mati capy asaktah 
staumy evam eva khalu te 'pi sada stuvantah 
vedas caturmukha-mukhas ca maharnavantah 
ko majjator anu-kulsalayor viseshah 

Now, even though I am weak and incompetent, as far as I have any knowledge or 
intelligence, I shall glorify the Lord until 1 must stop from exhaustion. The Vedas and 
the Brahma's many mouths always glorify the Lord. What is the difference between a 
great mountain and a speck of dust when both are plunged in the depths of the ocean? 


kim caisha sakty-atisayena na te 'nukampyah 
stotapi te stuti-kritena parisramena 
tatra sramas tu su-labho mama manda-buddher 
ity udyamo 'yam ucito mama cabja-netra 

O lotus-eyed Lord, this poet does not expect to earn Your mercy by a display of 
powerful eloquence. His intelligence is dull and these prayers were composed with 
great labor. 

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Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 


navekshase yadi tato buvanany amuni 
nalam prabho bhavitum eva kutah pravrittih 
evam nisarga-suhridi tvayi sarva-jantoh 
svamin na citram idam asrita-vatsalatvam 

O Lord, if You had not glanced on them, these worlds would not exist. Without Your 
glance how can anything happen? O Lord, it is not surprising that although You are 
everyone's friend, You especially love they who take shelter of You. 


narayana tvayi na mrishyati vaidhikah kah 
brahma sivah satamakhah parama-svarad ity 
ete 'pi yasya mahimarnava-viprushas te 

O Lord Narayana, what learned Vedic scholar will not accept You as the all-powerful 
and unlimited Personality of Godhead? Brahma, Siva, Indra, and the liberated residents 
of Vaikuntha are but drops in the ocean of Your transcendental glory. 


kah srih sriyah parama-sattva-samasrayah kah 
kah pundarika-nayanah purushottamah kah 
visvam vicitra-cid-acit-pravibhaga-vrittam 

Who is the splendor of the goddess of fortune? Who is the shelter of the pure devotees? 
Who has handsome lotus-eyes? Who is the Supreme Person? In a fraction of a fraction 
of a hundred-million-millionth part of whom is this world, filled with wonderful 
spiritual and material variety, manifested? 


ko 'nyah praja-pasu-pati paripati kasya 
padodakena sa sivah sva-siro-dhritena 

Who, by giving the most precious gifts and by removing a host of calamities, such as 
the troubles brought by the demons, the theft of the Vedas, and a host of heavy sins, 
protects Brahma and Siva? The water from whose feet does auspicious Siva carry on 
his head? 


kasyodare hara-virinci-mukhah prapancah 
ko rakshatimam ajanishta ca kasya nabheh 
krantva nigirya punar udgirati tvad-anyah 
kah kena vaisha paravan iti sakya-sankah 

In whose abdomen is this material world, headed by Brahma and Siva, manifested? 
Who protects this world? From whose navel was this world bom? But for You, who 
jumps over the world, devours it, and then spits it out? Who can be considered greater 
than You? 


tvam sila-rupa-caritaih parama-prakrishtaih 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 
sattvena sattvikataya prabalais ca sastraih 
prakhyata-daiva-paramartha-vidam matais ca 
naivasura-prakritayah prabhavanti boddhum 

O my Lord, those influenced by demoniac principles cannot realize You, although You 
are clearly the Supreme by dint of Your exalted activities, forms, character, and 
uncommon power, which are confirmed by all the revealed scriptures in the quality of 
goodness and the celebrated transcendentalists in the divine nature. 


sambhavanam tava parivradhima-svabhavam 
maya-balena bhavatapi niguhyamanam 
pasyanti kecid anisam tvad-ananya-bhavah 

O my Lord, everything within material nature is limited by time, space, and thought. 
Your characteristics, however, being unequalled and unsurpassed, are always 
transcendental to such limitations. You sometimes cover such characteristics by Your 
own energy, but nevertheless Your unalloyed devotees are always able to see You under 
all circumstances. 


yad andam andantara-gocaram ca yad 
dasottarany avaranani yani ca 
gunah pradhanam purushah param padam 
parat param brahma ca te vibhutayah 

The material universe, everything moving within the universe, the ten coverings around 
it, the modes of nature, the unmanifested stage of matter, the purusha-avatara, the 
supreme spiritual world, and the Supreme Brahman, are all Your opulences. 


vasi vadanyo gunavan njuh sucir 
mridur dayalur madhurah sthirah samah 
kriti kritajnas tvam asi sva-bhavatah 

You are naturally controlled by the love of Your devotees, generous, virtuous, 
straightforward, honest, pure, gentle, merciful, charming, steadfast, equal to all, 
blissful, wise, and saintly. You are a nectar ocean of all auspicious transcendental 


upary upary abjabhuvo 'pi purushan 
prakalpya te ye satam ity anukramat 
giras tvad-ekaika-gunavadhipsaya 
sada sthita nodyamato 'tiserate 

Desiring to measure one of Your transcendental qualities, the words of the Vedas again 
and again multiply by a hundred the qualities of the demigod Brahma. Although 
eternally engaged in this way, they cannot cross beyond even one of Your qualities. 


tvad-asritanam jagad-udbhava-sthiti- 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

bhavanti lila-vidhayas ca vaidhikas 

The creation, maintenance, and destruction of the material universes, the granting of 
liberation from the cycle of birth and death, a host of other actions You playfully 
perform, and the words of the Vedas(l), which are the thoughts sheltered deep in Your 
heart, are all meant for the benefit of they who take shelter of You. 


namo namo van-manasati-bhumaye 
namo namo van-manasaika-bhumaye 
namo namo 'nanta-maha-vibhutaye 
namo namo 'nanta-dayaika-sindhave 

Obeisances, obeisances to You, who are beyond the power of words and mind! 
Obeisances, obeisances to You, the only proper object for the voice's words or the 
mind's thought! Obeisances, obeisances to You, the master of limitless powers and 
opulences! Obeisances, obeisances to You, who are a limitless ocean of mercy! 


na dharma-nishtho 'smi na catma-vedi 
na bhaktimams tvac-caranaravinde 
akincano 'nanya-gatih saranya 
tvat-pada-mulam saranam prapadye 

I am not a virtuous person, fixed in the principles of religious conduct, and neither am I 
a great transcendentalist, awakened to spiritual knowledge. In addition to this, I have 
not the slightest trace of devotion for Your lotus feet. O refuge of the devotees, although 
I am so unqualified, please permit me to take shelter under Your lotus feet, for I am 
now lost in this material world, I do not possess anything of value, and I have no place 
to turn. 


na ninditam karma tad asti loke 
sahasraso yan na may a vyadhayi 
so 'ham vipakavasare mukunda 
krandami sampraty agatis tavagre 

In this world there is not a single abominable deed I have not done thousands of times. 
Now that my sins are bearing fruit, and I have no place to turn, I come before You. I 
weep and cry out, "O Mukunda!" 


nimajjato 'nanta-bhavarnavantas 
ciraya me kulam ivasi labdhah 
tvayapi labdham bhagavann idanim 
anuttamam patram idam dayayah 

Drowning for a long time in the limitless ocean of repeated birth and death, I have now 
attained You, who are like a safe shore, and You, O Lord, have now attained the perfect 
object for Your mercy. 


abhuta-purvam mama vapi kim va 
sarvam sake me sahajam hi duhkham 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

kintu tvad-agre saranagatanam 
parabhavo natha na te 'nurupah 

What unprecedented calamity has not already fallen on me? I always suffer. Suffering 
has become second-nature to me. O Lord, it is not right that they who have taken 
shelter of You be defeated in this way. 


nirasakasyapi na tavad utsahe 
mahesa hatum tava pada-pankajam 
rusha nirasto 'pi sisuh stanandhayo 
na jatu matus caranau jihasati 

O Lord, even if You push me away, I cannot leave Your lotus feet. Even if angrily 
pushed away, an infant can never leave his mother's feet. 


tavamrita-syandini pada-pankaje 
niveditatma katham anyad icchati 
sthite 'ravinde makaranda-nirbhare 
madhuvrato nekshurakam hi vikshate 

How can my heart wish anything else now that it is placed at Your lotus-feet, 
overflowing with nectar? In the presence of a honey-filled lotus a bee does not even see 
a thorny, dried-up ikshuraka flower. 


tvad-anghrim uddisya kadapi kenacid 
yatha tatha vapi sakrit-krito 'njalih 
tadaiva mushnaty asubhany aseshatah 
subhani pushnati na jatu hiyate 

Placed by anyone, at any time, or even only once, palms folded at Your feet dispel all 
inauspiciousness and create great good fortune. The benefit obtained from those folded 
palms will never be lost. 


kshanena nirvapya param ca nirvrittim 
prayacchati tvac-caranarunambuja- 

Quickly extinguishing the forest-fire of repeated birth and death, a single drop from the 
nectar ocean of love for Your reddish lotus feet, brings great transcendental bliss. 


namasyad-arti-kshayane krita-kshanam 
dhanam madiyam tava pada-pankajam 
kada nu sakshat-karavami cakshusha 

When with my own eyes will I see Your lotus feet, which playfully stepped from the 
bottom to the top of the material world, which quickly remove the sufferings of the 
surrendered souls, and which are my only treasure? 

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Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 


kada punah sankha-rathanga-kalpaka- 
trivikrama tvac-caranambuja-dvayam 
madiya-murdhanam alankarishyati 

O Lord Trivikrama, when will Your lotus feet, which bear the marks of conchshell, 
disc, kalpa-vriksha tree, flag, lotus, elephant-goad, and thunderbolt, adorn my head? 


nimagna-nabhim tanu-madhyam unnatam 

O Lord dressed in splendid yellow garments, O Lord as dark as a smiling atasi flower, 

O Lord whose navel is deep, O Lord whose waist is thin, O tall Lord, O Lord whose 
broad chest bears a splendid mark, 


cakasatam jyakina-karkasaih subhais 
caturbhir ajanu-vilambibhir bhujaih 

O Lord splendid with four arms that are handsome with marks of the bowstring, that 
reach to Your knees, and that praise the touch of Your beloved's garland, lotus, earrings, 
loosened hair, and ornaments, 


mukha-sriya nyak-krita-purna-nirmala- 

O Lord whose conchshell-neck is handsome with curling locks of hair and earrings 
hanging over Your broad shoulders, O Lord the splendor of whose face shames the 
splendor of lotus and the spotless full moon, 


sa-vibhrama-bhru-latam ujjvaladharam 
suci-smitam komala-gandam unnasam 

O Lord whose eyes are handsome as charming, newly-blossomed lotuses, O Lord who 
has graceful eyebrow-vines, O Lord whose lips are glorious, O Lord who smiles 
splendidly, O Lord whose cheeks are delicate and soft, O Lord who has a raised nose, O 
Lord whose curling locks of hair touch Your forehead, 


lasat-tulasya vana-malayojjvalam 


9 / 9/2018 

Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

O Lord splendid with glistening crown, bracelets, necklace, Kaustubha gem, belt, 
anklets, many ornaments, disc, conch, sword, club, bow, glorious tulasi, and garland of 
forest flowers, 


cakartha yasya bhavanam bhujantaram 
tava priyam dhama yadiya-janma-bhuh 
jagat-samagram yad-apanga-samsrayam 
yad-artham ambhodhir amanthy abandhi ca 

O Lord who made a home for Her between Your arms, O Lord whose dear 
transcendental abode is Her place of birth, O Lord whose sidelong glance is the resting 
place of all the worlds, O Lord who churned the ocean for Her sake, 


sva-vaisva-rupyena sadanubhutayapy 
apurvavad vismayam adadhanaya 
gunena rupena vilasa-ceshtitaih 
sada tavaivocitaya tava sriya 

O Lord who, with the eternal vision of Your supreme handsomeness, pastimes, and 
virtues, fills the goddess of fortune with unprecedented wonder, 


taya sahasinam ananta-bhogini 

O Lord seated with Her on the coils of Ananta, which are the abode of great knowledge 
and strength, and which are splendid with the many glittering jewels on the serpent's 


sarira-bhedais tava seshatam gatair 
yathocitam sesha itiryate janaih 

O Lord for whose sake Ananta assumes many shapes to become Your residence, bed, 
throne, sandals, garments, pillow, umbrella, parasol, and many other objects, and in this 
way has become known to the people as Your sesha (paraphernalia), 


dasah sakha vahanam asanam dhvajo 
yas te vitanam vyajanam trayimayah 
upasthitam tena puro garutmata 

O Lord before whom stands Garuda, who bears Your splendid footprints, and who is 
Your servant, friend, carrier, throne, flag, canopy, fan, and three Vedas, 


tvaya nisrishtatma-bharena yad yatha 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

priyena sena-patina niveditam 
tathanujanantam udara-vikshanaih 

O Lord who with merciful glances approves every request made by the dear general of 
Your army, who eats the remnants of Your food, and to whom You have given complete 


hatakhila-klesa-malaih sva-bhavatah 
sadanukulyaika-rasais tavocitaih 
nishevyamanam sacivair yathocitam 

O Lord appropriately served in many ways by a host of companions free from all 
troubles and filled with the nectar of love for You, 


prabuddhaya mugdha-vidagdha-lilaya 
kshananuvat kshipta-paradi-kalaya 
praharshayantam mahishim maha-bhujam 

O Mighty-armed Lord pleasing Your queen with charming and clever pastimes that 

awaken the sweet nectars of many kinds of transcendental love and make many 

millenniums seem like a moment, 42 



sriyah sriyam bhakta-janaika-jivitam 

samartham apat-sakham arthi-kalpakam 

O inconceivable, glorious, wonderful, eternally youthful Lord, O nectar ocean of 
transcendental handsomeness, O splendor of the goddess of fortune, O life and soul of 
the devotees, O powerful Lord, O friend in times of need, O kalpa-vaykaja tree to they 
who offer prayers, 


bhavantam evanucaran nirantarah 
kadaham aikantika-nitya-kiaokarah 
praharajayiajyami sa-natha-jaivitam 

by serving You constantly, one is freed from all material desires and is completely 
pacified. When shall we engage as Your permenant eternal servant and always feel 
joyful to have such a perfect master? 


dhig akucim avinaitam nirdayam mam alajjam 
parama-puruaja yo 'ham yogi-varyagra-gapyaiah 
vidhi-akiva-sanakadyair dhyatum atyanta-dauram 
tava parijana-bhavam kamaye kama-vayttah 

Fie on me! I am unclean, proud, merciless, and shameless! O Supreme Person, I still 
yearn to become Your companion, an attainment Brahma, aKiva, the Four Kumaras, 
and the best of the yogis consider far beyond their reach. 

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Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 


patitam bhaima-bhavarapavodare 
agatiam akarapagatam hare 
kaypaya kevalam atmasat kuru 

O Lord Hari, please mercifully accept this person who is a storehouse of thousands of 
offenses, who has fallen into the terrible ocean of repeated birth and death, who has no 
place to go, and who now begs shelter from You. 


bhagavan bhava-durdine pathah- 
skhalitam mam avalokayacyuta 

O Lord, O infallible one, please glance on me, from the right path fallen into the 
calamity of repeated birth and death, where all directions are darkened with clouds of 
ignorance and filled with a constant monsoon of sufferings. 


na mayaja paramartham eva me 
akayapu vijnapanam ekam agratah 
yadi me na dayiajyase tada 
dayanaiyas tava natha durlabhah 

Let us submit one piece of information before You, dear Lord. It is not at all false, but it 
is full of meaning. It is this: If You are not merciful upon us, then it will be very, very 
difficult to find more suitable candidates for Your mercy. 


tad aham tvad-ayte na nathavan 
mad-ayte tvam dayanaiyavan na ca 
vidhi-nirmitam etad avyayam 
bhagavan palaya ma sma jaihaya 

Without You I have no master, and without me You have no suitable candidate for Your 
mercy. This is our eternal relationship, ordained by fate. O Lord, please protect me. Do 
not reject me. 


vapur-adiaju yo 'pi ko 'pi va 
guapato 'sani yatha-tatha-vidhah 
tad aham tava pada-padmayor 
aham adyaiva maya samarpitah 

Whatever I possess in terms of this body and its paraphernalia, and whatever I have 
from the modes of nature, today I offer at Your lotus feet. 


mama natha yad asti yo 'smy aham 
sakalam tad dhi tavaiva madhava 
niyata-svam iti prabuddha-dhair 
atha va kiam nu samarpayami te 

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Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

An enlightened person prays, "My Lord, O husband of the goddess of fortune, myself 
and everything I own is already eternally Your property.^ How, then, is it possible for 
me to offer anything to You? 


avabodhitavan imam yatha 
mayi nityam bhavadiyatam svayam 
kripayaivam ananya-bhogyatam 
bhagavan bhaktim api prayaccha me 

I know that I am eternally Your property. O Lord, please kindly give me pure 
devotional service. 


tava dasya-sukhaika-sanginam 
bhavaneshv astv api kita-janma me 
itaravasatheshu ma sma bhud 
api me janma caturmukhatmana 

Let me take birth, even as an insect, in the home of they whose only happiness is Your 
service. Let me not take birth, even as a Lord Brahma, in the home of any other people. 


mahatmabhir mam avalokyatam naya 
kshane 'pi te yad-viraho 'ti-duhsahah 

Please place me within the sight of the great souls from whom You cannot bear even a 
moment's separation, and who, yearning for a single glimpse of Your transcendental 
form, consider both impersonal liberation and the most intense sense pleasure worthless 
as a blade of straw. 


deham na pranan na ca sukham aseshabhilashitam 
na catmanam nanyat tava kim api seshatva-vibhavat 
bahir bhutam natha kshanam api sahe yatu satadha 
vinasam tat satyam madhumathana vijnapanam idam 

O Lord, I cannot tolerate for a moment my body, it's breathing, the happiness everyone 
wants, my self, or anything else kept apart from You. Let them perish hundreds of time. 
O Lord Madhusudana, this is my actual wish. This is my request to You. 


durantasanader apariharaniyasya mahato 
vihinacaro 'ham nri-pasur asubhasyaspadam api 
daya-sindho bandho niravadhika-vatsalya-jaladhe 
tava smaram smaram guna-ganam iticchami gata-bhih 

O ocean of mercy, O limitless ocean of fatherly love, even though I am misbehaved, 
animalistic, and a storehouse of great, limitless, beginningless sins, because I meditate 
again and again on the great host of Your transcendental virtues, I am able to desire in 
this way without any fear. 

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Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 


anicchann apy evam yadi punar apicchann iva rajas- 
tamas-channa-cchadma-stuti-vacana-bhangim aracayam 
tathapittham-rupam vacanam avalambyapi kripaya 
tvam evaivam-bhutam dharani-dhara me sikshaya manah 

Although I have no such desire to praise You, as if I did desire to praise You, I have 
written these prayers that are only a trick of passion and ignorance. O maintainer of the 
earth, please kindly accept these words, and please teach my heart what is right. 


pita tvam mata tvam dayita-tanayas tvam priya-suhrit 
tvam eva tvam mitram gurur api gatis casi jagatam 
tvadiyas tvad-bhrityas tava parijanas tvad-gatir aham 
prapannas caivam sa tv aham api tavaivasmi hi bharah 

You are my father. You are my mother. You are my beloved son. You are my well- 
wisher. You are my friend. You are my master. You are the shelter of the universes. I am 
Your property. I am Your servant. I am Your follower. I have You as the goal of my life. 
I am surrendered to You. I am Your dependent. 


janitvaham vamse mahati jagati khyata-yasasam 
sucinam yuktanam guna-purusha-tattva-sthiti-vidam 
nisargad eva tvac-carana-kamalaikanta-manasam 
adho 'dhah papatma saranada nimajjami tamasi 

Even though I was bom in a great family of pure brahmanas famous in this world, 
engaged in Your service, fully aware of the truth about the Supreme Person and the 
modes of matter, and their hearts naturally placed only at Your lotus feet, still, O giver 
of shelter, I have become the most sinful person, sinking lower and lower into the 
darkness of ignorance. 


amaryadah kshudras cala-matir asuya-prasava-bhuh 
kritaghno durmani smara-para-vaso vancana-parah 
nrisamsah papishthah katham aham ito duhkha-jaladher 
aparad uttirnas tava paricareyam caranayoh 

How will I, uncivilized, degraded, fickle, a breeding-ground of envy, ungrateful, proud, 
overcome by lust, addicted to cheating, cruel, and sinful, be able to cross this shoreless 
ocean of pain and serve Your feet? 


raghuvara yad abhus tvam tadriso vayasasya 
pranata iti dayalur yasya caidyasya krishna 
pratibhavam aparaddhur mugdha-sayujya-do 'bhur 
vada kim apadam agas tasya te 'sti kshamayah 

O Lord Raghuvara, You were kind to a crow that bowed down to offer respect. O Lord 
Krishna, You granted sayujya-mukti to Sisupala, who offended You in every birth. O 
Lord, please tell me: What offense will You not forgive? 


nanu prapannah sakrid eva natha 



Sri Yamunacarya^s Stotra-ratna 

tavaham asmiti ca yacamanah 
tavanukampyah smaratah pratijnam 
mad-eka-varjam kim iti vratam te 

Do You remember Your promise that if a person once surrenders to You and says, "O 
Lord, I am Yours," You will give Your mercy to him? Why am I excluded from Your 


prema-prakrishavadhim atmavantam 
pitamaham natha-munim vilokya 
prasida mad-vrittam acintayitva 

Not thinking of what I have done, but looking instead at my grandfather, Natha Muni, a 
great saint full of sincere love for Your lotus feet, please be kind to me. 

Vaisnava Saints Pa ge 

3 15 3 8 4 6 



[Sri Yamunacarya — otherwise known as Sri Ala- 
vandar—is the forerunner and spiritual Guru 
of Ramanuja. He is the author of Mahapurusha 
Nirnaya, Agamapramanya and Siddbitraya (Atma, 
Samvit and Isvara Siddhi)—scholarly works of 
a rather argumentative nature. His Stotra Ratna 
is a song overflowing with devotion to the Lord. 
He has written in his own lucid and melodious 
style another hymn in four verses called Catus- 
sloki on Goddess Lakshmi. The four verses say 
that Lakshmi also has the four qualities which 
are attributed to Her consort Narayana in the 
four chapters of the Brahma Sutras. They are : 
i. He is the cause, efficient and material, of the 
whole universe; ii. His greatness is unsullied 
by anything; iii. He is the means by which 
one has to obtain the highest goal, the supreme 
bliss and iv. it is Himself. Lakshmi also has 

The first Sloka speaks about the Vibhutis of Goddess 
Lakshmi, the second about Her greatness which 
is incomprehensible even to Her omniscient Con¬ 
sort, the third about Her grace which grants the 
different wishes of all and the last speaks about 
Her charming forms which are ever insepara¬ 
ble from, and co-existent with, those of Sri 
Narayana. The Stotras of the Acaryas who 
came after, have been based more or less upon 
this and they elucidate the idea contained 

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1. O Goddess ! Purushottama, the greatest 
Lord of a]l Souls, (is) your consort; the Lord of 
the hooded (serpents, Adisesha) (is) your couch 
and throne; the sovereign of the birds, (Garuda) 
whose body Vedas are, (is) your vehicle; Maya, the 
world-enchantress (i. e., Prakriti, composed of 
the three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) 
(is) your veil; all the hosts of Gods with their 
sweethearts (are) your bevy of attendants and 
maids. Your name itself is Sri. (Possessed of 
all this greatness, as you are), how can we (ade¬ 
quately) sing your praise ? 

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2. Your greatness, which is boundless, eter¬ 
nal and ever blissful by nature, cannot be com¬ 
prehended in its entirety even by your Loving 
Consort, omnipotent though He be, even as He 
cannot His own greatness. 0 the Supreme 

Sovereign of the Universe! The Beloved of the 
Saviour of the Universe! I know you shower 
your mercy on those who seek refuge in you 
and so I fearlessly begin to sing (the greatness 
of) you. For I am both your servant and 
Prapanna (i.e., refugee)- 

wmz II ^ II 

3- Being blessed by the grace of a particle 
of the nectar of your merciful glances, the three 
worlds, non-existent before because of its absence, 
are saved (i.e., placed free from all troubles) now 
and are endowed with endless prosperity. For 
without the grace of the Darling of the heart of 
the Lotus-eyed (Naravana), the joy is. never 
possible for the souls anywhere—in this world, 
in the Kaivalya and in the path of Vishnu (i.e., 

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4. With your wealth, splendour and forms 
suited to His own are inseparably united, they 

say, all His forms : that aspect of His which is 
free from any modification, which is unlimited, 
which is the Lord of the Great Vibhnti and which 
is called the Para Brahman; that form (of Vishnu) 
which is called Brahman, which is marvellously 
charming and hence more liked by Him; and 
also all the other forms assumed by Him at his 
own pleasure to divert Himself.